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In this study I explore the military, administrative and governmental practices of 
British men as rulers in India during the Victorian and early Edwardian period. The 
historical events that are the focus of this study are the massacres and disturbances in 
Punjab, Amritsar 1919. I concentrate on three ruling characters involved in these 
events; an administrator, a military officer, and an Indian Secretary of State. The 
central question I ask is: how are these white men who claim to be fitted to rule over 
others made? I explore the changing relationships between these men and the history 
of colonialism in India. More specifically, I examine the intersections between 
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movements for independence and shifts in styles of colonial domination amongst 
these men in India at the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
In analyzing the events of 1919 I bring together discourses usually separated in 
discussions of colonial power. First, by following Foucault's leads on the problem of 
government and his reformulation of it as 'governmentality', I pursue the question of 
colonial sUbjectivity and its constitution. I remove the colonial authorities in these 
instances from discourses of the singular and sinister. I find on the contrary that what 
is at stake are specific professions and traditions of imperial duty that have both 
internal and external manifestations. Internal in the sense that the men I investigate are 
concerned to conduct themselves in a manner that befits their calling as rulers, and 
their conduct is in their view beyond reproach in this regard. External in the sense that 
their deportment is directed to carrying out their imperial duties in the service of 
others. I also implicate Indian rule in the extra state techniques of government that 
preoccupy Foucault's histories of governmentality. Second I combine this approach 
with an attention to the lives and biographies of certain exemplary individuals. Here I 
use an approach close to Stefan Collini's characterological method, in which O'Dwyer, 
Dyer and Montagu exemplify a certain character formation crucial to the exercise of 
colonial rule. Each of the men I investigate is concerned in their own ways, to support 
the longevity of empire. In this sense, both through their larger work, in particular 
their writing and public conversations, and their conduct, they give voice to their 
specific traditions of empire. 
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I therefore propose a novel reading of Amritsar that sees those events as a window for 
exploring shifts in styles of colonial rule and domination in India during those times. 
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
1 
Foreword 
In this chapter I introduce the historical events that are my anchor and with which 
I engage- the massacres and disturbances in the Punjab, especially Amritsar, 1919. 
Through a (re )readingof relevant historiographies, I consider the massacres, and set 
out my point of departure from the scenes as they are recounted in that literature. 
In the final analysis, I do not analyze the events of 1919 as an event. Nor do I 
judge the events of 1919 in terms of legitimacy or justice. My analysis is of a 
different question: how the three central characters I investigate are fashioned as 
rulers? 
Thus, in chapters 3, 4 and 5 I investigate how each of the white men, who are 
centrally involved in the Amritsar massacres and are the focus of my concerns, is 
shaped as a ruler. I explore firstly, the ethos of an 'administrative man' (Sir Michael 
O'Dwyer); secondly, those of an 'military man' (Brigadier-General Reginald Dyer); 
and thirdly, those of a man who finds himself in 'governmeI1' (Edwin Montagu). 
In the final section I summarize my research aims and present a preCIS of the 
chapters that follow. 
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Massacre and Shame 
(a) Massacre 
At about 4:00 p.m. on the 13th April 1919, Brig-General Reginald Edward Harry 
Dyer led a small group of troops through the narrow streets of Amritsar, posting 
bands of pickets at strategic points along the way, to the JallianwalaBagh.1 There 
he found a meeting being held despite his earlier proclamations prohibiting any 
gatherings. The Bagh, far from being a garden,2 is a bleak, uncultivated and 
neglected strip of waste ground, approximately two hundred yards long,' ... wholly 
enclosed by backs of houses and low boundary walls ... which ... rose sheer from the 
edge of the Bagh' (Sayer 1991: 144/5). The only space free of houses was the end 
farthest from the main entrance at which the General and his troops arrived. He 
hesitated for a moment. The entrance is only just wide enough to permit two 
people walking abreast to pass through. It proved impossible for him to take his 
armed cars, with their mounted machine guns, through such a narrow lane. 
Consequently he had to leave them behind. 
In the next moment he walked with his men through the lane and stepped into the 
Bagh. He took up position on a raised platform just inside the entrance. There, 
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from his panoptical position, he saw a large crowd at the opposite end of the Bagh 
being addressed by a man standing on a raised platform. Estimates of the size of 
the crowd vary - initially thought to number about 5,000, with the figure being 
revised later to between 15,000 and 20,000. 
Within seconds of his entry to the Baghhe deployed twenty-five of his men to the 
left of the entrance, and twenty-five to the right. He then gave the order to fire. 
There was no warning. Nor any demand that the crowd should disperse. 
The firing continued unabated for ten minutes, with 1650 rounds of ammunition 
discharged; the only interruption in the sequence of firing being Dyer's order 
directing fire to where the crowd was thickest and countermanding his fellow 
officer's view that the firing should be over the assembled heads. In their panic, 
many had rushed towards the mud and brick walls that surrounded the Bagh in 
desperate attempts to escape the hail of bullets. It was providence perhaps that 
delivered so many into the hands of the Brig. General. 
According to official figures, 379 died, with over 1,200 wounded. Unofficial figures 
of casualties and fatalities were even higher. Later, before the Hunter Committee, 
Dyer admitted, had he been able to bring his armored cars into the Bagh and use 
them, he would have done so. 
With almost all his ammunition spent and the Bagh littered with the bodies of the 
dead and dying, Dyer marched off with his troops in tow, the way they had come. 
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He ' ... did not do anything to see that either the dead were attended to or the 
wounded receive help' (Hunter 1920: 116). The Committee commented, Dyer 
, ... did not consider it to be "his job" , (Hunter 1920: 116). Dyer added, 
' ... the hospitals were open and the medical officers were there. The wounded 
only had to apply for help. But they did not do this because they themselves 
would be taken in custody for being in the assembly. I was ready to help them 
if they applied .. .' (Dyer in Hunter 1920: 116). 
And so ended one of the bloodiest, and arguably, one of the more inglorious, 
episodes in British imperial history. 3 
(b) Reactions at the Time - Shame 
F or many writers, readers and contemporary commentators, the massacre and the 
authorities' conduct in bringing it about, is an imperial story of shame? But, what 
is interesting about that story, is the variety of shame it elicits. 
(i) Honor and Prestige 
For some, perhaps a majority, assuredly of a certain ruling and imperial class, 
General Dyer's actions inflicted utter defeat upon the opponents of empire that 
day. 4 Who would, they reasoned, expect anything less from a man like Dyer - a 
soldier, indeed! (Men like Dyer).5 These men were imbued with empire to the 
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bottom of their boots, and are of proven heroic standing.6 They were truly, as 
Kipling came to revere them, Victoria's sons: 
'Ave you 'eard 0' the widow at Windsor 
With a hairy gold crown on 'er 'ead? 
She 'as ships sail on the foam - she 'as milliona at 'ome, 
An' she pays us poor beggars in red. 
There's 'er nick on the cavalry 'orses, 
There's 'er mark on the medical stores -
An' 'er troopers you'll find with a fair wind be'ind 
That takes us to various wars. 
Then 'ere's to the Widow at Windsor, 
An' 'er's to the stores and the guns, 
The men an' the 'orses what make up the forces 
0' Missis Victorier's sons. (Kipling 1927: 406/7).7 
Accordingto these gallants, the defeated masses would have to come to terms with 
their disgrace at the hands of such a vigorous servant of empire.8 In this sense, 
Dyer's actions wiped away any stain on the edifice of empire, ensuring continuing 
imperial prestige, and taught those who sought to blacken its name, a lesson they 
would not forget.9 
Dyer would by his actions humble a nascent Indian national consciousness; and in 
the bargain embolden Anglo-Indian senses. What, we may ask then, is the nature of 
the lesson Dyer's supporters maintain he delivered to that constituency by his 
actions? Perhaps, for them, the key lies in his unashamedly reminding the 
squeamish amongst the ranks of imperial rulers, whether official or unofficial, 
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where their duty lay. According to such conceptions they would have to learn 
again, and try to hold on to, the principles of rule, in India, enumerated over thirty 
years earlier, by James Fitzjames Stephens. 10 According to Stephens, the 
government in India is, 
' ... essentially an absolute government founded, not on consent, but on 
conquest. It does not represent the native principles of life or of government, 
and it can never do so until it represents heathenism and barbarism. It 
represents a belligerent civilization, and no anomaly can be so striking or so 
dangerous as its administration by men who, being at the head of a 
Government founded on Conquest, implying at every point the superiority of 
the conquering race ... and having no justification for its existence except 
that superiority, shrink from the open, uncompromising, straight-forward 
assertion of it, seek to apologize for their own position, and refuse, from 
whatever cause, to uphold and support it' II 12 
In sum, according to practitioners of this style of rule, India, obtained by the 
sword, was to be held on to by the sword. 13 
(ii) Dishonor and Humiliation 
Others however, thought, and told, a different tale. Members, certainly of a 
specific subject class, simply enumerate a story of sadness, even bemusement. 
Prakash Tandon, who Helen Fein describes as a non-political Indian, is simply 
amazed at the turn of events (Fein 1977: 171). Taken in by, and taking seriously, 
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the administrations' claims to bring a benign paternalism to their rule in India, he 
describes how he and his contemporaries, couldn't believe what transpired. 
According to him, they ' ... were born to the "blessings of the British Raj" and 
accepted them as the natural order of life .... ' (Tandon 1961: 120/3). Anesthetized 
perhaps, to the growing frustrations with British administration all around them, 
and not yet in tune with calls for freedom from so-called political Indians, he adds, 
'in Gujrat we felt the tremor only slightly.' It wasn't long though, 
' ... when news of Gandhi's arrest came there was trouble also in our Gujrat. A 
young handsome cousin of ours, grandson of granduncle Thakkur-Das, led 
some young men to cut telegraph wires and march about the city, until they 
were picked up and put in the local jail. But in Lahore we heard that martial 
law was declared .... 
All kinds of rumors floated out of Lahore of beatings and mass arrests, of 
people being made to crawl on their bellies on the roads, of students made to 
walk every day to Lahore cantonment six miles away in the hot sun just to 
salute the flag. And then came the news of the lallianwala Bagh at Amritsar. ... 
People in Gujrat were stunned and fumbled back in their memory to Nadirshah. 
But Nadirshah was just an adventurer, a bandit who claimed he had an excuse: 
some of his soldiers had been murdered after Delhi had capitulated, and the 
order of general massacre was the punishment he prescribed for Delhi breaking 
its word. But this Sarkar was different; it had been kind and benign, it had ruled 
for sixty years without the traditional marks of power. Why this sudden 
change?' (Tandon 1961: 120-3; Fein 1977: 171). 
Tandon was not alone in feeling so let down. As Datta reminds us, such turns of 
sadness, such dismal distress, such tortuous torment even, we find especially 
prevalent among those of the ruled, who were honored by the administration. So, 
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for instance, Rabindranath Tagore was so moved, he renounced his knighthood.14 
He wrote to the Viceroy saying, 
'Knowing that our appeals have been in vam and that the passIOn of 
vengeance is blinding the nobler vision of statesmanshi p in our government, 
which could so easily afford to be magnanimous as befitting its physical 
strength and moral tradition, the very best I can do for my country is to take 
all consequences upon myself in giving voice to the protest of my country 
men, surprised into a dumb anguish of terror. The time has come when badges 
of honor make our shame glaring in their incongruous context of humiliation, 
and I for my part wish to stand shorn of all special distinctions, by the side of 
those of my countrymen who, for their so-called insignificance, we are liable 
to suffer degradation not fit for human beings. These are the reasons which 
have painfully compelled me to ask your Excellency, with due reference and 
regret, to release me of my title of knighthood, which I had the honor to 
accept from His Majesty the King at the hands of your predecessor, for whose 
nobleness of heart I still entertain great admiration' (Tagore 1919 in Datta 
1969: 170). 
Tagore 'underscored his anguish and disillusionment,' with another, perhaps more 
radical tum, when he wrote to C F Andrews: 
' ... The late events have conclusively proved that our true salvation lies in our 
own hands, that a nation's greatness can never find its foundation in half-
hearted concessions of contemptuous niggardliness ... ' (Tagore 1920 in Mohan 
2000: 69) 
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Yet another so-called honored Indian, who admitted to a deep regret at the tum of 
events in Amritsar, is Mohindas K. Gandhi. He experienced them with a profound 
sense of betrayal. All the promises contained in David Lloyd George's 1917 war 
speech, intoning all peoples of the empire to support the empire in its fight against 
injustice, and to which Gandhi and many other Indians nodded assent, now seemed 
nothing more than flakes of so much dust. Lloyd George said, 
'Now we are faced with the greatest and the grimmest struggle of all. Liberty, 
Equality, Fraternity, not amongst men, but amongst nations - great and small, 
powerful and weak, exalted and humble - equality, fraternity, among peoples 
as well as amongst men - that is the challenge which has been thrown to 
us ... My appeal to the people of this country and, if my appeal can reach 
beyond it, is this, that we should continue to fight for the great goal of 
international right and international justice, so that never again shall brute 
force sit on the throne of justice, nor barbaric strength wield the sceptre of 
right' (in Rai 1919: 1 ).15 
Now, like Tagore, Gandhi chose to renounce certain honors that fell to him for 
beinga loyal Indian. According to Datta, 'Gandhi, who had rendered great service 
to the British cause during the first World War. .. returned his Kaiser-i-Hind Gold 
medal, and ... with it...his Zulu War Medal' (Datta 1969: 171);16 And, when doing 
so commented on the administration's actions, thus: 
'the punitive measures taken by General Oyer. .. were out of all proportions to 
the crime of the people and amounted to wanton cruelty and inhumanity 
unparalleled in modern times .... Your Excellency's lighthearted treatment of 
the official cnme, your exoneration of Sir Michael O'Dwyer and Mr. 
Montagu's dispatch and above all your shameful ignorance of the Punjab 
events and callous disregard of the feelings betrayed by the House of Lords 
have filled me with the greatest misgivings regarding the future of Empire, 
have estranged me completely from the present Government and have 
disabled me from tendering as I have hitherto tendered my loyal co-operation' 
(Gandhi 1920 in Datta 1969: 171). 
Many joined in these disapproving choruses. Disapproval burst forth from such a 
growing band, if not of malcontents, then certainly, as they would perhaps 
perceive their plight, of the dishonored. So, Tagore and Gandhi were certainly not 
alone. Other Indians matched them in their words and actions. Indeed, such 
instances could be multiplied. l7 The remarks of Mian Feroze Ali, an Honorary 
Magistrate, summarized the intensity of a sense of betrayal he and those others 
experienced. Commenting on the conduct of martial law in Amritsar he noted, 
'I must say, ... the pride which 1 myself, and my countrymen, felt in British 
justice, had received a rude shock ... So far as the people of Amritsar are 
concerned 1 pray to God that we may not have to see those martial law days 
. , 18 
agall1 . 
Fed by such feelings of shame, Gandhi, already engaged in a mass movement he 
calledSatyagraha,19 led the way, hoping to carry his fellow ashamed with him, to 
define the precise hue that the burgeoning national consciousness would take. His 
very distinctive project for gaining honour in freedom came to be defined by an 
ethics of non-eo-operation with the administration, and its practice informed by 
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his antipathy to violence?O Non-violent, non-cooperation, as many sought to label 
it, grew out of Gandhi's realization that the consent of the ruled was vital to 
sustaining that rule. As worked out in his classic, Hind Swarag, addressing himself 
to the colonial power, he said: 
'You have great military resources. Your naval power is matchless. If we 
wanted to fight you on your ground, we should be unable to do so, but if the 
above submissions be not acceptable to you, we cease to play the part of the 
ruled. You may if you like cut usto pieces. You may shatter us at the cannon's 
mouth. If you act contrary to our will, we shall not help you and without our 
help, we know that you cannot move one step forward. It is likely that you 
will laugh at all this in the intoxication of your power. We may not be able to 
disillusion you at once; but if there be any manliness in us, you will see shortly 
that your intoxication is suicidal and that your laugh at our expense is an 
aberration of intellect... If you will abandon your so-called civilization and 
search into your own scriptures, you will find that our demands are just. Only 
on condition of our demands being fully satisfied may you remain in India' 
(Gandhi 1938: 88).21 
(iii) Militant Reclamation 
Other Indians, whether contemporaries, forerunners and those who followed, 
Bhagat Singh perhaps the foremost, but not the only among them, preached the 
adoption of a different set of strategies and tactics to salvage their pride.22 Only by 
engaging in forceful counter-action, Singh and his fellows argued, would they be 
able to wipe away the shameful stains and agony that rule by others had brought 
upon their consciousness. 
Almost cathartic in its insistence on meeting force with force,23 for Singh and his 
colleagues, nothing less than violent revolution to overthrow the administration 
would do. They would, they reasoned, give no quarter to the colonial state. That 
state, always in a position of 'precarious hegemony' for these putative 
revolutionaries, could no longer consider itself sovereign?4 Their feelings of shame 
then are altogether different from the shame Indians complicit in colonial promises 
would suffer. Their radicalism would not be extinguished by platitudes calling for 
togetherness, or awards, or favors and honors from the bureaucracy. Undoubtedly 
when Lloyd George made his appeal to the people of his country and beyond to 
the empire, Bhagat Singh and his fellow revolutionaries would not rush to, would 
not be first to, offer their services to Empire. Echoing sentiments contained in the 
'Commonweal' in 1916, expressions of loyalty to empire and India, in such an 
instance for them would not mean' .. .loyalty to the King-Emperor but the support 
of foreign domination, embodied in the administration as it exists' (Datta 1975: 
940)?5 Their experience of the colonial administration is not characterized by 
wanting to help with peace and order so that Anglo-Indians could go about their 
business undisturbed, rather it is inscribed as humiliation by autocracy. 26 
These so-called 'young revolutionaries' Mohan maintains, could not easily be 
dismissed as 'impulsive or irrational' troublemakers, addicted to some simplistic 
nostrum termed violence (Mohan 1985: 212).27 In a hurry they certainly were. 
Yet, as Mohan once again usefully reminds us, 'they had ... a clear grasp of the 
existing political situation ... I They knew how difficult non-violent methods for 
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'fighting against the foreign rulers' are (Mohan 1985: 212). In their tract, 'The 
Philosophy of the Bomb'28 they sought to chide Gandhi about the complexity of 
his message. Though comparable leaders, Singh and his colleagues argue, liked to 
claim themselves men of the people, they deluded themselves. Referring to 
Gandhi's tours round the country, they asked, when does he ever step off his 
public platform and truly mix among the masses? In an ironic echo of many an 
Anglo-Indian's claims to know his flock, they ask rhetorically, when 
'has he sat with the peasant round the evening fire and tried to know what he 
thinks? Has he passed a single evening in the company of a factory laborer 
and shared with him his woes?' (in Nayar 2000: 177). 
In contrast, the putative revolutionaries assert, 'we have, and therefore we claim to 
know what the masses think.' But, perhaps even more to the point, they seek to 
remind ' ... Gandhi that the average Indian, like the average human being, 
understands little of the fine theological niceties about Ahimsa and loving one's 
enemy ... ' (in Nayar 2000: 177). 
For them, these questions are quite simple really, and they describe matters thus, 
'The way of the world is like this. You have a friend: you love him, sometimes 
so much you that you even die for him. You have an enemy: you shun him, 
you fight against him and, if possible, you kill him. The gospel of the 
revolutionaries is simple and straight. It is what has been since the days of 
Adam and Eve, and no man has any difficulty about understanding it' (in 
Nayar 2000: 177). 
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Their tract 'The Philosophy of the Bomb' is not the only place in which the 
prospective revolutionaries set out their stall, and call for revolution. Mohan cites 
an extract from the journal, 'Peaceful and Legitimate' that she thinks elaborates a 
little further on their complex commitment to and engagementwith other than non-
violent methods of usurping foreign rule. Hence: 
'Non-violent Satyagraha would rank as an invincible weapon if the conditions 
governing it could be satisfactorily fulfilled. A particular moral and mental 
atmosphere is necessary for its success. But this atmosphere is very difficult to 
achieve, so difficult, that up to time, despite the efforts of Mahatma Gandhi, 
it has not been possible to bring it into existence ... because they are under the 
wrong impression that this form of struggle is easier than armed 
resistance ... the absolute faith in Ah imsa and Satyagraha is mostly wanting in 
them .... Besides, the lack of mental and moral climate, there was the 
provocative attitude of the Government. With the help of its repressIve 
policy the Government would be able to incite the uneducated masses to 
violence. This would lead to the disintegration of any Satyagraha movement, 
as it had happened in the case of the non-cooperation movement' (in Mohan 
1985: 212/3).29 
Of course, it can be insisted, that so-called, non-violent non-co-operation, and 
violent confrontation, pace the versions here enumerated, are not so distinctive as 
to be separates. Perhaps, in a Foucaultian sense they are better regarded merely as 
different perspectives on resistance. Foucault after all did leave us with the now 
familiar statement, 'where there is power, there is resistance'. In this sense 
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violence/non-violenceare different techniques in resistance maybe even tactics III 
pursuit of a strategy that each party understood to fall under the umbrella they 
called freedom. 
Indeed, however different, formally stated at least, Bhagat Singh's engagement with 
and practice in pursuing liberation; and whatever their precise disagreements, 
Mohan reminds us how much the revolutionaries did appreciate Gandhi's 
contribution to awakening the masses: 
'Mahatma Gandhi is great and we mean no disrespect to him if we express our 
emphatic disapproval of the methods advocated by him for the country's 
emancipation. We would be ungrateful to him if we do not salute him for the 
immense awakening that has been brought about by the non-cooperation 
movement in this country. But to us Mahatma Gandhi is an impossible 
visionary' (in Mohan 1985: 213). 
Yet, Bhagat Singh and his fellow patriots, Chander Shekhar Azad, Raj Gur, 
Sukhdev and Bhagwati Charan, sought to catch and prevail with a certain, more 
assertive mood among the ruled, foretold in numerous places. In 1916 a poem 
published in the 'Pratap' is a case in point. 
'The lions of India will ceaselessly work to free their revered mother from her 
troubles. They will not retreat through fear. Thousands will die in the service 
of the country. They will remove with the sword all the obstacles standing in 
the way of their union and nat ionality. Their enthusiasm will overcome all 
difficulties and they will bring cruel oppression to an end'. 30 
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Sarojini Naidu's epic poem, reflecting specifically we are told on Amritsar, is 
another occasion where the ensuing, more assertive mood, and the coming battles 
for freedom are captured in all their complexity: 
How shall our love console thee, or assuage 
Thy hapless woe; how shall our grief requite 
The hearts that scourge thee and the hands that smite 
Thy beauty with their rods of bitter rage? 
Lo! let our sorrow be thy battle-gage 
To wreck the terror of the tyrant's might 
Who mocks with ribald wrath thy tragic plight, 
And stains with shame thy radiant heritage! 
o beautiful! 0 broken and betrayed! 
o mournful queen! 0 martyred Draupadi! 
Endure though still, unconquered, undismayed! 
The sacred rivers of thy stricken blood 
Shall prove the five fold stream of freedom's flood, 
To guard the wrath-towers of our Liberty. 31 
Making Sense of the Massacre 
Much has already been written about these episodes, both official and unofficial. 
The secondary literature is vast. I will review this in detail in Chapter Two. Here, 
for simplicity, we can say that there are two main approaches. 
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The first, exemplified best by Rupert Furneaux's Massacre at Amritsar (1963), 
suggests that Brigadier-General Reginald Edward Harry Dyer's resolve on that 
fateful day was due to his mental state. He suffered from arteriosclerosis from 
which he would eventually die. So, According to Furneaux, the actions Dyer took 
on that day were his and his alone, and because of his illness wholly exceptional in 
that regard. 
The second, adopted by a number of other writers, though they all vary in their 
tracking of the nuances in the story, is marked by a shifting of the responsibility 
for events in 1919, away from an individual officer. B G Horniman, Chief Editor of 
the Bombay Chronicle for instance, in his Amritsar and Our Duty to India (1920). 
seeks to emphasize the role of the bureaucracy at large. For him, it is their refusal 
to countenance radical constitutional reform in Government, that leads to protest, 
that in tum lead to the massacre. 
Written in the same year, Pearay Mohan's An Imaginary Rebellion, seeks to show 
how the Punjab Government, composed of men like Sir Michael O'Dwyer were 
especially brutal in their conduct of Government. This they imagined was the only 
way to gain and then keep control of India, but more specifically keep control of 
the 'virile and action-oriented inhabitants of the Punjab ... ' (Mohan 2000: 69). 
Alfred Nundy's compilations, Present Situation with Special Reference to Indian 
Unrest, I919-1920 (1919), and his Revolution or Evolution (1922), written almost 
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contemporaneously with growing unrest in India and the Punjab at the time, 
highlightthe increasing misunderstandings of intention between ruler and ruled, and 
their consequences. 
Mark Naidis's The Punjab Disturbances of1919 - A study in Indian Nationalism 
(1950), from his thesis of the same name, is similarly concerned to show how the 
administration saw a more assertive population as a threat to British India, and 
reacted accordingly. 
Arthur Swinson's Six Minutes to Sunset (1964) forthrightly declares that in a battle 
between ruler and ruled, as it is argued this was, by taking the prompt actions he 
did, General Dyer saved the threatened lives of all Anglo-Indians, particularly 
those of white women. 
Raja Ram's .!allianwalaBagh: A Premeditated Plan (1969), tries to show, without 
supporting evidence, in many commentators' views, that the massacre, far from 
being the result of actions led by an individual officer, was an orchestrated plan 
thoughtfully carried through to fruition on the appointed day. 
V N Datta is arguably the most prolific contributor to the vast literature on the 
Amritsar massacres. His work includes the .!allianwalaBagh (1969), New Light on 
the Punjab Disturbances Volumes I & II (1975) and his more recent edited 
collection,.!allianwalaBagh Massacre (2000). He sees the events as an expression 
of the confrontation between ruler and ruled. 
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Similarly, in her Imperial Crime and Punishment: The Massacre at Jallianwala 
Bagh and British Justice 1919-20 (1977), Helen Fein assumes that ruler and ruled 
occupy separate moral domains, such that the massacre should be seen as a 
'prototypical instance of a repressive collective punishment practiced by the 
British in black and Asian colonies .. ' (Fein 1977: xii-xiii). 
Windows of Opportunity 
My argument will be that though all these narrative histories of events in Amritsar 
tell us something of what happened, until relatively recently most stick with a 
simple narration of those events in order to establish what really happened. As I 
say above my concerns are somewhat different. I analyze the forms of colonial 
government in India at this time; the role of the military within such government; 
and the shaping of particular men who exercise rule, whether as members of the 
military, the administration, or government. 
(a) Conceptual Resources 
My conceptual inspirations for such an enterprise are many and varied. But the 
work of Michel Foucault is a significant presence. I draw on both his methods and 
his substantive concerns. Borrowing a sentiment from Rai, who in turn borrows 
from Foucault's 1978 lecture 'What is Critique', my critique and concern in the 
analysis of Amritsar 1919 does not seek to establish 'what error or illusion' about 
Amritsar is fostered by 'the relay between knowledge and power' (Rai 2002: xv). 
Rather, my 
' ... question(s) instead would be: how can the indivisibility of knowledge and 
power in the context of interactions and multiple strategies induce both 
singularities, fixed according to their conditions of acceptability, and a field of 
possibilities, of openings, indecisions, reversals and possible dislocations which 
make them fragile, temporary, and which turn these effects into events, 
nothing more, nothing less than events' (Foucault 1978 in Rai 2002: xv). 
Thus, the displacement in the genre I seek is not for a better more complete 
history. Rather, the inspiration I gain from Foucault is that of the open book. I 
look for a field of openings, of possibilities, in the relay between power and 
knowledge about Amritsar. What is crucial for me in Foucault's method is its 
avowed aim of recording 'the singularity of events outside of any monotonous 
finality' (Rai 2002: xvii). Being sensitive to the singularity of events in the way this 
method proposes enables me to pursue a non-linear even disruptive narrative about 
Amritsar. Foucault continues, his aim is to 'listen ... carefully ... to history' to find 
'something altogether different behind things: not a timeless and essential secret, 
but the secret that they have no essence and that their essence was fabricated in a 
piecemeal fashion from alien forms' (Foucault in Rai 2002: xvii). 
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Let there be no mistake. In proposing to write another series of contributions, the 
histories I suggest do not move my readers or me beyond what I call the genre or 
this particular way of knowing about Amritsar. That would merely be another 
proposal for transcendence. The other histories I construct, the file of possibilities 
that are opened up by my refusal to repeat the genre are necessarily complicit in 
what has gone before. I do not regard that as disabling the claims in my histories. 
My histories explicitly recognize the nominalism at the heart of every historical 
enterprise; or as Rai puts it, ' ... the essential instability of any historical enterprise' 
(Rai 2002: xviii).In this sense refusing the impulse to rise above the instabilities of 
any historical enterprise enables me to tease out other memories immanent in 
Amritsar. Naminghis endeavors as genealogiesFoucault put it thus: 
' .. .lfthe genealogist refuses to extend his faith in metaphysics, if he listens to 
history, he finds that there is 'something altogether different' behind things: 
not a timeles s and essential secret, but the secret that they have no essence 
and that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms' 
(Foucault in Rai 2002: xvii). 
Foucault is not alone in urging us on a genealogist's work. This is how Michel de 
Certeau describes such an unstable but fruitful task of history: 
'Historians are in an unstable position. If they award priority to an "objective" 
result, if they aim to posit the reality of a former society in their discourse 
and animate forgotten figures, they nonetheless recogl1lze 111 their 
recomposition the orders and effects of their work. The discourse destined to 
express what is other remains their discourse and the mirror of their own 
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labours. Inversely, when they refer to their own practices and examine their 
postulates in order to innovate, therein historians discover constraints 
originating well before their own present, dating back to former organizations 
of which their work is a symptom, not a cause ... Thus founded on the rupture 
between a past that is its object, and a present that is the place of its practice, 
history endlessly finds the present in its object and the past in its practice. 
Inhabited by the uncanniness that it seeks, history imposes its law upon the 
faraway places that it conquers when it fosters the illusion that it is bringing 
them back to life' (de Certeau in Rai 2002: xviii). 
Writing of this past in the present, or as de Certeau has it, locating myself in this 
uncanny but enabling space, allows me to write that other history or those other 
histories of Amritsar. I want to fill the space opened up by the genealogist's 
method by posing questions about government; that is to say colonial government. 
Foucault's histories are concerned with matters of government too. Like much else 
that Foucault talks about, the concept of government in his hands underwent a 
profound transformation. That is to say as well as giving me the space in which to 
think differently, to be alert to the vicissitudes of history, Foucault's work on 
government introduces me to the practical possibilities of such a space. 
So for instance he analyzed the state and power. Of course many have already 
grappled with questions about either or both. Generally these have been about the 
state as a source of authority; in whose name does it act? How in times of crisis 
does it perpetuate that tainted knowledge? Foucault's intervention aims to change 
the way in which ' ... notions of state and power. .. ' are analyzed (Rai 2002: 1). 'We 
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know' he says, 'the fascination which the love, or the horror, of the state exerCises 
today; we know how much attention is paid to the genesis of the state, its history, 
its advance, its power and abuses, etc' (Foucault in Rai 2002: 2). Foucault regards 
such fascinations with the state as 
' ... paradoxical because apparently reductionist: it is the form of analysis that 
consists in reducing that state to a certain number of functions, ... and yet this 
reductionist vision of the relative importance of the state's role nevertheless 
invariably renders it absolutely essential as a target needing to be attacked and 
a privileged position needing to be occupied ... But the state, no more probably 
today than at any other time in its history, does not have this unity, this 
individuality, this rigorous functionality, nor. .. this importance, maybe, after 
all, the state is no more than a composite reality and mythicized abstraction, 
whose importance is a lot more limited than any of us think. Maybe what is 
really important for our modernity - that is, for our present - is not so much 
the etatisation of society, as the 'governmentality' of the state' (Foucault in 
Rai 2002: 2). 
The implications of Foucault's intervention and reformulation here cannot be 
underestimated. Rai sums it up thus: 
'Such a shift entails a massive estrangement of analysis of power; instead of a 
centered locus of legitimate violence, one is able to pose questions that dehisce 
this unity, and re-member other sources and dynamics of force relations, other 
sites of counter-discourse, and ex-centric practices' (Rai 2002: 2). 
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Foucault's 'reformulation of notions of state and power as governmentality' (Rai 
2002: 1) veers us away from asking questions just about who exercises power and 
whether its exercise is legitimate. Rather these notions appeanng as 
govemmentality lead us to look at the problem anew. That is to say instead of 
asking whether a particular act of authority is legitimate or not, he asks how 
authorities can better govern others. In his later work he asks how' ... authorities 
constitute themselves as authorities ... ' and needless to say how the other, in the 
form of counter discourses etc, is always present (Osborne 1984b). One's attention 
is drawn firmly to the logic of how we do what we do, and not why we do what 
we do. I am reminded here of Foucault's comments about violence rather apt in the 
context of my work on Amritsar. Hence, he says 
'All human behavior is scheduled and programmed through rationality. There 
is a logic of institutions and in behavior and in political relations. In even the 
most violent ones there is a rationality. What is most dangerous in violence is 
its rationality. Of course violence itself is terrible. But the deepest root of 
violence and its pennanence come out of the form of the rationality we use. 
The idea had been that if we live in the world of reason, we can get rid of 
violence. This is quite wrong. Between violence and rationality there is no 
incompatibility' (Foucault 1980: 299). 
As we see many have not hesitated to take up the leads provided by Foucault. 
Thomas Osborne has done so in his work and for me in an extremely useful way 
(Osborne 1994; Osborne 1994b). Hence as he points out, when Foucault talks 
about government he refers in the most general sense to 'all those means and 
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techniques for guiding and shaping conduct' (Osborne 1994b: 6). Yet, Osborne goes 
on 'this is not simply a question of regulating the conduct of others; rather it is a 
question of regulating ... 'the conduct of their conduct', that is, the ways in which 
people understand and reflexively regulate their own conduct' (Osborne 1994b: 6). 
Osborne uses the words of Gordon, to explain what is at stake thus 
'Government as an activity could concern the relation between self and self, 
private interpersonal relations involving some form of control or guidance, 
relations within social institutions and communities and, finally, relations 
concerned with the exercise of political sovereignty ... [Foucault] was interested 
in government as an activity or practice, and in the arts of government as 
ways of knowing what that activity consisted in, and how it might be carried 
on. A rationality of government will thus mean a way or system of thinking 
about the nature of the practice of government (who can govern; what 
governing is; what or who is governed), capable of making some form of that 
activity thinkable or practicable both to its practitioners and to those upon 
whom it was practised' (Gordon in Osborne 1994b: 6). 
I draw on these insights when I explore the makings of the different men who are 
the subject of my own remaking of Amritsar. 
Rabinow is another who distills the later work of Foucault in a manner that aids 
my project (Rabinow 1991). Hence, Rabinow outlines how the problem of the 
subject is a fundamental to Foucault's work. He notes Foucault's 'recent self 
characterization' of his work when he says: 
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'the goal of my work during the last twenty years has not been to analyze the 
phenomena of power, nor to elaborate the foundations of such an analysis. 
My objective, instead, has been to create a history of the different modes by 
which, in our culture human beings are made subjects' (Foucault in Rabinow 
1991: 7). 
I tum these comments to account in relation to the figures that are my subjects; Sir 
Michael O'Dwyer; Brigadier-General Dyer; and Edwin Montagu. Rabinow 
helpfully splits Foucault's objectification of the subject into three modes. In my 
character studies I show how Foucault's third mode - what Rabinow calls 
subjectification, the 'way human beings tum him - or herself into a subject' - is 
particularly relevant. Though all my characters are in some sense part of various 
traditions, this mode of subjectification stresses and isolates what Foucault calls 
' ... those techniques through which the person initiates an active self-formation' 
(Rabinow 1991: 11 ).32 
Just as Rabinow draws our attention to the part of government that is about the 
techniques of active self-formation, he reminds us of its other broader but related 
aspects. How in other words do these individuals who actively tum themselves 
into, in my thesis a military officer; an administrator; a member of the government, 
carry out their roles. In the knotty problems of colonial government we see 
perhaps more clearly than elsewhere the concern with orderly government or with 
what Foucault calls the arts of government (Rabinow 1991: 15). What Rabinow 
alerts us to here are governments', especially colonial governments' concerns with 
40 
how best each activity could be accomplished. Best, Foucault reminds us, 
invariably means 'most economica[lly ]' (Foucault in Rabinow 1991: 15). Thus, 
'The art of government ... is concerned with ... how to introduce economy that 
is the correct manner of managing individuals, goods and wealth within the 
family, ... how to introduce this meticulous attention of the father towards his 
family, into the management of the state' (Foucault in Rabinow 1991: 15). 
To clarify further what is at stake here, Rabinow refers us to Foucault's adoption 
of Guillaume de la Perri ere who says, 'government is the right disposition of things 
arranged so as to lead to the most convenient of ends' (Perriere in Rabinow 1991: 
15). Rabinow observes that in 'Perriere's definition there is no mention of territory' 
(Rabinow 1991: 16). On the contrary, 'a complex relationship of men and things is 
given priority' (Foucault in Rabinow 1991: 16). Hence for Foucault the 
implications are obvious. He resolves that: 
'the things which the government is to be concerned about are men, but men 
in their relations, their links, their imbrication with those other things which 
are wealth, resources, means of subsistence, the territory with its specific 
qualities, climate, irrigation, fertility etc.; men in their relation to other kinds 
of things which are customs, habits, ways of doing and thinking, etc.; lastly, 
men in their relation to that other kind of things which are accidents and 
misfortunes such as famine, epidemics, death, etc' (Foucault in Rabinow 1991: 
16). 
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I pursue the shifts in modes of colonial government that pay a great deal more 
attention to arranging things so as to achieve the most convenient of ends, in my 
investigation of the character Edwin Montagu. 
Recently, writers who take the massacres and disturbances as their central point of 
concern have tried to open out the historiographies. In this sense I follow the leads 
provided by Derek Sayer in his British Reaction to the Amritsar Massacre (1991 j, 
and lately, Kam1esh Mohan's contribution to V N Datta and S Settar's edited 
collection,JallianwalaBagh Massacre (2000). 
Sayer seeks to open up the historiographies by alerting us to the problems of 
government over others, and Mo han by alerting us to the role of so-called 'muted 
groups,' in political consciousness. 
Mohan takes the lead for her discussion of a change in and articulation of a political 
consciousness among 'muted groups' from the work of Edwin Ardener (Mohan 
2000; Ardener 1975).33 I say no more about her discussions here, save to register 
its importance in moving us on in our discussions of Amritsar from a simple 
narration of events. I do however want to dwell for a moment on Sayer's work. I 
discuss the details of his claims in chapter 2. Here I want to signal the conceptual, 
Foucaultian, basis for his arguments. 
Sayer pursues the argument that many regarded Dyer's conduct as the perfectly 
normal actions of an officer of his rank and experience. Underpinning these 
42 
arguments he suggests is the positive construction of Indians as particular sorts of 
subjects who need the guidance that only their rulers can provide. Positivity is akin 
here to signalinga factual enterprise. That is to sayan empirical facti city of things. 
What he hooks into are the moral, perhaps ethical, relations at stake? Dyer's 
defence he suggests was 'rooted in widely held norms' (Sayer 1991: 160). 
If that is the case, Sayer asks 'what kind of ethos could have allowed, indeed 
obligated, the actions he took' (Sayer 1991: 160). The kind of morality that is at 
stake here is not simply about totting up the good and bad moments - avoiding 
dastardly deeds! What such a debate about morality leaves out is how officers like 
Dyer conceived of their job and responsibility toward Indians. Borrowing a 
description from Osborne the morality at stake here is 'a question of discipline and 
self-discipline ... ' (Osborne 1994b: 4). In a profoundly Foucaultian manner Sayer 
refers to the words of Lords Sumner and Salisbury as exemplifying what Osborne, 
borrowing from Austin, calls a 'performative aspect of moral forms' (Osborne 
1994b: 4). Hence, Lord Sumner argued that Dyer took the action he did ' .. .in 
mercy to them ['the Indian population themselves'], in order that they might not 
die, that it became the duty of General Dyer to use force and put to death those 
who were challengingthe authority of the Government, who were rebels, only not 
in arms' (Sumner in Sayer 1991: 161). Another, the Marquess of Salisbury put it 
thus: 'The people of India are entering upon a great experiment; and surely the 
lesson which, above all others, you must teach them is that there is nothing in self-
government which authorizes disorder' (Salisbury in Sayer 1991: 161). I draw on 
the conceptual map Sayer paints in my discussions of notions of duty. 
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The works of Ranajit Guha and his colleagues on the Subaltern Studies project has 
also proved very useful. In Dominance without Hegemony: History and Power in 
Colonial India (1997), he sets out the project's initial impetus. It aims at nothing 
less than revising 'studies on colonial India' (Guha 1997: ix). According to Guha, 
whatever their precise tendencies, the 'whole range of liberal-imperialist and liberal-
nationalist' writings about colonial India assume that ' ... the power relations of 
colonial rule were contained in an integrated and unified field with all the ideologies 
and political practices of the period articulated within a single domain' (Guha 1997: 
ix). Influenced in no small part by the work of Michel Foucault, the group 
questions such an assumption. As Guha puts it' ... there was no such unified ... and 
singular domain of politics .. .'. Indeed politics ' ... was, to the contrary, split 
between an elite and a subaltern part, each of which was autonomous in its own 
way' (Guha 1997: ix). 
Inevitably the split the group points to and calls for between elite and subaltern 
histories raises further questions about the colonial state itself. Thus according to 
them all South Asian historiography has 'proceeded from a thoroughly unexamined 
belief that the so-called unitary character of politics was nothing other than the 
effect of the homogenizing function of colonialism' (Guha 1997: x). If politics can 
be split between an elite and subaltern part, then it can also be split between 
different modes of doing politics. In their inaugural statement this is how they 
defined their project: 
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'What is clearly left out of. .. the ... un-historical historiography is the politics 
of the people. For parallel to the domain of elite politics there existed 
throughout the colonial period another domain of Indian politics in which the 
principal actors were not the dominant groups of the indigenous society or the 
colonial authorities but the subaltern classes and groups constituting the mass 
of the labouring population and the intermediate strata in town and country -
that is, the people. Thi s was an autonomous domain, for it neither originated 
in elite politics nor did its existence depend on the latter' (Guha 1997: x). 
Writing other histories, especially as Guha says histories from below, is the hard 
task they set themselves. The sources for such histories are not readily retrieved. 
Their project is an example then of profoundly important scholarship. What I take 
from their plan in addition to their commitment to writing histories of the other is 
their characterization of the colonial state. The colonial state was they contend 
very different from the 'metropolitan bourgeois state' (Guha 1997: xii). The 
difference they enumerate is worth setting out in full. Hence: 
'The difference consisted in the fact that the metropolitan state was 
hegemonic in character with its claims to dominance based on a power relation 
in which the moment of persuasion outweighed that of coercion, whereas the 
colonial state was non-hegemonic with persuasion outweighed by coercion in 
its structure of dominance ... The originality of the South Asian colonial state 
lay precisely in this difference: a historical paradox, it was an autocracy set up 
and sustained in the East by the foremost democracy of the Western 
world ... Since it was non-hegemonic, it was not possible for that state to 
assimilate the civil society of the colonized to itself. We have defined the 
character of the colonial state therefore as a dominance without hegemony 
(Guha 1997: xii). 
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Though I do not explicitly write a history from below, the value of the groups' 
project to my work is multifold. Generally, the other haunts the histories I write. 
Just as importantly I benefit greatly from their emphasis on the limited reach of 
the colonial state, which I translate into a series of problems about the fashioning 
of power. To take an example from the work of David Arnold about colonial 
prisons, his observation that 'revolts against the gaze' - resistance in other words -
was far more widespread amongst the prison population specifically than many 
describe. Thus, taking prisons as a case in point he says 'prisoners were far from 
being the docile bodies that Foucault describes' (Arnold 1994 in Arnold & 
Hardiman 1994: 150). In this sense he reinforces Foucault's observation that 'where 
there is power there is resistance' (Foucault 1895: 95). 
(b) Conclusions 
Instead of being involved in a faithful recounting of the events of 1919, this chapter 
has positioned my thesis in relation to the literature on how rulers are fashioned. In 
particular what went into their making? In the chapters that follow I examine how 
those rulers are made. The types of authority claimed over others and over 
themselves by such men are many and varied. I contend that in each of their 
varieties, in our case military, administrative and governmental, they form a 
distinctive set of ethics and codes of practice, that are entirely normal. 
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Distaste for their practices is an entirely modem abhorrence. We see in particular 
how each man is concerned to be faithful to himself in his calling, and do his duty 
to India and Indian others. My concerns in the foregoing chapters then are, with 
forms of colonial government in the Foucaultian sense, as governmentality. In 
chapters 3 to 5 one by one I concentrate on how certain ruling men grapple with 
their jobs as rulers both in terms of policing themselves, and others. Thus in 
chapter 3 my focus is on Sir Michael O'Dwyer. I look at how he is made a 
candidate for colonial governor and how he is trained in the arts of colonial 
government in the elite institutions of empire. I show how Benjamin Jowett's 
pivotal contribution to O'Dwyer's formation ensured that these candidates never 
doubted for a minute their place as rulers. In chapter 4 I tum to how the army, the 
imperial army, is formed in an age when its job grew more complicated. No longer 
the amateurs of the East India Trading Company, they now grew into the habits of 
professionals. In that they are drilled ultimately to perform order in carrying out 
their duty. In chapter 5 my focus shifts from the day to day job of empire as 
performed by O'Dwyer and Dyer. I relate how Edwin Montagu dares all future 
rulers to think differently about their roles in India. I find that imperial purpose III 
Montagu's hand changes but stays the same. 
Thus I investigate the roles of the military and administration within colonial 
government. In short I am concerned with the making of those who would exercise 
rule in the traditions of imperial purpose. Firstly I investigate the ethos of an 
'administrative man'; secondly those of an 'military man'; and thirdly those of a 
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man who finds himself in 'government' as Secretary of State for India, the later 
being a deal more complex than the two other men because he was Jewish. 
Before I embark on my journey of reconstruction in these terms I engage the 
secondary literature on Amritsar in detail in the next chapter and give a sense of the 
methodologicalresources I use to propose the readings I do. 
Thesis Structure 
(a) Chapter 2, 'The Search for a Narrative,' looks III detail at the literature 
addressing itself to the Amritsar Massacre; 
(b) Chapter 3, 'The Administrative Complex,' begins my exploration of the 
makings of competent men, men who claim to be able to bring a special 
expertise in their administrative service to India. I focus on the figure of Sir 
Michael O'Dwyer Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab at the time of the 
massacres; 
(c) Chapter 4, 'The Military Complex,' takes the story of the makings of a 
competent administrative man to a consideration of specifics in the make up of 
a military officer. The figure I concentrate on here is Brigadier-General Reginald 
Dyer, the officer who conducted operations at the Bagh; 
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(d) Chapter 5, 'The Government Complex,' examines how Edwin Montagu, 
Secretary of State for India at the time, grapples with and tries to define and 
designate a different mode of being a ruler in India; 
(e) Chapter 6, presents my conclusions. 
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I. His force consisted of fifty riflemen from the 19th Gurkhas, the 54th Sikhs and the 59th Sikhs, 
together with a separate band of forty Gurkhas armed not with rifles but kukris. They had in tow 
two armoured cars (see Sayer 1991). 
2. Datta gives us a brief history, and sense, of the Jallianwala Bagh; how the area to which it 
refers came to be known by that name; and how the term garden is a descriptive misnomer. 
According to him, the 
' .. area had once belonged to one Bhai Hamit Singh Jallianwala, a courtier of Raja Jaswant Singh 
ofNabha, who had been a vakil (Iawyer/pleader)in the service of Ranjit Singh. 'Jalla' is the caste 
name of the owner, 'wala' the genitive cane and 'bagh' 'garden.' The Bagh was used as a dumping 
ground and not even the oldest living citizen of citizen of Amritsar has any recollection now 
whether it has ever really been a garden ... Sunk bellow the level of the city ... it... was situated in 
the heart of the town and surrounded by narrow mazy lanes. It was an open uneven space, oblong 
in shape and about twelve bighas in area, a kind of irregular quadrangle closed in by the back walls 
of adjoining houses and by stretches of clumsily built wall. At some places the houses projected 
into it. It had three or four openings through which people could pass without much inconvenience 
and between the houses parts of the boundary wall were low enough to lean over. Opposite the 
main entrance (a narrow passage just broad enough for two men to walk abreast) there were no 
houses for about a hundred feet and a low brick and mud wall about five feet high marked of this 
portion. To the right there was another low wall made of mud. Within this area a few mounds of 
broken earthenware lay scattered among trees, a dilapidated smadh ... (Mausoleum) ... with a dome 
and closed well' (Datta 1969: 96). 
Among other descriptions of note, Gandhi characterizes it as a 'dunghill'; General Sir George 
Barrow, biographer of Sir Charles Carmichael Munro, forthrightly dismisses any images of utopia, 
conjured up by use of the term garden. For him, it is in no sense such a place. He thinks it can 
best be 'described as resembling a very large sunken bath with perpendicular sides' (cf. Furneaux 
1963: 16; Barrow 1931: 184). 
3. Of course, as Sayer comments, the British were no strangers to putting down challenges to their 
authority with exemplary brutality. As instances, he cites their actions during the so-called Indian 
Mutiny; actions against Kuka rebels in 1872, again in India; and draws our attention to Governor 
John Eyre's conduct in Jamaica 1865. He also reminds us of actions closer to home, when over 
four hundred were killed in actions taken to suppress the Gordon Riots. The British authorities 
were no strangers then to taking forceful action in the restoration of order (Sayer 1991). Returning 
to an Indian context, the 1893 edition of the Amy Book for the British Empire states categorically 
that in the defence of British imperial possessions, force of arms is a crucial necessity (cf. 
Goodenhough & Dalton 1893; Chap. 4 on notions of the Garrison State). Uday Mahukkar alerts us 
a similar carnage. Three years after the events at Amritsar, Mahukkar reminds us that 'in a remote 
Bhil village in north Gujarat ... its alleged that 1,200 people were killed as a result of actions 
conducted by Major H G Sutton' (Uday Mahukkar 1997). 
4. A so-called 'Planters' views set out in the Calcutta Statesman are exemplary in this regard. 
Thus, our 'Planter' berates those who seek to criticize Dyer's actions as versions of Prussianism -
a distasteful synonym applied to describe Gennan actions during the First World War. According 
to our planter's view, Dyer alone had by his actions shamed the opponents of empire; He alone 
restored the prestige of empire. He brought law and order to Amritsar and consequently, India. 'I 
wonder,' our Planter adds, 'if they will think of the man whom they have helped to malign if they 
have ever the experience of being chased by a maddened mob of coolies who are out for their 
blood.' An Englishwoman writing in Blackwood's Mag was as equally sure. He and he alone, by 
his actions that day, had saved them! And saved them from the shameful indignities of the 
' ... crowded, insanitary and servant-less conditions suffered by... European women and children 
"who had never known a days real hardship before" in the fort during the next few days' (Calcutta 
Statesman 20 July 1920, in Sayer 1991: 138/9; On alleged German atrocities see Bland 1915). 
5. Men, whom Kipling never tied to embroider, who played the great game like soldiers they 
were: 
'When you're wounded and left on Afghanistan's plains 
And the women come out to cut up what remains, 
Jest roll to your rifle and blowout your brains 
An' go to your Gawd like a soldier' (in Strawson 1989: 72). 
6. According to Sayer, Commander Caryl on Bellairs captures, perfectly, the tone of Dyer's 
supporters; frightening in its utter conviction of the rightness of their heroes actions, and its utter 
contempt for its critics: 
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'The Dyer controversy may, indeed, be a turning point in our Imperial history. British rule has 
been respected because it has been wisely strong without being cruel, and because the word of the 
Englishman was his bond ... under democracy there has been a progressive decline in both these 
directions ... Chatham gave his men a free hand. He certainly censured for sins of omission, but 
one would be surprised to come upon any episode in his careerwhere he excitedly censured the too 
thorough execution of any task ... In the wake of every great achievement, as in Dyer's case, there 
is dust and dirt ... When a handful of whites are faced by hundreds of fanatical natives, one cannot 
apply one's John Stuart Mill' (in Draper 1991: 152; The Times 8 July 1920). 
7. Thanks to Peter B. Freshwater for drawing my attention to this reference. 
S Of this, Sir Michael O'Dwyer, Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab at the time felt sure. For 
him it was clear that, 
'Amritsar was in a state of open rebellion; not only Amritsar but the surrounding country was 
being infected by Amritsar. The civil authorities had informed General Dyer or his predecessorto 
endeavor to establish Civil Government by military measures. In re-establishing order the first 
duty of General Dyer was to see that the authority of the Government, which they had violated, 
was obeyed. Therefore, having proclaimed an order that if any meetings were held they would be 
dispersed by force and as the people in defiance of that order had held a gathering, he was, in my 
opinion, not only entitled, but bound to disperse it. I may say as head of the Government of the 
Punjab at the time that if General Dyer had not dispersed that crown by force, we should have an 
infinitely more serious state of rebellion' (O'Dwyer 1920 in Mohan 1985: 32). 
The Hon'ble Mr. J P Thompson, Chief Secretary to the Government of Punjab, would approve 
Dyer's actions in the most exacting of terms. He said, 'I approve the exact amount of bloodshed 
which was necessary to produce the effectthat was produced ... Ifhe had not taken some action like 
that we should have had much blood shed in the end' (Thompson in Mohan 1985: 295/6 n.1 06). 
9. Prestige may seem such an ephemeral thing, but many an empire subsisted on its 
indefinability. But for all that, the importance attached to its subsistence cannot be underestimated, 
whether in military discourses or strictly administrative ones. I talk specifically about its military 
cadences in chapter 4, but we can glean an instance from the Field Service Regulations issued in 
1920, concerned with military history for the staff college entrance examination, about operations 
in Afghan war of 1919. The British lost many a hard battle in Afghanistan, and perhaps for that 
reason felt the importance of getting prestige and retaining it, particularly there, so acutely. Hence, 
the regulations include notes on some points of interest. Thus, 'in 1842 - ... after many 
vicissitudes and one of the worst disasters in British military annals - and again in 1878, we 
forced our way to the hostile capital, replaced the reigning Amir by our own nominee, and 
successfully made evident the superiority of our arms, to the great and lasting benefit of our 
westige throughout the east ... ' (Field Service Regulations 1920: 115). 
0. A man of many parts, not least of which was to inspire the future Lord Curzon in a lecture he 
gave at Eton. According to Gilmour, on that day Stephens described how, in 'the Asian sub-
continenL.Britain held .. an empire more populous, more amazing and more beneficent than that of 
Rome' (Gilmour 1994: 135). An English lawyer, Stephens served on the Viceroy's council as the 
law member from 1869-72. Kamlesh Mohan describes Stephen as one whose mode of operation 
marked the end of what she calls the paternal element in British rule. Stephen's modus replaced it 
with, 'an authoritarian tendency towards utilitarianism, though an evangelical zeal still energized 
the imperial mission. Believing that the foremost function of government in India was "to protect 
peaceable men and to beat down wrong doers, to extort respect and to enforce obedience," he 
highlighted the positive role of law, backed by power' (Mohan 2000: 54; Stokes 1982: 299). 
11. Stephens 1883 in Sinha 1995: 40. Stephens views were given in a letter to the Times dated I 
March 1883, which, Fein tells us, attacked proposals contained in the notorious Ilbert Bill. The 
Proposals incited a lurid controversy known as the 'white mutiny.' According to Sharpe, one 
Courtnay Peregrine Ilbert proposed that Indian magistrates should have criminal jurisdiction over 
Europeans. This proposal caused outrage amongst Europeans, especially since there was an 
assumption that white people should be subject only to the judgement of white magistrates. 
Opposition, Fein tells us, was fiercest among indigo planters in Bengal. And that fear Sharpe 
points out, found itself expressed most vociferously in terms of their fears for white womanhood 
(Sharpe 1993: 89-91; Fein 1977: 51-52; see also Mrinalini Sinha 1992). Anil Seal tells us that, 
'A European and Anglo-Indian defense Association was formed ... There was wild talk of a white 
mutiny, of packing the Viceroy offto England by force, of getting the European Volunteer Corps 
to disband ... The cry of "our women in danger" revived fears and passions latent since the 
Mutiny. They were not confined to India. In England, too, the controversy evoked an outspoken 
attack on liberal policy towards India and an uncompromising assertion of the doctrine of racial 
superiority' (Anil Seal 1968: 165). 
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12. Of course, we must not confuse this particular mutiny with others that sprang up from time to 
time and were so described. Another, earlier, mini revolt amongst the white population concerned 
pecuniary matters - grievances about the amount of Batta paid to army officers for instance. 
Sometimes the anny officelS would take matters into their own hands. Cardew tells us of an old 
practice in Bengal - a Bazar tax - levied by officers 'for their own benefit, on the bazars within 
their jurisdiction ... an abuse imitated from native practice, but... very lucrative.' He adds, ' ... at a 
time when no retiring allowance or pension was provided, there was a certain excuse for it.' 
Needless to say when the Company moved to withdraw the privilege for levying it, it was 'bitterly 
resented'. Yet another well known instance occurred during Sir George Barlow's tenure as 
Governor of Madras at the beginning of the nineteenth century (on these disputes and more cf. 
Cardew 1929: 10; Mason 1974). 
13. A phrase so often repeated that it is apt to describe it as an axiom of a style of British rule. 
One Frank Richards for instance, is not the first, nor would he be the last, to regard it as totemic. 
He has one of his colleagues repeat the mantra to him when their party is confronted one day by an 
uppity road sweeper. Directed by one of the party to another job the so-called native apparently 
replied, that he would do it once he'd finished his sweeping up. On hearing this the old soldier 
drove his fist into the natives' stomach, shouting at the same time, "you black soor, when I order 
you to do a thing I expect it to be done at once." He then added "my God it's scandalous the way 
things are going on in this country. The blasted natives are getting cheekier every day. Not so 
many years ago I would have half-killed that native ... If he had made a complaint afterwards and 
had marks to show, any descent commanding officer would have laughed at him and told him to 
clear off." They all agreed that the natives were getting cheekier every day. And none balked from 
the proposition, 'what is won by the sword must be kept by the sword, and it's the law that will 
ever apply to this country'. Strawson, a commentator on the anny brings it right up to date. 
Fulfilling what he calls, the imperial urge meant the realization, 'India no doubt had been won by 
the sword and would have to be kept by the sword' (Richards 1936: 74-75; Strawson 1989: 45). 
14. Renunciation of titles of course is nothing new. These occasions are specific instances in which 
dissatisfaction at the bureaucracy is expressed. On 28 June 1918, the Amrita Bakaria, tells us about 
other, earlier, instances worth noting. Reporting a speech by Babu Jitendra Lal Bannerjea given to 
honor Subrayma Iyer, Bannerjea congratulates Iyer whom he describes as ' .. neither 'Sir' nor' Dr.' 
but simply Subramanya Iyer - the man who without titles is the greatest of the modern living 
Indians.' Though, the writer tells us, there are others who have refused titles, Mr. Gokhale and Mr. 
Narottam Moraji Gokulday, being among their number, 'the case of Subramanya Iyer stands on a 
different and more remarkable footing.' Not only did he not accept the colonial yoke, he 'flung it 
in the face of the English people ... for..a genuine Indian ... knows that no foreigner, no alien, can 
honor a native son of the soil.' The writer finishes with a call for alternative approbation: 'If we 
must be houred, it is from ourselves that the honour must come: It is from the approbation of our 
countrymen - from the sanction which the country lends to our activities- not from anything else' 
(in Datta 1975 vol. II: 930). 
15. David Lloyd George, 'Causes and the Aims of war,' Speech delivered at Glasgow on being 
presented with the freedom of that city, June 29 1917. Quoted in Lala Lajput Rai, The Political 
Future of India. B W Huebsch Inc.New York 1919. A month before 'New India' would counsel 
against holding out false hopes of great changes in Indian government after the 'Great War': 
'The President of the United States talks about a league of Free Nations, declares that the war is a 
war of democracy against autocracy not even remembering that England has established in Asia the 
most powerful autocracy in the world .. and .... fathered more repressive acts than the Central Powers 
can boast; interns the youth of the country by hundreds untried and unsentenced and restrains the 
liberty of peaceable citizens to travel freely over the land. All the paeans sung over the successful 
revolt (i.e., of Russia) sink into the minds of Indians who, like Mary, ponder these things in their 
hearts ... Desperate they (students) broke away from all control of their elders, began to conspire and 
numbers of them have conspired ever since. Some have been hanged, some ... sent to the living 
death of the Andaman Islands; some ... imprisoned here. Now the students watch with amazement 
the Premier of Great Britain rejoicing over the results of the similar actions of young Russians 
who blew up trains and assassinated a Tsar, and who are now applauded as martyrs .... The names 
which were execrated are held sacred and sufferings are crowned with triumph' (New India 23 May 
1917 in V N Datta 1975: Vol. II, 911). 
16 In his autobiography, Gandhi tells us how, at the outbreak of the Zulu rebellion in 1906, his 
citizen ship of Natal and his belief then that the 'British Empire existed for the welfare of the 
world,' made him write to the Governor 'expressing ... his ... readiness to form an Indian 
Ambulance corps'. The Governor wrote back accepting his offer. How could he do otherwise he 
reasoned? He bore no animosity, nor grudge, toward the Zulus, he says. They after all had harmed 
no Indian. Nor did the rightness or otherwise of their rebellion effect his decision to support the 
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Empire in its hour of need - 'A genuine sense of loyalty prevented me from wishing ill to the 
Empire' (Gandhi 1927: 261). During this period, and a few years later during the 1914-1918 war, 
Loyalty to Empire is his watch-role, so to speak. At a meeting in London, August 1914, he 
exhorts all present to volunteer and serve in the anny just as so many English students did. Many 
among his audience objected. Why should they serve the empire, they asked? There was a world of 
difference between Indians and the English. Indians were slaves and the English their masters. 
How, in these circumstances, could a slave, or indeed should a slave, co-operate with his master 
particularly in his master's hour of need? Shouldn't the slave, instead, 'seeking to be free .. make 
the master's need, his opportunity' Persuasive though this argument is, it failed at the time to 
appeal to him. He knew the difference between Indian and Englishman, he said. Yet he didn't 
think Indians slaves. And about misunderstandings between Indians and Englishmen from time to 
time, as a true loyalist at the time he added: 'I..feel..iLis more the fault of individual British 
Officials than of the British system, and that we could convert them by love. If we would improve 
our status thorough the help and co-operation of the British, it was our duty to win their help by 
standing by them in their hour of need' (M K Gandhi 1927: pp290-291). 
17. Kamlesh Mohan describes these gestures as signaling a rise in an Indian consciousness, a turn 
in such a putative constituency, from ambivalence to alienation. She suggests many people in the 
Punjab followed the example set by Gandhi. They returned their 'Kaiser-i-Hind decorations, 
.. their.. certificates, .. their.. sanads, .. and their.. titles of Rai Sahib, kurinashin, etc.' 
Interestingly, she also notes the actions of Sarla Debi Chaudharani, a 'lone women', 'who returned 
her war badge, granted for recruiting services for the fonnation of the Bengali regiment during the 
first world war' (Mohan 2000 in V N Datta & S Settar eds. 2000: 52-79). 
18. From Report of the Commissioners Vol. II Statement No.2, cited by Kamlesh Mohan ibid: 68 
Perhaps, for the sake of completeness, we should note that Anglo-Indians often use the words of 
Indians in contrary senses. For instance, to augment their approval of the shame inflicted by the 
administration on opponents of empire. In a letter to The Times (1 June 1920) for instance, (Lord) 
Sydenham writes of one Hon. Mahommed Shafi, who was one amongst a deputation received by 
Sir Michael O'Dwyer, and who, according to Sydenham, complimented O'Dwyer's administration 
in the following terms: 
'The province (Punjab) owes it to your wise administration that it has enjoyed complete tranquility 
and peace throughout the war and has seen a remarkable diminution of crime ... Although towards 
the end of your Honor's brilliant regime the enemies of law and order, as a result of organized 
conspiracy, succeeded in deluding a section of the people into riots and disturbances, yet it is a 
tribute to your Honor's far-sighted statesmanship that finnness that the situation was soon got well 
in hand by using the speedy and effective method ofmartiallaw .... The critics of the Punjab 
Government outside the province do not realize of what stuff the Punjab is made, and the recent 
disturbances must open their eyes and would show how dangerous it is to allow the agitators to 
play with such stuff 
Sydenham dismisses later reports of the same Mahommed Shafi apparently saying that since 'there 
had been no organized conspiracy or preconceived conspiracy to subvert British rule ... . there was 
no justification for the enforcement of martial law. ' Sydenham sniffs at this apparent retraction as, 
the misconceptions of a man that become used to the calm security, even serenity, of Simla 
(Emphasis mine.The Times I June 1920: 12). 
19. Is the name given to Ghandhian, non-violent forms of political protest - its literal meaning 
being, 'truth force.' 
20. Its antecedents lay in his campaigns to resist South African government restrictions on the 
movement ofIndian (coolie) labour. 
21. Mohan adds, Gandhi' .. acknowledged that the development of such a critical temper and 
consciousness ofthe people's strength among the thirty crores ofIndians demanded a 
psychological transfonnation. It implied the removal of 'slavish and defeatist mentality' 
underpinned by fear, caused by infliction of brutal physical force and psychological onslaught.' So 
he promptly set about cultivating such a critical temper (Mohan 2000: 56 in Datta & Settar (eds.) 
2000). 
22. The Ghadar (revolutionary) movement founded on 18 August 1913 in San Francisco, is an 
earlier case of an organization that wanted to gain India's freedom explicitly by force. Its objectives 
were succinctly stated in its newspaper, 'Ghadar' as a slogan: 'Today, there begins in foreign lands, 
but in our country's language, a war against the British Raj ... What is our name? Ghadar. What is 
our work? Ghadar. Where will Ghadar break out? In India. The time will soon come when rifles 
and blood will take the place of pen and ink.' The party's impact extended well beyond its initial 
focus - immigration to Canada. At the turn of the Century immigration from India to Canada 
became a focus of contestation. Under a 'keep Canada white for ever' policy, the Canadian 
authorities came to an agreement with the Government in India that it would discourage the 
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emigration of Indians to its shores. The Indian Government obligingly invoked the provisions of 
the Emigration Act 1883. Under this Act emigration was only allowed to countries listed in its 
schedule and which had adequate legislation in force to protect the interests of such emigrants. Of 
course Canada was not to be found listed in the schedule as one of the approved countries and no 
provision had been made by the Canadian authorities to protect the interests of immigrants. This 
lead to many aborted attempts by men from the Punjab, mostly Sikhs, to land in Canada and to 
those already there being under pressure from the local laws to make the return journey to India. As 
Datta, says, between 1908 and 1911 approximately a thousand of these emigres were compelled to 
return to India with many more fleeing to the United States. In an incident that tested to the limit 
the notional separation between radicalized reason and universal laws, a Japanese merchant ship, 
the Komagata Maru, chartered by a Gurdit Singh, was turned away by the authorities at Vancouver 
and forced back to India. Arriving at Hoogly estuary on 27 September 1914 it docked at Budge-
harbor on 19 September. The passengers were not free however to disembark. They were ordered 
onto trains bound for the Punjab under the Ingress Ordinance 1914 passed by the Indian 
Government to restrict the movement of anyone entering India after 5 September. But these 
returnees had to some extent become radicalized through their experiences and the vehicle that 
provided a focus for many of their concerns was the Ghadar party. Many, Datta continues, 
disobeyed the directive and marched through the streets of Calcutta. The resulting confrontation 
with the police left eighteen dead with another twenty five wounded. Two hundred Ghadar party 
supporters were subsequently interned with the rest returned to the Punjab. 
The return of what the Government saw as potential revolutionaries was to be repeated soon after, 
leaving, Datta estimates, about one thousand individuals who had been influenced by the Ghadar 
party living in close proximity to one another. They were closely policed. And a general rising 
fixed by their leaders to commence on the night of21 February 1915 was quickly foiled. By as 
early as August 1915, the Punjab Government had virtually wiped out any trace of the Party, using 
its extensive powers under The Ingress Ordinance in combination with those found in the Defence 
of India Act. According to O'Dwyer himself 175 people were brought before Special Tribunals, of 
whom 136 were convicted of offences that in nearly all cases were punishable with death. 38 were 
sentenced to death, with 20 eventually being hanged. Of the rest 58 were sentenced to 
transportation for life and 58 transportation for varying telms. The Tribunals made the usual orders 
for the forfeiture of property (Cf. Harish K. Puri 1993; For a more detailed discussion about the 
specifics of nationalist imaginings in Asia see Partha Chatterjee 1993). 
}'. Nayar recounts to us a legend he thinks vouches for Bhagat Singh's radicalism. According to 
him, Singh 'had visited the .. Jallianwala Bagh ... and carried in his pocket for a long time a packet 
of dust he had collected from there. Thus was his way of paying homage to those whom had been 
killed by the rulers.' And perhaps, Nayar speCUlates, made him vow that members of the 
bureaucracy who conducted themselves as Dyer had, and referring specifically to Superintendent 
Scott actions against Lajput Rai, would be made to pay for those actions (Nayar 2000: 34). 
24. The reference to the terms 'precarious hegemony' is from Mohan in Datta & Settar 2000: 57, 
but the sentiment is from the work of Ranajit Guha and the Subaltern group of scholars. See in 
particular his, Dominance without Hegemony: HistOlY and Power in Colonial India, Harvard 
University Press, London 1993. 
25. The 'Commonweal,' 18 August 1916. 
26. Such sentiments found an echo in 'New India' comments about Britains place as a premier 
autocracy in the world at the time: 
The president of the United States talks about a League of Free Nations, declares that the war is a 
war of democracy against autocracy not even remembering that England has established in Asia the 
most powerful autocracy in the world [and] has fathered more repressive Acts than the Central 
Powers can boost; interns the youth of the country by hundreds untried and unsentenced and 
restrains the liberty of peaceable citizens to travel freely over the land. All the paeans sung over the 
successful revolt (i.e., of Russia) sink into the minds of Indians who, like Mary, ponder these 
things in their hearts .... Desperate they (students) broke away from all control of their elders, began 
to conspire and numbers of them have conspired ever since. Some have been hanged, some were 
sent to the living death of the Andaman Islands; some were imprisoned here. Now the students 
watch with amazement the Premier of Great Britain rejoicing over the results of the similar actions 
of young Russian men and women who conspired and blew up trains and assassinated a Tsar and 
who are now applauded as martyrs. The names, which were execrated, are held sacred and 
sufferings are crowned with triumph (New India 23 May 1917. See V N Datta, New Light on the 
Punjab Disturbances 1919 Vol. 111975: 911). 
27. The Manifesto of the Hindustan Socialist Republican Association had already called the young 
to arms: 
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'The future of India rests with the youths. They are the salt of the earth. Their promptness to 
suffer, their daring courage and their radiant sacrifices prove that India's future in their hands is 
perfectly safe ... Youths-ye-soldiers of the Indian Republic fall in. Don't stand easy; don't let your 
knees tremble. Shake off the paralyzing effects ofiong lethargy. Yours is a noble Mission. Go out 
into every nook and comer of the country and prepare the ground for future. Revolution which is 
sure to come. Respond to the clarion call of duty. Don't vegetate. Grow! ... Sow the seeds of 
disgust and hatred against British Imperialism in the fertile minds of your fellow youths. And the 
seeds shall spout and there shall grow a jungle of sturdy trees, because you shall water t he seeds 
with young warm blood' (Manifesto 1929 in Mohan 1985: 208). 
28. See Mohan 1985. Especially chapter 8 and her bibliographic reference which reads 'Hindustan 
Socialist Republican Association Manifesto One: The Philosophy of the Bomb (n.d.)': 409. 
29. On the pamphlet itself she alerts us to an intriguing matter of detail: ' ... Though issued by the 
Atashi Charkar Group, . .it did not profess a different ideology. One of the various reasons for 
formation of the Group by the erstwhile members of the Hindustan Socialist Republican 
Association was to divert attention of the police to the new party. It was likely to give freedom of 
action to Chander Shekhar Azad. Hence this pamphlet is regarded as part of the HSRA literature' 
(Mohan 1985: 377 n.64). 
30 19 June 1916, in VN Datta Vol. II 1975: 923. 
31 Sarojini Naidu, 'Punjab in 1919'. Naidu isn't alone in trying to capture in prose, the 
deafening screams and emotions, stirred and calling all to be ready for forceful action. Hari Singh 
reminds us how another writer, Subhadra Kumari Chauhan, comprehends such an enduring 
memory: 
'The Sweet notes of the nightingale are no longer heard here. 
Instead, cawing of cows renders this place noisy. 
The sombrous insects and moths generate an ilIusion of humming bees. 
Buds are semi-blossomed and engulfed by thorny outgrowth. 
The pants and flowers here are either parched or semi-burnt. 
The pollen-dust deprived of its usual fragrance had now, turned into an unseemly speck. 
Alas, the loveable, beautiful garden is all blood drenched. 
Welcome to the king of seasons but come stealthily. 
For this being a place of mourning where noise is forbidden. 
The wind may blow but she be bade to blow slowly. 
Lest she should blow away the sights and sobs of sorrow. 
The nightingale may sing and pour our mournful notes. 
The humming bees may hum but relate the tale of oppression. 
Thou mayest bring flowers but they be not extra decorative. 
Their fragrance be mild and they be dew dropped, 
Present then not as gifts to one's near and dear; 
They be scattered in devotion and in memory of those who are gone. 
Children innocent and of tender age fell here to the bullets. 
Thou mayest scatter some petals of buds in their name. 
Many a heart fulI of ambitions and longings have been pierced with buIlets here 
And they by brute force removed from their loving families and country at large. 
Some buds semi-blown be offered here in their memory. 
And some dew drops be scattered hither and thither in the form of tears. 
The old and elderly died here of buIlets wounds writhing in pain. 
In their memory too thou mayest scatter some flowers dried up. 
O! spring, the king of seasons 
Hail to thee 
But come stealthily 
For it being a place of mourning 
Where noise is forbidden.' 
Quoted by Hari Singh from Mukul (Collection of Poems of Subhadra Kumari Chauhan, Allahabad 
1965) in Datta & Settar 2000: 80-87). Singh's comment on the outpourings contained in such 
prose is instructive. According to him: 
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'Creative literature - be it poetry, fiction, drama or any other literary firm - had a much wider 
impact than the intellectual writings, the difference being that the former appealed to emotions and 
sentiments and the latter to the intellectual faculty. Our cognitive behavior is forever more rooted 
in emotionality, therefore, the creative literature produced as an aftermath of this great human 
tragedy of Indian history becomes as relevant as any intellectual analysis thereof can claim to be' 
(Singh 2000 in Datta & Settar 2000: 85). 
32 Elnphasis mine. 
33 The full reference for Ardener is Ardener (ed.) Perceiving Women, London 1975. See Mohan 
2000 in Datta & Settar 2000: 52-75, 75. 
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CHAPTER 2 - THE SEARCH FOR A NARRATIVE 
1 
Introduction 
As I outlined in chapter 1, much of the writings on the Amritsar massacres and 
disturbances are concerned to analyze the events of 1919 as an event. A faithful 
account of those occurrences is their raison d'etre. Those attempts of course are 
not abstract detached, exercises, but battles in defining how it should be 
understood. More to the point they are political contests. They are struggles to 
try and find those responsible or in the alternative to exonerate the bureaucracy. 
We saw in particular how dishonored Tagore felt about the turn to events. How 
in the alternative the pride (Kipling notably) others felt at Dyers actions. 
There are consequently many histories written over the years that have sought 
the final word on an event or series of events like these. This is a very noble, 
necessary if arduous task. So, for instance, histories of the holocaust are a case 
in point (Ozick 1984; Bauman 1989; Bauman 1991). Now the desire to write a 
final verdict on Amritsar is not so much an explosion of naivete as a very 
specific practice. So, such work is important not least for those who thought to 
point to its political uses. Hence, borrowing from Bauman, such scholarship 
lends weight to those warning and pointing out that these events could happen 
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'anytime and everywhere' (Bauman 1991: 41). We must therefore be on our 
guard. In the way Fein makes abundantly clear (Fein 1977). Sticking for a 
moment longer with accounts of the holocaust, Bauman, via Chorover, incites 
us to recall that the advent of the third Reich was not so much of a nazi 
invention. It has a profound history. Hence: 
'The sociological framework, upon which the justifications for genocide were 
ultimately built, was plainly not a Nazi invention. It had been erected in the 
name of science long before National Socialism became a reality ... 
The Nazi extermination programme was a logical extension of sociobiological 
ideas and eugenics doctrines which had nothing specifically to do with Jews 
and which flourished widely in Germany well before the era of the Third 
Reich ... 
The path was direct, from an allegedly objective brand of scientific discourse 
about human inequality to a purportedly rational form of moral argument 
about "lives devoid of value" and then to the final solution: "the release and 
destruction of lives devoid of value" '(Chorover in Bauman 1991: 41). 
Such work then has as I sayan important place. I do not join in such a project 
however. Borrowing once again from Bauman I see Arnritsar as ' ... a window, 
rather than as a picture on the wall' (Bauman 1989: viii). In other words, I take 
the battles in the scholarship to be part of the discursive production of Arnritsar. 
Looking through the window then I engage with the events of Amritsar not to 
establish what really happened, and so for me it is not a question of truth vs. 
falsity. Since for me, and I paraphrase Veyne, history is a false natural object. 
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He adds, ' ... history is what one makes of it. It has never stopped changing' 
(Veyne 1997: 182). Derrida reminds us that 'the day that there will be a reading 
of the Oxford card, the one and true reading, will be the end of history' (Derrida 
in Bauman 1991: viii). So, readings of history will not stop. 
My reading of these events then is different. Following what Veyne describes 
as Foucault's 'central and most original thesis'; I ask 'what is made' (Veyne in 
Davidson 1997: 160). Foucault doesn't take anything for granted. My interest 
then is in how subjects, in our case, rulers, are made. That, I contend' .. .is 
explained by what went its making at each moment of history; we are wrong to 
imagine that the making, the practice, is explained on the basis of what is made' 
(Veyne in Davidson 1997: 161). 
How, I ask, are the ruling characters involved in the massacre, and that I 
investigate, fabricated as rulers. How is General Dyer fashioned; how is Sir 
Michael O'Dwyer shaped; and how is Edwin Montagu made? That is the 
different history of these events that I write. 
I supplement my F oucauldian resources for writing the histories I do with 
reference to the work of Stephan Collini. In particular his, Public Moralists: 
Political Thought and Intellectual Life in Britain, 1850-1930. I do this in part 
because Foucault's work on the ethical practices of the self is a method that 
typically eschews biography. To be sure the writing of the self is a complicated 
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endeavor. Foucault knows this as his comments on the author function show us 
(Foucault in Bouchard and Simon 1977). He complicates any author function as 
he calls it by reminding us of its location within discourse and its 'differences 
from other discourses' (Foucault in Bouchard and Simon 1977: 124-127). For 
instance, 'criticism has been concerned for some time now with aspects of a 
text not fully dependent upon the notion of an author' (Foucault in Bouchard 
and Simon 1977: 124-127). Nothing comes out of the author per se. The words 
he/she speaks are not his/her alone. They are generally part of a tradition. 
But the focus of my characterological studies is different from if similar to 
Foucault's emphasis. I do not write biographies of the characters I examine. To 
be sure an authors words are complicated in the way he describes. But I treat 
the characters I focus on quite simply as exemplary figures. Figures whose 
words and actions illustrate the traditions of rule they are a part of. Collini also 
engages in studies of exemplary characters. He constructs for us the life 
histories of members of the Athenaeum Club. It is important for us because it 
represented the 'peak of London's club land, especially for the subjects of 
Collini's interest - the public intellectual' (Gorman 2001: 1). He tells us how 
prominent intellectuals spoke to a receptive audience among the educated 
classes' (Soffer 1992: 1524). 
Interestingly the membership of the club was not restricted to the 'world of 
inherited wealth and status' (Gorman 2001: 1). Under rule II the club accepted 
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men of distinguished eminence in Science, Literature, or the Arts or for Public 
Service' (Gorman 2001: 1). These men, these public intellectuals, as Collini has 
it, spoke on many moral issues of the day. Their talk, or as he glosses it, the 
written voice, becomes 'an extended conversation' in a language defined by 
common and continuing cultural and moral values' between an 'elite political 
class' about those shared moral values (Soffer 1992: 1524). The archetype, the 
individual, that emerges from these conversations is a figure who attempted to 
'persuade their contemporaries to live up to their professed ideals' (Gorman 
2001: 2). Obligation, manliness, altruism, proper character, duty and all such 
assumed and shared knowledge developed the identity of the man of the public 
sphere. 
The characters I investigate were not members of this club, but they were 
engaged in Public Service. Members of this class held forth in all their spoken 
and written voices on important issues in empire of their day. For instance their 
conversations ranged over national character. The 'abhorrence of apathy, the 
valuation of work as compared to Georgian leisure, self restraint and the 
domination of the will over baser motivations '" that ... marked the Victorian 
intellectual's moral terrain' (Gorman 2001: 3). In short, public service. 
Many of these conversations were conducted in and through their varied 
contributions to debates about moral conduct. That debate ranged far and wide 
and found its way into biographies, legislative debates, public speeches and 
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diaries. O'Dwyer for instance writes In his autobiography that he couldn't 
believe how any Indians would want to be free of their guardians. He believed 
there to be a right way of doing things and very definitely a wrong way. 
Guardianship right and freedom wrong. Indeed, so much freedom talk was a 
figment of many an Indian imaginations. Dyer in his turn similarly thought 
himself a dutiful character. For him demands for self-government by Indians 
were a horrible pretence (Dyer 1921). Montagu, in his diaries and numberless 
contributions to the public voice, expanded that talk to include Indians in such 
exchanges. Even after his resignation as Secretary of State for India he wanted 
to continue with the conversations he had started. 
Collini's approach offers me some interesting methodological insights into the 
characterological method that I deploy when telling of my character's life's 
work and the contributions that they made to public service. He enables me to 
appreciate how important speech and exchange is to the formation and flow of 
ideas that rule an empire. Specifically that what is often important in the 
circulation of public morality is not 'so much ... contained in ... the accepted 
'texts' of the period but rather the full range of the intellectuals public 
engagement' (Gorman 2001: 3). In this sense what he leaves us with is an 
appreciation of an individuals exemplary, ideal contributions to that morality. 
Their contributions are not by nature proselytizations, but rather conversations 
' ... upon which some ideological agreement has been reached ... ' (Gorman 2001: 
2). Hence, the talk is directed to audiences whose evaluative responses often 
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get brushed aside in considerations of political theory. They are on the contrary 
often' ... parasitic upon the lesser explicit habits of response and evaluation that 
are deeply embedded in the culture ... ' (Collini 1991: 4-5). 
The 'assumed knowledge' that circulates among the members of an elite defines 
an identity that coheres around exclusionary principles. Hence, we see for 
instance many Anglo-Indians cling together when defending the rightness of 
General Dyer's actions. Dyer's own contributions to that debate in standing up 
as he saw it for the rightness of his conduct are exemplary. His writings in this 
regard are not conventional texts. So for instance his defence of those actions 
was contained in a well-crafted, legal riposte. Drafted by Sharpe Pritchard and 
Co, a firm still in practice today (Draper 1981: 222). 
The other characters at the centre of Arnritsar similarly engaged in speaking 
about these events. To be sure my figures spoke to each other, and were often 
in fierce disagreement with each other as well as confirming to themselves the 
rightness of their actions. The disagreements between Montagu on the one hand 
and O'Dwyer together with Dyer are an instance of this. 
All this should not detract us from or be incompatible with, the use I make of 
Foucault's approach to ethical practices of the self. As I say above though the 
net in terms of conversations is cast wider, the words of the figures I investigate 
illustrate the traditions of rule they are a part of. They are in this sense 
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compatible with Foucault's method in exploring the formation of subjects. As I 
say mine are simply exemplary figures that illustrate the tradition of rule of 
which they are a part 
N ow in this chapter I engage with the discursive production of Amritsar for two 
reasons. Firstly in order to show just how vast that literature is, and the variety 
in their perceptions, and readings of the events. Secondly, as a preparatory to 
compose a different production in the terms I stated in chapter one; that is of 
the characterizations of men who rule and how such characterizations are 
subject to challenge and change. 
In Pursuit Of Closure - The Secondary Literature 
(a) Epic Restoration - Pearay Mohan (1920) 
One of the earliest texts that claims to have the Amritsar disturbances and the 
lallianwala Bagh Massacres as its central focus as an event, an event whose 
recounting it is hoped will bolster a political sensibility, is Pearay Mohan's, An 
Imaginary Rebellion (1920). I Sir Michael O'Dwyer stands accused of 
deliberately provoking the disturbances with his refusals to countenance the 
participation of educated Indians in government. Beyond this, perhaps 
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somewhat against the grain, Mohan wants to inaugurate a new era of goodwill 
in connections between India and England. 
Beginning in a solemn and somber mood, it consists to close on 200 pages of 
commentary and takes us through an analysis of the above events, with an 
admirable tenacity.2 Mohan follows this by 737 pages of small typed 
collections of various materials. Among these are journal articles on martial 
law and its applicability; reports of the proceedings in the Martial Law 
Commissions; debates in the Imperial Legislative Council; and evidence given 
to the Disorders Enquiry Committee (the Hunter Committee), appointed on 14 
October 1919 to Investigate the Disturbances in the Punjab, etc.3 
Hastily conceived and written, it is nevertheless a thorough and demanding 
tome.4 
No lesser person than Lala Lajput Rai wrote the book's foreword,s and his 
comments on it, and recommendations about it, are revealing. He compliments 
the exacting styles - this book he says, 'has been written with a scrupulous 
regard for truth and with remarkable lucidity, precision and impartiality' - and 
gives the reader a flavor of such a crucial labor (in Mohan 1920: xxi). 
Rai defines the rationale of the book as a desire to lay bare a brutal despotism, 
as opposed to a benevolent one, practiced by the administration in all its horrid 
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details. It aims to put it before the people so they could study the whole in 
readiness for effective and constructive criticism. And so put forth, Rai urges 
that' ... every iota of our energy ... (be put to use) ... to get rid of the bureaucratic 
system of government, under which we have lived for the last 70 years or so' 
(in Mohan 1920: xxi). According to Lala Lajpat Rai, the Punjab tragedy, as he 
called the events of 1919, 
' . .is a chapter of the world's history - a bloody chapter albeit - dyed red by the 
high Priests of Imperialism, which will retain its freshness whenever future 
generations of men and women happen to read it. It has placed us in a position 
to visualize the barbaric possibilities of Imperialism run amuck' (in Mohan 
1920: xix). 
As I suggested in chapter 1, it is a story of shame. It is time, Rai went on, that 
Indians saw for themselves, the character of foreign rule. Mohan's treatise 
showed them that character. It was time they realized that their hopes for a 
greater say in their rule did not lie with foreigners but with themselves. 
Arnritsar merely gave more impetus to seeing so-called benevolent despotism 
for what it really was. And why had Indians not seen this before? It could only 
be because he conjectures 
'Modern Indians had been so well inoculated with the serum of 'benevolent 
despotism', as to make them forget that it is easier for a leopard to change its 
spots than for imperialism to change its true nature. Benevolent imperialism is 
like a caged lion. However you may play with it so long as it is caged, or 
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under the spell of a master trainer, the moment it gets out of control, it is 
bound to behave in conformity with its real nature. The atrocities perpetuated 
at Amritsar have proved that Imperialism run mad is more dangerous, more 
destructive, more vindictive, and more inhuman, than a frenzied 
uncontrollable mob. When a mob get out of hand, it does things pretty bad and 
cruel; but its destructiveness is born of passion and is not deliberately planned 
and thought out. Imperialism, on the other hand, as represented by O'Dwyers, 
Dyers, O'Briens, Bosworth Smiths, Johnsons, Dovetons and others takes 
revenge with a deliberate aim. It plans out with a fixed purpose, and carries 
out those plans in a spirit of military vindictiveness' (in Mohan 1920: xix). 
Bearing the weight of such recommendations, Mohan doesn't disappoint. He 
concentrates his commentary on what he calls the 'reign of terror' both before 
and after the advent of martial law. 6 Mohan it seems is committed to the notion 
that the voluminous materials he puts before us will convince us of the terrors 
practiced by India's so-called Guardians. He tries through their recounting, to 
alert his readers, perhaps enable them to grapple with the horrors he says 
Indians feel at the 'atrocities perpetuated by some of the officers of the crown, 
under the cloak of martial law' (Mohan 1920: 182). 
Nothing in his work is merely detail. Instead the detail become the specifics in 
a sad tale of failure. Hence, as Mohan says, 
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'Sir Michael O'Dwyer's theo!)' of government miserably failed in the Punjab; 
and, on his own showing led an unarmed and ... loyal population to rise in open 
rebellion against his authority' (Mohan 1920: 182). 
In disgust almost, he scolds; it need not have been this way! So deep, according 
to him, did India and its inhabitants drink in the British well of just and 
beneficent rule. So deeply had loyalty to the British nation been rooted in their 
hearts, that Indians would refuse to be seduced into disloyalty, even in spite of 
what he calls 'the brief reign of terror, which was carried on in the Punjab 
under martial law' (Mohan 1920: 182). 
But, unfortunately, the famed Indian loyalty he proudly proclaims could not, 
according to him, last the reign of terror that took on new turns under martial 
law. 'Every loyal citizen,' he thinks, 
'is horrified at the atrocities perpetuated by some of the officers of the 
crown under the cloak of martial law, and is distressed to see that acts 
were done in the name of peace and order, of which every civilized 
Government should be ashamed. The vehemence with which these 
acts have been criticized is the measure of the ... esteem in which the 
British Government is held in India. Had such acts been everyday 
occurrences, had the whole purpose and policy of British rule in India 
not been sound and honorable, the horrors of martial law would not 
have caused so much pain and indignation throughout the country, nor 
would they have produced so insistent a demand for reparation' 
(Mohan 1920: 182-3) 
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As if to force home the message that the administration had 'caused ... pain and 
indignation ... ' Mohan hoped they would learn that 
'the regime of blood and iron, which was inaugurated by Martial Law ... 
proved that a policy of repression weakens the prestige of Government and 
makes martyrs of the persons who are unjustly made to suffer. Every person, 
of whatever position in life, who was imprisoned under Martial Law, has been 
feted and hailed as a hero and patriot on his release, which has naturally led 
him to believe that he has done something to merit the acclamations of the 
people. It is indeed a sad state of things that the measure of a man's sincerity, 
patriotism and ability is the extent to which he is chastised by the Government. 
Such a state of affairs is injurious to both the Government and the people; and 
the Government should realize that repression carried beyond a certain point 
becomes its own antidote, just as at a certain stage pain becomes its own 
anodyne. Every wise Government should see that that limit is not crossed' 
(Mohan 1920: 182). 
Human (British) salvation in this context lies he proposes, in its, and Indians', 
full appreciation of the errors of wielding the big stick in these ways. Aren't we 
all working towards the same goal, one could imagine him asking? The Indo-
British connection he feels is such that only by working together will they 
arrange for the good government of India. Once good government returns the 
'honor and reputation of England' should be restored (Mohan 1920: xvii). 
This then I propose is the path Mohan plots. 
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He stages the events of 1919 as a tragic drama - 'the tragedy of errors' he calls 
it - in the hope that the temporal index of human (British) salvation can be 
restored. Thus he divides the 'tragedy of errors' 1919, into five acts. 
The first consists of the events leading up to the disorders under what he calls 
the effective and able guidance of that august administrator, Sir Michael 
O'Dwyer. Sir Michael, he says, 'never lost an opportunity to proclaim to the 
rest of India the loyalty and magnificent sacrifices of the (Punjab) province.' 
Even on occasion he thinks in 'a most aggressive and offensive form' (Mohan 
1920: 2). Hence, Mohan notes how on the 7th April 1919, only a week before 
martial law was declared, and in his last speech to the Punjab Legislative 
Council, O'Dwyer observes: -
'Gentlemen, I have often been criticised for dwelling on the achievements of 
the Punjab in season and out of season. But my pride in the province is based 
on no parochial spirit. I have spent 15 years away from it, during which I have 
seen many other parts of India. 
I might say: -
'Much have I seen and known - cities of men, 
And manners, climates, councils, governments. 
But nowhere did I find the same qualities as the Punjab can show from the 
prince's palace down to the peasant's hut. I found I could meet the Punjabee, 
whatever his class or condition, as man to man without suspicion or mistrust. I 
found him in the mass - and I refer primarily to the rural masses - loyal but 
not subservient, brave but not boastful, enterprising but not visionary, 
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progressive but not pursumg false ideals or mistaking the shadow for 
substance .... 
I regard it as great privilege to have lived and worked with such a people and 
to be closing my service amongst them .... ' (in Mohan 1920: 2). 
The week before, during one of the stops on his tours - at Gujranwala -
exhorting people in the Punjab to join in supporting, mainly by providing 
manpower, the war effort, we find in his words another instance of his 
confidence and pride in the Punjab: -
'It is a great pleasure to me to come among you today and to have this 
opportunity of meeting so many friends whom I have not forgotten and who 
have not forgotten me, to hear such good accounts of the progress of the town 
and district and to be able to congratulate you on the staunch loyal support 
which I and my office have received from you during my six years term of 
office and particularly during the critical period ofthe war. ... 
As you know Gujranwala was slow in starting but under the stimulus given to 
your efforts by the vigorous personality of Colonel O'Brien, it made a notable 
advance in the last year of the war, and in the 11 months from December 1917 
to October 1918 it raised 7,000 recruits for the army. 
When the war ceased you had about 13,000 men in the army and in proportion 
to your male population while far below Amritsar and Gurdaspur, you were 
equal to your neighbours in Sialkot and a good way better than Lahore. So 
Gujranwala though not in the first rank has removed the reproach that would 
have attached to it had you allowed other people to fight your battles. In the 
matter of War Charities the generosity of Gujranwala has been conspicuous 
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and Lady O'Dwyer desires me to express her gratitude to the zealous workers 
who gave such liberal and unfailing support to the Red Cross and Comforts 
Fund. 
And now Gentlemen, I take leave of you with a heart saddened by the thought 
that I shall not see you again. Many happy days I have spent here, but I find 
comfort in the recollection of the many and valued friends I have made here' 
(in Mohan 1920: 3). 
Yet, Mohan wonders at his conceit; for when the curtain rises a second time -
and the time Mohan fixes on is the 10th April in Amritsar - we are confronted 
with scenes of panic, murder, riot, arson and bloodshed. Perhaps, hints at what 
is to become the second scene of the drama are to be gleaned from the night 
before. According to Sayer, on the 9 th Miles Irving, the Deputy Commissioner, 
witnessed extraordinary 'scenes of fraternization between Hindus and Muslims, 
including the public sharing of water vessels' (Sayer 1991: 137). Perhaps, the 
unease these extraordinary instances of fraternization instilled in Miles Irving 
led O'Dwyer to order the deportation from Amritsar of two prominent 
campaigners against implementation of the Rowlat bills. 7 
And so when on the 10th news of this spread, crowds gathered, determined to 
breach the civil lines - the name given to the area where Europeans lived - and 
protest against the deportations outside Miles Irving's bungalow. They were 
confronted by troops equally determined to keep them back. Borrowing a 
description from Sayer, 
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, ... by the end of the day many buildings had been looted and burned down, 
and five Europeans had been beaten to death. One such assault, the attack on 
the manager of the City mission school, Miss Sherwood - who was left for 
dead, but was given first aid by Hindu shopkeepers - was particularly to 
incense Dyer, who arrived in Amritsar late the next evening to take effective 
control of the city from the civil authorities. The rest of the European women 
and children were safely ensconced in the fort by 4 p.m. on the 10 April. The 
railway lines had been damaged, and the telegraph and telephone wires cut. 
Word came in, magnified by rumor, of riot, murder and arson elsewhere in the 
Punjab' (Sayer 1991: 137-138). 
By the third act scripted by Mohan, we witness scenes of devastation and 
destruction, where official bloodletting reaches new heights of 'vindictive 
lawlessness, both before and after the proclamation of martial law' (Mohan 
1920: xvii). In the district of Gujranwala, two weeks after O'Dwyer's speech 
eliciting recruits for the war effort, Mohan tells us how machine guns and 
airplanes were deployed against disorder (Mohan 1920: 3). Amidst such scenes, 
Mohan unfolds the penultimate act in his drama; the clash of opposing forces. 
Their clash is magnified, depicting a colossus of disorder bearing down upon 
the civilization that Europeans have brought with them to bestow on those less 
fortunate than they are. 8 
According to Mohan, many column inches in the Anglo-Indian press, and 
numerous hours of debate in the Imperial Legislative Council, are given to 
justifying the extraordinary responses that such a situation demanded from the 
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authorities. It began, he thinks, a 'white washing process' that would be 
completed by Lord Hunter's Committee ofInquiry. 
It is in this condition that we approach the fifth act, for him the most important 
part of the drama so far. At stake here for Mohan, as I point out above, are 
grave issues concerning the future of India. Specifically, 'the contentment of 
the people of India and the honor and reputation of England as well as the 
mutual goodwill of the European and Indian people' (Mohan 1920: xvii). He 
admits the arguments will be passionate. In these scenes we will witness, he 
thinks, people's attempts to bring the perpetrators of terrorism to justice, and 
the government's counter-attempts to 'shield their proteges from the 
consequences of their misdeeds' (Mohan 1920: xvii). 
At the time Mohan began writing 'An Imaginary Rebellion ... ' (1920) the 
Punjab Sub-Committee's report on the disturbances, cataloguing the 
humiliations of the martial law regime, lay ready. 9 Mohan confidently asserts 
that before the curtain comes down on this final act we should know the moral 
and political repercussions of the tragic drama of the Punjab disturbances and 
the lallianwala Bagh massacre. He hopes it would be a restoration of Britain's 
imperial mission to carry civilization to the nether regions of the world. 
Thus a tragic tale of errors can mean only one thing. They should detract only 
for a moment and not a second longer from the sound and honorable purpose 
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and policy of British rule in India. That the moments of terror and humiliation, 
slaughter and persecution, imprisonment and transportation (to the Adnam 
islands usually), are so intensely felt is for him only so much confirmation of 
these honorable purposes. Now is the time for justice and reparation. But, he 
warns, justice must be delivered in full measure, only then he argues can the 
bitter memories of 1919 be obliterated from the collective recollections of the 
people ofIndia. 
The first step in such an obliteration he says must be to bring to trial those 
responsible for the cruel and vindictive enforcement of the regime of martial 
law, thereby bringing the name of the government into disrepute. It is for the 
sake both of Indians and England that Mohan asks for an assurance that cruel 
and inhuman acts will never again tarnish the name of Great Britain. That 
name, so long synonymous in her colonies, with the 'principles of justice, 
liberty and Imperial rectitude ... may ... be irretrievably lost' (Mohan 1920: 183). 
Thus, whatever his criticisms of the brutalities and barbarisms of 1919, and 
there are many, he seeks to rescue British honor and its civilizing mission from 
the funeral pyre. From the still burning embers, he says, a new more rigorous 
monument to progress is about to arise, inaugurating a new era in 
'the history of our connection with England. It is proper that ... [we]. .. should 
begin with a clean slate and that all rankling sense of injustice over the past 
acts of the Government or its officials should disappear without leaving the 
slightest trail behind. Let us enter upon the era of peaceful reconstruction with 
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mutual confidence and goodwill: and let not the dawn of the new era be 
darkened with the clouds of suspicion and mistrust (Mohan 1920: 183/4). 
(b) Another Comprehensive attempt at Redemption - V N Datta (1969) 
Mohan's account of the Punjab disturbances is plotted as an insightful and epic 
drama, in which he attempts to resolve the contradictions in Britain's imperial 
mission. V N Datta's early contribution, Jallianwala Bagh (1969), though 
similarly epic in its dimensions, is less so in its refusal to restore the 
monumental vision of empire (Datta 1969). There is little to be rescued in this 
sense Datta thinks from the scenes of rubble that Mohan writes about. Datta's 
emphasis rather is on how the disturbances, and Gen. Dyer's actions, are 'an 
expression of the confrontation between ruler and ruled' (Datta 1969: ix), 
without the tale of redemption told by Mohan. The scenes of a tragedy of errors 
that Mohan recounted will, Datta argues, never be redeemed. He describes the 
tyrannical rule of India by the British not so that he can retrieve it from the 
funeral pyre, by some reconciliation between ruler and ruled. On the contrary 
he argues, the 'lallianwala Bagh was the parting of the ways between the 
British and Indians' (Datta 1969: ix). IO An unstoppable parting of the ways he 
argues, that gave great ' ... impetus to the struggle for India's freedom, because 
people [realized they] could no longer afford to be complacent' (Datta 1969: 
173). 
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In my introduction we saw how ashamed some honored Indians were at the 
administrations actions, Tagore being prominent among them. In time, 
Rabindrinath Tagore now added, the present shock of disillusionment would 
pass away and 
'form the basis of the new era of the career of national self-respect, spiritual 
emancipation and national progress only by freeing ourselves from the spirit of 
dependence and mendicancy, casting out fear and guarding ourselves against 
the wasteful destruction of impotent rage and revengeful resentment.' 11 
Using the words of a resident of Arnritsar, Datta neatly sums up what he sees as 
the new situation 
Ab to hai apne sud 0 zyen par mujhe 
Voh din gha ke lab peh mere ji hazur thaa. 
We know now what's good or bad 
p We are no more yes- men. -
Of course Datta is reluctant to rebuild the edifice of Britain's imperial mission. 
He carefully highlights the historical specifics and complexities of such a 
mission. Yet, in his desire to propel into the history of the lallianwala Bagh a 
burgeoning Indian nationalist sentiment that confronts an equally belligerent, 
though by now anxious, British imperialism, his argument, borrowing a 
description from Young ' ... functions as an overall syncretic frame' (Young 
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1990: 173). Such an argument works as a transcendentalising historical gesture 
to produce what Benjamin calls 'the historical outlook of historicism' 
(Benjamin 1992: 247). An emphasis that proclaims, 'the truth will not run away 
from us', it is waiting to be recovered (Benjamin 1992: 247).13 This of course 
is a profoundly political gesture. It is not naIve to think or want such and 
analysis. But more to the point Datta complements such an emphasis with a 
complicated story of political protest. 
Hence Datta devotes the whole of chapter one of his Jallianwala Bagh (1969) 
to recovering the origins of the growing nationalist sentiments and plotting 
their rise (Datta 1969). Herein perhaps, more than his refusal to reconstruct the 
imperial mission lies his disagreement with and difference from Mohan. 
Insightful though Mohan's work is, for Datta it is not insightful enough. I 
suggest that this is not regret by Datta that Mohan excludes such a context as 
part of the background to the disturbances and the massacre, but the desire for a 
yet fuller account of the Massacres et al as an event. What Datta means in other 
words is that Mohan's book is not voluminous enough. He thinks it remains 'at 
best a chronicle of events derived from official reports: Legislative Council 
Debates and Ordinances, but not from the Hunter Committee evidence' (Datta 
1975: 8).14 Not only, according to this argument, does Mohan's account of the 
disturbances, the massacres and the martial law regime depend largely on 
official sources, there is a great lacuna in its perusal of the documentation. The 
official report of the disturbances had not yet been completed. Thus, however 
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fulsome Mohan's attempts at ascertaining the truth, and however much Mohan 
defines his project as being about placing the truth 'in its naked form before his 
readers,' and howsoever 'unpleasant that task has [personally] been' (Mohan 
1920: xviii), it is not, for Datta, complete enough. 15 
As I argue above, this engagement with Mohan's text by Datta is clearly based 
on the assumption that it is desirable, possible even, to get to the whole truth of 
the events at Amritsar as an event, and to describe the past as it really was. In 
order to articulate it as it really was, it is necessary to deny those accounts that 
fall short of the exacting requirements he, and this conception of history, 
demands of them. 16 Evidence of what went on during early 1919 is stacked up 
and up, because it is assumed that in this way we can get at its reality. Then, 
when we come to writing it up the words we use will be nothing but merely a 
'reflection of the real.' Michel de Certeau for instance aptly describes this type 
of historical discourse, when he writes that it 
gIves itself credibility in the name of the reality which it is supposed to 
represent, but this authorized appearance of the 'real' serves precisely to 
camouflage the practice which in fact determines it. Representation thus 
disguises the praxis that organizes it (de Certeau 1986: 203). 
The denial of the role and place of a mediating historian is somewhat ironic, 
though perhaps understandable. Ironic because it is plainly Datta - an historian 
- who argues and therefore puts himself between the material and its writing -
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it is writing he says, that is not complete enough. Understandable, in that he 
wants to win the political battle over its comprehension as a confrontation 
between ruler and ruled, and wins it via a tradition of historical writing that 
defines its project in terms of finding the truth. 
Whilst it is impossible by this means to falsify Mohan's interpretations, the 'at 
best' formulation, allows Datta at the very least to side-step them and continue 
with his immensely scholarly and important task. 
Datta's engagement with Mohan's tome entails a claim as to how the study of 
history should proceed. His own contribution(s) and I am thinking here in 
particular of his Jallianwala Bagh 1969, though rigorous in its applications of 
the 'historical project,' also has its own supplements. They cannot be reduced 
to technical or methodological imperatives of the passage of time as progress. 
Commonly deemed a linear conception of historical time. Enormously 
interesting from this point of view is the first chapter in the above book. As he 
enumerates the history of nationalist sensibilities among the diverse 
populations of India for instance, our attention is not solely drawn to the 
recovery of pre-existing and invariant traditions of political protest that cohere 
around a stable national culture. Rather it is drawn to their immense 
complexity, taking different shapes in the course of argument and negotiation. 
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Thus, important as this project is - politically, there is a certain integrity at 
stake in the struggles for independence of Indians - we do well to remember 
that, as well as such coherence, traditions of political protest acquire power and 
resonance through their profound anti -conformism. In this sense, Datta's 
historical context doesn't correspond to a pre-given reality out there that he 
meticulously recovers and catalogues. I propose rather that his foray into the 
growing demands for freedom by the diverse populations of India should be 
read another way. They should be read as an exegesis on the creation and 
construction of complex movements with inter-cultural, inter-national and 
trans-national networks that mediate against their easy location within a 
mapping of history as progress. 
Instead of presenting us only with an uncomplicated narrative of the rise of 
nationalist sensibilities, he draws attention to their messy realities; to their 
unstable and changeable character and to their emergent identifications. The 
story of Amritsar presents us then with a window of opportunity. An 
opportunity for exploring beyond this genre's demands for the last word. In this 
sense, the stories about Arnritsar, this story of Amritsar, in spite of following a 
certain tradition, is more than just about recovering the events as an event. 
(c) The Case of Guy Horniman (1920) 
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Datta's scholarship is first and foremost driven by the desire to offer his readers 
a complete and definite account of the events of 1919, notwithstanding my 
reading of his opening chapter that suggests his writing turns out to be about 
more than that. Datta reads the events as an expression of a confrontation 
between ruler and ruled. 
Guy Horniman's book Amritsar and Our Duty to India (1920), offers us some 
other interesting supplements on the theme of what really happened. Central to 
that is his claim to have based his account on personal observations and 
experience. Hence, making explicit the importance of his role in narrating the 
story. 
Regarded by many as an effective propagandist in the cause of Indian Home 
Rule, he edited the Bombay Chronicle. 17 His ' ... pungent criticisms of British 
rule ... ' over a number of years, ensured that he attracted the ire of the 
Government ofIndia in droves (Draper 1981: 113).18 The Governor of Bombay 
notes one such incident and remarks on it with barely concealed alarm. Thus, 
he notes that 'on Tuesday 8th (April 1919) ... Horniman published in ... the 
Chronicle a passive resistance manifesto in which methods of resistance to 
certain laws were explained.' 19 Only a month before Horniman had shown what 
a thorn in the Government of India's side he was with a series of notable 
diatribes in the Chronicle of 11 March 1919. Commenting on the strangulation 
of Indian industries by selfish alien rulers, the Chronicle agreed with a recent 
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speech by Sir PC Ray. For him the masses must be alerted to this fact and that 
until they had sufficient cognizance of it, they would continue to be the 
'victims of those who ... despoil them of the fruits of their labor' (in Datta 1975: 
915). 
After conferring with the Viceroy about the grave situation in Bombay the 
Governor of Bombay decides at last that ' ... Horniman must be deported.' The 
Governor adds: 
'I have shown great patience and done all I can to bring public opinion round 
on the side of the Gove111ment, but it is no longer possible to allow open 
advocacy oflaw breaking to continue.' 20 
On 27th April and for some not before time, Horniman would be put on board 
the S.S. Takada, which set sail from Bombay, and deported to England. 
Deported, according to the Viceroy, ' .. .in view of the inflammatory propaganda 
being conducted by him.' Propaganda the authorities reasoned would ' ... be a 
cause of...the ... recrudescence of...trouble and also ... ferment ... discontent 
among the troops by the free distribution to them of his paper'.21 
Planning ahead, the Secretary of State for the Colonies sent word by telegram 
to the Governor of Gibraltar, and administrators in Malta, that Horniman 
'should not be granted a passport to return to India.'22 If they hoped by this 
means to silence him they were in for a shock. Paraphrasing Draper, 'what 
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could be done ... with impunity .. .in India could not be done in England ... '. 
Homiman knew this and needless to say , ... seized his deportation as an 
opportunity to write an account of the events in the Punjab ... based ... on his 
personal experiences and observations' (Draper 1981: 114). 
Homiman continued to mock Sir Michael O'Dwyer's attempts to silence the 
press. Thus: 
'One of the greatest counts in the indictment against Sir Michael O'Dwyer. .. is 
the policy of concealment which he deliberately pursued ... From the beginning 
every newspaper in the Province was placed under pre-censorship by the 
Government and nothing, either by comment or reports of events could be 
published without being submitted for official approval and sanction. In this 
way the publication of inconvenient exposures of the methods that were being 
pursued was prevented at one stroke' (in Draper 1981: 114). 
Of course Homiman's departure from the scene didn't go unheeded or indeed 
unmarked. As news spread of his deportation, and the politicians came under 
pressure to react in some way to show their disapproval of the authorities ac-
tions, Gandhi convened a meeting of the Satyagraha Sabha on the 4 May 1919. 
The Sabha decided, 'after mature deliberation that next Sunday 11th instant 
should be the day of observance of Hartal, fasting for 24 hours reckoning from 
previous evening and private religious devotion in every home.' 23 
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If the Government hoped, by deporting Horniman, to stem the flow of 
wounding invective coming from his direction, they failed miserably. The point 
being that Horniman took his deportation as an opportunity to write his own 
account of the Punjab disturbances, published as Amritsar and Our Duty to 
India (1920).24 
Based on his personal observations and experiences, (he apparently stood near 
the scene), Amritsar and Our Duty to India (1920), is a provocative and highly 
polemical indictment of the British bureaucracy and military. That the events of 
1919 should be completely accessible to Horniman without mediation, is just 
one of the underlying assumptions of an account that places an undue emphasis 
on being a first hand description of what appeared to the senses. In this case 
what he witnessed and experienced. Yet precisely because Horniman's 
description in this sense is explicitly tied to his narration of events as a 
dereliction of imperial duty, the urgency and exactitude of those descriptions 
carries a strong emotional charge. His representations of those events are 
informed by his adherence to the task of piecing the fragments of British honor 
back together, after its soiling at the hands of a few, but thoroughly determined 
officials.25 A similar task perhaps to the one undertaken by Mohan: The 
recovery of the Imperial mission. 
Thus, he is scathing in his remarks about Sir Michael O'Dwyer's tenure as 
Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab. Not surprisingly he felt the full weight of 
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O'Dwyer's measures against the press. He terms them deliberate policies of 
concealment. Hence: 
' ... every newspaper in the Province was placed under pre-censorship by the 
Government and nothing, either by comment or by reports of events, could be 
published without being submitted for official approval and sanction. In this 
way the publication of inconvenient exposures of the methods that were being 
pursued was prevented in one stroke' (in Draper 1981: I 14 )?6 
If this wasn't stain enough on British honor his suggestion that the punishments 
and humiliations meted out to all and any Indians who transgressed the martial 
law rules, made up often at a soldier's whim, conformed to a pattern that 
seemed more than mere coincidence. He went further. 
It seems hardly conceivable that fortuitous circumstances could have 
produced, at one moment and in one Province of the Empire a coterie of 
officials who were capable of the frightful excesses which occurred in the 
Punjab last year. It is hardly credible that the moment should have found ready 
to hand the men to commit these excesses directly the opportunity occurred, 
and to vie with one another in their severity and cruelty. The question must 
suggest itself to the mind of those who know the British Character as it really 
is, whether it was not by premeditated design that the right men were in their 
places ready for the job when the moment arrived (in Draper 1981: 116). 
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What at first sight may appear to be a gentle suggestion - i.e. that a group of 
officials came together to plan and execute the massacre - the punishments and 
humiliations of 1919, he argues, suggest something rather more momentous. 
The shock of the gentle is deceptively traumatic. Horniman's seeming disbelief 
that the excesses of 1919 are anything but fortuitous is tied to the suggestion 
that those who really know the British character could not help but ask 
themselves the question whether those occurrences were not in some sense 
premeditated. The guilt of a few is used as a weapon, in a way that resembles 
Mohan's project. Whilst I do not intend to pursue the argument further here, 
what seems to be being paraded is an overpowering spectacle of 
disempowerment, even if ultimately, certainly in Mohan's case, to return us to 
an innocent pursuit of progress (civilization). 
Doubtless the urgency of this history - history with a capital H - to tell it as it 
is, in the hope of rescuing something productive from the wreckage, is 
undermined somewhat for many traditionalists by its polemical tone. Because 
of course it is supposed that in the best traditions of history, as I note above, the 
constructive principle is held in abeyance. Moreover Datta's comment that 
although Horniman stood near the scene he had no access to the, as yet 
unavailable, official records somewhat adds to traditional historical criticisms 
of its incompleteness. 
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Certainly for instance in the rush to weld the baton of premeditation27 
according to these models of history, it is a prerequisite that some evidence 
tending towards that conclusion be tendered. If Homiman is reluctant or is 
unable to do so in a way that satisfies the requirements of historicist methods, 
then among the other secondary literature, Raga Ram's writing of History is 
another attempt to do so. 
(d) Ram's Conspiracies (1969) - A Premeditated Plan? 
The title of Raga Ram's book, The Jallianwala Bagh Massacre: A 
Premeditated Plan (1969) gives away his particular emphasis. In what can be 
described as a supplement to Datta's writings, or even perhaps Mohan's, Ram 
suggests, like Datta before him, that the 'great massacre was the inevitable 
clash between two diametrically opposed forces, those of Imperialism and 
Nationalism' (Ram 1969: 142). His twist lies, though rather ironically Mohan 
and Datta signal much of it, in his claim that 
the massacre was not the result of a decision taken by an individual (General 
Dyer) on the spur of the moment, but of a premeditated plan, carefully 
designed in advance, and executed on the appointed day, by the British 
bureaucracy (Ram 1969: vii). 
The lallianwala Bagh in this sense is only where 'the final showdown' between 
the two great monoliths of imperialism and nationalism takes place. Of course 
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we are already aware, even if only seemingly, that this view is not as contrived 
or as outlandish as some suggest.28 Even those most reticent of committees, 
reticent in their thorough determination to check, cross check and check again 
every piece of testimony so that it constitutes evidence of this reality, the 
Punjab Sub-Committee, left the door open to such possibilities. Tied still to a 
conception of History as knowing and uncovering the truth, because, as Jayakar 
says, 'we do not have enough evidence before us to support a definite finding,' 
they tacitly admit that doesn't mean they have no evidence (in Draper 1981: 
202). 
The coup d'etat in the battle over this particular detail, and by implication, in 
the larger battles for a singular explanation of 1919, as an event in which the 
Bureaucracy conspired to teach Indians a lesson, lies in a number of 
interrelated suggestions, which concern a character called Hans Raj .29 Yet, 
Ram only devotes half a page to a consideration of his role. But, this particular 
detail can also be read as an opportunity to move us beyond singular 
explanations. 
One of the organizers of the Jallianwala Bagh meeting,30 many thought Raj a 
police informer (Mohan 1920: 117-25) (Datta 1969: 166). Indeed, according to 
a leading article in the Bombay Chronicle of 15 July 1920, Hans Raj, ' ... was in 
active touch with the police ... and ... a death trap had been laid by police 
underlings to help the authorities ... teach a lesson to the citizens of Amritsar' 
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(Datta 1975: 166). Raj announced before and during the gathering of people for 
the meeting, the presence of a notable speaker, who it transpired, never 
attended.3l When an airplane flew over the Bagh frightening the audience, Raj 
calmed their fears by urging them to remain seated and not to worry. According 
to Datta, 
he told the people that the 'Government will never fire.' After a while he 
waved his handkerchief and Dyer and his soldiers appeared. Hans Raj then 
stepped down from the platform and disappeared in their direction on the 
pretext of having a talk with them. Immediately after this the shooting began. 
Hans Raj had already left the meeting' (Datta 1969: 163). 
Hans Raj managed to evade attention for a few days. But, extraordinarily 
perhaps for a so-called police informer, according to Mohan, the police arrested 
him on 16 April. Subsequently the authorities accused him of sedition and 
wagmg war. Yet, Mohan continues, four days later he became the chief 
approver in the Amritsar Leaders case (Mohan 1920: 120).32 
Known before the Bagh for his vigorous, albeit recent, championing of the 
Indian freedom movement broadly construed, just as extraordinarily he 
somersaulted into the role of government approver. He described his apparent 
change of allegiance thus: 
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On my arrest was taken to fort, was kept with other persons arrested .... For 
four days there made no statement, was not questioned. No one said I was to 
be shot. I was taken to Kotwali, and placed in lock-up. On reaching Kotwali I 
was asked to make a statement and I said I was ready to do so. I was put 
before a magistrate and I made my state ment .... After my statement I went to 
lock-up. No police officer spoke to me after that. When I made my statement I 
was not given a pardon. I was given a pardon on the 24th May (in Mohan 
1920: 120). 
With more than a touch of irony, Mohan is amazed. How, he asks, on the basis 
of this statement, could 
the genuine patriot, the intrepid lieutenant of Dr. Kitchlew and Dr. Satyapal and the 
great leader of the lallianwala 8agh, to whom General Dyer's bullets were blank 
cartridges, became an approver without the slightest persuasion or inducement, 
without any pressure or threats by the police, without even a pardon by the police. 
Such selfless altruistic approvers are indeed a rare commodity. Who could have played 
the police spy to a greater perfection? (Mohan 1920: 120). 
In addition to his comments about Hans Raj and his proclivities, Ram suggests 
the existence of a plan to 'shoot well' those residents of Arnritsar, who attended 
the Bagh that day (Ram 1969: 175). On the 9 April 1919, he says, a group of 
officials met at Government House, Lahore, and decided that no better oppor-
tunity presented itself than the day's Baisakhi celebrations, to carry out their 
'nefarious plan' (Ram 1969: 175). 
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Yet, a little later Ram adds, 'what actually transpired among the few top offi-
cers of the Government [on] the evening of 9 April, nobody can now know' 
(Ram 1969: 176). Nevertheless, he insists the authorities knew on the evening 
of the ninth that trouble might occur on the thirteenth and laid their plans 
accordingly.33 
Like other historians we have encountered so far Ram tries to offer us a com-
pelling account of the events of 1919. In this sense the narrative elements of the 
plot structure are as important as the specific claim to the way things really 
are. 34 It is not inconceivable that the colonial government felt under such siege 
from growing nationalist sentiments, that they convinced themselves the only 
way to prevail on Indians that they would remain under British rule come what 
may, was by military might. To do that they had to deliver a blow that would 
reverberate throughout the land and across Britain's other imperial possessions. 
Ram searches for the crucial detail that will assure us of a complete and 
definitive meaning in terms of a predetermined plan. Thus, he says, on the 
evening of 12 April Sir Michael O'Dwyer informed the authorities at Simla by 
telephone of the state of affairs in Amritsar and elsewhere. They replied, he 
says, that 'if troops had to fire, they should make an example' (Ram 1969: 
178). Ram doesn't give us any reference for this quote. It may be this lack and 
others like it that led Sayer to comment that Raga's claim of a premeditated 
plan is unsupported by the evidence (Sayer 1991: 133). 
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Of course this engagement with Ram's work is premonish. But, perhaps 
deserving - for it fails in its own terms. Ram does after all write about and seek 
to analyze the events of 1919 as an event. In the absence of evidence to support 
his hypothesis his claims are, to borrow a recent phrase from Datta, 'ridiculous' 
(Datta 2000: 4). Ram's story remains opaque. 
For me of course this is not a cause for despair, or indeed lament in the terms 
used by Pearay Mohan. It is merely an acute incitement to my project; that is, 
to analyze; 
(a) Forms of colonial government; 
(b) Roles of the military within colonial government; and 
(c) The shaping of those who would exercise rule - the ethos of a 'military man'; 
those of an 'administrative man'; and those of a man who finds himself in 
, government.' 
My task is to read the events of 1919, in this instance as elaborated by Ram, 
otherwise, otherwise than as a government conspiracy. 
(e) A turn to biography - General Dyer: a Case of Mis-representation 
(1964) 
Arthur Swinson's book Six Minutes to Sunset: The Story of General Dyer and 
The Amritsar Affair (1964), is another work in broadly the same genre as many 
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of the others I have discussed here - engaged in a recuperation of the events as 
an event. He battles to define Amritsar, and does not flinch from claiming that 
General Dyer's actions were justified, on the grounds of a perceived threat to 
the Empire from Afghanistan. In other words Dyer merely carried out his duty 
as a soldier and protector of European, particularly women's, lives. 
At the outset Swinson defines his task in grandiose terms. His quest is proposed 
in a series of questions prompted by opposing stands, as he sees them, in the 
existing debates and literature. The city of Amritsar he says has become 
synonymous with violence, emblematic of the violence of the military against 
civilians. Its horrors are still imprinted on the Indian mind. The English mind is 
similarly tortured regarding, in turns, General Dyer as a dutiful guardian of a 
whole way of life or a 'sadistic butcher.' None of these views is obviously 
satisfactory, for he asks, 
but what is the truth? Who was Dyer and what kind of man was he? How did 
this extraordinary incident come about? Every time there is violence against a 
civilian population, such as Sharpville or Budapest, the name of Amritsar is 
mentioned again and all the old arguments, the charges and counter-charges 
reappear, but.., very few people know the facts ... The truth has become buried 
beneath a rising mound of prejudice, suspicion and hatred (Swinson 1964: 1). 
According to him over the years the entanglement of 'moral, military, legal and 
constitutional' issues concerning Amritsar and the Bagh has added to their 
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opacity (Swinson 19644: 1). No one, he says, 'has attempted to separate the 
various issues'; nor does anyone' ... assess the Amritsar affair on a realistic 
basis' (Swinson 1964: 1). 
However after setting out on a grand quest for the truth he is suddenly aware of 
its compensatory rhetoric. He settles instead for a more modest project. 
Certainly analyzing the Amritsar affair in a less absolutist sense, as far as 
getting to a truth is concerned, and on a realistic basis, is a more pragmatic 
position from establishing what really happened. What really happened 
assessing on this basis it seems is that Dyer took the action he did because he 
feared both for his safety and the safety of the women and children who lived 
behind the civillines.35 
Perhaps it is Swinson's pragmatism that leads at the end of his quest, to a 
begrudging recognition of some of the problems that beset any colonists' 
history of the Bagh. If, he says, it is 'complained that the foregoing chapters 
have been written from the British viewpoint as it then appeared ... [I would an-
swer] that is inevitable' (Swinson 1964: 204). The burden of history it seems is 
too much to bear. Thus, 
in this drama, Dyer is the protagonist and the politicians, British and Indian are 
the antagonists. Gandhi, Nehru, Jinnah, together with the small fry like 
Satyapal, and Kitchlew were fighting to free their country from what they 
regarded as alien domination, and one can sympathise with them and respect 
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them for it. One can forgive them their duplicity, their lies, they're 
dissembling; the way of patriots is hard and they had to battle on the best way 
they could. One can even forgive them their conceit; the belief that all their 
troubles were due to the British and that they will disappear when India 
assumes responsibility of her own destiny; that they were ready, even in the 
early twenties to take over the country (Swinson 1964: 204/5). 
Although Swinson has submitted rather meekly to an antecedent reality that lies 
outside the realm of disputation, he does nevertheless appreciate the mutual 
exclusivity of the respective points of view - British and Indian. He is not too 
enamoured of certain British points of view either. His distaste in this instance 
is because they are those of Edwin Montagu, Secretary of State for India, and 
an Anglo-Jew.36 He is harder on them, particularly on Montagu, than he is on 
the so-called Indian patriots. He can forgive these patriots their du plicity. What 
is harder to forgive he argues, is 'the duplicity of British politicians; the 
hypocrisy of a man like Montagu, who could tell the House of Commons that 
Britain did not rule India by domination or the rule of force, but by partnership' 
(Swinson 1964: 205). 
The refuge that a realistic basis for assessment of Amritsar momentarily 
provided from the onerous demands of truth, is now a cauldron of com plexities. 
Swinson soon returns us to the certainties of his earlier cultural logic. This is 
after this hesitating detour through the complexities that an Anglo-Jew like 
Montagu brings to the equation. The inevitability that his history is written 
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from the British point of view, sealed off from an Indian one is reinforced 
through a mutual recognition of an eternal truth. Hence, ' ... the truth was, and 
both the British and the Indians knew it, that the British governed India or any 
other place by force' (Swinson 1964: 205).37 
Swinson starts by defining his project in terms of a quest for the truth of 
Amritsar. Then he moves to the deceptively less onerous task of offering his 
readers a purely descriptive task that accounts for the protagonists and 
antagonists. He does not stay there long though. He moves his project back 
again to a search for monumental and eternal truths of what we always knew to 
be foundational to Amritsar 1919. In this sense Swinson remains committed to 
a universal and singular narration of Amritsar as an event. Hence his lament 
when he is unable to track down Volume VI of the evidence submitted to the 
Hunter Committee Inquiry. Thus 
Even today [Vol. VI] is extremely elusive and this writer has failed completely 
to run a copy to earth even with the assistance of the British Museum, State 
Paper section, the Commonwealth Relations office, and the various specialist 
libraries in England. Montagu may have been devious and misguided, but he 
was certainly thorough (Swinson 1964: 146). 38 
Swinson's disappointment with being unable to track down the elusive volume 
VI is quickly dissipated when he tells us Dyer's last words, spoken he says to 
his daughter-in-law on the morning of 14 July 1926 (Swinson 1964: 208/9).39 
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That is not to say that Vol. VI contains such testimony. Rather that, committed 
as he is, to a universal and singular history of events, particularly as they 
impinge upon the story he tells of General Dyer, such testimony can only 
enhance his claims to tell that story as it really happened. In a sense, his 
inability to locate Vol. VI, though encoded as a failure accord ing to 
conventional models of history, is more than compensated for when we are 
introduced, in a much more immediate way, to the his story of General Dyer's 
final demise. The tension and drama of his last moments more than makes up 
for the general inadequacy Swinson undoubtedly feels at his failure to recover 
all 'the facts.' That lacuna is quickly forgotten and resolved when, with the 
General's daughter-in-law, he takes his readers into the room with him to be 
present at this most engrossing of moments. The drama of this moment is 
undeniable. His readers feel honored to be at Dyer's bedside as he breathes his 
final breath (Swinson 1964: 209). 
(f) Dyer's Pathology - Brigadier-General Dyer's State of Mind (1963) 
In his Massacre at Amritsar (1963), Furneaux doesn't dwell to any significant 
degree on the background or con text to the disturbances and massacre of 1919 
in the way for instance Datta does. Yet, he too pursues what I call a grand 
history of the events of 1919 as an event. Like Swinson he focuses on General 
Dyer. 
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Fumeaux argues that both at the time of the mas sacre and subsequently General 
Dyer suffered from arteriosclerosis. 4o Since arteriosclerosis he contends has a 
'retrograde effect' on those suffering from it, it may well be that this illness 
crept up on Dyer throughout 1919. 41 The cumulative effect of this condition is 
such, it is claimed, that 'his judgement, at times of extreme mental stress, may 
have been so impaired as to diminish his responsibility' (Fumeaux 1963: 178). 
Thus 
Prior to the incident in the laIlianwala Bagh, Dyer had been under extreme 
tension for two exhausting days. His mind had been inflamed by stories of 
brutal murder and dastardly assault. He believed the situation to be critical. In 
Amritsar he was responsible. He and he alone could save the situation in the 
Punjab. His orders ... had been disobeyed, flouted. He marched to the ... Bagh 
detennined to break up the meeting and teach the unruly mob a lesson. To 
punish them and teach them a lesson for their previous bad behavior. When he 
reached it he was excited and angry. He opened fire. The blood flowing to his 
brain became congested .... He may have misjudged the position, thinking that 
the two waves as they surged back were going to rush him. He fired at first to 
warn and punish; he continued firing because he feared his force might be 
overwhelmed. His mind became confused and he went on firing (Furneaux 
1963: 177). 
The implication of these arguments is clear. To support them Fumeaux cites the 
case of R v. Kemp 1957. Heard in the Queen's Bench Division, Kemp was 
charged with causing grievous bodily harm to his wife. His defence counsel 
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maintained that Kemp suffered from arterioscelrosis, al though he displayed no 
obvious signs of mental impairment. The incident with which he stood charged 
occurred when he temporarily lost consciousness 'from a congestion of blood 
on the brain.,42 In the original case Mr. Justice Devlin accepted counsel's ar-
gument, and allowed the appeal ruling that such a condition came within the 
McNaghten rules. 43 
For Fumeaux, insanity, at least in law, is a convenient explanation. Indeed, 
such a matter would be a convenient defence for Dyer's actions throughout this 
period. But it is, to say the least, a desperate one. There is much wringing of the 
hands, as Fumeaux agonizes over what I suggest is the defining principle of his 
investigations. That is his disbelief that the killings at the Bagh, and the 
atrocities of the martial law regime could have taken place.44 All Fumeaux's 
investigations are directed at establishing the singularity of the events of 1919 
in terms both of their marginality to the imperial project and their being 
perpetrated on the orders of an increasingly insane individual. 
It wouldn't be an exaggeration to say that Fumeaux is terrified of the disruption 
that Dyer's actions have wrought on, the supposed serene economy of colonial 
order. We can glimpse the restorative confluence of insight and anxiety in the 
following thickly layered passage much of which we have encountered before, 
but which nevertheless deserves setting out in full: 
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It is natural that we should wish to find some reasonable explanation for 
Dyer's conduct, which it seems impossible to justify. He was a British officer, 
a Colonel, an acting Brigadier, who, on his own showing, callously and in cold 
blood shot down an unarmed and unresisting crowd of natives, directing his 
fire to where the crowd were thickest, picking off those trying to escape. He 
gave no warning of his intentions, and he admitted that the crowd might be 
dispersed without firing. If he had stronger means the casualties might have 
been greater. He fired and continued to fire because he feared the crowd might 
laugh at him, make him feel a fool, not because his troops were in danger. 
Having exhausted nearly all his ammunition, he marched away leaving the 
wounded to take care of themselves. If the act had been done by a Gennan, a 
Russian or an Afrikander, we would not bother to seek an explanation. We 
would probably condemn a man of another race out of hand. Therein lies the 
danger that we may try too hard to find an excuse for Dyer; because our 
national pride demands it, we may delude ourselves, we need to realize 
(Furneaux 1963: 176). 
For skeptics there is little or no precise information on Dyer's mental condition, 
before or after 1919. 45 Indeed, Furneaux himself is careful to hedge any un-
adorned assertions about Dyer's mental stability. Arteriosclerosis may have 
been creeping up on him in 1919; his actions suggest that he was the victim of 
some mental disorder; the blood flowing to his brain may have led him to 
misjudge the position of the crowd and so on. Certainly, even for those who 
consider seriously the proposition that upon firing Dyer experienced a rush of 
blood to the brain, that lead him to imagine the crowd were getting ready to 
rush him, whereupon he directed continuing fire on the carnivalesque gathering 
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at the Bagh, this has yet to be proved. Interestingly Datta uses remarks made by 
Sir Michael O'Dwyer to cast further doubts on Fumeaux's claims. Interesting, 
not only because they contradict this account of events, but also because they 
are set out in Vol. VI of the evidence given to the Hunter Committee of 
Inquiry, a volume upon which Fumeaux does not, according to Datta, 
comment. O'Dwyer said: 
I ought to mention this in justice to Dyer. He was aware that his retreat might 
be cut off. I think, he said after he fired the first volley, the crowd made a rush. 
He thought that this was intended to intercept his retreat and he went on firing, 
but he thought afterwards (he was very frank about it) that this was one of the 
methods of egress so as to escape from the lallianwala Bagh.46 
But, gIven Fumeaux's anxieties and pressmg needs these rather technical 
criticisms ignore the power of a story which as well as being committed 
formally at least, to a conventional recovery of what really happened, weaves a 
tale of distant terror, from which we can comfortably feel removed. So when 
Fumeaux says of Dyer's proposed insanity, 'that is the kindest excuse we can 
find for [him]' he is also saying, we can once again feel at ease with ourselves 
in the sites of centralized (imperial) production (Fumeaux 1963: 177). By 
weaving a tale that exceeds the terms of its own project. In the sense that the 
power of his history stems at least as much from its formal status as narrative, 
as it does from its adherence to historicist methodologies, we are once again 
alerted to the ironies of historical evidence. It is by this means that he hopes to 
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restore the only slightly ruffled vision of the imperial project. The madness of 
an individual like Dyer can, according to this view, be put to one side. Its sheer 
exorbitance, it is thought, marginalises it.47 
(g) Collective Punishment - Helen Fein's Imperial Crime and Punishment 
(1977) 
Imperial Crime and Punishment, The Massacre at Jallianwala Bagh and 
British Judgement (1977), is an urgent attempt to explain how, 'groups 
condone, legitimate, authorize violence toward other groups which would be 
punished as criminal if committed against their own members' (Fein 1977: ix). 
She concludes, the only way, in this instance, colonial rulers can condone 
violence against the ruled is by not considering them a part of their world of 
moral obligation (Datta 2000: 5) (Cohen 2001). 
In broad-brush strokes equal to the broad canvass Fein constructs, she argues 
that collective violence, the violence that often appears in its different guises as 
'racial, religious, or communal violence,' is the scourge of the century (Fein 
1977: ix). Since the mass exterminations practiced against European Jewry 
during the 1939-1945 war, we have she adds, witnessed many instances, too 
numerous to be a final ac count, of genocide and massacre practiced against a 
range of distinct groups 'without external check' (Fein 1977: ix). In spite of its 
prevalence, she argues, we have learned very little about how it occurs and 
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whether it can be checked. To retain any belief at all in the fulfillment of the 
hopes and aspirations embodied in a document like the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights 1948, and the covenants, protocols and conventions that have 
followed, she thinks that social theorists need to develop a coherent 
explanation of collective violence. As I indicated earlier and as we see below 
she gives no quarter in the pursuit of such an explanation. 
Although there are she confesses, analyses of collective violence, these have 
been 'divided arbitrarily by disciplinary borders, regions in which the cases 
occur, and topical contexts' (Fein 1977: x). What is overlooked by these dis-
crete case studies she believes, is the 'essentially repressive nature of collective 
violence - the deliberate injury of any and sometimes all members of the tribe, 
race or community accused of the crimes of one member, or some members. Or 
accused of simply being the other' (Fein 1977: x). 
In an echo of V N Datta's writings on Amritsar she maintains that the 
lallianwala Bagh massacre should not be thought of as an isolated phenomena. 
It should be read as 'an expression of a confrontation between ruler and ruled' 
(Datta 1969: ix). Specifically, relying on and developing the work of Emile 
Durkheim, she attempts to show how the massacre (and disturbances) of 1919 
should be read as 'a prototypical instance of a repressive collective punishment 
practiced by the British in [their] black and Asian colonies' (Fein 1977: xii-
xiii). 48 
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Understanding collective violence as collective punishment, as a 'crime and 
punishment simultaneously,' enables her to explain how 
repressive sanctions - punishment designed deliberately to injure the offender -
restores the unity of a community based on mechanical solidarity, likeness of 
role, belief and habit and sentiment. An injury against one is an injury against 
all until it is expatiated. (Fein 1977: x-xi). 
A social order predicated on 'membership in racial, ethnic, religious or national 
groups tends to produce class crimes and class solidarity' (Fein 1977: xi). In 
this way, she argues, 'each class is excluded from the universe of moral 
obligation of the other' (Fein 1977: xi). The consequences of such an order 
become a common place: offences against a putative other are not recognized as 
such. The conclusion seems irresistible: 
Although crimes against members of the dominant class by members of the 
class dominated are understood by the dominant class to be crimes against all 
its members, they recognise no obligation toward the dominated class that 
impels them to punish their own crime toward the dominated (Fein 1977: xi). 
However irresistible her conclusion,49 it is not the occasion for her to throw 
hands up in despair. The urgent need she expresses for an explanation assumes 
the sense that knowing more about these massacres may place us in a better 
position to be able to prevent such explosions of violence in the future. 
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Comparing the judgements made by the British in Parliament and elsewhere 
confirms to Indians, she claims how for the most part their person and their 
claims for self-government could be violated with impunity. Yet, to reiterate 
this is not intended as an invidious exercise. She is quite clear that the 
comparisons of British judgement does not, is certainly not intended to, 
diminish the dignity of the victims as human beings. Comparisons of British 
judgement are 'both irrelevant and irreverent in weighing the pain to the 
survivors oflives cut down and wasted' (Fein 1977: xv). 
Some writers, seeking to commemorate the victims, have contrary she says to 
her portrayal, sought to identifY those present on that day in the Bagh, in 
mythical terms, as freedom fighters or martyrs in the cause of Indian freedom 
(Singh & Saggar 1996). However demeaning or distasteful it may be to portray 
the violation of Indians almost at will by the British powers, they do not have 
their dignity confirmed by such a re-writing of their collective biographies 
(Fein 1977). She prefers instead an assumption. That assumption is the 
assumption(s) of a right to be and to enjoy elementary human rights. It is a 
supposition she thinks most readers will grant. Where on the contrary, 
'dominant classes,' some of whom might be her readers 'do not grant them we 
must learn how to establish or defend these rights' (Fein 1977: xv). Such is the 
core of her project. 
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(h) Making Sense of the Massacre Beyond the Events as an Event - A 
Productive Reading - Indians as Children; Imperialists as Fathers (1991) 
Helen Fein does not undertake the kind of complex analyses that the massacres 
demand. However in a relatively recent contribution to debates Derek Sayer 
offers us an interesting supplement of fragments more attuned to and informed 
by 'a constructive principle' of history (Benjamin 1992: 254) (Sayer 1991). 
Sayer criticizes suggestions that Dyer's actions were singular. By doing so he is 
agreeing with many commentators who read Dyer's actions as being part of the 
imperial system. That manifests itself in a number of versions. Ram's view that 
the massacre was part of a nefarious plan by the British to teach so-called 
uppity Indians a lesson is a prominent one (Ram 1969). Datta of course takes 
the view that in the light of the various movements to rid India of British rule, 
the massacre, far from being an isolated phenomenon appears as an expression 
of a confrontation between ruler and ruled (Datta 1969). Fein's view that the 
massacre is a prototypical instance of a repressive collective punishment 
practiced by the British throughout their colonies, focuses squarely on an 
Imperial system (Fein 1977). 
Yet, there is another constituency that does not see the massacre as 'singular,' 
monstrous, or even sinister.50 It is with those views Sayer in the main is 
concerned. Epithets like Prussianism, used specifically to describe the actions 
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of Dyer and others involved in the administration of martial law, elicit little 
remorse or guilt from members of this constituency. Even the luke-warm 
disavowal of Dyer's actions on what appears to be the technical grounds of a 
mistaken conception of his duty, by the majority of the Hunter Committee was, 
Sayer says, deplored by the large and influential Anglo-Indian community. 
Sayer reminds us that the Houses of Parliament did not exactly condemn 
Dyer's actions (Sayer 1991). Indeed a large minority in the House of Commons 
and a majority in the House of Lords, full to the brim with ex-officials of the 
empire of one sort or another, failed to join in that condemnation. Eventually, 
to the joy of his supporters, no less a figure than a British judge appeared to 
lend his support to Dyer's actions in the course of Sir Michael O'Dwyer's libel 
action against Sir Sankaran Nair. 51 Nor should we forget the vociferous 
campaign by some sections of the press on his behalf. The Morning Post's 
campaign resulted in a substantial sum of money for the General's defense 
fund. For them too Sayer notes, Dyer's actions were no aberration. 
As we see in chapter 1, this constituency did not look for excuses. It believes 
precisely in Dyer's characterizations of his action. I had he said, simply carried 
out 'my duty - my horrible, dirty duty , (in Sayer 1991: 134). 52 The remarks, 
thoughts and actions of this ruling class constituency provide the focus for 
Sayer's discussion. It is his contention that this is a significant and perhaps a 
sufficient explanation for Dyer's actions. He argues that Dyer's contemporaries 
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were indeed correct when they believed that he had only carried out his duty his 
horrible, dirty duty. 53 To this extent he was merely articulating the views of this 
constituency, ' 'trailing his coat,' before Anglo-Indian opinion' (in Sayer 1991: 
133). 54 Thus, although 'in some quite obvious ways,' he suggests, Amritsar 
was singular, 'its explanation lies rather in the ways it was not' (Sayer 1991: 
134). 
Thus to this extent Sayer agrees with Fein. Members of a dominant imperial 
class do exclude the dominated class from their own I ••• universe of moral 
obligation' (Fein 1977: xiv). As I note in chapter one, the British have a 
history of putting down rebellions in India and elsewhere with exemplary 
brutality. Whether or not the situation in Amritsar constituted a rebellion, in the 
final analysis rule by a small minority over other peoples can be a messy 
business. The use of machine guns and bullets undoubtedly playa large part in 
guaranteeing the continuance of such rule. Often a precondition of those 
charged with ensuring the continuance of such rule is the defining of the 
actions of the dominated group, against members of the dominant group as 
crimes. Conversely they will define the actions of the dominant group against 
those dominated as legitimate punishment. 
Nevertheless characterizing the relationship between ruler and ruled as entirely 
or wholly defined by these im peratives IS, according to Sayer, 'an 
oversimplification,' and a dangerous one at that (Sayer 1991: 139. It isn't 
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simply the case, according to Sayer, that the colonial rulers of India exclude 
those whom they ruled from their domain of moral obligation. Quite the 
contrary he argues. As Dyer's evocation of duty suggests, the relationships are 
a great deal more complicated. 
Nevertheless Sayer delivers a suitably somber reading of the extent to which 
different moral standards did apply to Indian and British actions. This is not 
done, I suspect, in order to try before some later day tribunal the misdeeds of 
the past imperial administrators. Yet, it is important not to lose sight of this for 
the reasons below and I follow him in recapitulating the application of different 
standards, which resulted from the exclusion of Indians from the same moral 
standard as the British. 
All this supports the hypothesis Fein advances. Sayer's comments do not 
detract from that, but he goes beyond a simple cataloguing of them. Of course 
we should appreciate their breadth of horror. In this regard I can do no better 
than emphasize one notorious instance concerning Dyer - the so-called 
crawling order. That order should alert us to talking about the massacres and 
violence not as if they were over there, activities not a part of this British 
imperial practice. On the contrary, we should appreciate their frightfulness as 
being a part of our story, the story of an intensely moral universe, in which both 
ruler and ruled are implicated. According to Jenny Sharpe it is hard to maintain 
their separation when the putative civilized is implicated as an 'agent of torture 
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and massacre' (Sharpe 1993: 6). The emphasis is not so much on the exclu-
sion/separation of the moral universes of the ruled from those of the rulers, 
rather their moral connectedness. 
Bearing these imperatives in mind we begin to reap what Fein sows. Thus, 
according to Sayer, collective punishments were widespread. Electricity and 
water supplies, for instance, were shut off in Amritsar (Sayer 1991: 140). At 
Gujranwala,55 the authorities resorted to aerial bombardment. Among the 
targets were a student residence called the Khalsa Boarding House, and a 
wedding party of about 150 people on the roadside, making its way to 
Gujranwala.56 If the bombing of villages and the machine gunning of houses are 
not sufficiently confirmatory of Fein's hypothesis, then in her search for the 
truth, Fein readily turns to the infamous crawling order promulgated by General 
Dyer.57 It does seem then that in her search for evidence, to substantiate her 
hypothesis, Fein is spoiled for choice. 
Thus the 'crawling order' is only one of the more notorious instances ofrepres-
sive collective punishment. The so-called hallowed principles of British crimi-
nal justice, not least the bedrock 'thou art innocent until proved guilty,' were 
more honoured in their breach than in their application. So six Indians were tied 
to a triangle erected in Kaurhianwala Street and whipped for little more than 
their implication in an assault on the missionary Marcella Sherwood. Quite 
fortuitously the six breached fort discipline whilst in military custody. Such a 
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breach didn't concern the mIsSIOnary. Nor had they been charged with 
assaulting her. Indeed Dyer initially appeared reluctant to charge them. It is 
quite unlikely that they would be so charged. Evidence linking them to the 
assault was thin and in these circumstances Dyer, notwithstanding his and the 
administration's feeble concern to distinguish the innocent from the guilty, 
could not be sure that they would be found guilty of the so-called assault. So, as 
Sayer notes' ... dispensing with the niceties of a trial.. . Dyer. .. had them flogged 
there ... ' (Sayer 1991: 142). 
Yet, due process as such was not dispensed with certainly as far as Dyer 
himself is concerned. This comes across quite clearly in the protests at Dyer's 
treatment, often and ironically, stated on the grounds that a conspiracy of 
politicians (Frocks!)58 hounded him out of the army without regard to due 
process of law! It may be being a bit melodramatic to describe being asked to 
resign his commission with his one would guess not inconsiderable military 
pension intact, as being hounded out of office. But that aside, Sir Edward 
Carson spoke for many when he said: 
You talk of the great principles of liberty which you have laid down. General 
Dyer has a right to be brought within those principles of liberty. He has no 
right to be broken on the ipse dixit of any Commission or Committee, however 
great, unless he has been fairly tried - and he has not been tried.59 
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An even more passionate evocation of due process for Dyer came from Lord 
Sumner in the House of Lords: 
If General Dyer had been tried - tried in any form that you like, such as 
enables a man to have it called a trial - he would have been entitled to have a 
very definite charge formulated against him in writing before the inquiry 
began, so far as it related to him; he would have been entitled to know who 
was to be called against him; he would have been entitled to cross-examine 
those persons and to call witnesses to answer them; he would have been 
entitled to representation; he would have been entitled to be present at every 
stage of the hearing, and he would have been entitled if he chose, to offer 
himself as a witness, with the protection of advisers60 if he gave evidence, not 
in the capacity of a person who, as an officer of the Govemment, was bound to 
give an account of his doings. He would have been entitled then to be wamed 
that there were questions that he need not answer...he was heard without any 
f h . 61 o t ese protectIOns. 
Of course what allows Carson, Sumner and many others, to call for the 
application of due process in Dyer's case; to proclaim that 'to break a man 
under the circumstances of this case is very un-English', an interesting choice 
of phrase (Carson 1920 in Sayer 1991: 154); in short to sound 'a very English 
refrain' about Dyer's treatment at the hands of his detractors, and not to express 
the same or similar horror at the treatment of sundry Indians does suggest the 
exclusion of Indians from the British rulers' universe of moral obligation. It 
seems a reasonable explanation. 
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The individuals caught in a British terror mill did change their fate. Arguably 
the Amritsar massacre provided one more impetus along the road to freedom 
from the British yoke. Indeed some have called it a watershed in Indian -
British relations (Spear 1990; Sharpe 1993). The massive display of sovereign 
power is symptomatic not of a confidence in their position, but a realization of 
decline, the last massive gasp of a body that knows it has lived on borrowed 
time since 1857 (Cohen 1985; Mohanty 1991; Sharpe 1993). 
Indeed the water-shed year of 1857 inaugurated an humanitarian form of 
government in India that emphasized the values of ' ... self sacrifice, moral duty 
and devotion to others' garnered as racial superiority (Sharpe 1983: 8). It is this 
change that leads Sayer to contend that Fein's conclusion that colonial rulers 
excluded the ruled from their domain of moral obligation is an 
oversimplification. 
It is not the case, he says, that the British recognized no obligations towards 
Indians. It was because Dyer 'had acted morally - dutifully - according to the 
canons of mutual obligation between ruler and ruled, as they were defined by 
the former,' though increasingly subject to negotiation and formulation by a 
rising Indian professional class, that his actions were so vehemently defended 
by his supporters (Sayer 1991: 139). We are not entering into an a-moral 
universe here, but on the contrary into an intensely moral one. As if to 
emphasise this Sayer points to the laconic and he believes thoroughly accurate 
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observation made by Rudyard Kipling about Dyer: 'He did his duty, as he saw 
it' (Kipling 1920 in Sayer 1991: 158).62 
'Men like Dyer and O'Dwyer,' Sayer adds, 'had a clear conception of their duty 
towards Indians, and ofIndians' obligations toward the Raj' (Sayer 1991: 160). 
Central to this, Sayer argues, is the maintenance of order (often to the extent of 
inflicting massive disorder). The supreme value placed on order is predicated 
on a complex composite set of beliefs. One of the more predominant is the 
'construction of Indians as unfitted to govern themselves' (Sayer 1991: 160). 
The corollary, of course, being the construction (enduringly patriarchal, indeed 
masculinist) of white Christian men as being eminently fitted to rule over 
others less fortunate than themselves. 
The relationship that Sayer is proposmg has conveniently been expressed 
elsewhere in the Latinised vernacular, popular with those writing in English as 
Ma-bap: literally, mother-father. It designates a relationship at once protective, 
at times benevolent and certainly paternalistic. What was expected of Indians in 
return was obedience, loyalty and gratitude. Thus, 
'It was the place Indians occupied within their rulers' moral universe, not their 
exclusion from it, which explains why, in the situation that prevailed at 
Amritsar - a 'rebellion,' as it was necessarily defined by the same set of 
conceptions - they could be slaughtered for moral effect; like the cattle to 
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whom O'Dwyer once compared them, grazing, as he put it, in the shadow of 
the British oak' (Sayer 1991: 163). 
As Dyer did not tire of repeating, on that day in the Bagh he faced a stark 
choice. He faced the prospect of 'carrying out a very distasteful and horrible 
duty or of neglecting to do my duty, of suppressing disorder or of becoming 
responsible for all future bloodshed' (Dyer 1920 in Draper 1981: 155). 63 
According to Sayer, in this as in his later testimony to the Hunter Committee 
his language 'recalls nothing so much as the schoolmaster's: this will hurt me 
as much as it hurts you' (Sayer 1991: 162). Thus, to pick only one more in-
stance from Dyer's numerous testimonies, asked by Chimanlal Setalvad 
whether by adopting what he called these methods of frightfulness, it ever oc-
curred to him that he was doing the British Raj a great disservice, he replied 
No, it only struck me that at the time it was my duty to do this and that it was a 
horrible duty. I did not like the idea of doing it but I also realised it was the 
only means of saving life and that any reasonable man with justice in his mind 
would realise that I had done the right thing; it was a merciful though horrible 
act and they ought to be thankful to me for doing it...it would be doing a ... lot 
of good and they would realise that they would not to be wicked (Dyer 1920 in 
Disorders Inquiry Comm. Vol. III 1920: 126). 
Conclusion 
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In this second chapter I have attempted to show how large the literature that 
addresses Amritsar and the Massacres is. I also tried to show how that literature 
went about its tasks and how different authors joined in battles to define how it 
should be understood. The literature itself is part of the discursive production of 
Arnritsar. But my concern is rather different. It is to compose a contrary 
production. My concern is with the characterizations of three white men who 
are centrally concerned in the drama of Amritsar; and how such 
characterizations are subject to challenge and change. How I ask, are these men 
made and made as rulers? That is my history of these events. 
In order for me to get there, as I point out earlier, I treat Arnritsar as a window 
rather than as a picture on the wall. So looking through that window I treat 
Amritsar not as something we can give a faithful account of. History for me is a 
false natural object. It is plainly as I point out 'what one makes of it. It has 
never stopped changing' (Veyne 1997: 182). I choose to look through the 
window to glimpse the processes of the formations of these particular men as 
rulers. How their characters are shaped so as to exercise and conduct colonial 
government as colonial governmentality. I ask, how they become men who do 
their duty both to themselves and by India? How are they quite simply 
exemplary in that regard? 
I take each character in their turn in chapters three, four and five. Thus, in the 
next chapter, I begin my composition of Amritsar in these terms with a 
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consideration of the figure of an 'administrative' man - Sir Michael O'Dwyer. 
O'Dwyer was Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab at the time of the massacres. 
He carries forward a changing tradition of white ruler in India; an inheritor one 
moment but a professional turned out in the elite institutions of imperial rule, in 
the other. 
In chapter four I move to a consideration of a 'military' man - General Reginald 
Dyer. Dyer was for many the military hero of the hour. Almost, 'cometh the 
moment cometh the man'. A decorated soldier of some renown (he was a 
Companion of the Order of Bath - CB) in the Victoria's little everyday wars in 
India he exemplified a growing tradition of professionalism in the carrying of 
arms, but with more than a nod towards the adventurers of old. A soldier made 
in Sandhurst and the Staff College at Camberley. 
In chapter five I consider the makings of a man in the imperial government -
Edwin Montagu. He was Secretary of State for India at the time. He was 
resolutely opposed to O'Dwyer and Dyer's conduct in Imperial government. 
Cooperation was his aim and he tried and spoke his heart out to try and achieve 
it. 
I. Thanks to Gursharan Singh for bringing my attention to this invaluable work of reference. 
2. The dedication reads: 
'To the 
Revered 
and 
Sacred memory 
Ofthe Europeans 
And Indians, who died 
As the result of the disorders, 
This book is most 
Respectfully 
Dedicated 
by the 
Author' (Mohan 1920: v). 
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3. Lala Lajpat Rai, calls this assortment a 'unique collection of documents, needed to throw 
light on the various phases of the tragedy' (Mohan 1920: xxi). Hunter Committee 1920 (cmd. 
681). 
4. We appreciate just how hasty, compelling and important Mohan conceives of his task from 
the recommendation he gives to his readers. Hence he says: 
'we are so near the actual enactment of the tragedy, that it is not possible for us to have the 
proper perspective which is necessary to obtain a detached view of the history of the disorders. 
But on the other hand, it may be pleaded that we are the men who have seen these events with 
our own eyes and have heard the harrowing tales of afflicted Punjab with our own ears from the 
very lips of those who have suffered. What ever view the reader may take, the author can 
assure him that he has tried his best to ascertain the truth and place it in its naked form before 
his readers, however unpleasant that task has been on many occasions' (Mohan 1920: xviii). 
5. Lajpat Rai is one among the famous trio of radical Indian nationalists whose activities sent 
the bureaucracy into waves of panic. The others are, Lokmanya Bal Gangadhar Tilak, 
celebrated for coining the demand, 'swarag is my birth right and I shall have it;' and Bippin 
Chandra Pal. Collectively they came to be known as Lal-Bal-Pal. Rai's publications include, 
Story of my Deportation (1915); A history of The Aya Sam rag (1915); Young India: An 
Interpretation and a history of the National Movement From Within (1917); England's Debt to 
India (1917); his famous, Political Future of India (1919); The Agony of the Punjab (1920); 
India's Will to Freedom: Writings and Speeches on the Present Situation (1921). 
6. Datta tells that on the 13th April the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab moved for the 
governor-general in council to stop the normal functioning of the criminal courts in Amritsar 
and Lahore and announce martial law declared so that all offenders could be tried by court 
martial (Datta 1969: 93). 
7. For the sake of clarity, I should point out that one of the administration's claims for 
~overning India was the construction of these communities as antipathetic to each other. 
~. For the specific place of law, and by implication order, in the gospel of civilization 
generally see Peter Fitzpatrick 1992. By reference to Stephen's words he draws our attention to 
how law, our law is implicated in such a project. Hence according to Stephen our law 
' ... is ... the sum and substance of what we have to teach them. It is, so to speak, the gospel of the 
English, and it is a compulsory gospel which admits of no dissent and no disobedience' (see 
Fitzpatrick 1992: 107). 
9. This is a reference to the Report of the Commissioners Appointed by the Punjab Sub-
Committee if the Indian National Congress Vols. 1& 11 Bombay 1920. 
10. See also E J Thompson's, A Letter from India, in Datta 1969: 173. For Thompson Amritsar 
would ' ... end ... the British connexion with India.' On his response generally, as an attempt to 
sanitize the British implication in barbarism, past (the 'mutiny') and present (Amritsar and 
Jallianwala Bagh) see Jenny Sharpe 1992: 117. 
11. Rabindranath Tagore, Bombay Chronicle 25 July 1920 (in Datta 1967: 171). Iqbal, the 
Urdu poet expressed the same mood in almost identical terms: 
Har Zaarey Chaman se yeh kehti hai khake bag 
Gaafel na rehjahaan men gardun ki chaal se 
Sinchae gyaa hai khune shahidan se is ka tukhm 
Tu aansuon ki bukhl na kar is nihaal se 
The dust of the garden says to every bird in the orchard 
Do not ye remain indifferent to the ways of Heaven 
Its seed has been watered with the blood of martyrs 
Do not ye grudge to shed tears for this budding. 
In VN Datta 1967: 17112 
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12 Quoting Brahman Nath in Datta 1967: 173. 
13 Benjamin borrows these words from Gottfried Keller. 
14 Emphasis mine. 
15 Mohan is aware of this lacuna and is therefore complicit in the conception of historical 
discourse that it assumes. Dividing what he calls the tragedy of errors enacted in the Punjab of 
19 I 9 into five acts, he writes immediately after the curtain has risen on the fourth. That is after 
commentators in the Anglo-Indian press and on the floor of the Imperial Legislative Council, 
sought to exaggerate the violence in order to justifY the measures taken by the authorities. The 
Hunter Committee is appointed, but has yet to report. He therefore confines himself to 
recounting the first three acts in his drama. Though we are he admits 'so near the actual 
enactment ofthe tragedy, that it is not possible for us to have a proper perspective which is 
necessary to obtain a detached view of the history of the disorders,' it must he continues, be 
'pleaded that we are the men who have seen these events with our own eyes and have heard the 
harrowing tales of the afflicted Punjab with our own ears from the ... lips ofthose who have 
suffered' (Mohan 1920: pref.). Of course, as I note in my opening remarks, to be or remain 
detached in recounting any but perhaps especially these events, is near on impossible. Perhaps 
in this context such a statement of aims is a profoundly political one in the sense of playing and 
trying to beat the master at this own game, with his own assumptions. Mohan was a lawyer, 
and trained in the game of constructing a case. And so in fact I think Mohan knows he is 
battling in a game of validity and uses all the tricks of his trade, to make that case. 
16. See note 13 above. 
17. He warrants an entry in the 1964 edition of ' Who Was Who' Vol. IV 1941-1950. His 
associations with the Indian Freedom movement are long and varied. His entry reads, 
'Journalist and Author; President, Indian Journalists' Assoc.; ... Editor Southern Daily Mail, 
1897 - I 900; subsequently on leading English journals; Assistant Editor Calcutta Statesman, 
1906- I 9 12; Special Correspondent Eastern Bengal, 1907-8; ... founded, with Sir Pherozeshah 
Mehta, Bombay Chronicle, 19 I 3; after continued exclusion for over six years, landed Colombo 
and India Jan. 1925; Founder and Editor Indian National Herald, 1926-29; later associated with 
conduct of Bombay Chronicle and associated journals; Editor-in-Chief, Bombay Sentinel, 
1933-45.Publications: Amritsar and our Duty to India; The Agony of Amritsar (with Helena 
Normanton). Recreations: housework and loafing .... ' (Adam & Black 1964: 564). 
18. The Viceroy would later reflect in scrupulous detail on what the imperial authorities would 
regard as Horniman's deleterious career and dangerous presence in India. Horniman, he 
reasons, left him with little choice, but to do as he did! He recalls how: 
'Shortly after arriving in Bombay as editor of the Bombay Chronicle, Horniman established 
himself as prominent member of extremist section. The paper which became recognized a 
(organ) of extremist politics was conspicuous for consistently misrepresenting policy and 
intentions of Government, making personal attacks on officials and giving prominence to all 
incidents likely to arouse racial animosity'. 
Condemnation of course is never pint sized. It comes in the bucket full. He continues in this 
vein and ends with the resounding chorus of public interest. Public interest he recalls is what 
'compelled local government to use more expeditious means of removing this prime mover of 
attacks on the Government who was one ofthe most dangerous elements in the ... situation' 
Telegram from Viceroy 151511 91 9 in LlP&J!I211 I file No. 326611 9 April 191 9-Nov. 1921 p25 
- India Office records. See also National Archives India: Home Department, Simla, file No. 
204, Period 1907 to 1926, Special Branch (confidential), No. S D 523 of 1919. 
19. Letter from Governor of Bombay 15/411919 in LlP&JI1211 I file No. 326611 9 April 1919-
Nov. 192 I p3 - India Office records. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid,pI2. 
22 Ibid, p24. 
23 See n. 28 above. A Hartal is a cOlnplete cessation of economic activity - A strike! 
24 Draper includes the following paragraph as an instance of the kind of invective - so-called 
- that the government so objected to. Horniman wrote 
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'One of the greatest counts in the indictment against Sir Michael O'Dwyer, as Lieutenant-
Governor of the Punjab, is the policy of concealment which he deliberately pursued. In the first 
place, from the beginning every newspaper in the province was placed under pre-censorship by 
the Government and nothing, either by comment or reports of events, could be published 
without being submitted for official approval and sanction. In this way the publication of 
inconvenient exposures of the methods that were being pursued was prevented at one stroke' 
(Draper 1981). 
25. Swinson, who calls Horniman a 'fonnidable propagandist,' quotes his description of 
General Dyer thus: 
'The lallianwala Bagh battle is an achievement which has created for Dyer a special niche in 
the gallery offrightfulness .. .it will go down in history as an indelible blot on British rule in 
India. He did not pretend that what he did was necessary, even for the dispersal of a meeting -
he had no authority for what he did. He had no authority to make his proclamation prohibiting 
meetings. Martial law had not been proclaimed. He conceived in the wisdom of his own 
Prussian mind that the time had come to act, without rules or regulations' (in Swinson 1964: 
69). 
That Swinson labels a highly inaccurate piece of invective! 
26. We learn from the confidential papers of the Home Department files that on February 20 
1918 Homiman, as keeper of the Bombay Chronicle press, paid the maximum possible security 
ofRs.2000. 
27. It is interesting to note here that this strategy, if indeed it were a strategy, resembles that 
adopted by Gandhi and his Satyagraha movement. A kind of purity of the victim. 
2S. It is echoed to some extent in the deliberations of the Punjab Sub-Committee's Report on 
the disturbances. One of its conclusions included the claim that 'the lallianwala Bagh massacre 
was a calculated piece of inhumanity towards utterly innocent and unanned men, including 
children, and unparalleled for its ferocity in the history of modem British administration.' 
Another that the 'Martial Law Tribunals and ... Summary Courts were made the means of 
harassing innocent people, and resulted in abortion of justice on a wide scale, and under the 
name of justice caused moral and material sufferings to hundreds of men and women' (Report 
1920: chap VI). The first claim is admittedly not the same as saying that the massacre is the 
result of a carefully worked out strategy. But, according to Draper the Committee did wish to 
go further but felt it couldn't for lack of evidence. He cites the following private note written by 
M R Jayakar, one of the members of the committee: 
'On all the facts it is suggested that the meeting had been planned by Hans Raj and his 
associates with a view to making a large number of people gather at the Bagh. Whether the 
authorities at Amritsar were parties to this plan and yielded to it in their desire for revenge we 
are unable to say, as we have not enough evidence before us to support a definite finding. But it 
is any rate perfectly clear that Dyer took fullest advantage ofthe meeting in effecting on the 
inhabitants of Amritsar as condign and complete a punishment as was needed to satisfY their 
lust for revenge' (Cf. Draper 1981: 202). 
29. For a brief biographical sketch of Hans Raj see Datta (Datta 1969: 162). Also see Mohan 
(Mohan 1920: 117-120). 
30. As Ram suggests, on the 12'h July 'a meeting was held in the compound of the Hindu 
Sabha School. No president was elected. Hansraj, an active worker of the Congress, made a 
speech ... He announced that a meeting would be convened the next day in the lallianwala 
Bagh, where letters from Dr Kitchlew and Dr Satyapal would be read. He exhorted people to be 
prepared for. .. sacrifices ... and ... proposed that volunteers should be recruited, whose duty 
would be to infonn the public of the arrests made in the city, and ... said that those proposals 
would be discussed at the next day's meeting. In the end he advised that suspension of business 
should be continued till Dr. Kitchlew and Dr. Satypal were released. The audience agreed to his 
suggestions (Ram 1969: 107-108). 
31. For those inclined to find in this line of thought a total explanation for the massacres and 
disturbances and the punishments handed out under the martial law regime, it is significant they 
think that so many gathered in the hope of seeing and listening to Lala Kanheya Lal. Such 
explanations become more believable in the light of Colvin's comments. Dyer's biographer 
writes that the General believed the best way to fight the rebels would be away from the 
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winding streets of Amritsar. If only he could somehow get them out in the open, he would 
deliver his Cromwellian nightmare. Referring to the meeting at the Bagh Colvin writes, 
'this unexpected gift of fortune, this un-hoped for defiance, this concentration of the rebels in an 
open space - ... gave [Dyer] such an opportunity as he could not have devised. It separated the 
guilty from the innocent; it placed them where he would have wished them to be - within reach 
of his sword. The enemy had committed such another mistake as prompted Cromwell to 
exclaim at Dunbar, 'The Lord hath delivered them into my hands" , (Colvin 1929: 172). 
These sentiments, and Dyer's well documented refusal to do anything to prevent the meeting 
taking place as scheduled at 4.30 p.m. when he first learnt of people assembling as early as I 
p.m., leads Helen Fein to agree with Datta and presumably Ram, that a conspiracy did exist 
(Fein 1977: 34). 
32. Chief approver means accuser for the government. The Amritsar Leaders case concerned 
accusations of revolutionary conspiracy against a number of Amritsar residents. 
33. In support of his propositions and arguments he cites a note from Adjutant-General 
Hudson. The note reads 'No previous warning was received at Army Headquarters from either 
civil or local military authorities that trouble was expected at Amritsar (on the 10th April), and, 
so far as is known, the only information which the G.O. C., 16th Division, received was verbal 
information at Government House. Lahore, on the evening of the 9th that it was possible that 
trouble might occur on the 13th in Amritsar. ' Emphasis is from Ram. His source reads: Punjab 
Govt.-Home-Military-Part B-Jan. I 920-No. 256 Adjutant-General to Thompson, dated Simla, 
II Oct. 1919. 
34. Perhaps in spite of what many commentators feel is lacking - evidence for his proposition -
in Ram's work is compensated for by its narrative compulsion. Hence, Arendt once said, 
'[narrative] reveals meaning without committing the error of defining it, that it rings about 
consent and reconciliation with things as they really are, and that we may even trust it to 
contain eventually by implication that the last word which we expect from the day of 
judgement' (Arendt in Mcthenia 1991 in Papake ed. 1991: 30). 
35 A term used to describe the areas behind which Europeans lived. 
36 See chapter 5. 
37 Emphasis mine. 
38 See also Datta 1975. Of course Datta uses Swinson's lament to signal the death of any 
claim Swinson has to writing a complete and definitive account of Amritsar. But the lament 
defies even this conventional reading, arguably denying the lacunae's relevance through the 
strenuous and almost exhaustive assertion, as we shall see, of the reliability and accuracy ofthe 
materials he has been able to get his hands on. Moreover here Swinson deflects us away from 
his own perceived inadequacies at writing a comprehensive history by telling us a heroic tale of 
the writer's quest for the holy grail (cf. Ira B. Nadel, 'The Biographer's Secret' in James Olney 
(ed.) 1987: 24-31). 
39. Dyer is reported as saying: 'Thank you, but I do not want to get better.. .. So many people 
who knew the conditions in Amritsar say I did right...but so many others say I did wrong .... I 
only want to die and know from my maker whether I did right or wrong.' 
40. A disease that Furneaux suggests' ... has a retrograde effect ... ' and means blood does not 
flow to areas of the brain. Thinking becomes impaired (Furneaux 1963: 177). 
41. RFurneaux 1963: 177. 
42. For these short details of the case R v. Kemp I rely on Swinson (Swinson 1964: 199). For a 
fuller report of the case see 1956 3 All E.R. 249. 
43. On these rules cf. any criminal law textbook. The standard work in the field is Smith and 
Hogan's Criminal Law. I have taken the following description from the second edition of Philip 
Harris's Introduction to Law. For the sake of completeness, formulated by the judges in the 
McNaghten case in 1843, the rules outline the occasions when insanity can be a defence to the 
commission of a criminal offence. In short, with a few notable exceptions none of which are 
relevant here, every person charged with an offence is presumed sane, unless the contrary is 
proved. Ifhowever it is shown that at the time of the commission of the offence, s/he had 'such 
a defect of reason resulting from a disease of the mind as notto know the nature and quality of 
his action; or ifhe did know it, that s/he did not know he was doing wrong,' then s/he will not 
be responsible for those actions. 
44. Furneaux's text is littered with statements of disbelief, or consistent with what I have called 
his hand wringing, liberal angst. For instance he says, Dyer 'seems to have been prone to 
outbursts of indignation, such as when he imposed his craw ling order and when he had the boys 
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who were suspected only ofthe assault on Miss Sherwood flogged. Those acts alone suggest 
that Dyer was a victim of some mental disorder' (Furneaux 1964: 177). 
45. There is a little more information from Swinson who, at least in part, is in agreement with 
Furneaux when he says, that his theory cannot be dismissed lightly. In November 1921 Dyer 
suffered a stroke, leaving him partially paralyzed. And on 2 June 1919 in Thai, he collapsed 
when giving orders for the final attack. In failing health he applied in August of that year for 
leave due to ill health. Yet he goes on to say, whilst we are in a sense entitled to conclude from 
the above that Dyer's health throughout this period began to deteriorate, that is a long way from 
agreeing with Furneaux' s propositions (cf. Swinson 1964: 199). 
46. In Datta 1975: 25. He in tum gets it from Vol. VI of the Hunter Committee Report 
1920:68. 
47. Of course, as I point out in my introduction, sheer exorbitance in actions taken by the 
British, throughout their Imperial history is not so rare as Furneaux' s descriptions of Dyer 
would have us believe. In fact, instead of imagining this as exorbitance per se, as being 
completely beyond the pale, I would suggest such episodes to be at the very heart of Britain's 
imperial project. In this context we would do well to bear in mind Walter Benjamin's famous 
proposition that 'there is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a document 
of barbarism , (Benjamin 1992: 248). 
48. Emphasis mine. Sir Henry Cotton provides us with an insightful commentary on the extent 
of imperial terror. He alerts his readers to the everyday, violent reality ofImperial rule. He 
catalogues the amount of terror routinely inflicted on Indians for instance under the Indian 
Whipping Act 1864, which according to him is ' ... one of the disastrous consequences of post-
mutiny legislation' (Cotton 1911: 79). He continues, ' ... the number of judicial 
floggings ... inflicted in India is appalling; in 1878 it amounted to 75,223 .. .in 1900 it was 45,054 
and has rarely been below 20,000 in any year' (Cotton 1911: 79). In the same urgent vein he 
also tells us of what he calls 'the cult of Nicholson. ' A fetish ofthe rulers of India for stick and 
whip, beyond strict legislative legitimacy. He narrates the oft told story about a number of 
youths at Lahore who used to hang about the door of the church which a parishioner called 
John Lawrence frequented. They frequented it 'because they knew,' he says, that 'the Chief 
Commissioner would be sure to hammer his syce (groom) before driving home, and they 
wanted to see the fun' (Cotton 1911: 65). Striking the natives he says 'prevailed as a common 
and general habit during the whole of my residence in India' (Cotton 1911: 65). 
49. A conclusion she arrives at first of all she says, deductively, by 'extrapolating Durkheim's 
theory of crime and punishment,' and secondly' inductively, by reading the debates on the Dyer 
sanction' and testing the hypothesis by examining whether it explained the way the speakers in 
the debates voted (Fein 1977: xiv). Clearly repressive collective punishment is a feature of the 
Jallianwala Bagh Massacre. Perhaps as importantly it was a feature of the operation of the 
martial law regime both before and after the massacre. 
50. See chapter 1 for commentary on members of an Anglo-Indian constituency for whom 
Dyer is a hero. 
51. Michael O'Dwyer brought an action against Sir Sankaran Nair on the ground that Nair 
libeled him in his book, Ghandi and Anarchy (1922). A number of passages in his book were 
the subject of the libels. Firstly, Nair wrote of O'Dwyer: 'Before the reforms it was in the 
power ofthe Lieutenant-Governor, a single individual, to commit atrocities in the Punjab'. In 
the second he referred to the process of recruitment during the war. He wrote that 'the 
recruitment of non-Mohammedans also went up and both were due to the terrorism of Sir 
Michael O'Dwyer, very useful in this instance'. In the third Nair objected to the praise heaped 
on O'Dwyer: 'I realize that the eulogium passed by the English Cabinet on Lord Chelmsford 
and Sir Michael O'Dwyer was an outrage on public opinion' (in O'Dwyer 1925: 332-334). 
O'Dwyer succeeded in his action, and many saw in his victory and in the words used by the 
trial judge (Mr. Justice MCCardie) a vindication of his administration and General Dyer's 
actions at the Bagh (India Office Library and Records - Transcript of the case L/PO/6/l2. 
52. The minority on the Hunter Committee expanded on such a principle. They include the 
thoughts of one 'General Drake-Brockman' who in a 'written statement at Delhi says, 'force is 
the only thing that an Asiatic has any respect for' (Hunter 1920: 116). 
53. Of course the list of voices that railed to Dyer's defence that I discuss here is not 
exhaustive. Many members of the military formed part ofthis broad Dyer lobby. And many 
believed precisely in his characterisations of his actions. Sir Henry Wilson, chief of the 
Imperial general staff said 'The Frocks have got India (as they have Ireland) into a filthy mess. 
On that the soldiers are called in to act. This is disapproved of by all the disloyal elements and 
the soldier is thrown to the wolves. All quite simple' (Major General Sir C E Callwell 1927, 
Vol. II: 238). 
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54 'Trailing his coat' Sayer tells us is Miles Irving's description. It is found in Edward 
Thompson's A Letter from India (London 1930: 104). There are of course many literary sources 
for these views. E M Forster's, A Passage to India is a good source. In A Passage to India 
Forster characterizes Ronny Heaslop, the overzealous and just as officious administrator as one 
who exemplifies such an ethic of stiff-backed duty towards Indians. Speaking about the naivete 
of Adela Quested who apparently questions the unpleasant behaviour of Anglo-Indians toward 
Indians, Ronny exclaims 
'What did I tell you? I knew it last week. Oh, how like a woman to worry over a side issue!' 
'A side issue, a side issue?' she repeated. 'How can it be that?' 
'We're not here for the purpose of behaving pleasantly!' Ronny exclaims 
'What do you mean?' 
'What I say. We're here to do justice and keep the peace. Them's my sentiments. India isn't a 
drawing room.' 
'Your sentiments are those of a god,' she said quietly (Forster 2000: 69). 
55. The minority on the Hunter Committee reported that Michael O'Dwyer, the Lieutenant 
Governor, considered that the hartal at Gujranwala presented 'a good opportunity for 
aeroplanes to use bombs, as there is little opportunity of hurting friends' (Hunter 1920: 134). 
56. Major Carberry's evidence is cited by the minority on the Hunter Committee and, in terms 
of the truth that Fein is advocating, would seem to provide the ample confirmation of it that she 
requires. Thus, one of the committee members asked him whether after he dropped bombs he 
agreed with the assessment that the people began to run away in the direction of the village and 
into their houses, seeking shelter from the bombardment. To which he replied, yes. Pressing the 
Major a little further, the member asked 'You fired [a] machine gun into the village and threw 
bombs onto those people who took shelter in the houses, but there were other innocent people 
in those houses?' The major could not have misunderstood the implication, but he was 
forthright in his unconcern. He retorted: 'I could not discriminate between innocent people and 
other people who were I think doing damage, or going to do damage.' The examination of the 
Major continued in this manner. The coup d'etat for the questioner and Fein's hypothesis came 
soon enough, when the questioner asked a supplementary: "When the crowd split up and there 
could not be on the spot particular people in the village, they must be running away and 
entering the houses, then you fired [a] machine gun into the village which hit the houses in 
which there were perfectly innocent people?' If he felt no concern at the implications of an 
earlier question, he felt even less when asked this one: 'I was at a height of200 feet. I could see 
perfectly well, and I did not see anybody in the village at all who was innocent' (Hunter 
Committee 1920: 133). 
57. The crawling order is a reference to an instruction issued by Dyer to make Indians atone as 
he saw it for the assault against the missionary, Miss Sherwood. He ordered the street where 
she suffered assault to be closed. At on end of the street he put a whipping triangle, posted 
pickets at the other end and made it known that anyone wishing to pass through the street and 
that included its residents, had to do so on all fours. Sayer notes: 
'In practice people had to squirm through the filth of the lane on their bellies, prodded along by 
the boots and bayonets ofthe soldiers. Prisoners were deliberately routed through the 
"Crawling Lane'" (Sayer 1991: 142). 
And after criticism, even by Sir Michael O'Dwyer, this was Dyer's explanation: 
'It is a complete misunderstanding to suppose that I meant this order to be an insulting mark of 
race inferiority. The order meant that the street should be regarded as holy ground, and that, to 
mark this fact, no one was to traverse it except in a manner in which a place of special sanctity 
might naturally in the East be traversed. My object was not merely to impress the inhabitants, 
but to appeal to their moral sense in a way which I knew they would understand' (Dyer, 
Statement to the Army Council Cmd. 771 1920). 
58. Frocks are a derogatory description often used by members ofthe army to describe 
politicians. See n. 16 chapt. 4. 
)9. Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th series, Vols. 115-148 (29 Apri11919-10 November 
1921), col. 1712. 
60. Sir George Barrow in his biography of Sir Charles Munro denies the claim that Dyer never 
had or was denied the assistance of counsel (in Colvin 1929: 238). In full Barrow contends, 
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, ... it would be interesting to know who it was denied Dyer the assistance of counsel. It was 
certainly not the Government of India, nor the Commander-in-chief, nor the Hunter Committee. 
On the contrary, counsel was pressed on Dyer by the Government; and his friends, knowing his 
tendency to excitability, begged him to accept the assistance that was offered to him. Dyer 
obstinately refused saying that he would and could conduct his own case. Neither was he cross-
examined without warning. He had many days in which to prepare his evidence. As to friends 
ready to help him, they too, were not wanting ... General Beynon gave Dyer a friendly hint as he 
was going into the room where the Committee sat. .. There was a friend on the Committee itself 
who was only too anxious to extend to him all the assistance that was possible, but Dyer never 
gave him half a chance. Dyer was at liberty to employ the services of counselor of any of his 
friends in that capacity. Naturally his friends could not take his place in the witness-box' 
(Barrow 1931: pp212-213). 
61. Parliamentary Debates (Lords), 5th Series, Vo1s. 37-56 (23 October 1919-27 March 1924), 
cols.333-334. 
62. This observation accompanied Kipling's contribution to the Dyer relief fund. 
63. The extract is from General Dyer's report to the General Staff, written whilst on sick leave 
in Dalhousie (1920). 
125 
CHAPTER 3 - THE ADMIINISTRA TIVE COMPLEX 
1 
Introduction 
'The Primal Duties shine aloft like stars, 
And charities that soothe, and heal, and bless, 
Are scattered at the feet of men like flowers' (Smiles 1880: 11). 
In this chapter I continue my analysis of Amritsar 1919 - and begin my 
composition of those events in terms of the characterization of men who rule and 
how such characterizations are subject to challenge and change. The events of 1919 
throw up a whole host of characters, and I shall refer to them throughout my 
narrative. Here I start by focusing on one of the main protagonists in this saga - Sir 
Michael O'Dwyer, Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab 1913-1919. I take him to be 
an ideal typical representation of a certain style of administrative composure. 
I address the question of the relationship between specific administrative 
competencies and the history of colonialism in India. I ask, what is the style of 
administration O'Dwyer practiced? More especially I examine the intersections 
between movements for independence and shifts in the styles of colonial 
domination in India at the end of the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. 
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In my analysis of the discursive production of Amritsar events of 1919 in those 
terms I pull together discourses usually separated in discussions of colonial power. 
First, by following Foucault's leads on the problem of subjectivity and its 
constitution, I remove the ruling colonial subject from discourses of the singular 
and sinister. Second, by engaging his suggestive comments on the arts of 
government, I implicate Indian rule in the extra state techniques of government that 
preoccupy his histories of governmentally. 
An Administrator par-excellence 
(a) Descriptions in Administration 
'There is nothing so bad or good that you will not find Englishmen doing it; 
but you will never find Englishmen in the wrong ... His watchword is always 
Duty; and he never forgets that the nation that Lets its duty get on the 
opposite side of its interest is lost' (Shaw 1930-38: vol. viii: 193). 
'We are here ... by our own moral superiority, by the force of circumstances 
and the will of Providence. These alone constitute our charter of government, 
and in doing the best we can for the people we are bound by our own 
conscience and not theirs' (J Lawrence in O'Dwyer 1925: 407) 
'It is true that to hate injustice and cruelty is the right of every man, and not 
of one particular faction. It is more especially the duty of those who 
administer affairs among a subject popu lation to cultivate that feeling. But 
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severely to punish those who openly set themselves against the laws, 
promptly to crush an incipient rebellion ruthlessly, to trample out a flagrant 
insurrection, these are equally the duty of an administrator. When there is 
doubt some will give it in favorem vitae, others in favorem republicae. And 
here is the difficulty. It is no small check over a vigorous administrator that 
he knows that he will have to justify any act of severity at the bar of a 
clamorous, powerful and prejudiced tribunal.' (Carthill 1924: 86). 
'For forms of government let fools contest, 
Whate'er is administered is best' (O'Dwyer 1925: 372). 
(b) The Lieutenant Governor's Times - A political context and contests 
'O'Dwyer is ... opposed to everything ... he is determined to maintain his 
position as the idol of the reactionary forces, and try to govern by the iron 
hand' (in Draper 1982: 33). 1 
Sir Michael O'Dwyer, famously gunned down at Caxton Hall in 1940, exemplifies 
a specific ruling tradition in India. He was a man who had no doubt, whatsoever, 
about his place and role in the sub-continent. 2 And he arguably became more 
belligerent in his beliefs, as the realization dawned on him that he was entering an 
age when all that he assumed about his place, his role, and how he should rule over 
others, was increasingly in question, and was about to come to an end. 
Nevertheless, at this time, all the passionate certainties about their place and role in 
another's land, espoused by him and his brethren fell to be replaced by a growing 
discomfiture with his and their place there. Before I examine how he envisioned the 
make up of a man who sought to rule over others, particularly Indians, and the 
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make up of traditions he formed so much a part of, I consider the historical 
contexts that threw these questions into such sharp relief at this time. 
(i) Are we staying or will we be forced to go? - Official contemplation 
Few doubted that British rule in India would not go on forever,3 but for a while at 
least, plenty reasoned, bluster would continue to suffice.4 Many simply sought to 
deny the impending menace posed by movements for independence. Menace! 
What menace?, they asked?; If they ever got as far as asking the question that is. 
As many again, looked inward, and simply couldn't understand what they'd done 
to invoke the rise in counter passions for freedom from the colonial yoke, by a 
people whom they considered, their charges, their children. At such times doubts 
about British rule in India resembled a tale almost of an unrequited love. 
Claude Auchinleckrecords a pre First World War army view. Only 40 or so years 
before, the empire's army had experienced a revolt in its ranks. Yet, with almost 
disdainful presumption he confidently states: 
'I don't think the average subaltern thought much about British Rule and, 
indeed, took it for granted that it would go on forever. I do remember when 
one of our Indian officers from the hills in the north said to me, "What is 
going to happen when the British leave India?" I looked at him and said, 
"Well, of course, the British are never going to leave India" , (Allen ed. 1975: 
203).5 
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Many in the Indian Civil Service (ICS), O'Dwyer prominent amongthem,joined in 
to deny such a menace. So, for instance, Allen once more recounts how even for 
young men who sought to join at the time of the so-called Great War 'such as 
Christopher Masterman, it was not a serious issue' (Allen 1975: 203).6 A career in 
the Indian Civil Service, to be a servant of Empire, at this time is still, if only just, 
held in high regard. In Masterman's words, 
, ... When I first went to India it never entered my head that India would one 
day be independent, but I saw a sign when the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms 
were introduced in 1921. I certain 1 y felt then that independence would come, 
but I don't think we realized that it would be coming so soon' (in Allen ed. 
1975: 203). 
Those in government could barely visualize their charges grown into a maturity 
where they would want, or could, flee the nest. O'Dwyer famously and 
continually dismissed all calls for self-government by an increasingly assertive 
subject population. 
Allen usefully refers us to some interesting correspondence in the form of certain 
minutes floating around offices, hidden away in files, and quoted by Vere 
Birdwood.7 Although they relate, strictly speaking, to a time after the events with 
which I am concerned, they still display an almost ridiculous ambivalence, even at 
this late stage, towards freedom's prospectus. Apparently, late in 1941, Birdwood 
saw a minute attached to a file, in which, 
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'the most junior officer had written, "1 don't think we'd better start this 
project, there may not be time to finish it." His senior officer had minuted on 
the file, "What nonsense. I was told this in 1919." And the most senior 
officer, the Governor, had minuted on that same file, "Absolute nonsense, I 
was told this in 1909" , (in Allen ed. 1975: 203). 
Rather than ensure longevity in British administration the tendency to deny India's 
ferment for freedom only ended up inciting more intense political activity by 
Indians. Hence, Indian politicians started to believe that when the time came, the 
British administration did not have 'any intention of handing power over at all' (in 
Allen 1975: 203). In fact time again Indian campaigners managed to convince 
themselves that British officials 'were going to find some trick to avoid handing 
over power' (in Allen 1975: 203). Such uncertainties were Allen thinks, the perfect 
'foundation ... for. .. Indians' ... Non-Cooperation Movement' (Allen 1975: 203). 
(ii) Are we staying or will we be forced to go? - Unofficial contemplation 
If those in government were prone to rue the day when they were not on hand to 
keep order, and carry on with their mission in the sub-continent, then those same 
events cameto baffle a mass of Anglo-Indians outside government, who, formally 
at least, were distant from officialdom. 
To some extent, Indians' disbelief echoed that in governmental quarters. Eugene 
Pierce8 for instance didn't believe' ... British rule would come to an end, and 
certainly not as abruptly as it did' (in Allen 1975: 212). Pierce adds, 'when it was 
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announced that India was to get her independence we were very jittery about it. 
We immediately started discussing what we were going to do' (in Allen ed. 1975: 
213). They had ajob to do, and would continue with it. In this sense, although 
these particular people were outside government, when they came to question 
movements and demands for freedom by Indians, their doubts arguably amounted 
to a pure statement of the principles at stake. The job and nothing less than the job 
guided many a government official in relation to India and Indians. Their jobs in 
India are everything. 
For others, it is different. Of course their concerns against movements for home 
rule, could easily be stated in the same missionary terms as their colleagues in 
government. But, their refusal to contemplate an end game for themselves in India 
is informed rather more by the frightful prosp ect of their hedonistic days in the 
sun coming to an end. Indeed, Allen alludes to 'a certain escapism' affecting those 
outside government about the ferment for freedom from Indians. Thus, he refers us 
to another (unnamed) of their number who concedes for instance, 'if we thought 
about Ghandi at all it was really that he was just a bit of a nuisance and slightly 
absurd' (inAllened. 1975: 203).9 
If there is any doubt about demands for self-rule, we should more appropriately 
call them refusals to understand or contemplate the mood abroad then Allen's tale 
of the audacious Roberts family is positively brazen. 10 Even in Bengal, where 
Allen says 'officials and policemen were being regularly assassinated, the Roberts 
could still feel untroubled.' They added, ' "For the first twenty or thirty 
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years ... we were on our own there, sleeping out on the verandah. The house was 
more or less open but I don't think we felt uneasy at all" , (in Allen ed. 1975: 
204).11 
By seeking to deny, and failing to understand the melee breaking all around and 
seeking to continue with and confirm their rather quixotic relation to India and 
Indians Anglo-Indians' heads remained firmly stuck in the sand. But in the end 
Anglo-Indians, both inside and outside government, were simply unable to dispute 
fervent native/nationalist yearnings for home rule. Anglo-Indians would just have 
to adjust to the terms of new debates and practices. 
Many Indians just didn't have the same memories of empire so loved by their 
rulers. Their memories are not so endearing about their so-called benevolent 
rulers.12 Their recollections are often littered by the 'vulgar, violent, or coarse 
minded men, often of an inferior class,' (Russell 1857 in Brown 1948: 229). The 
practices of such men would only add to the aversion Indian's felt towards their 
rulers. Nor did such practitioners have sufficient imagination to posit a world so 
very different from how Russell describes an earlier time. 13 Borrowing once again 
from Russell, the good old days of the hookah and cut-glass goblets had well and 
truly gone.14 We are at this time in a different age! 
(iii) Their ruling investments in this land 
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Of course, both those in government, and those outside it, would not easily give 
up, what they, in tum, saw as their duty to India. Nor part easily with their 
seductive privileges there. Just as those in government could not envisage their 
tutelage of the Indian masses as ever being complete, 15 then those outside it were 
loath to give up their endless days of pleasure in the sun. 16 
It is instructive to look at some expressions of regret and disbelief in the prospect 
that their days as masters are soon to end. By doing so we get a sense of how 
intensely gripped the context of the lives and imaginations of some Anglo-Indians 
are with these fears. We also get a peep of the depths of what I call, a 'crisis in 
denial'; how such crises, or perceptions of such, affected and re-ordered the task of 
administration. Breakfast, lunch, dinner and port, would certainly not taste or be at 
the normal time ever again ... 
Many a tear or two would be shed at the mere thought of such a prospect, and 
perhaps a river of grief flow when that thought became a fait accompli. Isabel 
Hunter for instance gives us a taste of the investments made by the ranks of 
unofficial Anglo-Indians, many of who are women, in a land that had cast a spell 
on their minds. 17 On her impending departure from India she recalls those, and 
specifically her, uncomplicated times fondly: 
'I love the very recollection of these days, the easy pleasantness of every 
detail. I loved the attentions so freely and unstintingly given; these never 
failed or lacked. It was a Miss Sahib. She must be looked after; and not once or 
ever, can I recall rudeness or the slightest approach to it, but instead, a 
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superfluity of all that was kind and nice. Dare I contrast English ways? I will 
not detail them, but only two journeys have I taken in England in one year, 
and on each occasion there was default and impertinence for which there was 
no justification or need.' (Hunter 1909 in Brown 1945: 26112). 
What was it then that such Anglo-Indians, who are, strictly speaking, outside 
government, would miss most? Of course for some, as Isabel Hunter recognizes, 
the context of rule is a powerful drug. It induces expectations of obeisance, from 
those one rules over, towards you and all you do, however much your subjects 
may contrive their approbation. When one is no longer on the same dosage, one 
gets attacks of cold turkey. As many realize, there is little chance of similar 
treatment once they are back to a place they are not even sure is home. So who, for 
instance, would run your bath at a moment's notice, without so much as a titter? 
Who would glory in your presence by addressing you by the right exaltation? As 
Hunter glories in, Miss Sahibthis, Miss Sahibthat, on and on and on! Who would 
pull the punkah, all day, to ensure fresh air waft in your direction, all day? All this, 
and more, ... and more .. and .... Is it any wonder then that the only thought on 
Anglo-Indian minds, for a while at least, is to traverse the rising opposition to 
British rule? 
However many rulers, albeit outside formal government may wish to deny the 
shift in contexts, the (expectant) disappointments and sadness on such a shift, are 
still palpable. This is the sense one gets from the litany of letters written by 
Anglo-Indians about such a prospect. When the time eventually came, they would 
bid farewell to their beloved India with huge regrets. In 1914 G M Graham wrote: 
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'When the spell of the East falls veil-like upon me I see a processIOn of 
familiar faces, those of friendly thieves and liars, amongst which Peter's is 
strangely distinct, and I am conscious that despite his approbation of my 
stockings, my spoons and my substance generally, and ayah's shameless 
annexation of what was left, I still hold them both in affectionate 
remembrance. They are friends and unchanging ones, for if I ever return to 
find my face forgot by those of my own race, these two would come to me 
with welcoming words of deferential devotion to anticipate my desires and to 
steal my possessions. I am in the land of my birth again now, but the joys of 
the day that is done are still with me. As for the rest, philosophy asks whether 
it is better that the dhoby should steal one's garments, and hire them out for 
weddings, funerals, and sea bathing indiscriminately, or that the steam laundry 
should riddle them with holes and amputate entire limbs! Pour moi, c' est ega!. 
Here I am learning formalities, conventionalities, and many other useful 
things, but I have my hours of longing for the land of the lotus, with its subtle 
scents, it impenetrable solitudes, and its unfathomable peoples' (Graham 1914 
in Brown 1945: 262). 
The adult/child like relations and language here is unmistakable. Graham is like a 
tolerant grand aunt. She is conscious of her subjects' juvenile antics, but always 
forgives. Parting, for her, and for massed ranks of other Anglo-Indians, often means 
the end of their world, and these relations. Many ask themselves a profoundly 
disturbing question; who precisely do we think we are? When there are no longer 
any dhoby's, no punka-wallas, and any ayas, who are we? 
Sir William Hunter's answer to such a conundrum did not reassure. According to 
him, 'the Englishmanin India has no home and leaves no memory' (Hunter in Allen 
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1975: 212). 1895).18 Maud Diver, is another who is just as equally opaque. She 
just couldn't adjudicate upon the rival claims bearing down on her from India and 
England. Pragmatism it seems, would never find a better suitor, but even then all 
her agonizing led to only one result - a broken heart: 
' .. The problem of nurse or ayah pales, all too soon, before one of infinitely 
greater moment - the rival claims of India and England; of husband and child. 
Sooner or later the lurking shadow of separation takes a definite shape; asserts 
itself as a harsh reality; a grim presence, whispering the inevitable question: 
"Which shall it be?" A question not lightly to be answered: if indeed, in 
generalized form, it can be answered at all. Every woman, when her time 
comes, must face it frankly, from her own individual standpoint; and thresh 
out her own individual answer according to her lights. An unsatisfactory one it 
is bound to be, at best; and countless brave hearts have been strained to 
breaking point during those bitter hours of indecision' (Diver 1909 in Brown 
1945: 257). 
Olive Douglas is perhaps a little more sanguine. Though she too wraps it in her 
own particular confusions; but not so much so. She meditates morbidly 
' ... and so I am gomg home to my own bleak kindly land, "place of all 
weathers that end in rain." I am going home to my own people; and I am 
going home to you. And the queer thing is I can't feel glad. I am so home sick 
for India' (Douglas in Brown 1945: 262). 
Maybe she is a little more sanguine about her impending move away because her 
questions, about her place in this strange land, and who precisely she is, fell from 
her head at an earlier time. All she could do, at one time, she tells us, was to walk 
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around and ask herself, why? Why me? Why am I here? and broadening it out, 
why are we (the British) here?: why do I1we require an army of servants to cater 
after our every need?; all day, and everyday she continues in the same vein, until 
such thoughts begin to irk her. No one it seems could, or would, give her any 
satisfactory answers. So she continued to ask, why? But, all her questions led only 
to a mild reassurance from a colleagueabout how she should moderate her conduct 
while in India, and agonize a little less about her presence, and the precise character 
of her relations with those who served her (Douglas in Brown 1945: 211/2). In her 
own words, these are her agonies-
'Why, for example, should we require a troop of servants living, as we do, in a 
kind of hotel? And there they are - Boggley's bearer and my ayah - I can see 
some reason for their presence - a kimutgar to wait on us at table and bring 
tea in the afternoon, another assistant kimutgar who scurries like a frightened 
rabbit at my approach, a delightful small boy who rejoices in the name of 
paniwallah, whose sole duty is to carry water for the baths, the dhobi who 
washes our clothes by beating them between two large - and I should say, 
judging by the state of the clothes, sharp - stones, losing most of them in the 
process, and a syce or groom for each pony. Seated as one sometimes sees 
them, in rows on the steps, augmented by a chuprussi or two, brilliant in 
uniform, they make a sufficiently imposing spectacle. I have few words, but I 
look at them in as pleasant a way as I know how, partly because I like to be 
friends with servants, and partly because I'm rather afraid of them and don't 
want to rouse them to mutiny or do anything desperate, but Boggley 
discouraged me at the outset. "You needn't grin at them so affably," he 
remarked, "they will only think you are weak in the head" '(emphasis mine. 
Douglas in Brown 1945: 212). 
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Irene Edwards 19 is another consumed by similar questions/uncertainties. Once it 
looks as though her time in India is coming to an end, she is assailed by questions 
of identification - paraphrasing Allen, she has to 'decide once and for all where .. 
her .. loyalties and .. identity . .lie .. ' (Allen ed. 1975: 2l3). As soon as she 
articulates these fears and perhaps goes some way to understand them, she appeals 
to recognizable symbols to reassure her that things would remain just as they are; 
and would continues to be so. She looks back with fondness. She says, 
I remember once sitting on a platform in Mhou. You could see the fort in the 
distance with the Union lack flying, and a group of little Indian chokras ... 
sitting and talking near by ... One said to the other, "do you see the flag up 
there? Do you know, there are a lot of people who want to see that flag come 
down? But that flag will never come down." And I, in my foolishness, agreed 
with them; I thought the flag would never come down. We were proud of being 
British. My father, when he heard "God Save the King" being sung, even away 
in the distance, stood up and we had to stand up with him. That is what we 
thought of the British Raj and it came as a shock to us when it ended. Now we 
did not know where we were, whether we were Indians or British or what' (in 
Allen ed. 1975: 213). 
Romance, nostalgia, SPICY sensibilities are all in the jumble of emotions and 
attachments many would feel. Comfortable times III Indian from a lasting 
impression on our coterie of Anglo-Indians. What would it take to guarantee their 
round of balls, concerts, harmonica nights and supper on the verandaio Subsisting 
without a care in the world wouldn't last forever. 
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In an everyday sense, the changed and changing circumstances did prove 
impossible to ignore. To those who thought themselves sovereigrn over all they 
surveyed, often in the most to them abhorrent of ways. Allen once again provides 
us with a most superlative instance showing how such changes were effecting 
Anglo-Indians daily lives. One Edwin Pratt, recalls, 'when I first went to Calcutta 
you could walk down Chowringee and the Indians walking in the opposite 
direction would just get out of your way. Time came when they just continued to 
walk where they were and you got out of the way' (in Allen 1975: 204). Times 
were indeed changing. 
(iv) Defining/Groping for an administrative tradition - Curzon 
Keeping control in these most fractious days began to consume paSSIOns both 
inside the ICS and outside it. Of course in one sense it is an old enigma. The 
imperial writ often had a limited range. After 1858 governing India came to be seen 
not so much a given but a problem.21 The question honestly put was how best to 
keep a firm hold on India. Lord Curzon, Viceroy 1899-1905 turned his not 
inconsiderable talents to defining a ruling tradition and actualizing that goal.22 
Gilmour tells us how Curzon's interest in India was inspired. He heard Sir James 
Stephen lecture at Eton. Stephen would claim that in 'the Asian sub-continent,' 
Britain held 'an empire more populous, more amazing and more beneficent than 
Rome.' That determined him in his design about the conduct of rule in India. He 
firmly believes that 'British rule in India was the greatest thing his countrymen had 
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achieved.' So much did he suppose this to be the case that ' ... he dedicated his 
Persian volumes to the officials who carried it out' (Gilmour 1994: 135). 
Administration of the empire would be in the hands of the rcs. Curzon considered 
them 'the proudest and most honorable service in the world' (in Gilmour 1994: 
160). Yet, Gilmour adds, Curzon's ' ... standards of efficiency were so high that he 
was bound to find fault with its performance' (Gilmour 1994: 160). Nevertheless, 
as Gilmour suggests, 
'dedicated and incorruptible, the ICS was the most admirable component of 
the British presence in India. Fresh from Balliol or Haileybury, the young 
official spent his early career in the district subdivisions, riding for half the 
year from village to village, his day starting in the saddle at dawn and 
progressing through visits, inspections and disputes settled from his office-tent 
under the trees, before ending in an evening stroll, the camp fire and the 
mosquito net' (Curzon 1994: 159). 
Curzon himself would not tire in stressing the importance and urgency of the task 
of administration. He writes 
'It is only when you get to see and realize what India really is - that she is the 
strength and greatness of England - it is only then that you feel that every 
nerve a man may strain, every energy he may put forward cannot be devoted 
to a nobler purpo se than keeping tight the cords that hold India to ourselves' 
(in Allen ed. 1975: 202). 
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Perhaps the first words he spoke on his arrival in Bombay would signal his intent 
like no others. He announced, as Gilmour reminds us, that 'he had come to India 
"to hold the scales even" between the different races and religions of the country ... ' 
(in Gilmour 1975: 171). Perhaps, as important as these statements of his job in 
India is what Gilmour calls his 'first commitment.. . to "righteousness in 
administration" , (Gilmour 1975: 171). According to Gilmour, Curzon set out his 
administrative stall as follows ... 
'He would not connive at scandals or wink at fraud or hush up ill-doing in high 
places, because the British were in India to set an example, and all their 
actions should be open to inspection. Only by demonstrating 'superior 
standards of honor and virtue' could they continue to hold the country' 
(Gilmour 1994: 171). 
(v) A changing inheritance in administrative tradition - Sir Michael 
O'Dwyer 
Curzon's specific modes of ruling over others, were drawing to a close. So what 
were the elements that Sir Michael O'Dwyer brought to his job? What, to coin a 
phrase, are the elements of O'Dwyerism? The days of 'Curry and Rice', and all 
things nice, relatively speaking, were already the stuff of recent memory when he 
entered the job.23_24 
The Guardians, as Woodruff describes men like O'Dwyer, were now trained to 
think about, and do little else but, their duty by India and Indians, however 
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perverse. 25 This new breed of professional administrator, Woodruff adds, sought 
to model themselves on Dr Arnolds's famous hope and dictum spoken by the 
character Squire Brown about pupils passing through Rugby: 'ifhe'll only tum out 
a brave, helpful truth tellingEnglishmanand a gentleman and a Christian, that's all 
I want..' (Woodruff 1954: 21). Their tasks and the manner in which they were to 
achieve them grew more complex day by day. 26 Ironically if successful in pursuing 
their duty to India and Indians they would eventually write themselves into 
oblivion (Woodruff 1954). 
Of course many Indians never accepted English suzerainty. Perhaps, it is the 
growing realization by many in the bureaucracy of such non-acceptance and, not 
incidentally, competition regarding claims to competence in governing themselves 
by those groups, that would demand that members in the bureaucracy relate to 
Indians differently. 
O'Dwyer was not one of those. His collar remained firmly starched. Never mind 
that he saw his charges exceed his expectations. He invariably finds their skills 
uncomfortable, threatening even! Doing his duty for Indians as we see would 
ensure he remain marked by his distrust of pretenders as he saw it, to the 
sovereign's throne.27 O'Dwyer has little patience with what he regards as the soft 
hearted or feeble-minded peddlers, advocates, for Indian democracy. Khuswant 
Singh rather colorfully describes how O'Dwyer thought of demands for self-
government and freedom from the colonial yoke. Such demands he thinks as being 
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'preposterous figments of the mind of the urbanite babu and the wog barrister' 
(SinghII 1999: 162).28 
O'Dwyer's reputation was for a tough, 'I know best' rule. It is no accident 
perhaps that he found himself in the Punjab. It was one of the last states to fall 
under British tutelage and only then after a composite of treachery and two bitter, 
hard fought wars in 1845 and 1848.29 In this sense he carried on a long tradition. E 
M Forster, chronicles it well in his, A Passage to India when he has Ronny dismiss 
Adela Quested's questioning of the unpleasant behaviour of Anglo-Indians towards 
Indians with the terse assertions, 'we are not here for the purpose of behaving 
pleasantly!' When she asks, 'What do you mean?',he replies, 'what I say. We're not 
here for the purpose of behaving pleasantly.... We are here to do justice and keep 
the peace .... India isn't a drawing room' (Forster 2000: 69; see chapter 2. n. 53). 
Such a hard reputation could arguably only be enhanced by accusations, ultimately 
rejected by the majority on the Hunter commission, that he ran a press ganging 
system for recruitment into the army throughout the Punjab, during the 1914-18 
war. 30 
(vi) Anglo-Irish antecedents 
One of fourteen children, O'Dwyer came from a wealthy land owning Irish family. 
Accordingto Woodruff, O'Dwyer was 
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'brought up in a world of hunting and snipe- shooting, of threatening letters 
and houghed cattle, where you were for the Government or against it, where 
you passed everyday the results of lawlessness in the blackened walls of empty 
houses .. a world very different from the ordered life of southern England' 
(Woodruff 1954: 236). 
His Anglo-Irish background is an interesting back cloth to his role as Lieutenant-
Governor in the Punjab. He had a fearsome dislike of 'politics', and the disorder 
that he felt came in its train. The first few pages of his autobiography are littered 
with a sneering impatience with its Irish versions. He extrapolates at length about 
how it should also be excised from its Indian terrain, coupled, ironically of course, 
with an equally fearsome assertion of an independence of spirit, a peculiar 
property we are told, of the O'Dwyers' (Woodruffl954: 235-43). 
He attributes the source of his dislike for politics, to the views of his father. He 
says, ' ... as regards internal politics, all of his nine sons followed the example of.. 
their .. father, who had a dislike for politics and a distrust for politicians, less rare 
in an Irishman than is commonly thought ... ' On the very next page he adds, 
' ... my father was too much concerned with the problem of bringing up a family of 
nine sons and five daughters on four or five hundred acres of land to have any time 
to spare for politics .. ' (O'Dwyer 1925: 5-6) The coup de grace in this particular 
denial of the importance of, or indeed the need for politics, is delivered in his 
preface. There it is stated as being the central reason he turned his hand to writing 
his book, and its ethical urgency is proclaimed when he explicitly couples it with 
the misdirected interests of his Indian charges: 
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'Many of the matters I ... touch ... on are controversial; but in discussing them 
my sole object has been to place the facts as known to me on record, and to 
state my own conclusions as based on those facts. The mam purpose of the 
book is to emphasize the responsibility of the people and Parliament of Great 
Britain "for the welfare and advancement of the Indian peoples," and to show 
where that responsibility is being lost sight of or inadequately discharged ... In 
my time I have done what I could according to my lights to serve the interests 
of the peoples of India, and particularly the dumb masses who, in the tumult 
and shouting of politics, are least likely to get a hearing. If these pages direct 
attention to their wants and wishes, which find but little expression in the new 
Indian Legislatures now dominated by a small but very vocal class, my 
purpose 'will have been served' (italics mine. O'Dwyer 1925: ix-x). 31 
As Woodruff reminds us, these sentiments are not 'irrelevant to O'Dwyer's 
perceptions of what his job as Lieutenant -Governor of the Punjab demands of 
him. According to Woodruff, he knew ' ... from his boyhood what conspiracy and 
outrage meant to peaceful folk' (Woodruff 1954: 238). Of course, demands for 
freedom from a subject population, which ran as follows, would only amount, 
could only amount, in these genuflections, to what he was later to suggest to a 
travesty of conspiratorial facts: 
'The Indian nation was united, civilized and prosperous under its indigenous 
rulers. Then the British Wolf found his way into the fold and struck down the 
helpless flock. The British, by treachery or. .. ruthless force, strangled the 
independence of India, made her free people slaves, bled them white 
by ... excessive taxation, ruined their trade and industry to benefit Britain's 
commerce, made them powerless and unmanly by prohibiting the use of arms, 
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maintain a costly mercenary army at India's cost for the service of the British 
Empire and, to strangle Indian patriots by cruelties such as the Punjab 
atrocities and the Amritsar massacre of 1919, exploit the immense resources 
of India for the benefit of Britain, and India's sons their rightful place in the 
administration of their own country and that independence which is their 
birthright..' (Unattributed in O'Dwyer 1927: 167). 
The lessons that he learned from a version of Irish politics whose aims, with an 
eye to India, he loosely dubbed Irish Swaraj (home rule), and later Indian Swaraj, 
led him to conclude, 
'If the home rule movement after a hundred years of agitation has so far 
produced no better results among a people fairly enlightened and 
homogeneous, in a country no larger or more populous than a single one of 
the five divisions of the Punjab, what results can we expect from it in this vast 
continent of 315 millions, with its infinite variety of races, creeds and 
traditions, and its appalling inequalities in social and political development? 
What results could we expect from it even in our own province? In the matter 
of Home Rule, I fear the case of Ireland, in so far as it is analogous at all, 
conveys to us a lesson and a warning' (O'Dwyer 1925: 14). 
Indians, and political Indians in particular would have to be content and recognize 
the fact that, 'an Indian nation has never existed and is not likely to come into 
existence for generations, if ever' (O'Dwyer 1927: 178). Once they come to their 
senses, 'we can, then,' he adds, '... ask Indians to co-operate with us in the 
development of self-government in its only practicable form, i.e., provincial 
autonomy. Even here, progress will be difficult' (O'Dwyer 1927: 178). And 
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competent Indian opinion he says agrees with him. He quotes the Maharaja of 
Benares of whose authority he thinks no-one can be in any doubt. Thus, according 
to O'Dwyer, the Maharaja said 'it is a mockery to call ourselves a nation. We 
cannot do without British protection for centuries. A further reduction of the 
British element in the services and the courts would be a disaster..' (Maharaja of 
Benares in O'Dwyer 1927: 177). 
Clearly then, as an administrator in India, and as an administrator of one of the 
provinces thought by the administration to present them with more challenges than 
most, his modus operandi had, to be more than merely acquiescent. Rather it 
would have the character rather aptly described by Carlyon Bellairs. According to 
him 'British rule has been respected because it has been wisely strong without 
being cruel, and because the word of an Englishman is his bond .. .' (The Times 8 
July 1920). Perhaps the phrase that is the closest to describing his ruling style is 
the description of his conduct in India as a benevolent, independent, autocracy. 32 
That very independence of mind and action are also loudly proclaimed by him as 
his very rasion d'etre, alongside his distaste and impatience with politics in equally 
forthright terms. 
He supports our vision of him as a stern fellow when he recounts in the opening 
page of his autobiography, a story of what he refers to as his clan from Ireland. He 
proudly boasts how in Ireland the O'Dwyer's are mentioned in a Lord Justices's 
report of 1515 to Henry VIII, on 'The State of Ireland and plans' for its Reform', 
as constituting one amongthe twelve clans thought of as the King's Irish Enemies. 
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The clan, described as being of Muster and holding North Tipperary, and its 
captains (chiefs of clan), ' ... maketh war and peace for himself and holdeth by 
sword and hateth imperial jurisdiction within his room, and odyeth to no other 
person, English or Irish, except only too such persons as may subdue him by 
sword' (O'Dwyer 1925: 1). 
(vii) Education of an administrative elite 
O'Dwyer went to a Jesuit school called St. Stanislus (O'Dwyer 1925: 16). From 
there he went to Wrens towards the end of 1881, where he passed as a probationer 
for the ICS examination the following year (O'Dwyer 1925: 18).33 His batch of 
probationers went to Balliol College, Oxford where he initially spent two years, 
then staying on a further year to get a degree and read a normally three year law 
course in a year. He managed to get a first and shone as a linguist. In general 
Woodruff remarks that during his studies one gets the impression of a man 
consumed in his own thoughts with little time for the complexities of the world 
(Woodruff 1954: 235-43). 
Balliol College, under the vice chancellorship of Benjamin Jowett, from 1882 to 
1885, was pivotal in providing prospective ICS candidates with, as Osborne notes, 
, ... the main perquisites for Civil Service appoint ments in India' (Osborne 1994b: 
24).34 Indeed after the closure of Haileybury College in 1854,35 discussion on the 
recruitment to the Civil Service in India passed almost exclusively to the place of 
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Oxbridge in eqmppmg candidates for their furlough to India. On these 
developments Jowett comments, 
'1 cannot conceIve a greater boon which would be conferred upon the 
University than a share in the Indian appointments. The inducements thus 
offered would open to us a new field of knowledge: it would give us another 
root striking into the soil of society; it would provide what we have always 
wanted, a stimulus reaching beyond the fellowships, for those not intending to 
take orders ... ' (in Osborne 1994b: 24) 
O'Dwyer himself observes that Jowett had always shown a very great interest in 
the ICS exams. He believes that he, Jowett, was responsible for the rules and 
regulations, as well as the content of the examination. The ICS Probationers, 
O'Dwyer informs us, had their own curriculum. It consisted of Indian languages; 
Law; and Political Economy. Having their own curriculum exempted them from the 
College and University exams, and according to him 'in .. [such] .. a large college 
where the tone was ... rather highbrow and cliquey' this had' .. a tendency to 
[mark] us out as birds of passage' (O'Dwyer 1925: 19-20). 
It is perhaps no exaggerationto say that Balliol was then at the zenith of its fame 
(O'Dwyer 1925). Its hall of fame reads like a, Who's Who of Indian 
administrators. Although as O'Dwyer's tells us the likes of Asquith, Milner and 
Curzon had by that time gone, their achievements and glamour remained a 
profound influence on all who aspired to follow in their footsteps. Amongst the 
many prominent names reading at the collegein 1885, he lists a few who, he says, 
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were marked out for brilliant careers. Amongst these are to be found, Lord Grey of 
Falloden, later to be archbishop of Canterbury; Anthony Hope; and F W Pember, 
later warden of All Souls (O'Dwyer 1925: 19-20). 
Paying attention to such a hall of fame alerts us to the question of the existence of 
a substantial body who would be termed an administrative elite. Such an elite 
didn't simply existto extend, or pursue 'imperial forms of proselytization.' What 
is at stake here, is passing on forms of expertise.36 This new clerisy, Osborne says, 
would practice, what Osborne terms a new form of 'moral regulation' (Osborne 
1994b: 24). That is to say, one whose major focus of concern is not with 
proselytization, but with the formation in these souls of certain characterological 
traits that would enable them to better experiment with and practice, good 
government. What is envisaged in the formation of such a new clerisy is ' ... a 
cultural and administrative intelligentsia - entrusted with a particular vocation in 
terms of moral regulation ... ' (Osborne 1994b: 24). O'Dwyer was very much of 
this tradition. 
What is being passed on here, is' ... all those means and techniques for guiding and 
shaping conduct' (Osborne 1994b: 6). Not the regulation of the conduct of others; 
quite simply the conduct that forms the material to be defined, crafted, shaped and 
played with here, is the 'conduct of their conduct' (Osborne 1994b: 6); the 
conduct of the new clerisy. What is expected is a self-reflexivity; an attention to 
form as one would pay attention to any handbook or practical manual on conduct 
and manners; but in addition, an auto-critique, if required, when one steps outside 
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those mannered terrains as one must when exercising those precepts. Gordon 
describes these relations to the self thus, 
'Government as an activity could concern the relation between self and self, 
private interpersonal relations involving some form of control or guidance, 
relations within social institutions and communities and, finally, relations 
concerned with the exercise of political sovereignty ... [Foucault] was 
interested in government as an activity or practice, and in arts of government 
as ways of knowing what that activity consisted in, and how it might be carried 
on. A rationali ty of government will thus mean a way or system of thinking 
about the nature of the practice of government (who can govern; what 
governing is; what or who is governed), capable of making some form of that 
activity thinkable or practicable both to the pract itioners and to those upon 
whom it was practiced' (in Osborne 1994b: 6-7; Gordon 1991: 2-3; Foucault 
1979; 1990). 
There is little doubt of the confidence bestowed on O'Dwyer by his time at 
Balliol. O'Dwyer's beliefin his ability to carry out administrative tasks/roles in 
India on behalfof, and for, his colonial charges, people famously characterized by 
Kipling, as 'new-caught, sullen peoples half-devil, half-child', was never less than 
unflinching?? To be sure, as Draper notes, O'Dwyer's belief in his right to 
administer Indian territory was enduringly racisP8 Yet as Draper adds, this is 
racism of a specific sort. It constructs village India as the real India; the majority 
India. It is a simple India. An India, suffering from arrested development. This 
India, as the real India, and its 'pathetic contentment' is the (ICS) masters sole 
concem;39_AO Indeed as O'Dwyer says, fair treatment by the administration of the 
peasant class ensures that his, the peasant's, reasonableness endures: 'In the 
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Punjab .. the placid pathetic contentment of the peasantry, which highly placed 
British politicians thought right to disturb, is not due to dull apathy, but to a 
consciousness that they are being fairly dealt with .. ' (O'Dwyer 1925: 56). Trouble 
and agitation would in these circumstances not be in the forefront of their minds. 
He adds, ' .. only when they had reason to think otherwise .. would they be .. quick 
to show their discontent and insist on redress .. ' (O'Dwyer 1925: 56). 
(viii) O'Dwyer's rule in practice 
O'Dwyer gives us a short history lesson regarding his regard for the peasant's 
contentment. According to him ever since Akbar's time the peasantry formed a 
particular object of government concern. In that sense at least the newly emerging 
arts that British administrators laid claim to had time honored antecedents.41 On 
this account, Akbar ensured as far as possible that the burdens imposed on 
peasants in the form of the State demand were kept to a light touch. At one time 
constituting nearly one half of all the farmers' revenue, the demand came down to 
'one-third of the produce or of its estimated cash value .. ' (O'Dwyer 1925: 57). 
This special taxation regime ensured a 'great extension of cultivation and of 
agricultural prosperity under his (Akbar's) beneficent rule .. ' (O'Dwyer 1925: 57). 
In time he thinks, this changed. 
The local rulers began once again to squeeze as much out of the peasantry as they 
could. This he says, is the state in which the new rulers, the British Government, 
found matters. No better description of this state if affairs is found than 'in the 
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pathetic saying', ' ... the peasant has no one to look to but God, and God is far 
off...' (O'Dwyer 1925: 57). As if a warning to so-called Bolshevik inspired 
political ambitions, he adds, 'I heard the same wail in Russia ... ' (O'Dwyer 1925: 
57). Unlike the Russians presumably, he says that the new administration realized 
quite quickly or at least convinced itself that 'the well being of the peasant and the 
protection of agriculture are the foundations of the prosperity of the state ... ' 
(O'Dwyer 1925: 57). There is little doubt that he placed this concern for the 
peasant very high on his list of personal administrative achievements. The 
peasants as he defined them were his babies; he would not desert them. Hence: 
'In the Punjab even today, notwithstanding the great increase in prices and in 
the selling value of land, the Government demand on the land does not 
average more than half-a-crown per cultivated acre, while the average sale 
value over £20 per acre. It is this consideration for the peasant and his 
dependents (90 percent of the population) - "whose life is a long drawn 
question.. Between a crop and a crop .. " - that has been, and is, the greatest 
asset of the British government in India and the strongest argument for the 
permanence of our rule. The town-bred intelligentsia, whom we are now 
putting in power, have no sympathy for the peasant, and as in the past would 
suck him dry if allowed to do so ... Yet the Governments in India and here, 
both of whom claim to be the champions of the weak and oppressed, feebly 
acquiesced in this selfish proceeding as being the natural result of the new 
democratic (?) institutions in India. Those of us who have been working all our 
lives for the Indian peasantry view with dismay this betrayal of their interests 
in the name of democracy' (O'Dwyer 1925: 58).42 
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There is here a real aversion to what he calls the educated middle classes. They 
were deemed transgressors of his real - peasant - India. Having stepped outside 
their characterizations as simple people who tilled the land, they presented a 
profound challenge to their rulers, and their self- conceptions as the bringers of 
order.43 Thus, 
'In much Anglo-Indian Mythology, the authentic India was the India of the 
villager and the loyal sepoy; simple manly fellows, far more congenial to it 
than the Bombay bania or shop keeper-moneylender, or the voluble Bengali 
babu, or clerk, or the madrassi lawyer, heir of a log line of Brahminical logic 
choppers' (Kiernan in Draper 1981: 161). 
Woodruff also captures the perils presented to O'Dwyer's ilk, by those of their 
wards who had grown up: 
' ... More and more educated Indians were in varymg degrees nationalist at 
heart. They were rivals for power and knowledge, sharp critics too of all that 
Western world in which they claimed a share, and it was easy to be jealous and 
resentful of them, to fall into the habit of glorifying instead the villager, the 
soldier, the servant, all who had not yet been 'spoilt by education,' who were 
still ready to use the old obsequious expressions of respect' (Woodruff 1954: 
17). 
Compensatory visions of the simple villager,soldier and servant would have to do. 
Such an India in these versions is the authentic India. Time in this India had it is 
supposed, stood still. In such a casting, O'Dwyer is compelled, committed even, 
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just as enduringly to his role as an administrator - a commitment to a particular role 
- with its own historical specificity; to do one's duty by one's charges.44 
In the Punjab, where O'Dwyer gained his first appointment, there was a special 
place, romantic or otherwise, for men of vigour, who took to loving India as well as 
its supposed simple inhabitants. O'Dwyer, that most masculine of men, 
conceptualized his role in the most paternalistic, misogynistic of ways. Woodruff 
recalls the relations posited here: 
'The tolerant and bantering but none the less real affection of the master and 
officer on one side, the soldier's or the villager's trust, the confidence he 
mingled with a shrewd perception of character like that which small boys 
nickname a schoolmaster. Those feelings were real; servant and master, 
officer and soldier, risked and sometimes laid down their lives for each other..' 
(Woodruff 1954: 17). 
Affection there may be, but, he adds, 'the relation was not one of equality; there 
could be no familiarity and no unguarded speech ... ' (Woodruff 1954: 17). His 
' ... reference to small boys is telling' (Sayer 1991: 162). Administrators like 
O'Dwyer would find themselves at the tender age of 25, in charge of a district 
composing an area of three thousand square miles and a population of nearly three-
quarters of a million. In such circumstances they were the men who would be; and 
for all practical purposes were, kings; firm, but fair kings, maybe! 
(ix) O'Dwyer's character and order in the Punjab - Traditions 
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It is probably true to say that O'Dwyer was aglow at being posted to the Punjab. 
In the battle for precedence between the central administration and 'the man on the 
spot', O'Dwyer was very much wedded to a demeanor that would ensure the 
latter's priority; and his probity came foremost, especially when judging such a 
man's conduct of his administration.45 For instance, O'Dwyer comments that 
during Sir Charles Aitchison's Lieutenant-Govenorship (1882-87), 
'there was ... an uneasy feeling that the secretariat was gammg an undue 
influence and that skill in minute taking was the test of efficiency and the 
stepping stone to promotion ... The appointment of Sir James Lyall to 
succeed Aitchinson ... was generally welcomed by the official world and ... 
rural interests. Lyall had never been a Secretary, having spent all his official 
life ... working among the rural masses as settlement officer, Settlement and 
Financial Commissioner ... Lyall had a unique knowledge of the people, and 
though shy and unpretentious in manner, had their confidence and affection to 
an extraordinary degree. His judgment in matters affecting their interests and 
welfare was almost unerring. He lacked Aitchinson's intellectual distinction and 
clarity of expression, but his wide knowledge of and sympathy with the people 
made his administration more popular and efficient' (O'Dwyer 1925: 28). 
And, he adds, with an even more undisguised relish, that 
' .. .in the Punjab, which had been then only thirty-six years under our rule, 
there was still ample scope for the individual effort and initiative of the 
British officials, who had built up the fabric of British rule ... The Punjab ever 
since annexation had offered a splendid field for a progressive and beneficent 
administration .. .' (O'Dwyer 1925: pp27-28). 
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The role that comes most readily to mind when one thinks of this independent 
sphere of action is that of the much maligned, if almost in equal measure much 
revered, if lonely, District Officer; an almost legendary official in imperial labour. 
He would sit so the stories go, under the bunyan tree, listening to the woes and 
agonies of the inhabitants of his district and deliver, if necessary, speedy and 
effective justice.46 In exercising such a sympathetic authority it is hard not to 
remember the qualities required of an administrator enumerated by Sir Bartle Frere 
to Lord Goderich almost seventy years earlier: 
'It is really of more consequence to the natives that he (the young British 
Officer or official) should be good in the cricket field and on horseback, 
popular with servants and the poor, and the champion of bullied fags, that he 
should have a mother who taught him to say his prayers, and sisters who 
helped her to give him reverence for womankind and respect for weakness, 
than that he should be first to take a double-first at Oxford ... ' (Frere 1858 in 
Brown ed.1945: 229). 
Borrowing a phrase from Barnett who is talking about a related topic - the 
education of military elites - in this instance Bartle Frere sees the qualities of 
character as being amongst the most important postures in an Indian administrator; 
a posture in which we saw 'reflected the finest virtues of the nation .. ,' in its 
assumed role as benevolent ruler in India.47 
Woodruff gives us a taste of some of these finer virtues when he conveys the 
jobbing elements in a district officer's day taken from G 0 Treveyan. Though 
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Trevelyan's account is written in the 1860s, Woodruff thinks it still a faithful 
summation of an officer's job even many years later. According to this account, the 
district officer 
' ... rises at daybreak and goes straight from his bed to the saddle. Then he 
gallops off across fields bright with dew to visit the scene of the late dacoit 
robbery; or to see with his own eyes whether the crops of the zemindar who is 
so unpunctual with his assessment have really failed; or to watch with fond 
parental care the progress of his pet embankment.... Perhaps he has run with 
the bobbery pack of the station, consisting of a supernatural foxhound, four 
beagles, a greyhound, the doctor's retriever, and a Skye terrier belonging to 
the assistant magistrate, who unites in his own person the offices of M.F .H., 
huntsman and whipper-in. They probably start a jackal, who gives them a 
sharp run of ten minutes and takes refuge in a patch of sugar cane; whence he 
steals away in safety while the pack are occupied in mobbing a fresh fox and a 
brace of wolf clubs ... The full field of five sportsmen ... adjourn to the 
subscription swimming bath, where they find their servants ready with clothes, 
razors and brushes. After a few headers ... and tea and toast.... the collector 
returns to his bungalow and settles down to the hard business of the day ... He 
works through the contents of one dispatch box after another; signing orders 
and passing them on; dashing through drafts, to be filled up by his subordinate; 
writing reports, minutes, digests, letters of explanation, of remonstrance, or 
warning, or commendation. Noon finds him quite ready for a dejeuner a la 
fourchette, the favourite meal in the districts, when the tea-tray is lost amid a 
crowd of dishes - fried fish, curried fowl, roast kid and mint sauce, and mango-
fool. Then he sets off in his buggy to the courts, where he spends the 
afternoon in hearing and deciding questions connected with land and revenue. 
If the cases are few and easy to be disposed of, he may get away in time for 
three or four games at rackets in the new court ... By ten o'clock he is in bed, 
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with his little ones asleep in cribs enclosed within the same mosquito-nets as 
their parents' (Trevelyan in Woodruff 1954: 92-93). 
Accordingto Wilkinson, such a level of sensitivity in all his works marks out this 
model District Officer as a 'paragon of virtue' (Wilkinson 1963: 104). To be sure 
Wilkinson adds, ' . .in a remote district far from higher authority, in a position of 
great power not simply as an administrator but also as a judge, the District Officer 
had every opportunity to be lazy, corrupt and unjust .. ' Yet, as he recounts, such 
officers were rare. Instead they were invariably' ... nearly always honest, humane 
and hard working ... ' (Wilkinson 1963: 103); committed to the principles redolent 
of a noblesse oblige. So perhaps instead of choosing between such a false 
antithesis, it would be better to say, they were both lazy and hard working; 
corrupt and honest. 48 
It is well of course in this regard then to remember Philip Mason's characterization 
of his first arrival at the civil station in Saharanpur. The shock of the new remains 
with him, in a hauntingly quietest way. Though presented with numerous 
challenges and seemingly quite frightening burdens, the shock of the new was not 
meant to stifle the official and sometimes unofficial actions of an energetic 
administrator. He would be required to hold his nerve in any situation, as well as 
on this occasion learning to play polo: 
'I arrived in the middle of the night, which one almost always did in India ... I 
was met by a man two years older than myself, who was killed playing polo 
about a year later. He met me at the station and drove me to the Collector's 
house, where I was put into a tent, a great big marquee. Its floor was covered 
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with straw, with a dhurri laid over it and there was a bathroom at the back. I 
was astonished how comfortable it was and how fresh and clean and pure the 
night was in December. . .In the morning I looked out and I saw trees which 
looked so like English trees ... the most beautiful landscape. There was a feeling 
of freshness and vigour which I have never forgotten. I met my collector for 
the first time at breakfast. He came in from his morning ride and said, 'Hello, 
Mason, I've got a pony for you that you can buy immediately after breakfast 
if you like. There's a dealer here and you might wish to buy it. Work? ... no, 
you don't have need to do any work for your first year. Here's a book about 
polo, you can read that and I'll examine you on it in the evening ... ' Also that 
first morning, very early, there came a long procession of officials who said, 
'Sir, I am the Nazi, have you any orders for me?' and Sir, I am the tahsildar, 
have you any orders for me?' I simply couldn't think what to do with any of 
these people, and I only gradually found out who they all were and how they 
all fitted into the hierarchy ... ' (Mason in Allen ed. 1975: 61).49 
Once O'Dwyer was similarly placed in a district, he would he reasoned be able to 
combine all the character traits that are supposed to be the peculiar preserve of an 
ideal imperial administrator at this time. Borrowing once again a characterization 
from Wilkinson - O'Dwyer ideally portrays himself as a man like many a colonial 
administrator who came before him and those yet to come, ready to build up and 
maintain the high standards assumed of British administration. In exercising his 
duties, O'Dwyer thought and felt he would bring together' ... a sense of moral 
obligation without the cruelty of the crusader' (Wilkinson 1963: 103). In his own 
words, O'Dwyer describes with pleasure the innumerable duties he undertook 
whilst a Settlement Officer for the authentic India he is so fond of; if at the same 
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time, tinged with a growing suspicion and fear of burgeoning ranks, for him in his 
monopolistic role, of threateningly clever natives - his bogey: 
'For a civilian the post offers the best life and the most fascinating work to be 
found in India. It is the basis of all real knowledge of the rural masses. For six 
or eight months in the year he lives and works among them, almost 
exclusively. He learns thei r inner life, their trials and hardships, their joys and 
their sorrows. He deals with them in their fields and their villages, where they 
are at their best, rather than in the law courts, where they are at their worst; 
for they are then endeavoring to circumvent, often by fraud or false evidence, 
the various obstacles in the shape of legal formalities which to, their minds, we 
have placed between them and justice. When an Indian rustic comes into the 
atmosphere of a court he has his mind made up to swear to anything alongside 
that he thinks will suit his purpose, and it is no light task to get the truth out 
of him. Put the same man in the same cause in the village chauk ... or under 
the village tree among his own people, and he will hesitate to lie even in a 
good cause. That is why the peripatetic justice, to which the Indian lawyer and 
the Indian politician so strongly object, as wanting in legal formalities, IS so 
much more speedy and satisfactory ... ' (O'Dwyer 1925: 53). 
As a settlement officer in Gujranwala, the job of recording all rights in the land, 
' ... field by field, holding by holding and village by village ... ', was O'Dwyer says, 
an arduous but necessary task; a preliminary to setting as he saw it a fair rental 
that would apply for the next twenty or thirty years (O'Dwyer 1925: 53). Though 
savouring of a rather bureaucratic, formal process he rather enjoyed the personal 
contact such a process allowed him to have with the rural population. 50 Maybe 
this was all the release and reward that a conscientious administrator needed. As 
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Orwell describes it, administration in India was an unrewarding daily grind. If 
Orwell is to be believed, one should not underestimate how desperate the need for 
confirmation in one's role was: 
'The life of the 'Anglo-Indian' officials is not all jam. In comfortless camps, in 
sweltering offices, in gloomy dark bungalows smelling of dust and earth oil, 
they earn, perhaps, the right to be a little disagreeable' (Orwell 1935: 32).51 
Quite simply, the Anglo-Indian official's life consisted in, ' ... service, serVIce, 
service every time .. ' (Allen ed. 1975: 182); in another guise, duty, duty, duty 
every minute of everyday. In this sense O'Dwyer was no different. He along with 
innumerable others thought, 'Only British control can hold together the jarring 
elements of even a single province .. ' (O'Dwyer 1927: 178); members of the ICS, 
being duty bound to perform this role could not baulk in that duty. 
Charles Allen refers to Rosamund Lawrence's comments on her husband - Henry 
Lawrence - and his work. According to her, her husband sought to steer his 
everyday life in a direction that ensured he carried through his duty, duty and 
duty. A Herculean commitment that reminds me of Wordsworth's ditty to duty: 
'Stern lawgiver! Yet thou dost wear 
The Godhead's most benignant grace; 
Nor know we anything so fair 
As is the smile upon thy face; 
Flowers laugh before thee on their beds, 
And fragrance in thy footing treads; 
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Thou dost preserve the stars from wrong, 
And the most ancient heavens, through Thee, are 
Fresh and strong' (in Smiles 1880: 30). 
In Rosamund's words, in his commitment to duty her husband was '.. like the 
Duke of Wellington, always talking about duty. My husband's people, the 
Lawrences, were very religious and they were absolutely immersed in what they 
felt was their duty to India.' We might add with Smiles, it is the toiling away in 
ones duty that turns the onerous principle fixed on conscience into action. 
Rosamund Lawrence even likened the form her husband's relation to duty took as 
if it were a charm whose allure captivated him. In vernacular terminology it ' .. took 
the form of a shauq, an obsessive interest..'(Allen ed. 1975: 183): 
'My husband was absolutely heart and soul wrapped up in what he calIed the 
Sukkur Barrage. He was obsessed by it, by the amount of people there were and 
how they were alI going to be fed by it, but he was only one of a chain of 
people, who had started it long before .. ' (Allen ed. 1975: 183/4). 
A days work in India for a member of the Ies was never done; at least that is 
according to Rosamund Lawrence's account, or should we say lament, for her 
husband. 52 It was nothing but duty, duty, and duty: 
'run .. like .. response(s) through litanies of 'Anglo-India'. Even those outside 
the military or the civil administration used .. them.. when referring to the 
'tour of service' by which they were contracted to their employers. It was part 
of an.. unconscious attitude inherited.. by alI those who made thei r careers in 
India .. ' (Allen ed. 1975: 182). 
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A little resentful and often a little bitter, accordingto Carthill, ' .. men trained in the 
atmosphere of a free state ... were ... particularly jealous of paternal government . .'; 
as such, these men' .. were .. by no means men who would have been the servile 
tools of an oppressive tyranny' (Carthill1924: 42). Accordingly, 
'They felt they had two duties, a duty to India, and a duty to England. But they 
felt that everyone whose opinion was of any value would feel that in doing 
their duty by India they were also doing it by England. England required no 
tribute from India. She did not ask for any special privileges there. She looked 
merely to the increasing wealth and prosperity of this valuable market for her 
material reward, and to the consciousness that she was ruling and benefiting 
three hundred of millions of the human race for the satisfaction of her 
appetite for less material recompense .. ' (Carthill 1924: 42). 
Allen once again, offers us a window on the activities that such a cluster of 
obsessions sets in train: 
'Duty of the order exercised by the ICS meant that 'an officer of the Raj could 
never say his home was his castle. There never seems to be a moment when 
you could be entirely free - unless you were on leave. You would find 
somebody waiting to see you on a Saturday evening or a Sunday, because he 
knew that that was the time you were free.' Accessibility to the humblest 
petitioner was a Mogul tradition inherited and maintained by the British. Its 
most significant expression was in the early morning queues of Mulaquatis on 
the verandah of every district or political officer in the land . .' (Allen ed. 1975: 
184). 
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The assumptions that drilled one into such a devotional ethic came, according to 
his illustrations, from both ruler and ruled. Here for instance is Geoffrey Allen 
speaking about how the local population in Bihar relied on him for justice: 'you 
were always being asked to try cases which were before you. It was much cheaper 
for tenants to come to you to decide cases than to go many miles away to the civil 
courts .. ' (in Allen ed. 1975: 182).53 Who amongst the ranks of our Oxford educated 
administrators would not believe in their ability to deliver justice on demand; a 
belief inherited Symington suggests, ' ... by all those who made their careers in 
India ... ' Such a belief came, he thinks from the realization, 
' ... that we were members of a very successful race. We belonged to a country 
that, in the world league, had done exceedingly well for a small island ... We 
also realized that we were working in a country which was as preeminently 
unsuccessful as we were successful.. I suppose that produced a frame of mind in 
which we tacitly - not explicitly - felt ourselves to be rather superior people . .' 
(in Allen ed. 1975: 182). 
In the high noon of British Imperialism it never occurred to administrators so 
placed to doubt their abilities or standing. Nor that they could not exercise 
authority over people they regarded as a subject race. Listen to George Carroll. He 
, ... had authority over hundreds of policeman in his district': So, ' ... The question of 
exercisingmy power never arose in my mind because it seemed so natural that, as 
an Englishman, I should have power over all my Indian subordinates ... ' (in Allen 
ed. 1975: 182). 
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What was that power for? 'For the good of my charges'is a phrase that rang out 
loud and clear in every district up and down the country; even more so when an 
administrator convinces himself that his charges would expect nothing less from 
him. His authority could only be enhanced by such expectations. Delusionary it 
may be, but it founded an ethos. Many an administrator stood by that ethos 
religiously. Doing work on behalf of their charges, and working for their good, 
further convinced these administrators of the rightness of their actions. In this 
sense the ruler's authority, Allen reasons, is founded on the ma-bap principle -
literally, 'I am your mother and your father' - a principle that assumes the existence 
of what I've hinted at already - a dutiful paternalism; Allen illustrates this by 
reference to Kenneth Warren. Warren was a tea-garden manager. Warren describes 
his daily contact with his labour force thus: 
' ... It was customary for a member of the labour force who had a request to 
make to come to you and first of all to address you as Hazar - Your Honour, 
and then ma-bap - you are my father and my mother, I have this, that and the 
other request to make .. ' (Warren in Allen ed. 1975: 183). 
So many colonial administrators, so many stories to tell about life 'under a blazing 
sun.' Yet, there are a few constants and these senses of duty, however perverse 
they may seem in the light of a modem day sun, contain some of them. Warren 
recounts another tale of these ethics in practice. Warren shares with his readers an 
incident at his workplace: 
'We had an epidemic of opthalmia in the garden where I was manager and a 
number of the labour had to come to hospital for treatment, among them a 
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man who was three days in hospital under treatm ent and was cured. The next 
thing I heard at my early morning durbar was that this man's child had been 
taken to hospital with her eyes burnt out. She had developed opthalmia and 
her father, although he himself had been cured in the hospital, said he knew 
better and that he knew of ajungle cure, a mixture of certain herbs and jungle 
plants, which he mashed up and plastered on his daughters eyes and burnt them 
out. She was a child of about fourteen, a charming little girl, and when I came 
into the hospital she heard my voice and fell on to her knees and held on to 
my legs and implored me to cure her saying, 'Sahib, I know you can cure me. 
You can do anything if you wish to.' It was a most distressing and terrible 
experience for me. I held the durbar the next morning. I had the father 
brought up to my office together with the whole of his clan. I told them what 
had happened and how disgraceful it was and what did they, the clan, suggest 
should be done. With one accord they said he should be beaten. They put th eir 
heads together and discussed it and then the headman turned to me and said, 
'Sahib, we think it is right and proper that you should beat him and not us.' So I 
said, 'Well, if that is your decision all I can do is carry out your wish.' I came 
down from the verandah and I went up to this fellow and I hit him. I hit him 
so hard that I bruised my right hand and I had to have it in a sling for twenty-
four hours afterwards (in Allen ed. 1975: 183). 
Though all Warren's actions are informed by the need, as he sees it, to ensure that 
the cured father's daughter receives hospital treatment - as opposed to an unholy 
species of jungle treatment - the practice of duty here is also what Smiles calls, self 
devoted. Though our version of administrative practice did not seek gold, and our 
practitioners would deride any accusation that implied so, the general point is well 
made. 54 Duty is, 
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' .. not merely fearlessness. The gladiator who fought the lion with the courage 
of a lion, was urged on by the ardour of the spectator s, and never forgot 
himself and his prizes. Pizzaro was full of hardihood. But he was actuated by 
his love of gold in the midst of terrible hardships .. ' (Smiles 1880: 16). 
Perhaps this so-called self-devotion to duty is better glimpsed in Samuel Smile:; 
comment that, 'the best kind of duty is done in secret': 
'Many .. duties are performed privately. Our public life may be well known, but 
in private there is that which no one sees - the inner life of the soul and spirit. 
We have it in our choice to be worthy or worthless. No one can kill our soul, 
which can perish only by its own suicide. If we can make ourselves and each 
other a little bit better, holier and nobler, we have perhaps done the most we 
could' (Smiles 1880: 17). 
(x) Duty's seminal regard 
To recap, regard for others is a part of the characterological traits that our 
administrators hold so dear. Smiles adds the sentence that come back to us time 
and time again and which ought he thinks to be written in every book on morals: 
'Do unto others, as ye would that they should do unto you.' Yet, his explicit 
reference to self-devotion as a regard to one's inner life, soul or spirit, alerts us, as I 
discussed earlier, to the 'constitution of authority itself.. .the ... ways in which 
sources of authority construct themselves as ... subjects with the authorization to 
subject others to authority' (Osborne 1994b: 2). 
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Smiles elaborates on this aspect of duty, by using a sentence from Goethe that 
travels there via a regard for others. In the first part, Goethe asks what 'is your 
duty?' The reply comes back, 'the carrying out of the affairs of the day that lie 
before you' (in Smiles 1880: 22). This is consistent with the kind of paternalism 
that characterized many administrators' actions. An ideal administrator did not, 
indeed could not desert his post in this sense.55 As we have seen already, Allen 
alerts us to a, 'duty of the order exercised by the IeS ... which ... meant that an 
officer of the Raj could never say his home was his castle. There never seemed to 
be a moment when you could be entirely free - unless you were on leave' (Allen ed. 
1975: 184). 
But, this is Smiles says, too narrow a view of duty. Goethe realizes it and asks, 
'what .. .is the best government?' (in Smiles 1880: 22). To which he replies, 'that 
which teaches us to govern ourselves ... ' (in Smiles 1880: 22). So government is not 
outward directed, but comes to be fixed on managing the souls of the 
administrators themselves. To illustrate Smiles has recourse to what Plutarch said 
to the Emperor Trajan. Plutarch told the Emperor, ' ... let your government 
commence in your own breast, and lay the foundation of it in the command of your 
own passions ... ' It is here that we find the triumvirate of self-control, duty and 
conscience (in Smiles 1880: 22) 
As I instance above, Warren's sense of the right way to conduct oneself endears 
him he hopes, to the local population. Yet, his conduct also confirms to himself the 
rightness of his presence and his actions, carried out according to his own rigorous 
170 
protocols. No doubt a little heroic martyrdom entered into such equations. If the 
little girl's father wouldn't admit to the superiority of hospital treatment, even 
though he was cured there, then he, the caring and dutiful Sahib would ensure she is 
admitted. In doing so Warren would ensure the continuance of the Golden age of 
paternalism. Many administrators still adhered to Senex's version of The Golden 
Age, 
'No deep division severed them 
The Powers that Be from other men; 
But all was friendly to the core, 
When Thompson ruled in Thompson pore.' (in Allen ed. 1975: 61) 
Somewhat romantic it may be, but there are many Thompsons and countless tales 
of their deeds.56 There are many statements of intent and action full of references 
to working for India's and Indians' welfare. Administrative history in India is 
littered with such references. But we probably won't be able to find a better, 
general, almost manifesto like statement, than that contained in Cunningham's 
manual (1882). He writes ' .. .in a form easy of access and simple in arrangement, 
for the practical discussion of some of the principal administrative and social 
problems involved in the government of India ... ' (Cunningham 1882: 4). The 
object in view is simply to instruct administrators how they should govern India in 
a way, that is most conducive to its and its people's welfare, conducted by those 
most suited to the task. The administration can sit back and watch its responsible 
superintendence bare fruitful improvements. Thus, ' .. .in considering the 
administration of the country ... no other object but its welfare has to be taken into 
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account...' (Cunningham 1882: 4). And what are those duties of superintendence? 
They are to, 
' ... keep order, to reclaim, to irrigate, to extend communications, to develop 
trade, to educate to improve jails and hospitals and courts and police, and the 
administrative machinery - generally to import as many European 
improvements as there is money to pay for, is a task for which the 
Englishman feels himself especially qualified, and which he performs with 
vigour, and for the most part with success .. ' (Cunningham 1882: 51). 
Yet, many that would work their whole lives for India, often felt themselves 
misunderstood and forgotten. Neglected even. Service, service, service; duty, duty, 
duty; all came, according to such people, to nothing. Rewards there were none! 
Kipling once again: 
Take up the white man's burden - / 
And reap his old reward / 
The blame of those ye better / 
The hate of those ye guard (Kipling 1899). 
For yet others, a heroic and manly pursuit it certainly wasn't. Norman Watney 
asserts his roles' simple banality: ' ... I thought nothing about the Raj ... It seemed to 
me that I had a job, it was a tough one, and that was all there was to it' (in Allen 
1975: 217). The job of course is wrapped in a self-serving ethic of self-sacrifice 
(Sharpe 1993); (Macaulay1833). 
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'I don't think we ever consciously thought about the British Raj as such. We 
simply accepted that this was where fate had placed us. We felt that this was 
our destiny - in many cases the destiny of our forebears - that we were there at 
some sacrifice to serve India. Those long partings from children were a great 
sacrifice, the loneliness was a sacrifice. There was absolutely no feeling of 
exploitation, no feeling of being wicked imperialists. In fact in those days we 
didn't think imperialists were necessarily wicked .. ' (Watney in Allen ed. 1975: 
217).57 
There is no denying the strength of such a feeling. The taste for India that is 
exhibited here, goes beyond a mere relish for savoury foods. For many, 
unashamedly as Allen remarks, ' ... on a personal level. .. benevolent paternalism had 
much to commend it' (Allen 1975: 217); and certainly a worthwhile job for many 
an Ies probationer: 
'The fashion is to judge India by the few who have made money out of it, and 
forget the devotion of people who served it. The men who looked after the 
forests, the people who built hospitals, the people who made roads, who did 
the irrigation. It was their occupation, granted, but they did it with a love of 
India, a love of the people, and what they did and what they contributed is 
now forgotten to a large extent. They were the ordinary, plain little people, 
the ones in the middle who were never exalted, but who ran India 
really ... and ... if[they] had not made a raj in India, somebody else would have -
and they would not have made such a good job at it ... ' (in Allen ed. 1975: 
217). 
Turning once again to Kipling, as the chronicler of 'the job', he gave his seal of 
approval to such small people. 58 Heroes, perhaps - for as he put it in the context 
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of famine relief work - ' ... famine was ... a ... sore in the land and white men were 
needed ... ' (Kipling in Parry 1998: 207). Administrators in this oeuvre are certainly 
thought of as heroes in their performance of the job.59 Hence Kipling once again as 
Parry puts it, ' ... gave a spurious grandeur to ... British peoples ... posturings ... as a 
nation of law-givers ... and endowed the discomforts of their job as imperial rulers 
with the glory of suffering and self sacrifice ... ' (Parry 1998: 207). 
There was to be no stepping over the mark. There would be no overfamiliarity 
with the natives. For Parry once again comments, doing the job ' ... was a bid for 
security ... ' not romance.60 Falling down on the job would mean hordes streaming 
over the North-West Frontier, probably in the pay of Russia. We all know where 
overfamiliarity led a succession of British secret service agents. Kipling himself 
warned his readers about such dangers in his chilling story, 'Beyond the Pale': 
'The story of a man who willfully stepped beyond the safe limits of decent 
everyday society, and paid for it heavily. He knew too much in the first 
instance; and he saw too much in the second. He took too deep an interest In 
native life; but he will never do so again ... ' (Kipling 1993: 159).61 
In the face of such a grotesque prospect it is much better to be someone who is a 
strict copy of a Kipling character called Strickland. In Kipling's pantomime 
Strickland knew the 'path(s) to understanding Indians and its purpose' (Parry 
1998: 211). Strickland 'knows as much of the natives of India as is good for any 
man ... and ... hates being mystified by natives, because his business in life is to 
overmatch them with their own weapons' (Parry 1998: 211). Indeed he 'know(s) as 
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much about the natives as the natives themselves' (Kipling 1993: 25). For all these 
reasons and more, 'natives hated Strickland; they were afraid of him. He knew too 
much' (Kipling 1993: 27). 
In Kipling's tale of 'Miss Y oughal's Sais', he plots how Strickland made it his lives 
works to know the ways and habits specifically of the saises. As Kipling writes it, 
Strickland's 
' ... crowning achievement was spending eleven days as a faquir or priest in the 
gardens of Baba Atal at Amritsar, and their picking up the threads of the great 
Nasiban Murder case. But people said, justly enough, 'Why on earth can't 
Strickland sit in his office and write up his diary, and recruit, and keep quiet, 
instead of showing up the incapacity of his seniors?' ... (Kipling 1993: 26). 
Eventually, Kipling has Strickland marry Miss Youghal ' ... on the strict 
understanding that he drop his old ways'; that is touring the bazars with his ears 
very much to the ground, and ' ... stick to Departmental routine, which pays best 
and leads to Simla ... ' (Kipling 1991: 31). 
But Kipling writes how such an adventurous man of the bazaars, and so useful to 
the administration in that guise could not keep away from them for long. Thus, it 
was a sore trial for Strickland to keep away. Not long after his promise, 'the streets 
and the bazaars and the sounds in them ... full of meaning to Strickland, called to 
him to come back and take up his wanderings and his discoveries ... ' (Kipling 1993: 
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31). That Parry adds, is 'the call of the job.' (Parry 1998: 211). And the job in this 
instance is all. 
Often the balance between the job as adventure and the job as job in these senses is 
difficult to draw. Kipling himself knew that to be the case and was sneering if not 
also a little scolding (as Parry helpfully tells us), of 'the British people for their 
immoderate toastings of empire' (Parry 1998: 215). For, in such toasting they are 
prone he would think, to forget the serious tasks that colonialism sets for itself. 
Hence, 
'If drunk with sight of power we loose 
Wild tongues that have not thee in awe, 
Such boastings as the Gentiles use 
Or lesser breeds without the law-
Lord God of Hosts, be with us yet 
Lest we forget, lest we forget (in Parry 1998: 215). 
Parry reads Kipling's, 'The Man Who Would be King' (1890) as one such 
immoderate yam. It tells a tale of two adventurers, Peachey Camechan and Daniel 
Dravot. Their lives and times in India are conducted in such a way as to be 
completely destitute of the laws of colonial order; they are loafers62 ; the kind of 
nasty members of the population one meets when travelling intermediate class on 
Indian Railways, Kipling tells us. Kipling alerts his readers to the lessons imperial 
administrators should draw from the tale at the outset - 'Brother to a prince and 
fellow to a beggar if he be found worthy'; these loafers are not worthy individuals 
(Kipling in Parry 1998: 221). 
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For Kipling the loafers' conduct in India is not worthy of the great names involved 
in the administration of India; certainly not for instance in the Bartle Frere; John 
Jacobs; John Beames; Charles Aitkinson; or even John and Henry Lawrence 
modes. They appear as ' ... archetypes of. .. adventurers whose greed, grandiose 
dreams and psychological need for license made them dangerous men in ordered 
society' (Parry 1998: 216). Their ethics are spelt out by one of them at a chance 
meeting on the train with our narrator. Thus, ' .. .ifIndia was filled with men like 
you and me, not knowing more than the crows where they'd get their next day's 
rations, it isn't seventy millions of revenue the land would be paying - it's seven 
hundred millions ... ' (Kipling1987: 244). 
All the facets of empire that were later reconfigured in Kipling's 'White Man's 
Burden' as self-sacrifice; duty; toil; 'seek another's profit I and work another's gain' 
- do not drive these men. Our attention is drawn to a series of earlier stories - to 
stories of 'avarice ... to ... the thirst for personal glory ... to ... the satisfactions of 
feeding on the homage of dependent peoples ... ' (Parry 1998: 220). In these senses 
however much Kipling wished by writing this story to alert his readers to a more 
virtuous story of empire ' ... the story ... nevertheless ... mimics historical 
occurrences from whose ethical assumptions Kipling did not dissent ... ' (Parry 
1998: 219). Avarice, rapine, plunder' ... form ... as these did an integral part of the 
white man's imperialist experience ... ' (Parry 1998: 219). Our fools and loafers, 
detested, feckless and hopeless folk as they are, envisioned as such by many a 
righteous Anglo-Indian, comment on their desires and dreams thus, 
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'we have been all over India, mostly on foot. We have been boiler fitters, 
engine-drivers, petty contractors, and all that, and we have decided that India 
isn't big enough for such as us ... The country isn't half worked out because 
they that governs it won't let you touch it. They spend all their time in 
governing it, and you can't lift a spade, nor chip a rock, nor look for oil, nor 
anything like that, without all the Government saying, "Leave it alone, and let 
us govern." Therefor e, such as it is, we will we let it alone, and go away to 
some other place where a man isn't crowded and can come to his own. We are 
not little men, and there is nothing that we are afraid of except drink, and we 
have signed a Contrack on that. Therefore we are going away to be Kings ... ' 
(Kipling 1888 in Parry 1998: 216).63 
Little men with enormous appetites they are set on their course. 
'I won't make a nation ... I'll make an Empire ... There must be a fair two 
million of 'em in these hills ... Two hundred and fifty thousand fighting men, 
ready to cut in on Russia's right flank when she tries for India! Peachy man ... 
we shall be Emperors of the Earth! ... I'll treat with the Viceroy on equal terms 
.. When everything was ship-shape, I'd hand over the crown - this crown I'm 
wearing now - to Queen Victoria on my knees, and sh'd say: "Rise up, Sir 
Daniel Dravot!" Oh, it's big! It's big, I tell you ... ' (in Parry 1998: 219). 
For Kipling whatever sympathy he has with the derring doers of Empire, ideal 
moral authority is based on the law, and its subsequent worth is precious. He 
warns 
'The law, as quoted, lays down a fair conduct of life, and one not easy to 
follow. I have been fellow to a beggar again and again under circumstances 
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which prevented either of us finding out whether the other was worthy. I have 
still to be brother to a prince, though I came near to kinship with what might 
have been a veritable King, and was promised the reversion of a kingdom -
army, law-courts, revenue and policy all complet e. But today I fear my King is 
dead and if! want a crown I must go hunt it for myself...' (Kipling 1982: 244). 
Our adventurers aren't enamoured of good rule by law. They are not interested in 
India. Certainly not in the sense of giving their time over to conducting a 
'progressive, beneficent rule' (Myers 1968: 711-23). Quite the contrary. They are 
of an old school that believes explicitly in markets and their morality; or borrowing 
a phase from Sharpe, 'self interest and .. .its ... moral superiority' (Sharpe 1993:7). 
Thomas Babington Macaulay envisaged 
It is scarcely possible to calculate the benefits which we might derive from the 
diffusion of European civilisation among the vast population of the East. It 
would be, on the most selfish view of the case, far better for us that the people 
of India were well governed and independent of us, than ill governed and 
subject to us; that they were ruled by their kings, but wearing our broad cloth, 
and working with our cutlery, than that they were performing their salams to 
English Collectors and English magistrates, but were too ignorant to value, or 
too poor to buy, English manufactures. To trade with civilised men is 
infinitely more profitable than to govern savages .. .' (Macaulay 1883 in Sharpe 
1993: 7).64 
Sir Michael O'Dwyer describes a different pleasure. He describes the pleasure he 
derives from doing right by the inhabitants in whatever villageis under his tutelage, 
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as doing his duty. Doing his duty as we have seen, often meant echoing the playful 
contests, termed, 'bantering between master and servant': 
'We would go round the village lands - say one thousand acres of cultivation 
for an average village of one hundred peasant proprietors - to see the crops. 
The headman would, of course wish to take me to the worst lands. I had a big 
black Turcoman horse known as "Death". He had killed a wounded boar, that 
unwisely attacked him in the jungle, by a well aimed right and left from his 
hind legs, and thereafter was thought highly of. I would leave the selection to 
"Death," who for his own selfish aims would invariably make for the fields 
where the crops were thickest and highest. This would draw a laugh from the 
crowd who said the horse was not death but "Shaitan" (Satan) from his 
uncanny knowledge. This playful contest of wits would be renewed most 
mornings for the five or six months of the cold weather, from 7 am till noon. 
In that time three or four villages were covered daily. The group of villagers 
was then assembled outside my tent in the afternoon, and in the general pow-
wow further facts were elicited, ifnot from the village concerned at least from 
its neighbours, for each would magnifY its neighbour's resources while 
minimising its own ... ' (O'Dwyer 1925: 55). 
Is it any wonder, given the intensity of the expenences, and the burden of 
expectation it is imagined falls on their paternal shoulders, that the imperial 
administrator feels most at home, at home so to speak in camp. In camp in 
Gujranwala as a settlement officer, O'Dwyer was 
' ... in daily touch with the ... peasantry. He saw the villagers swarm around 
himself and his assistants with their disputes; he lived among them in tents for 
nine months every year, with no Sundays or holidays, spending most of the 
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day in a good-humoured chaffing battle of wits, they trying to persuade him 
that their land was poor, he looking for the best crops with an eye sharpened 
by the knowledge that the tallest sugar cane might hold a boar or a partridge. 
No one who has ever been a settlement or a record officer can forget those 
months in camp; he comes to think of the peasants as his children, and the 
more masculine his character the harder he finds it to believe that anyone else 
can look after them. And there could be few characters more masculine than 
O'Dwyer's (Woodruff 1954: 237) 
A master such as O'Dwyer whose deeds and actions were informed by such a 
moral universe, wouldn't hesitate, if he deemed it necessary, to chastise his 
charges. Perhaps he would see himself as less of a man if he did anything short of 
such chastisement. As his officer in charge on that fateful day - April 19 1919 -
Brigadier-General Dyer, would later say to the Hunter Commission, his actions 
were intended to punish the 'naughty boy' (Dyer 1920). That these actions, 
informed as they are by the moral codes I am describing, resulted in such a loss of 
life is not really the point. Chastisement, in the precise form it took on the 19 
April 1919 is elevated by adherence to these codes to what Sayer terms, ' ... the 
high moral status of duty ... '. Carthill even exal1s massacre to a form of good, 
effective chastisement, especially since, 
' ... massacre as a part of the activities of government, is by no means in itself 
abhorrent to the mind of the Oriental, and the Indian was familiar enough with 
it. There are several forms of the political massacre, and there was nothing 
about any of them which was repugnant to the Indian. There is the massacre 
which is the resource of the weak government. If offences are not punished 
from time to time, and particularly if dangerous agitation is tolerated, then it 
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invariably happens that the government must ultimately abdicate or fight ... ' 
(Carthill 1924: 93). 
When it came to quelling disorder, one of the pnme reasons administrators 
rationalised their presence in India, many would not readily dismiss or question 
O'Dwyer's use of Saidi's Persian couplet in relation to their actions when they 
sought to put down such disorder, 
'The spring at its source may be turned with a twig; 
When it has grown to a river it cannot be crossed by an elephant' (in 
Woodruff 1954: 239) 
Woodruff even gIVes these proceedings a name. He calls it, 'the Lawrence 
Tradition'. In a similar, though in a more specific vein, Colonel Edward said of both 
Lawrence brothers - 'They sketched a faith, and begot a school, which are both 
living things at this day ... ' (Edwardes in Smiles: 78). Perhaps O'Dwyer and some 
of his fellow administrators inherited their pose. Accordingto Woodruff, 
'The Lawrence tradition had not died and in the Punjab more than anywhere it 
was the first article of faith that the man who is most ready to use force at the 
beginning will use least at the end' (Woodruff 1954: 236). 
Perhaps the Lawrence tradition gaineda particular kind of notoriety because of its 
over-association with muscular and masculine action. In this regard a case 
conceminga Mr Cooper and his actions during the 1857 rebellion is interesting. Ian 
Colvin tells us about it in his biography of General Dyer. Accordingto Colvin 
182 
'The 26th Native Infantry mutinied on the 30th July 1857, murdered their 
Colonel and four officers, and fled from Lahore to join the mutineers 
marching on Delhi. They were intercepted at Ajuala, near Amritsar, by Mr 
Cooper ... with a body of anned Punjab police, forced to surrender and shot -
to the number of 240. Sir John Lawrence, the Lieutenant Governor, wrote to 
Mr Cooper on the 2nd August congratulating him on his success. "You and 
your police," he added, "acted with much energy and spirit, and deserve well of 
the State. I trust the fate of these sepoys will act as a warning to others" 
(Colvin 1929: 332). 
Yet Colvin also relates to us a seemingly different element in our erstwhile pose 
that is given the honorific tradition. He describes how when, 
'some months later Cooper described his action in the 'Crisis in the Punjab,' 
and gloried in the carnage in a style which Lawrence found 'nauseating.' But 
Lord Canning made this comment: "1 hope that Mr Cooper will be judged by 
his acts done under stern necessity rather than by his own narration of them" 
(Colvin 192 9: 332). 
It is important to place such a tradition in its specific context.65 For this purpose I 
want briefly to look at the lives and the administrative/military traditions that the 
brothers Lawrence brought to their roles in India. 
(xi) Vigorous Traditions 
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The Lawrence brothers cast a long shadow over Indian affairs; Henry Lawrence 
even being included alongside Clive, Warren Hastings and Sir Henry Havelock the 
hero for many of the Mutiny, in F M Holmes, Four Heroes of India (1892).66 One 
reason for such a worshipful devotion to the Lawrence's heroic stature, is the way 
in which they dispensed policy at fraught times. At the time of the 1857 
rebellions, John Lawrence was Chief Commissioner of the Punjab. Mason relates 
how when news of the troubles spr ead, John Lawrence was impatient of delay in 
acting to root out the rebels. Uncertainty regarding his and his soldiers' food 
supplies did not deter for long. He calculated that his mobile force could march 
with only four days supply of food; supplies being replenished by officers as 
needed. It didn't enter his head that the rebels could possibly succeed in their 
design. So sure was he in his propose he counselled, 'Reflect on the history of 
India. Where have we failed, when we have acted vigorously? Where have we 
succeeded, when guided by timid counsels?' As Smiles relates, such an officer could 
think, feel and act with a frightening conviction fed by a racial arrogance to be sure, 
but also his devotion to the ethic I label, 'duty'. 
'The country which ... John Lawrence ... governed had just been conquered by 
the English. He governed his new province welJ and wisely. He trusted the 
people the people about him, and made them his friends. And then he did what 
is perhaps unexampled in history. He sent away the whole of the Punjab 
native troops, to assist the English army at Delhi, leaving himself without 
any force to protect him. The result proved that he was right. The Sikhs and 
the Punjabees proved faithful. Delhi was taken, and India was saved. All this 
depended on the personal character of John Lawrence. The words which his 
brother, Sir Henry desired to be put upon his tomb, modestly describe his life 
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and character - "Here lies Henry Lawrence who did his duty!" , (Smiles 1880: 
79). 
As MacKenzie notes, at least until the 1960s and 1970s, the Lawrences appeared 
in school history text-books as figures to be admired by pupils (Mackenzie 1984; 
Dawson 1994: 147). What precisely is it then that they brought to India? A word 
that appears to be constantly applied is the familiar term, duty. Hence, 
'It is related of the great Lord Lawrence, that during the conduct of some 
important case for a young Indian Raja, the prince endeavoured to place in his 
hands, under the table a bag of rupees. "Young man," said Lawrence, "you have 
offered to an Englishman the greatest insult which he could possibly receive. 
This time in consideration of your youth I excuse it. Let me warn you by this 
expenence, never again commit so gross an offence against an English 
gentleman'" (Smiles 1880: 78). 
As Smiles adds, 'it is by the valour and honesty of such men that the empire of 
India has been maintained ... They have toiled at their duty, often at the risk of their 
lives' (Smiles 1880: 78-79). Retaking Delhi from the clutches of mutineers ensured 
their posterity in the annals of imperial heroes. 
The Lawrence brothers, Henry and John, defined their own modus operandi. 
Speaking about troubles stirring in Mooltan 67 in 1852, Sir Henry Lawrence, eerily 
predicting the principles guiding his brothers' actions in the 1858 rebellion, set out 
his thoughts on the actions necessary at these times: ' '" we cannot afford in India 
185 
to shilly-shally, and talk of weather and seasons. If we are not ready to take the 
field at all seasons, we have no business here' (in Kaye 1880: 127). 
After the annexationofthe Punjab, announced in a Proclamation by the Governor-
General to the assembled Chiefs in Lahore on 29th March 1849, its affairs were set 
to be administered under the care of a Board presided over by Henry Lawrence. 
His brother John sat alongside him. A Mr Mansel assisted them. Sir W J Kaye sets 
out for us how the Board so constituted saw it role. Starting by complimenting it 
on their notable accomplishments, he alerts us to the how the problem of 
government presented itself to them and the nature of the task before them and 
how these characters went about performing their task. Thus, 
'All the turbulent elements of Punjabee society were now to be reduced to 
quietude and serenity; out of chaos was to be evolved order; out of anarchy and 
ruin, peace and prosperity. Since the death of Ranjit Singh, there had been no 
government in the Punjab with the strong hand by which alone all classes 
could be kept in due subordination to each other; and the soldierly had 
therefore been dominant in the state. Their power was now broken; for the 
most part; indeed, their occupation had gone. But hence the danger of 
disbanded soldiers; factions grown desperate; and the greater question was how 
these praetorian bands, and th e Sirdars, or privileged classes, were to be dealt 
with by the new government. If there was one man in the country better 
qualified than all the others to solve in practice that great question, it was 
Henry Lawrence; for with courage and resolution of the highest order, were 
combined within him the large sympathy and the catholic toleration of a 
generous heart' (emphasis mine. Kaye III 1880: 135). 
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Kaye doesn't hold back in his admiring words about the two brothers. Their make 
up is presented as little short of god like. So much is Imperial conviction, so much 
hyperbole. Yet the belief in its appropriateness is little short of chilling. It is 
certainly a paradoxical mode of power. Paradoxical, in the sense that at its very 
centre lay toleration and generousness of heart. Yet, paraphrasing Rai, this is 
combined with an apparatus of security that becomes, as we have seen, more and 
more 'hysterical as well as total, at least in its aspirations after the Indian Mutiny 
of 1857 ... '. Indeed as we see, one of its foremost enabling conditions is a steely 
paternalism; despotic it certainly is; but also proud in its boasts of kindly 
affection; utmost in its duty. Kaye goes on to say that in the work of this Board 
of Administration, 
' ... we see epitomised a history of British progress in the East - we see the 
manner in which men reared under the great monarchy of the middle classes, 
which so long held India as its own, did, by dint of a benevolence that never 
failed, an energy that never tired, and a courage which never faltered, let what 
might be the difficulties to be faced, or the responsibilities to be assumed, 
achieve these vast successes which are the historical wonders of the world' 
(emphasis mine. Kaye III 1880: 136). 
John Lawrence himself elaborated on his relation to India and the Punjab in the 
following words to an assembly of notables after the formal opening of Lawrence 
Hall in the Punjab. They are worth citing in full: 
'Maharajas, Rajas, and Chiefs, - Listen to my words. I have come among you 
after an absence of nearly six years, and thank you for the kindly welcome 
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you have gIven me. It is with pleasure that I meet so many of my friends, 
while I mourn the loss of those who have passed away. Princes and Chiefs, it is 
with great satisfaction that I find nearly six hundred of you assembled around 
me in this durbar. I see before me the faces of so many friends; I recognise the 
sons of myoId allies; the Maharajas of Kashmir and Patiala, the Sikh Chiefs 
Malva and the Manjha, the Rajput chiefs of the hills, the Mohammedan 
Maliks of Peshawar and Khohat, the Sadars of the Derajat, of Hazara and of 
Delhi. All have gathered together to do honour to their old ruler. My friends, 
let me tell you of the great interest which the illustrious Queen of Englan d 
takes in all matters connected with the welfare and conifort and contentment 
of the people of India. Let me inform you, when I returned to my native 
country and had the honour of standing in the presence of Her Majesty, how 
kindly she asked after the welfare of Her subjects of the East. Let me tell you, 
when the great Queen appointed me Her Viceroy of India, how warmly she 
enjoined on me the duty of caring for your interests. Prince Albert, the 
consort of Her Majesty, the fame of whose greatness and goodness has spread 
through the whole world, was well acquainted with all connected with this 
country, and always evinced an ardent desire to see its people happy and 
flourishing. My friends, it is now more than eighteen years since I first saw 
Lahore. For thirt een years I lived in the Punjab. For many years, my brother, 
Sir Henry Lawrence, and I governed this vast country. You all know him well, 
and his memory will ever dwell in your hearts as a ruler who was a real friend 
of its people. I may truly say that from the day we exercised authority in the 
land, we spared neither our time nor our labour, nor our health in 
endeavouring to accomplish the work we had undertaken, we had studied to 
make ourselves acquainted with the usages, the feelings and the wants of every 
class and race, and we endeavoured to improve the condition of all. There 
are few parts of this province which I have not visited, and which I hope that 
I did not leave in some degree the better for my visit. Since British rule was 
introduced taxation of all kinds has been established. From the highest to the 
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lowest the people have become contented and have proved loyal. When the 
great military revolt of 1857 occurred, they aided their rulers most effectively 
in putting it down. The chiefs mustered thei r contingents, which served 
faithfully and thousands of Panjab soldiers flocked to our standards and shared 
with the British troops the glories as well the hardships of that great struggle. 
Princes and gentlemen, if it be wise for the rulers of a country to understand 
the language and appreciate the feelings of its people, it is as important that 
the people should have a similar knowledge of its rulers. It is only by such 
means that the two classes can live happily together. To this end I urge you to 
instruct your sons, and even your daughters. Among the solid advantages 
which you have gained from English rule I will only avert to one more. It has 
given the country many excellent administrators. Some of the ablest and the 
kindest of my countrymen have been employed in the Panjab. Every man, 
from the highest to the lowest, can appreciate a good ruler. You have such 
names as Sir Robert Montgomery, Mr Donald McLeod, Mr Roberts, Sir 
Herbert Edwardes, Col. Lake and Col. John Beecher, officers who have 
devoted them selves to your service. I will now only add that I pray the great 
God, who is the God of all the races and all the people of this world, that He 
may guard and protect you and teach you all to love justice and hate 
oppression, and enable you, each in his several ways, to do all the good in his 
power. May He give you all that is for your real benefit! So long as I live, 
shall never forget the years that I passed in the Panjab and the friend that 
have acquired throughout this province ... ' (italics mine. Lawrence 1864 in 
Latiff 1889: 587-588). 
According to William Kaye, after some three years as head of the Board of 
Administration, John Lawrence's brother, Sir Henry had written to him from 
Lahore. In his letter he outlined on what foundations the British precedence m 
India stood. Kaye comments: 
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'In [Lawrence's letter] we see epitomised a history of British progress in the 
East - we see the manner in which men reared under that great 'monarchy of 
the middle classes,' which so long held India as its own, did, by dint of a 
benevolence that never failed, an energy that never tired, and a courage which 
never faltered, let what might be the difficulties to be faced, or the 
responsibilities to be assumed, achieve those vast successes which are the 
historical wonders of the world ... ' (Kaye 1880: 136). 
Picking out a few of Sir Henry's own words, 
'We wish to make the basis of our rule a light and equable assessment; a strong 
and vigorous, though un interfering police, and a quiet hearing in all civil and 
other cases... We have hunted down all the daciots. During the first year we 
hanged nearly a hundred, six and eight at a time, and thereby struck such a 
terror that Dacoitee is now more rare than in any part of India (Kaye 1880: 
136).68 
After the so-called Mutiny in 1858, the Queen-Empress reassured her subjects of 
the merciful, indeed sympathetic character of her rule over them. All this at a time 
when administrators and army officers were caUingfor and often wreaking, a horrid 
revenge on Indians implicated, or not, in the revolts of 1857 (Sharpe 1993). Indeed, 
after the last battles in the rebellion, there were, Latiff tells us, proposals to raze to 
the ground the whole of Delhi, and with it the grand Mosque; but as he adds, John 
Lawrence resisted all such calls, saying, 'I will on no account consent to it. We 
should carefully abstain from the destruction of religious edifices, either to favour 
friends or annoy foes' (Latif 1889: 582). 
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Reinforcingthat paradoxical moment after the rebellim, The Queen-Empress said 
'To the nation at large, to the peaceable inhabitants, to the many kind and 
friendly natives who have assisted us, sheltered the fugitives, and are faithful 
and true, there should be shown the greatest kindness. They should know that 
there is no hatred to a brown skin, none; but the greatest wish on the queen's 
part is to see them happy contented and flourishing' (in Latif 1889: 582). 
Such a statement by the so-called Queen-Empress alerts us to the nuances of 
colonial power that Foucault's work on governmentally usefully highlights. It also 
indicates how limited such complexities often are. The nation that the Queen-
Empress speaks to is still constituted for the greater part by so-called natives 
whose contentment is the sole concern of their (Platonic) Guardians.69 In the 
phraseology of rule at the time, 'them is for whom we labour.' The investment and 
belief in such a duty is not to be underestimated. Sir Walter Roper Lawrence 
elevated the Guardian's status with Shakespeare's words from the Tempest: 
'How many godly creatures are there here, 
How beauteous mankind is! Oh brave new world, 
That has such people in it' (Lawrence 1928: 14) 
They, who have yet to reach maturity, know not what is good for them. If left 
alone they would soon revert, it is assumed, to the chaos that is their peculiar mark 
of their styles of government. So O'Dwyer would argue we must persist with our 
plan for bringing order out of that chaos to India and beware of the noisy 
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'Mugwumps' as Carthill called Indians with political aspirations I (Carthill 1924: 
73, 74, 351). In his own inimitable style O'Dwyer would often repeat the 
following warning/lesson to the administration: 
'Because half a dozen grasshoppers under a fern make the field ring with their 
importunate cries, while thousands of great cattle, reposed beneath the shadow 
of the Great British Oak, chew their cud and are silent, pray do not imagine 
that those who make the noise are the only inhabitants of the field' (O'Dwyer 
1925: 410). 
Conclusion 
In this chapter my aim has been to distill a distinctive set of practices that define 
the manner in which British administrators, specifically Sir Michael O'Dwye r, 
sought to conduct themselves in relation to governing/rulingIndia and Indians. By 
focussing on Sir Michael O'Dwyer I sought to present an ideal typical version of 
that relation at a specific moment. O'Dwyer's renditions of those relations, 
remains resolutely rooted in a vernacular of duty, a manly duty. In his version of 
such a duty he envisages a brand of patriarchy/style of domination firmly opposed 
to the idea that Indians might be able to manage the tasks of government for 
themselves. I argue that the man that emerges from my considerations of the 
literature is, paraphrasing a famous Kipling tale, a man who would be king - a 
benevolent king at that. He is a man who is compassionate, firm and fair in all his 
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dealings with Indians. A man who regards Indians as his children and children who 
need looking after. A man who is proud to proclaim from the roof tops to anyone 
who will listen, 'You can (if your very clever and very unscrupulous) fool all the 
people for some time. But you cannot fool all the people for all the time' 
(O'Dwyer 1925: 270). That was the lesson that his competitors for Indian 
government needed to learn. 
The government of India was a hard task. Not everyone or anyone could be trusted 
to fulfil that role. He understood it better than most. According to him, all that 
politics would result in would be disorder. Such disorder could mean only one 
thing. People would be at each other's throats. Quelling disorder was what white 
men were here and made to do. At the first signs of disorder white men resolved to 
act, bearing in mind 'Saidi's Persian couplet' 
'A stream can be stopped at its course by a twig, 
Let it flow and it will drown even an elephant' (O'Dwyer 1925: 268). 
In the next chapter I follow the duty filled elements in the making of an 
administrator through a specific consideration of their applicability and importance 
in the poise of an army officer - Brigadier-General Reginald Edward Henry Dyer 
CB. Dyer carries forward these traditions of a tough, belligerent and thoroughly 
professional man into the Indian army. The army was the bedrock of empire. The 
Indian army in particular were quite simply, as we see, the 'Praetorian Guard of 
Empire, set apart from the public control, and available always for the protection 
of the Inner State' (Morris in Strawson 1989: xvii). Always ready to ensure the 
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longevity of empire, these men were ready to act a moment's notice. They were 
made as modem managers, professional soldiers, with a hint of adventurers of old. 
How else, Strawson asks, 'but by the power of the sword could the empire have 
survived?' But now it was the power of the professional sword (Strawson 1989: 
xii). It was in Dyer's time that the power of Sandhurst and Camberley drilled these 
men into taking on a vocation, second they thought to none. A growing militocracy 
made of such men, would turn their attention to achieving a 'carefully regulated 
empire' (Guha 1997: 25). It is to a consideration of the foundational ethics of 
armed order, and how the schools and experiences associated with the delivery of 
such order, turned out men, that I now tum. 
Draper attributes these remarks about Dyer to Lloyd George Montagu, but without further 
reference. 
2. Intensely felt and fiercely practiced; See below. One amongst many of his comments, on this 
occasion to the Punjab Legislative Council on 7 April 1919, is an instructive moment in this 
regard. He sets out his stall in the fight for competence in government and its manner in the 
Punjab firmly on the necessity of public order: 
'The government of this province is, and will remain, determined that the public order which was 
maintained so successfully during the war shall not be disturbed during time of peace ... The 
British Government which has crushed foreign foes and quelled internal rebellion could afford to 
despise these agitators, but it has the duty of protecting the young and the innocent whom they 
may incite to mischief and crime while themselves are standing aside ... 1 therefore, take this 
opportunity of warning all who are connected with political movements in the province that they 
will be responsible for the proper conduct of meetings which they organize, for the language 
used ... and the consequences that follow from such meetings' (see Datta 1969: 55). 
3. An early instance of doubts about British Rule, and of course not the only one, and its 
precarious nature, what Driver characterizes as 'Solemn thoughts', were expressed in 1838 by Miss 
Eden, whilst ruminating on Simla. She says, 
'Twenty years ago no European had ever been here, and there we were, with the band playing the 
'Puritani' and 'Masaniello,' and eating salmon from Scotland, and sardines from the 
Mediterranean, and observing that St Cloup's potage it la Julienne was perhaps better than his other 
soups, and that some of the ladies' sleeves were too tight according to the overland fashions for 
March, etc.; and all this in the face of those high hill, some of which have remained untrodden 
since the creation, and we 105 Europeans being surrounded by at least 3,000 mountaineers, who, 
wrapped up in their hill blankets, looked on at what we call our polite amusements, and bowed to 
the ground, if a European came near them. I sometimes wonder they do not cut all our heads off, 
and say nothing more about it (Emphasis added. Miss Eden in Brown 1948: 255). 
4. Perhaps we would be hard put to find a more exigent instance of bluster in the manual of 
O'Dwyerisms than in his mocking references to Mohandas K. Gandhi's political creed - passive 
resistance. Gandhi maintains, 'the sword of passive resistance does not require a scabbard.' For 
him, resistance to colonial rule in this way had an honorable heritage. Hence, 'Jesus Christ, 
Daniel, and Socrates represented the purest form of passive resistance or soul force.' In answer to 
such a creed, O'Dwyer is reported as saying, 'remember, Gandhi talks of soul force, but there is 
another force greater than Gandhi's soul force .. .' Jayakar adds, 'saying this he raised his fist in a 
menacing manner and thumped the table.' O'Dwyer has only one answer - 'The right answer to 
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soul force was of course, fist force' (O'Dwyer in Jayakar 1958: 364; see also V N Datta 1969: 54). 
The Gandhi quotations are taken from Sunanda Gandhi's collection in the Gandhi Institute. See 
http://www.gandhiinstitute.org/quotes2.html#FORCE 1996). 
5. Of course, as we see when I discuss what went into the make up of a General Dyer in chapter 4, 
many in the army elite did still fear the sepoy. At this juncture the so-called Mutiny remains an 
eerie presence in their memories. Many knew colonial power was nearly broken in the uprisings of 
1857. The so-called mutiny did not constitute a minor local difficulty. As Omissi argues, 'in the 
years that followed, the white elite still feared the sepoys' (Omissi 1994: 131). He further reminds 
us of Lord Roberts's remarks in 1907. According to Roberts 'there are many discontented people 
amongst the 300 millions of India, and the native troops may again be lead astray' (Roberts 1907 
cited in Omissi 1994: 131/2). Fears for the empire were ignited by rebellion in 1857 to such a 
degree that dread it might happen again persisted. Such fears are a potent part in all formulations of 
imperial civil and military strategy at this juncture. These fears Omissi points out were not allayed 
much during the 1914-18 war. Around this time the Ghadar movement began its campaigns. 
Because their leaders knew that 'without the active cooperation of the troops, their plans for 
revolution in India are doomed to failure', inciting rebellion amongst sepoys forms part of their 
strategies (Omissi 1994: 132). Of course, fears that Russians or Germans would meddle in Indian 
affairs did not ease apprehensions about India. For a fuller discussion of army views, see chapter 4. 
6. Masterman's, KCSI, CIE, entry among Allen's contributors reads thus: ' .. born 1889; entered 
ICS (Indian Civil Service) (Madras) 1914; Sec. Board of Revenue 1924-28; Collector of Salt 
Revenue 1928-32; Collector, various districts, Madras 1932-6; Education and Public Health 1936-
9; Board of Revenue 1942-6; Chief Sec. Adviser to Governor 1946; Deputy High Comm., India 
1947-8' (Allen ed. 1975: 224). 
7. Since I use her descriptions of an Indian scene frequently, I note her antecedents. Vere, Lady, 
Birdwood CVO, is one of Allen's informants. For completeness, he describes her biographical 
details thus: born 1909; father Sir George Ogilve, KCIE, IPS; ancestors in India since 1765, was 
sixth generation to have lived in India; married Capt. (later Col.) Christopher Birdwood, Probyn's 
Horse (son of Field-Marshall Lord Birdwood, C. -in-C. India) in New Delhi 1931; left India 1945' 
(Allen ed. 1975: 221). I shall continue to note the antecedents of others that Allen refers to, and I 
use. 
8. Allen notes Pierce's biographical details thus: ' ... born 1909 Dehra Dun; Father in BB & CI 
Railway; educated St Joseph's Naini Tal; followed father on to railways, then into commerce; 
leading role in Anglo-Indian affairs; left India after independence' (Allen ed. 1975: 225). 
9. Draper tells us that the British regarded Gandhi 'as an unworldly crank totally divorced from 
the realities of life' (Draper 1981: 39). He ventures that 'the word "phoney" was on their minds if 
not on their lips' (Draper 1981: 39). Some others regarded him a half-naked fakir, and asked how 
such a person could possibly threaten the mighty British Empire. O'Dwyer himself is no less 
dismissive when he describes him as 'an uncouth hypocrite with his ascetic pose' (Draper 1981: 
39). O'Dwyer was no more impressed by Gandhi's political ethic, 'soul force.' See n. 2 above. 
10. Husband and wife, Rev. Arfon Roberts and Rosalie Roberts, their notable entries read: 'Rev. 
Arfon Roberts born 1906; went to West Bengal 1928 under Methodist under Methodist 
Missionary Society; service included Superintendency, Leper Homes, Bankura and Raniganj; left 
India 1951 ... Rosalie Roberts (nee Harvey) born 1902; went out as SRN to West Bengal 1926; 
nursing supt., Santal Mission Hosp., Sarenga 1926-31; married Arfon Roberts at Sarenga 1932, 
continued voluntary medical work in villages, West Bengal; Left India 1951' (Allen ed. 1975: 
225). 
11. Perhaps, the Roberts are mesmerized by the assumption that loyalty to the Raj is still the 
dominant ethic that guides Indians in their relations to their British rulers. There is much written 
evidence for such an assumption. As there is much, probably more, to the contrary. Brown 
highlights an ideal typical instance he regards displays loyalty. It comes from sentiments 
supposedly found in an address given to an English Collector by the inhabitants of Duboy on his 
final departure. Apparently translated fi'om the Persian, Dubaoy's inhabitants are depicted in the 
depths of despair at the news that their Collector is to leave them. What they wonder, had they 
done to bring them to this pass. They blame themselves! Should their Collector leave, they would 
be as inconsolable, as a son would be hearing about the death of his parents! 
'Dhuboym famed among the cities of the east, was happy when this English sirdar presided in 
their durbar; his disposition towards the inhabitants was with the best consideration '" All castes 
who looked up to him obtained redress, without distinction and without price. When he took the 
poor by the hand he made them rich: under his protection the people were happy, and reposed on 
the bed of ease. When he superintended the garden, each gardener performed his duty; and all the 
trees in the garden flourished. So equal was his justice, that the tiger and the kid might drink at 
the same fountain; and often did he redeem the kid from the tiger's mouth .... In this country we 
have not known any government so upright as that of the English;- Alas! if our protector forsakes 
us we shall be disconsolate as a widow: we shall mourn the loss of a father and weep as for the 
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death ofa mother! - ALLA! In thy mercy continue him to us!' (Forbes 1783 in Hilton Brown ed. 
1948: 223/4). 
12. Sir Henry Cotton gives us a glimpse of what he terms 'the cult of Nicholson'. Or, what he 
calls his exploits with stick and whip. It involves a rule of benevolence that invariably entangles 
rulers in the use of corporal punishment. He tells us about a story doing the rounds in John 
Lawrence's time as Chief Commissioner in the Punjab. This would be the 1860s. Apparently, 
young men at Lahore he says, 
'used to hang about the door of a church that John Lawrence frequented, because they knew that on 
some pretext or other the Chief Commissioner would be sure to hammer his syce (or groom) 
before driving home, and they wanted to see the fun. It was public property that as Governor-
General he was not exempt from the old vice, ... the pernicious practice of striking natives ... 
especially domestic servants' And Cotton adds, ' ... striking natives .. prevailed as a common and 
general habit during the whole of my residence in India' (Cotton 191911: 65). 
And Russell gives us another glimpse from 1857: 
'I was very shocked to see in this courtyard, two native servants, covered with plasters and 
bandages, and bloody, who were lying on their charpoys, moaning. On inquiring, my friend was 
informed by one of the guests, they were so and so's servants, who had just been "licked" by him. 
It is a savage, beastly, and degrading custom. I have heard it defended; but no man offeeling, 
education or goodness of heart can vindicate or practise it ... The master who had administered his 
"spiriting so gently to his delinquent domestics, sat sulky and sullen, and, I hope, ashamed of his 
violence, at the table; but he had no fear of any pains or penalties of the law' (From Russell 1857 
in Hilton Brown ed. 1948: 213). 
13. Describing British rule in 1858 Russell says: 
'I could not help thinking as we drove home how harsh the rein of our rule must feel to the 
natives .. Some of the best of our rulers administer justice in their shirt sleeves (which by the bye 
are used as a substitute for blotting-paper allover India), cock up their heals, in the tribunal, and 
smoke cherots to assist them in council; and I have seen one eminent public servant, with his 
braces hanging at his heels, his bare feet in slippers, and his shirt open at the breast just as he came 
from his bath, give audience to a great chieftain on a matter of considerable importance. The 
natives see that we treat each other far differently, and draw their inferences' (in Brown ed. 1948: 
229). 
14. Russell refers of course to a post 1858 prophecy about 'race-relations.' The good old hookah 
days are those for instance when relations between white men ofthe company and their concubines 
were encouraged. In full: 
'The good old hookah days are past; cheroots and pipes have now usurped the place ofthe 
aristocratic silver bowl, the cut glass goblets, and the twisted glistening snake with silver or amber 
mouth piece .... The race of Eurasians is not so freely supplied with recruits .... There is now no 
bee-bee's house - a sort of European Zenana .... There are now European rivals to those ladies (the 
native kept woman) at some stations. It was the topic of conversation the other day at mess that 
the colonel of the regiment had thought it right to prohibit one of his officers from appearing with 
an unauthorised companion at the band parade; and the general opinion was that he has no right to 
interfere. But the society of station does interfere in such cases, and though it does bot mind 
beebees or their friends, it rightly taboos him who entertains their white rivals' (in Brown 1948: 
258). 
15. As late as 1947 Reginald Savoy was heard to say: 'when I left India in December 1947 I felt 
we were leaving a task half finished ... Our intention in India was to hand over a running show and 
I believe that if we could have held on for another ten years that would have been the case.' (in 
Allen ed. 1975: 214). 
16. Maybe doing nothing is not exactly a pleasurable experience. But as for instance Maud Driver 
sees it, frolics in the sun did conspire to emphasize pleasure in the sun as the first principle of an 
Anglo-Indian woman's experience. Hence, 
'Save for arranging a wealth of cut flowers laid to her hand by a faithful mali, an 'Anglo-Indian' 
girl's domestic duties are practically nil. All things conspire to develop the emotional, pleasure-
loving side of her nature, to blur her girlish visions of higher aims and sterner self-discipline' 
(Diver 1909 in Allen ed. 1975: 72). 
17. Many of these experiences I glean from their words as collected and set out by Hilton Brown 
(Brown ed. 1948). There are specific histories relating to white women's experiences in India that I 
do not go into here. My references to some of their letters about their experiences only serve to 
highlight the intensity of an Anglo-Indian relation to India. For further commentary on white 
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women's or Memsahibs as they came to be known, experiences see Georgina Gowans (Sept. 1999), 
'A Passage From India: British Women Travelling Home 1915 - 1947' unpublished Ph.D. Thesis 
University of Southampton; Some ofthose I make reference to, see also, Maud Driver, The 
Englishwoman in India 1909; Harriet Tytler, An Englishwoman in India: The Memoirs of Harriet 
Tytler 1828-1858; Olive Douglass, Olivia in India 1913; Isabel Hunter, Land of Regrets 1909; 
Emily Eden, Up the Country (1836-1840); Maria Graham, Journal of a Residence in India (1809-
1811) There are numerous accounts by the same women (Memsahibs) of their experiences during 
the mutiny. Jenny Sharpe, Allegories of Empire 1993 is a good source for these. 
18. Hunter 1895. 
19. Once again her entry in Allen's notes reads, 'Irene Edwards (nee Green), Frontier Medal, Afridi 
Campaign, 1930-1; born Agra 1906; Father Railway Officer; nurse, St George's Hosp., Bombay 
1925-9; nursing sister, Lady Reading Hosp., Peshawar 1929-34; Matron King Edward Hosp., 
Indore 1935-6; private nursing, Calcutta; married 1938; Left India 1950' (Allen ed. 1975: 223). 
20. The reference to the daily round of amusements is from Brown ed. 1945: 194. See esp. 
chap.VI. 
21. The problem of government for Bartle Frere, one of the administration's most legendary 
figures, boiled down to a prosaic practicality. Stemming from an age when imperial government 
still reeked of amateurism, he succinctly summarized his thoughts on mundane government thus: 
'It is really of more consequence to the natives that he (the young British officer or official) should 
be good in the cricket field and on horseback, popular with servants and the poor, and the 
champion of bullied fags, that he should have a mother who taught him to say his prayers, and 
sisters who helped her to give him reverence for womankind and respect for weakness, than that he 
should be first to take a double first at Oxford' (Brown ed. 1948: 229). 
22. He certainly felt himself more than adequate to the task. According to Gilmour, Margot 
Asquith memorably describes his expression as being one of 'enameled self-assurance.' Chiseled 
features 'combined with his manner' to give him an air of superiority, which Gilmour adds, led a 
couple of his Oxbridge contemporaries to dedicate a few lines to him. A legend he fondly repeated 
with a subtle humour: 
'My name is George Nathaniel Curzon, I am a 
most superior person, My cheek is pink, my 
hair is sleek, I dine at Blenheim once a week' (Gilmour 1994: 30). 
23. Atkinson summed up the adventures he would recount in Curry and Rice fulsomely, at the 
outset. What, perhaps more than anything else, astonishes the modem day reader, is the luxuriant 
style of Anglo-Indian existence - akin to a medieval court. Thus, 
'What varied opinions we constantly hear 
Of our rich Oriental possessions; 
What a jumble of notions, distorted and queer, 
Form an Englishman's "Indian impressions!" 
First a sun, fierce and glaring, that scorches and bakes; 
Palankeens, perspiration, and worry; 
Mosquitoes, thugs, cocoanuts, Brahamins, and snakes, 
With elephants, tigers, and curry. 
Then jungles, fakeers, dancing-girls, prickly heat, 
Shawls, idols, durbars, brandy-pawny; 
Rupees, clever jugglers dust-storms, slipper'd feet, 
Rainy seasons, and mullingatawny. 
Hot winds, holy monkeys, tall minarets, rice, 
With crocodiles, ryots or fanners; 
Himalayas, fat baboos, with paunches and pice, 
So airily clad in pyjamas. 
With Rajahs--------- But stop, I must rea1Jy desist, 
And, let each one enjoy his opinions, 
Whilst 1 show in what style Anglo-Indians exist 
In her Majesty's Eastern domains (emphasis mine) (Atkinson 1854: 3). 
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24. 'Curry and Rice' contains a humorous collection of stories about the daily lives and trials of 
Anglo-Indians at their station in India. One gets the impression of an unchanging world in which 
the hours are whiled away in a serenity that often defies the coming complexities abroad. Hence, 
we get a series of vignettes of our, that is Anglo-Indians', lives in what the writer describes as, 'the 
loveliest village of the plain, basking beneath the rays of the orient sun.' And, if we wonder for a 
moment, where this earthy Eden he refers to could be, he adds, 'Oh! Ifthere be a paradise upon 
earth, - I suspect it must be this.' His reader gets a privileged view of microelements in such a 
domain when he introduces us to the coffee-shop culture. Where better after all to sample the 
delights of this oriental sun than in the early morning, in the station coffee-shop. It is here that 
'after the early ride or parade' they would diligently gather before they all went about their daily 
chores. Thus, 'with the aid of coffee and cheroots, newspapers, and ... a game of billiards in the 
adjoining room we would while away the fleeting hour, form plans for the coming day, and then, 
as the sun waxes warm, .. migrate to the Bath, which, next to the coffee-shop is decidedly one of 
the most popular scenes of resort at our station' where we 'are groomed and rubbed down by 
our... attendant slaves'. The living then is good and though the second edition didn't appear until 
1859, after the so-called mutiny, the impression sought to be religiously and assuredly conveyed 
to readers by Captain George Atkinson is the 'sunny side of Indian life.' Enough certainly to 
assuage the English ear after all the tales of 'horror that have of late fallen upon' those ears 
(Atkinson 1859: chap. 19)). 
25. Swinson captures a sense of such perversity when he describes O'Dwyer's God-like bluster. 
Hence, 
' ... The absolute certainty of men like O'Dwyer, brought up in the Victorian era and coming to 
power in the Edwardian, has ... a reckless bravado about it. The rigidity of their conceptions of right 
and wrong, success and failure, honour and dishonour, their insistence on dealing in absolutes, 
seem courageous to the point of stupidity. But one must make not make the mistake of imagining 
that they did not believe in what they said, to the very depths of their being. O'Dwyer and his 
colleagues believed in the white man's burden, in England's mission to India with a moral 
intensity that few people today can apply to anything' (Swinson 1964: 56). 
26. The growing complexities in their role, and its performance, is not lessened any by a 
frightening realization among their ranks that they could perhaps be the last in the line of an 
honorable tradition in administration. The prospects of failure to men who spent the best part of 
their lives doing the job are terrifying. Certainly O'Dwyer felt this acutely. In a particularly 
maudlin moment he says, ' ... there is one saddening feature for those of us who went from Oxford 
to take up our life-work in India ... we see practically no-one now coming forward to take our 
places ... There are now only a few candidates for an Indian career'. Not only would Oxford suffer, 
he thought, but also, the loss to India would be grievous, particularly as it was men like these who 
built up and developed the high standards of British administration. Apparently according to him, 
'the word had gone round in Oxford and elsewhere that the conditions of service in India [are] so 
altered, that a British official finds it difficult to serve with honour and self-respect (O'Dwyer 
1925: 24). Of course, all the sound and efficient administration for so long practiced by him and 
his peers would be lost once their British character and personnel were replaced by so-called Indian 
competition-wallahs. Ifthis tradition was lost either because 'suitable British recruits' weren't 
coming forward, or educated Indians took the reins, all the good work of a noble tradition would 
be lost. He appealed to his reader by asserting that even the best Indian elements viewed the 
wospects of a diminution in the English role with foreboding (O'Dwyer 1925). 
_7. Lord Glenville describes such a sovereign as, and Woodruff glosses its consequences, thus: 
'The British Crown is de facto sovereign in India. How it became so it is needless to enquire ... But 
the sovereignty which we hesitate to assert, necessity compels us to exercise' (in Woodruff 1954: 
27). Woodruff adds, 'it ought to be exercised, first, to provide for the welfare of the Indian people, 
next, but ranking far blow the first, to promote the interests of Great Britain. Lord Glenville's 
views had been accepted by almost everyone ... (in Wood ruff 1954: 27). 
28. We are lucky as historians to have access to a surfeit of sentiments spoken freely by O'Dwyer 
on this, his bete- noire of a topic. Indians, his children, he would stubbornly maintain are not 
ready to take charge of their own destiny, now, nor even in the foreseeable future. Singh uses his 
expressions on this topic quoted in the Congress Punjab Enquiry. O'Dwyer finds comfort in 
expressing in a vainglorious manner; both his ability to govern over others less fortunate than 
himself, so much better than they ever could themselves, and their complicity in agreeing to such a 
state of affairs. Thus, speaking about the demands he assumes are being made by the educated 
middle classes he says, 
' ... it is clear that the demands [for self-government] emanate not from the mass of the people, 
whose interests are at stake, but from a small and not quite disinterested minority, naturally 
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enough eager for power and place ... We must, if we are faithful to our trust, place and the interests 
of the silent masses before the clamour of the politicians however troublesome and insistent' (in 
Singh Vo1. II 1999: 162). 
29. See Gough & Innes 1897; Pearse 1848; Singh 1999; Singh 1968; 
30. The Punjab, with roughly 7:5% of the total population ofIndia supplied about 60% of the 
total number of troops recruited. Raja Ram & V N Datta are less than sanguine about O'Dwyer's 
recruitment practices (see Ram 1969; Datta 1969). 
31. See also O'Dwyer's review of V H Rutherford Modern India (1927) and R Palme Dutt 
Modern India (1927), where he dismisses a version of politics he calls Indian political 
nationalism, with reference to Sir Abdul Rahrnin's words, 
'The fact that they [Hindus and Moslems] have lived in the same country for nearly 1,000 years has 
contributed hardly anything to their fusion into a nation. The English panacea of nationalism has 
brought not more unity but worse divisions' (O'Dwyer 1927: 178). 
32. According to Woodruff, 'in the rest of India an Englishman alone in a village was usually 
physically larger than anyone he met and men were in awe of him. But in the Punjab, Sikh, Jat 
and Muslim are all big men physically, taller than most Englishmen, and the visitor must assert 
himself to hold the mastery. Further, Punjabis made up more than halfthe Indian Army. The 
civilian in the Punjab was at the fountain-head of power and could afford no laxity ... ' (Woodruff 
1954: 236). 
33. On this event O'Dwyer slyly remarks, ' ... Wren, who never minced his words, used to say 
that our batch of thirty was the rotten est that had ever passed through his hands ... often contrasted 
unfavourably with the brilliant stars of the following year ... [Among whom] ... were J S Metson, 
Sir ED Maclagh, Sir B Robertson, who became respectively proconsuls of the United Provinces, 
the Punjab, and Central Provinces, and Sir H J Maynard who was ... known as the brains of the 
Punjab. We were a more humdrum lot and perhaps did better in administration than - the role for 
which the ICS is better suited - than in politics, a comparatively new and exotic cult in India, 
which has still to justifY itself by results ... ' And his humdrum list goes on to enumerate such 
notables as Sir F W Duke, Sir A E Gait, Sir R H Craddock, himself, who became governors of 
Bengal, Behar, Orissa, Burma, and the Punjab. With Sir S M Forster finishing as Resident in 
Hyderabad, an appointment he regards as the 'blue ribbon of the Indian Political Department, and 
Sir H V Lovett and Sir D H Twomey, rising respectively to Head ofthe Revenue Board in the 
United Provinces and Chief Judge of the court of Lower Burma ... '; all of which leads him to 
conclude his sly comments with the satisfactorily smug remark, that ' .. Wren's harsh criticism 
was hardly justified by results' (O'Dwyer 1925: 19). 
34. Jowett was a member ofthe committee set up after the Report on the Organisation of the 
Permanent Civil Service, named after its authors, Sir Stafford Nothcote and Sir Charles Trevelyan. 
He would perfect its recommendations that entry to the Civil Service should be by competitive 
examination. The move away from allowing entry solely by reference to patronage is justified by 
him as complimenting the detailed knowledge of a candidate a patron would acquire and so be a 
good judge of his candidature. Thus: 
'For the moral character ofthe candidates, I should trust partly to the examination itself. University 
experience abundantly shows that in more than nineteen cases out of twenty, men of attainments 
are also men of character. The perseverance and self-discipline necessary for the acquirement of any 
considerable amount of knowledge are a great security that a young man has not lead a dissolute 
life .. .' (Northcote-Trevelyan 1854: 24). 
Suffice to say entry by such means was not entirely accepted as being better than the old system 
that recruited, as Reader puts it, according to agitation on a particular candidates behalf by well 
connected patrons. Sir Arthur Helps, as Reader notes, was more than a little acerbic in his 
comments: 
'I believe that the present system of competitive examination is a dream of pedantry - dreamed by 
some Chinese philosopher - and that more witches and wizards were discovered by the notable 
system of pricking with pins, than judicious and capable men are likely to be discovered by the 
present system of competitive examination' (Reader 1966: 87). 
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35 The moment that Haileybury represented in the arts we understand as government in India is a 
distinctly paranoiac one. As Osborne describes it, fearing an over-accommodation in the 
government oflndia to Hindu Culture, the court of Directors of the East India company, led by 
Charles Grant, set about establishing Hailybury College; A fear in short of officials charged with 
administrative government in India, going native. The emphasis at the college was ultimately on 
'founding a common culture of officialdom, separated from those who were governed, a 
homogeneous class of experts with a common ruling identity' (Osborne 1994b: 20). 
36. In a not unrelated field, specifically, the uses of military knowledge gained on what for 
British governors remained a place of romance if also a perennial headache, see also Andrew 
Skeen's, 'Passing It On'. It is a series of notes and lectures on managing, what he calls tribal 
country; where often the only way to neutralise the troublesome hordes is by 'alertness and 
cunning', modes of conduct that in this context are not so much ruled by abstract precepts as 
governed by being attentive to the details of their practice at the cliff and mountain face (Skeen 
1932). 
37 See Kipling's 'White man's burden' 1899; and see Draper 1981. 
38. See Sayer 1991. Picking out one amongst many instances of such enduring racism - we need 
only tum to O'Dwyer's comments on the administration of justice. All the weightier when we are 
informed that it is the ruled that express them. So, we are told that 
'The long judicial training which the average man in the ICS has, or had, to undergo, is invaluable 
to him in whatever line he subsequently takes up. It teaches him from the start to weigh evidence, 
to regard every question as having two sides, and to exercise his judgment impartially and 
judicially. It is this latter quality that has made the Indian of whatever class and way of thinking, 
even the rabid anti-British agitator of today, prefer that his case should be decided by a British 
official rather than by one of his own people ... ' (O'Dwyer 1925: 30). 
For a discussion of the so-called 'White Mutiny' against proposals contained in the Ibert Bill 
permitting Indian judges to try Europeans in certain areas; how such a revolt by the tea and indigo 
planters in Bengal, should be seen not only as enduringly racist but based on claims to very 
specific claims to professional competence, based on manliness; see Sinha 1995; and Sharpe 1993. 
39 Graham Dawson tells us that Henry Lawrence, the elder of the two brothers in this partnership 
featured amongst notable company in F M Holmes, Four Heroes of India: Clive, Warren 
Hastings, Havelock, Lawrence (1892). He adds, in the pantheon of heroes to be emulated both of 
the brothers featured heavily in school history books in the 1920s and 30s (Dawson 1994: 147-49). 
40 'Because half a dozen grasshoppers under a fern make the field ring with their importunate cries, 
while thousands of great cattle, reposed beneath the shadow of the Great British Oak, chew their 
cud and are silent, pray do not imagine that those who make the noise are the only inhabitants of 
the field' (O'Dwyer: 410). 
41. Akbar son of Humayan and grandson of Barbur - 1542-1605. He was Mughal Emperor of 
India from 1556-1605. 
42. The question mark is in the text. 
43. Rudyard Kipling is a fine cataloguer and soother of a British psyche that might feel threatened 
in any way by the rise and rise of what for him would be termed, an educated middle class of 
Indian. One is reminded in this regard of one of his creations in the novel, Kim - Huree Babu. 
Hurree is caught up with Colonel Creighton in the great game of espionage, in their roles as 
information gatherers used to more effectively exercise political control over the country. Huree has 
a not so secret desire to become a member ofthe Royal Society. To be recognised by such a 
prestigious institution in his role as an ethnographer for the secret service, would found his claims 
to be taken seriously as a man of science. Yet as Said reminds us he is almost always depicted by 
Kipling as, ' ... funny, or gauche, or somehow caricatural, not because he is incompetent or inept -
on the contrary - but because he is not white ... that is, he can never be a Creighton .,. Lovable and 
admirable as he may be, there remains in the Babu the grimacing stereotype of the ontologically 
funny native, trying so desperately ... to be like us' (Said 1993: 185); (Kipling 
F or a discussion of a much more threatening figure represented by the native lawyer see Upredra 
Baxi 1993. 
44 . Ranajit Guha describes this moment, when duty is elevated to an imperative political 
philosophy, as 'the high-noon of mid-Victorian imperialism' (Guha 1997: 40). Samuel Smiles is 
one of its greatest exponents. He wrote a series of books in the mid 1800s starting with, 'Self-
Help'. Then followed with three more; entitled respectively, Character; Thrift; and climaxing with 
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Duty. Here, as Guha suggests, ' "obedience to duty" is' considered paramount (Guha 1997: 40). 
Doing ones duty is constitutive of the glory of manly character. Thus, he who does his duty' .. .is 
entitled to rank with the most distinguished of his race' (Smiles 1880: 11). Hence: 
'Man does not live for himself alone. He lives for the good of others as well as for himself. Every 
one has his duties to perform - the richest as well as the poorest. To some life is pleasure, to 
others suffering? But the best do not live for self-enjoyment, or even for fame. Their strongest 
motive power is hopeful, useful work in every good cause' (Smiles 1880: 15). 
45 . Akin I would suggest in this guise to Bartle Free's thoughts on administration. A legend in a 
liberal conservative administrative practice, he was scathing of the Vice royalty, practiced by John 
Lawrence. Finding the old informal methods he carried through in the Punjab did not work, he fell 
back Frere felt, on a rigid system where rules ruled. This lead Woodruff thinks to 'that debilitating 
disease that sooner or later invades the bureaucratic system .. ' Frere wrote to Lawrence 
'There is always in India some need for public servants acting without orders, on the assurance 
that, when their superiors hear their reasons, their acts will be approved and confirmed; and I hold 
that when you have extinguished that feeling of mutual confidence between superior and 
subordinate authorities and made public men as timid as they are in England, you will have 
removed one great safeguard of our Indian Empire. It does not take long so to bridle a body of 
public servants as to paralyse their power of acting without orders ... ' (Woodruff 1954: 40). 
46. That the informality of it all could be detrimental to as well as ensuring the continuance of 
British rule is clear. Russell describes these processes thus, 
'I could not help thinking as we drove home how harsh the reins of our rule must feel to the soft 
skin of the natives ... Some of the best of our rulers administer justice in their shirtsleeves (which 
by the by are used as substitutes for blotting paper all over India), cock up their heels in the 
tribunal, and smoke cheroots to assist them in council; and I have seen one eminent public servant, 
with his braces hanging at his heels, his bare feet in slippers, and his shirt open at the breast just 
as he came from his bath, give audience to a great chieftain on a matter of considerable state 
importance. The natives see that we treat each other far differently, and draw their inferences 
accordingly ... ' (Russell 1857 in Brown 1958: 229). 
47 Barnett 1967 in R Wilkinson 1969: 18). 
48 Accounts of the character of days under a blazing sun aren't exactly rare. The classic collection 
of such memoirs that I'm using here is Charles Allen's sumptuous, Plain Tales From The Raj. 
Recently reissued it opens to us a world of work, pleasure and ultimately anguish (Allen ed. 
1975). 
49. Allen also gives us an account of plantation life in Assam. His account is very different from 
that narrated by Mason (1975). Allen thinks for instance, Kenneth Warren's untypical. Thus 
'Having had lunch, Bertie Fraser - with whom I was to share the bungalow - went off to play polo 
and I was left sitting on the verandah with nothing to do. I couldn't speak the language so I 
couldn't speak to the servants and I got more and more hungry. It was not until about eight o'clock 
that night that Bertie Fraser returned, having played two or three chukkas of polo and having spent 
the rest the evening at the bar. He came full of good cheer and called for dinner and we sat down 
for a meal. He seemed to be rather a queer sort of fellow; he was telling me about various matters 
of which I had no knowledge whatever when he suddenly leapt to his feet and, seized the lamp 
from the middle of the table and rushed out of the room, leaving me in complete darkness. I 
thought, 'Well, he is mad after all!' Then he started shouting at me from the lawn in front of the 
bungalow saying, 'Come out you foo!!' Then I suddenly realised that the bungalow was swinging 
about. I got halfway down the steps when the bungalow gave an extra heave and I slid down the 
remaining steps ... ' (in Allen ed. 1975: 62). 
Yet, Allen alerts us to instances of life in India that give us some perspective on the assumed 
privations and hardships of those on service in India. Thus, 
' ... For the great majority [of Anglo-Indians on service to India] actual hazards and privations were 
limited in duration and interspersed with generous periods of leave and a great deal of leisure. 
When not on active service officers in the Indian army observed a far from uncomfortable routine. 
An early morning parade was followed by breakfast and a change into mufti before 'regimental 
office' when charges and grievances were dealt with. Lunch was usually followed by a long siesta: 
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"Then in the late afternoon you either played games at the club or, if you were so inclined, you 
played games with your own men. Thursday was a whole day holiday. Saturday ... was a half-
holiday and Sunday was a holiday, You had as a right ten days absence every month and you were 
also entitled to an annual holiday of two months. Every three or four year you got eight months 
furlough at home. So it really cannot be said that any of us was greatly overworked" , (in Allen ed. 
1975: 190). 
50. Interestingly he contrasts the role of two officials at his earlier posting in Shahpur - Western 
Punjab, to emphasize their differences. It is clear which he valued most. Hence, he says, during 
Charles Aitchison's time as Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab (1882-87), 
'there was ... a feeling that the Secretariat was gaining an undue influence and that skill in minute 
writing rather than capacity in administration was the test of efficiency and the stepping stone to 
promotion ... The appointment of Sir James Lyall to succeed Aitchison in the spring of 1887 was 
generally welcomed by the official world and the rural interests. Lyall had never been a Secretary, 
having spent all his official life ... working among the rural masses as Settlement Officer, 
Settlement and Financial Commissioner. He had a unique knowledge of the people and, though 
shy and unpretentious in manner, had their confidence and affection to an extraordinary degree. His 
judgement in matters affecting their interests and welfare was almost unerring. He lacked 
Aitchinson's intellectual distinction and clarity of expression, but his wide knowledge of and 
sympathy with the people made his administration more popular and efficient' (O'Dwyer 1925: 
29). 
It's almost as if O'Dwyer is writing his own manifesto! 
51. I touch on some accounts that alert us to administrative discomfiture in more detail later. For 
instance the awful loneliness felt by some on service; and the privations and hardships experienced 
by some in a district. Just as Orwell alerts to the smelly discomforts of dust, earth and oil; he is 
also the author who alerts us to the burdens, confusions and expectations experienced by young 
men on service. In 'Shooting an Elephant' he tells how on service for the Empire, he vacillated 
between the great joy he would experience when he drove 'a bayonet into a Buddhist priest's guts,' 
and thinking the British Raj 'as an unbreakable tyranny, as something clamped down ... upon the 
will of prostate peoples ... ' But perhaps the most famous instance in the essay that recounts the 
fears and anxieties experienced by an administrator is when Orwell tells us about a rampaging 
elephant. He is expected by the entire crowd to take appropriate action against the anima1. With 
rifle in hand and an ever growing crowd following on his heels, he realises he has to shoot the 
elephant; the people expected it of him. It is at that moment he grasps what he calls the ' ... 
hollowness, the futility of the white man's domain in the East. Here was I, the white man with his 
gun, standing in front of an unarmed native crowd - seemingly the leading actor of the piece; but t 
in reality I was only an absurd puppet pushed to and fro by the will of those yellow faces 
behind ... ' And with an altogether unsure resolution he decides to act like a Sahib, simply because 
has to act like one. 'he has to appear resolute, to know his own mind and to do definite things. To 
come all that way, rifle in hand, with two thousand people marching at my heels and then to trail 
feebly away, having done nothing - no, that was impossible. The crowd would laugh at me. And 
my whole life, every white man's life in the East was one long struggle not to be laughed at...' 
(Orwell 1957: 96) 
52. A humorous if serious lament in this regard is found in Carthill's work: The Lost Dominion. 
He decries all calls for the emancipation of India, as Mugwumpery; practiced he argues, by a creeds 
obsessed with skepticism; creeds that, 'consider.. all things as open to question, the utility of 
which is to be tested not by any apparatus of pragmatism, but by the mediaeval a priori and 
deductive method . .'; and creeds to whom he applies Cicero's taunt, ' ... as the ultimate definition of 
mugwumpery . .': "This man imagines he is living in the republic of Plato, instead of in the dregs 
of that of Romulus ... " , In the end success for the Mugwumps means that ' .. all our labour has 
come to nought...' The only consolation for his conscientious administrator, is the knowledge 
' ... that it is ... God which assigns the task and the reward for the task. We labour blindly, not 
knowing the event. That knowledge the God has kept to himself, and none can fathom his 
purposes. If we have worked well and faithfully, then it is well with us . .' (AL. Carthill 1924: 73, 
74,351). 
53. In Charles Allen's list of contributors, the entry for Geoffrey Allen reads: 'Geoffrey, St G. T. 
Allen, OBE, MC; born 1912 Cawnpore; ancestors in India since 1799; grandfather founded 
Pioneer and Civil & Military Gazette; returned India 1919; Asst. Manager Darbhanga Raj 1933; 
217 Gurkha Rifles 1939-45; Seconded IPS 1945, Asst. Political Officer, Sadiya Frontier Tract; 
stayed on in IPS after independence' (Allen ed. 1975: 221). 
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54 See Rudyard Kipling's, The Man who Would be King (1991). 
55 Of course, some thought this a psychology of the Raj, based on a lie - John Morris declared, 
' ... the majority of the British in India were acting a part. They weren't really the people they were 
supposed to be. They were there for a very good reason; earning a living and making money -
nothing ignoble about that - but I don't really feel that most people had a sense of vocation, that 
they were really serving India.' Others, Allen ells us had their own criticisms. For some, he adds, 
'English rule in India was very often called sarcastically banya ki raj, the rule of the money lender, 
because all our laws enabled him to lend money to the illiterate poor at vast interest. It was money 
for jam for the moneylender and the law was on hi side.' Ed. Brown, another critic, thought the 
jewel in the crown of the Raj was cheap labour. He added, 'at the back of the jewel was squalor, 
hunger, filth, disease and beggary. Only when I came out of the army could I see what a terrible 
thing it was that a country had been allowed to exist like this. Such snobbery, so many riches, so 
much starvation' (in Allen 1975: 216-217). 
56. The Work of Meadows Taylor is an interesting fictional source for many of the modes of 
conduct and character traits in administrators I am pointing to here. See in particular his, 'Seeta', in 
which he paints a bold picture of one Cyril Brandon. A man he depicts as being revered by the 
native population of his district - 'many a dame, humble as she might be, repeated his name with 
that of her household gods each night, as she lighted the lamp before the simple shrine of her faith, 
and taught her children to say it; many a rude village poet had written ballads, and the minstrels 
had sung them to his praise, at village festivals. He had perfectly acquired the common vernacular 
dialect of his province, and spoke it almost as one of the people; and he was able to read and 
answer his ordinary letters without difficulty or error. .. He had studied ... the ... manners and 
customs ... of the people ... very deeply, and the people were therefore perfectly at ease with him; 
but he was so strict and so impartial in his duties, that no one ever dreamed of taking a liberty ... ' 
Taylor goes on in this manner to describe his subject's high birth, that he narrates as helping him 
immensely in his duties. He goes on, ' ... there is ... no point on which natives are more curious, 
and none which, when joined with other qualities, so soon or so completely influences popular 
estimation, as gentle descent...' (Meadows Taylor 1881: 70). 
57. Kipling's work is a good source for this kind of emphasis on the job of imperialism. 
Borrowing from Benita Parry, Kipling saw ' ... in imperialism a means through which men ... (often 
of the rCS) could win their moral integrity by self-abnegation, commitment to task and the 
exercise of responsibility ... ' (Parry 1998: 206). She adds, one of the most unadorned statements of 
such an ethic is found in , 'The white Man's Burden' in full from McClure's Magazine 1899: 
Take up the White Man's burden--
Send forth the best ye breed--
Go, bind your sons to exile 
To serve your captives' need; 
To wait, in heavy harness, 
On fluttered folk and wild--
Your new-caught sullen peoples, 
Half devil and half child. 
Take up the White Man's burden--
In patience to abide, 
To veil the threat ofterror 
And check the show of pride; 
By open speech and simple, 
An hundred times made plain, 
To seek another's profit 
And work another's gain. 
Take up the White Man's burden--
The savage wars of peace--
Fill full the mouth of Famine, 
And bid the sickness cease; 
And when your goal is nearest 
(The end for others sought) 
Watch sloth and heathen folly 
Bring all your hope to nought. 
Take up the White Man's burden--
No iron rule of kings, 
But toil of serf and sweeper--
The tale of common things. 
The ports ye shall not enter, 
The roads ye shall not tread, 
Go, make them with your living 
And mark them with your dead. 
Take up the White Man's burden, 
And reap his old reward--
The blame ofthose ye better 
The hate of those ye guard--
The cry of hosts ye humour 
(Ah, slowly!) toward the light:--
"Why brought ye us from bondage, 
Our loved Egyptian night?" 
Take up the White Man's burden--
Ye dare not stoop to less--
Nor call too loud on Freedom 
To cloak your weariness. 
By all ye will or whisper, 
By all ye leave or do, 
The silent sullen peoples 
Shall weigh your God and you. 
Take up the White Man's burden! 
Have done with childish days--
The lightly-proffered laurel, 
The easy ungrudged praise: 
Comes now, to search your manhood 
Through all the thankless years, 
Cold, edged with dear-bought wisdom, 
The judgment of your peers! 
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58. For these observations on Kipling I am indebted to Benita Parry's work, Kipling: Delusions 
and Discoveries: Studies on India in the Colonial Imagination 1880-1930, Verso 1998 
59. Privation and hardship tales on the job are not rare. Allen refers us to Arthur Hamilton who 
after a particularly tedious period in his job of surveying longed ' ... to meet a European to talk to 
him. The vastness of the mountains overcame me and I had an awful feeling that I must throw 
myself over a cliff ... ' (Allen ed. 1975: 190). 
60 . One of Kipling's most admired works, Kim, is a tale of how complicated doing the job is, 
especially when it involves playing the Great Game, the Great Game of espionage, subject all the 
time to the heat offailure (Kipling 1901). 
61. The story is intended as a warning to all that transgress the bounds of the colour-line. Kipling 
begins his tale with the now familiar warning against any so inclined; ' ... A man should, whatever 
happens, keep to his own caste, race and breed. Let the White go to the White and the Black to the 
Black. Then whatever trouble falls is in the ordinary course of things - neither sudden, alien nor 
unexpected.' Our hapless hero, Trejago, stepped beyond these bounds. In one sense an over familiar 
tale that resembles many other an Anlo-Indian tale of forbidden love. Yet it all ends with a limp. 
Trejago doesn't hear from his sweet Angle, Bisesa for two weeks and decides to visit once again 
the dark Gully where he first heard her voice. Bending down to greet her at the sill of a grating he 
notices both of her hands cut off at the wrists. At that moment he hears a grunt akin to that of a 
wild beast and feels something sharp stab through his boorka cutting into one of the muscles of 
his groin', and he limped for the rest of his days (Kipling 1993: 159-166); (1888). 
62. Walter Lawrence applied the description loafer to those he saw as derelict men who though 
sometimes interesting were definitely annoying particularly to administrative prestige: 
'I have seen the loafer as a troublesome and limpet like guest in a Dak Bungalow, running up a bill 
and terrifYing the hypnotised Khansaman; an unwelcome visitor to my camp far away from any 
railway, indignant and abusive when offered food without drink and a pass to Bombay instead of a 
gift of money. I have met him at railway junctions, uncertain and seeking my advice as to the city 
or the Raja he should next exploit; have admired him as a temporary and wholly inefficient servant 
of some ostentatious Indian magnate who preferred a white coachman to safety. There was always 
the inevitable end - fiery country spirits and a bad smash, and then to pastures new. The kindly 
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villages would find food and shelter, indeed, do anything if he would only move on to the next 
garish as soon as possible' (Lawrence 1928: 100). 
J. The spelling of contract is as found in the text 
64. From Thomas Babington Macaulay, 'Government of India: A Speech delivered in the House of 
Commons on 10 July. 1883,' in G M Young ed., Macaulay: Prose and Poetry, Rupert Hart 
Davies, London 1952 
65. For fuller discussion on such understandings of tradition see Benjamin (1969) Illuminations 
and Benjamin and Osborne (eds.) (1994) Walter Benjamin's Philosophy: Destruction and 
Experience. See also Jenny Sharpe (1993) Allegories of Empire. 
66 The four are Clive, Warren Hastings, Havelock, and Lawrence. 
67 There are variations in the latinised spellings ofthis place name. It often appears as Multan 
(see Latif 1889: 650). 
68. A dacoit is a robber, hence dacoity robbery. 
69. That there were conflicts between the parties in London about the precise status of the English 
and their role in India is not in doubt. And Woodruff broadly divides these camps into Liberals 
such as Gladstone and Morley and Conservatives such as Disraeli and Joseph Chamberlain; The 
former having more faith in the ability of Indians to govern themselves quite soon, and the latter 
seeing little immediate prospect of self rule, and delaying such a prospect into the long distant 
future. 
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CHAPTER 4 - THE MILITARY COMPLEX 
1 
Introduction 
'Covenants without swords are but words' (Hobbes in Howard 1957: 11).1 
In the last chapter I began my analysis of the characterisations of men who rule by 
focusing on the figure of an administrative man - Sir Michael O'Dwyer. In this 
chapter I consider the figure of a military man - Brigadier-General Reginald Edward 
Harry Dyer (1864-1927) and the military traditions to which he is a party. 
This chapter explores the intersections and battles between military and civil authority 
in the exercise of power, particularly colonial power in India at the time. It argues that 
military codes of conduct played a vital part in defining styles of imperial rule. I read 
the two spheres as being at times thoroughly embedded together. They are 
substantively so, in their avowal and practice of tough, belligerent styles of rule. 
Arguably they are also formally so in their interchangeability of roles. Each man in 
his own way, as soldier or administrator, saw himself as doing his duty by Indians. 
In the figure of Sir Michael O'Dwyer we glimpsed a particularly acute instance of a 
muscular administration at work. As we saw he exemplifies a specific ruling tradition 
I would characterise as 'tough love'. One that nods approvingly towards imperatives 
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more conventionally associated with the conduct of war. In the figure of Dyer (strictly 
speaking a military officer), we glimpse an instance of a muscular militarism at work. 
Not only do military ethics form a central plank in the organisation of manners in 
governing Indian others but also, in such acute manifestations we see an instance of 
larger debates about the precise role and mould of a soldier in India at the time. 
In Dyer, we discern a figure caught in battles raging at the time, about the traditions 
of a soldier both in India and beyond. The battles are between defining a soldier's role 
in technical terms - where he is more akin to a manager, maintaining order being his 
prime concern; and defining his role in more familiar terms - as a warrior, even 
adventurer; Clive of India being the most famous role model here. 
Distrust of Military Manners 
Before I examine precisely how Dyer envisioned the make up of a military man, 
specifically a military man in India, and the military traditions he carries forward in 
his actions, I consider the historical antecedents of those men who carry such 
traditions. There is a long history of suspicion between civil and military realms in 
Britain. This takes on both familiar and novel configurations in India. 
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(a) Breeds of antipathy 
'Was it reasonable ... that an honest gentlemen should pay a heavy tax, in order to 
support in idleness and luxury a set of felIows who requited him by seducing his 
diary maids and shooting his partridges? (Macaulay in Strawson 1989: 1).2 
'An armed, disciplined body is, in its essence, dangerous to liberty ... Undisciplined, it 
is ruinous to society' (Burke 1790).3 
My objective here is not to rehearse a long history of origins about the British Army. 
Nor do I narrate a precise history of its structures. However, with the help of a few 
instances from that saga, I aim to register the existence of a profound history of 
suspicions, sometimes fearful ones, at specific moments, about standing armies; 
conflicts about their independent spheres of action; their costs, and their control by 
the civil power.4 Such complex relations become even more complex when as in the 
colonial Indian context, a variegated-armed force seeks primacy over opposition 
forces. In colonial India military traditions quite easily coalesce with strictly 
administrative ones. A simple reason is of course that one country is claiming rule 
over another. Thus, in a general sense, these are issues of complex civil - military 
relations. 
Borrowing a description from Hammer, the problems of civil-military relations 
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'involve two closely related issues ... First, the problem of royal authority over the 
army ... a constitutional question ... that ... involved the conflict between Crown and 
Parliament for supremacy over the armed forces. Secondly, out of the gradual 
encroachment of parliament upon royal authority there developed another issue, 
namely the extent to which civilians should participate with soldiers in deciding 
questions ofa professional and technical nature' (Hammer 1970: 5). 
Howard pursues this a little further. Via observations attributed to C. M. Clode, who 
is in tum borrowing from William Windham, he alerts us to a context that did little to 
dampen the mutual fear and distrust civil and military authorities have of one another. 
He describes the army as a body of men who hold in their hands a monopoly of force; 
men of action; easily seen perhaps as a competing centre of authority, subject only to 
crown control. Thus, the army constituted 
'a class of men set apart from the general mass of the community, trained to 
particular uses, formed to peculiar notions, governed by peculiar laws, marked by 
peculiar distinctions ... and known as ... the armed forces of the crown' (Howard 1957: 
11 ).5 
Strawson in his tum rather elegantly reinforces the conundrum presented to civil 
authorities by the supposed competing loyalties of the army - stated baldly, to Crown 
or Parliament. One would be hard put to find a more paranoid register of distrust. 
What, we may ask, was at stake in resolving these questions? Extraordinary though it 
might be, what are at stake are nothing less than the integrity of a nation. And the 
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query at the heart of the conundrum is justice! Hence, according to Strawson, distrust 
of a standing army was traditionally 'one of the main pillars of English justice' 
(Strawson 1989: 1). To ensure justice prevails in the face of such competition, a way 
would be found to keep the army in tight check. Thus, according to Byrant, 
' ... Parliament - alone capable of voting funds for its maintenance' - kept those funds 
'at the lowest level compatible with national safety and often a good deal lower' (in 
Strawson 1989: 1). 
Straws on is not alone in bringing such matters to our attention. Michael Howard in 
his tum adds that for a long time the decision about who should have effective control 
of the armed forces went by default. Eventually it was' solved in England,' Howard 
remarks, 'by a decision to have virtually no armed forces at all - certainly none that 
might be used by the Crown to secure its authority' (Howard 1957: 14). The decision 
to have no army or only a limited force is made easier of course by the 
incontrovertible fact of the British Isles being surrounded by the sea. The pressing 
needs of a power bordered on all sides by other states that mayor may not be hostile 
just didn't exist. 
Nevertheless old fears about control of an armed presence, and an army's loyalty 
were never more than a hairbreadth away. A dread, haunted by the memories and 
principles associated with 1688.6 As Hammer contends, 'Whig fears that the crown 
would use the army ... for its own ends ... to suppress or threaten popular liberties died 
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slowly' (Hammer 1970: 6).7 It would be many years before the association of force 
with monarchical power was dismantled. 
(i) An early instance - Crown or parliament 
Straws on gives us a number of previous instances of such conflicts rearing their head 
in civil and military relations. Thus, he contends, in an earlier time, during Edward 1's 
reign for instance, demands for an army to subjugate Wales enabled Edward to 
muster an army that was 'the largest, best-equipped force that England had seen for 
more than two hundred years ... ' (Strawson 1989: 5). Yet, they were Strawson grants, 
an assorted levy. And their connections with the King, though large and quite diverse, 
were nevertheless with the King. So, 
, ... from France he acquired destriers, battle chargers and remounts for his household 
guard, able to carry the most heavily armed nobles. Apart from the feudal levy which 
raised a thousand armoured horsemen, he put together no fewer than 15,000-foot 
soldiers, some conscripted form the Fyrd, some volunteers recruited by veterans who 
had fought with him in the Crusade ... ' (Strawson 1989: 5). 
Men of action so assembled and owing loyalty to the Crown could indeed appear a 
fearsome prospect. 
Strawson continues; when elements in the reglOn rebelled once agam, Edward 
resolved to raise another force. This time the method he deployed differed. His aim 
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this time was to have under his command a more professional fighting force. 
Apparently he managed to persuade his barons and knights to 'contract with the 
crown.' By so contracting Edward hoped 'to have their fighting men paid for agreed 
periods, instead of the former system of having at his disposal the tenants-in-chivalry 
serving at their own expense for. .. forty days and then free to please themselves' 
(Straws on 1989: 5). Of course, as Strawson points out, Edward's former 'principal 
officers of state' anticipated in his move a likely loss of independence. In the old 
regimes many owed principal personal allegiance to the crown - a matter of filial 
devotion not contract. Edward fought many wars. These other wars stood out just as 
fearful a marker in civil/military relations. 
Perhaps these matters, as well as the suspicions an armed force generally generated, 
are not the only ones. The other perpetual problem, arguably merely a version of the 
problems with control, with which Edward came to be concerned and that would 
occupy many of his successors, was how to pay for raising and maintaining his 
armies. 8 Herein Strawson says ' ... lay the beginning of the endless struggle between 
crown and parliament..' (Strawson 1989: 7). 
(ii) A later Instance about civil vs. military control - Salisbury vs. Sir Henry 
Wilson 
We don't need to go quite so far back, as Edward's I's reign to glimpse other military 
and civil conflagrations, this time over control and command. Of course the First 
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World War, in the European theatre of action, provides us with many instances of 
disagreements between civil and military authorities.9 Though strictly speaking pre 
First World War, Hammer gives us a readily retrievable case of army and civil 
distrust of this sort, arising in a colonial theatre of action. That is, the mistrust 
between Lord Salisbury 10 and Sir Hemy Wilson at the end of the nineteenth 
century .11 As I detail below, Wilson is implicated in another dispute over civil and 
military competencies, this time concerning our military figure, General Dyer. 
Hammer reads this as an instance of what the army would regard as 'the continuous 
encroachment of the civilian upon the military.' Such encroachments began in earnest 
he suggests, as long ago as 1782 'with the appointment of.. .a ... Secretary at War. .. ' 
which opened up ' ... a vast area for controversy in the field of civil-military relations' 
(Hammer 1970: 41). 
In 1896, for instance, Lord Salisbury was determined to keep a forthcoming 
expedition to Dongola as far away as possible from the military's clutches. 12 Writing 
to Lord Lansdowne, Salisbury declared, 'I shall assent to anything which commends 
itself to you. But my advice will be, not to pay too much attention to your military 
advisers,.13 In holding to such a slant he echoed his earlier disdain for military 
expertise, when he said, 'I have the greatest respect for the advice of soldiers as 
regards the conduct of a war, none whatever for their opinions as to the policy which 
dictates war' (Hammer 1970: 41; 30).14 
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According to Hammer, in this instance, the soldiers involved countered. They 
expressed their own doubts and questions. What, they would ask, is the basis for 
claims of civilian authority and competence in military matters. Sir Henry Wilson put 
it as follows, 
'During this year I have got a wonderful insight into the working of the War 
Office ... and to my mind it is exceedingly unsatisfactory. The whole idea of 
governing the army by a civilian, whose training has been political expediency, and 
who knows less about the army then I do about the Navy, is vicious in theory and 
hopeless in practise' (in Hammer 1970: 41). 15 
(iii) Sir Henry Wilson vs. the government 
Leaving aside Sir Henry Wilson's spat with Salisbury over competencies and their 
respective spheres, he expresses a deep contempt for civil authority in the row over 
General Dyer's military future and treatment by those authorities. 
In his diary he describes a fraught meeting he attends on 14 May 1920 with the 
politicians. In full 
'Winston (Churchill) made a long speech, prejudging the case and in effect saying 
that the Cabinet, and he, had decided to throw out Dyer, but that it was advisable for 
the army council to agree. It appeared to me, listening, that the story was a very 
simple one. The Frocks had got India into (as they have Ireland) into a filthy mess. 
On that the soldiers are called in, and act. This is disapproved by all the disloyal 
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elements, and the soldier is thrown to the winds. All quite simple ... After the Army 
Council, I had a short meeting of Military Members, at which I suggested that it was 
our duty to protect a brother officer until he had been proved in the wrong by a 
properly constituted Court of Inquiry .. .In the near future we should have many Dyer 
cases both in India and Ireland, and that if we didn't stand by our soldiers we should 
lose their confidence ... (emphasis mine. Wilson 1920 in Callwell 1927: 238). 
Though there are other instances of antipathy between these realms, these spats 
between the two realms should be sufficient in giving us a flavour of the long saga. I 
tum now to a specific consideration of such a legacy in India. Though suspicion 
between the spheres persisted in India, it coalesces with the recognition of the crucial 
importance of arms to the imperial project. Men under arms in India transmogrified 
into what Strawson calls the 'Praetorian Guard of Empire' (Strawson 1989: xii). 
~ 
Militarism in India before 1857/8 
'It would appear, that the artificial entity known as India, in the absence of a strong, 
external, compulsive force, might cease to exist' (Carthill 1824: 347; 348). 
'Our only dependence is upon the same ground that we began and by which we 
subsist, fear' (Roe 1618 in Mason 1985: 8). 
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'Our government of the country is essentially military, and our means of preserving 
and improving our possessions through the operations of our civic institutions depend 
on our wise and politic exercise of that military power on which the whole fabric 
rests' (Malcolm in Peers 1995: 1). 
In spite of all I have argued thus far, about the many and historic quarrels between 
soldiers and politicians, Howard nevertheless suggests that in Britain these conflicts 
were 'primarily .... administrative ... embittered - as such struggles usually are - by 
personalities' (Howard 1956: 21). So according to him, the conflict 
, ... was not nourished by the bitter continental traditions of civil-military mistrust. For 
over two centuries the supremacy of the civil power had been unquestioned. Neither 
the army nor the navy had a political past. Nor did their officers constitute a separate 
caste with distinct values distinct from and hostile to those of the nation. The 
purchase system in the army had at least ensured this, that they were drawn from the 
country gentry, they took more pride in their amateur status than in their professional 
ability, and back to the country gentry, on retirement, they returned ... Thus the 
quarrels between politicians and soldiers in the First World War had few overtones of 
ideological conflict or political mistrust: they were ... straightforward disagreements 
about the best way of winning the war' (Howard 1957: 21). 
Disagreements between civilian and military realms during this time may indeed be 
straightforward in the way Howard suggests. Nevertheless they do indicate the 
existence of larger, more complex battles in other spheres, at other times and in other 
theatres involving action. As Howard proffers in his closing remarks, there was an 
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intense battle looming, over whether the army should primarily be a professionally 
constituted body, or a force of amateurs who came together as and when necessary. 
Perhaps the place where we glimpse the intensity of these battles, battles in defining 
what is at stake when we speak about an army vernacular, and its relation to the 
conduct of supposedly civil activities such as business and government, is in Britain's 
pursuit of its Imperial projects, especially in India. 
(a) Enterprise - A joint stock co. takes its fill. 16 
It bears repetition that the East India Trading Company's arrival on the scene is a 
significant marker of Britain's engagement with India and things Indian. On 31 
December 1600 Queen Elizabeth I had granted a charter to the 'Company and 
Merchants of London ... to trade ... with the East Indies' (Hibbert 1980: 17).17 
Once there the Company and its merchants quickly had to learn how to develop and 
negotiate trade concessions from India's Moghul rulers. Notes put together by the 
South Asian History Project (hereafter SAHP) emphasise how the Company had to 
win such concessions as it could with a 'measure of humility and propose trade terms 
that offered at least some benefits to the local traders and merchants' (SAHP 2001).18 
Hibbert adds, 'thirteen years later, III 1613, Jahangir. .. [Akbar's great-
grandson] ... granted this company permission to establish a permanent trading station 
on the Indian coast north of Bombay' (Hibbert 1980: 17). As it transpired, this was to 
be only the first foothold the company was to acquire along India's coastlines. 
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I don't go into any great detail about the intricate trading and military engagements of 
the Company with indigenous powers. I do mark these engagements however as 
intellectual and ethical problems, and, especially where trade is concerned, the 
Company 'entered the scene as ... only ... one more player capable of pursuing the 
same ... economic ... functions,' as indigenous institutions (Chatterjee 1993: 31). So, 
'rather than representing a set of governing principles imported from a foreign and 
'more advanced' culture, the early East India Company state might be seen as a 
logical extension of processes with distinctly 'indigenous origins.' ... If one is not to 
disregard the 'preponderant evidence' of early capitalist groups in India subverting 
indigenous regimes in order to seek support from the Company, one must accept the 
conclusion that "colonialism was the logical outcome of South Asia's own history of 
capitalist development" , (Chatterjee 1993: 31). 
Making common cause with indigenous traders, it is suggested, John Company's 
trade would flourish. 19 The Company's directors heeded the early warnings given to 
them from the Moghul court by their ambassador, that 'they must never "seek 
plantation by the sword," , ... but should go about their business, ' "at sea and in quiet 
trade" , (Hibbert 1980: 17).20 Questions of security, a systematic variety at least, did 
not seem at this stage to be a part of the Company's vernacular. So, flourish it did. 21 
Times however are wont to change. 
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In the fractious environment that accompanies the weakening and eventual collapse of 
Moghul prominence in India, the Company would have to confront the growing 
problems of managing its valuable trade directly. Past experience should have taught 
that not all the Mughuls were as willing as lahangir to readily accede trading 
concessions to the Company. Many, others, according to the SAHP, Aurangzeb22 in 
particular, would attempt to 'limit and control the activities of the ... Company,' 
(SAHP 2001)?3 
In the face of such a growmg ambivalence in dealings with the Company, the 
Directors in London realised that the hitherto mercantilist emphasis it pursued would 
now have to be explicitly complemented by reference to violence and the sword. 24 
The concessions it had worked so hard to acquire from the Mughul court had to be 
defended and when possible expanded. 
Of course in one sense, trade and military power are old bedfellows.25 Gaining and 
keeping new markets then is as much about military prowess as it is about the 
inherent value of what it is you're peddling. So, SAHP tell us that by '1669 ... Gerald 
Ungier, chief of the factory at Bombay had written to his directors: "the time now 
requires you to manage your general commerce with the sword in your hands" , 
(SAHP 2001)?6 Naturally the military interest and the mercantile one did not always 
coincide. However, in this context, the Company was prepared to go to almost any 
lengths to guard the valuable concessions its servants had worked hard to win from 
the Mughuls. 
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(b) Sir Josiah Child - early calls for sovereign power 
Whether, and if so how, to defend English factories, often in the midst of competing 
Indian powers, had of course already become a pressing concern for many of our 
erstwhile traders. Mason recounts an early instance. This concerns Sir Josiah Child, 
Bt, Director of the Company, 1677 till his death in1699.27 Bombay's mainland was in 
the hands of the Marathas, a competing power to Mughul prominence. The Company 
were completely reliant on the mainland for food. Yet, seemed powerless to deny 
access to the harbour by the Moghul admiral, who, 'used it...' Mason says 'for 
constant raids on the mainland.' It was obvious, Mason adds that the Marathas would 
sooner or later, retaliate (Mason 1985: 17). 
The English wished to remain neutral between Mughuls and Marathas. Of course 
such neutrality was tinged with a good dose of self-interest - 'it was impossible to 
break with the Mughuls, to whom Surat and other factories were hostages' (Mason 
1985: 17). Caught in such an intricate web with competing powers, and confronted 
with growing Marathan raids on Bombay harbour, Josiah Child chose, Mason says, to 
do nothing. He felt, Mason adds, that 'to defend the island was a vain pompous and 
insignificant course.' Child commanded that the existing defences be 'left unfinished 
and the militia disbanded ... Money had to be saved' (Mason 1985: 17). All this in the 
face of an impending Marathan attack on the harbour! 
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Sir Josiah Child's imperious manner inspired a rebellion led by Captain Keigwin, 
commandant of a small garrison of 150 European and 200 native troops (Mason 1985: 
17 -18). Keigwin's mutineers declared the island subject to the authority of the Crown; 
thereby superseding any authority vested in Josiah Child or the Company. Any real 
attack on the harbour at this time would ensure its fall. 28 Eventually Keigwin and his 
rebels surrendered. But before the rebellion fizzled out it passed on a valuable lesson 
in the arts of government in this context to Sir Josiah. A lesson Mason says led 'the 
great Josiah' to become a 'changed man' (Mason 1986: 18). During his rebellion, the 
mutineer, Keigwin, 
' ... told the Moghul admiral to keep out of the harbour, finished the fortifications, 
paid everyone his dues, and handed over the Treasury with as much in it as when he 
had taken it over. He had made the English a power; secure in their island, they could 
now ride out a storm on the mainland' (Mason 1986: 18). 
Sir Josiah took the lessons of this mini rebellion to heart. In 1685, two years later, he 
set out what is arguably an early expression of a changing sentiment of an orderly 
progress in the pursuit of trade - the ledger was well and truly to be accompanied by 
the sword to ensure order. Defence would be expensive, but security in going about 
their profitable business would presumably be well worth it! Sir Josiah said: 
'It is our ambition for the honour of our King and County and the good of Posterity, 
as well as this company to make the English nation as formidable as the Dutch, or 
any other European nation ... in India; but that cannot be done only in the form and 
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with the methods of merchants, without the political skill of making all fortified 
places repay their full charges and expenses' (in Mason 1986: 18).29 
This was, Mason adds, 'in 1685, a year after the rebellion; two years later he was 
writing of "the foundation of a large, well grounded, secure English dominion in India 
for all time to come" , (Mason 1986: 18). 
(c) Plassey - perhaps the defining, moment 
More conflagrations would come and go. Perhaps the most remembered, not least, 
because of its associations with the Black Hole of Calcutta,30 and the Imperial 
adventurer Clive, is the battle of Plassey. Plassey counts as another, perhaps the 
defining moment in the genesis of this new idea about how to conduct trade with the 
sword in your hand not so as to raze and seize by rapine, but to establish order so as 
to trade by orderly means. 
(i) The build-up 
Some would have us believe that the Company had hitherto been carrying on a quiet 
trade in Bengal. 31 Macaulay paints the scene there in idealistic terms. He says, 
'In spite of the Mussulman despot, and of the Mahratta freebooter, Bengal was 
known throughout the East as the garden of Eden, as the rich kingdom ... Distant 
provinces were nourished from the overflowing of its granaries; and the noble ladies 
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of London and Paris were clothed in the delicate produce of its looms. The race by 
whom this rich tract was peopled, enervated by a soft climate and accustomed to 
peaceful employment, bore the same relation to other Asiatics which the Asiatic bear 
to the bold and energetic children of Europe ... Whatever the Bengalee does he does 
languidly. His favourite pursuits are sedentary. He shrinks from bodily exertion; and, 
though voluble in dispute, and singularly pertinacious in the war of chicane, he 
seldom engages in a personal conflict and scarcely ever enlists as a soldier. We doubt 
whether there be a hundred genuine Bengalees in the whole army of the East India 
Trading Company. There never perhaps existed a people so thoroughly fitted by 
nature and by habit for a foreign yoke' (Macaulay 1891 Vol. III: 34). 
It would for many plausibly pass as heaven on earth. Yet its materiality whilst 
excluding it from heaven would ensure that it would be a veritable temple to 
Mammon. Mason puts it thus: 
'The English settlement had grown to a city of four hundred thousand inhabitants; it 
was a City of Refuge not only for men but for money from all over Bengal, Behar 
and Orissa. All the richest Bengalis banked in Calcutta as the only place where 
property was respected ... ' (Mason 1985: 32). 
However, trade was to become less than quiet in Bengal. The Nawab, Alivardi Khan, 
ruler of the Subah of Bengal, died on April 10 1756. During his rule, English, French, 
Dutch and Danish East India Trading Companies pursued their activities, but only at 
his sufferance. He had, Rai tells us, taken measures to keep their political and 
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economIC powers within certain limits (Rai 2002). As a consequence they played 
exceptional games with the limits he set on their activities. Rai puts it thus: 
'The French and British Company's servants and administrators, each in their own 
way, never stopped pushing the legal limits that Alivardi had set for them; one could 
say that 18th century French - and Anglo-Indian Colonial praxis was a performance 
of exceeding Oriental law .... In the case of the British, this colonial improvisation 
was easily construed as an outright defiance of the Bengali political order. But not 
without a crisis' (Rai 2002: 7). 
A crisis was indeed in the offing. Rai goes on 
'A number of different antagonisms were sutured together in an intolerable mode of 
tension brought about by Alivardi's death: First, for years the British Company's 
servants had abused their exclusive farman (royal grant) of 1717 by using their 
dastaks (guarantees for duty free trade) to cover not only the trade of the Company, 
but also their own private trade, and even more disastrously for the native 
government, that of Asian merchants who were willing to pay large sums for use of 
these dastaks - both practices exceeded the terms of the farman ... Consequently, the 
Bengal subah was losing hundred of thousands of rupees yearly. Second, in 
preparation for the impending Seven Years War with France, all British presidencies 
were concerned about ensuring the defensibility of their territories, and were 
consequently fortifying their various forts ... Operating within a cultural logic of 
territorial integrity, the Nawabs of Bengal did not consider Calcutta a separate 
Company territory; Alivardi had made it clear that. .. the Company and its servants 
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were obliged to submit to his protection. Nonetheless, even during the time of 
Alivardi the Council at Fort William ordered that fortifications be built--all without 
the Nawab's permission' (Rai 2002: pp7-8). 
(ii) A quiet trade no longer 
On Alivardi's death the question of his succession became an urgent one for all, 
especially the competing trading companies. There were numerous candidates, but 
without the bloodshed that often attends such stories of accession, the contending 
parties agreed to Alivardi' s own choice of successor. 32 He chose the son of his 
nephew, one Mirza Muhammed, known by the more familiar name Sirag-ud-daullah. 
Writing many years later Thomas Babington Macaulay thought Alivardi's choice of 
successor the worst of all worlds, certainly for the European Companies. Looking 
back, Macaulay writes about Sirag-ud-daullah in the following terms - 'oriental 
despots are perhaps the worst class of human beings; and this unhappy boy33 was one 
of the worst specimens of his class' (Macaulay 1891 Vol. III: 35). James Mill was no 
more flattering. In his monumental History of British India he writes 
'Siraj-ud-daullah was educated a prince, and with more than even the usual share of 
princely consideration and indulgence. He had accordingly, more than the usual share 
of the princely vices. He was ignorant; he was voluptuous; on his pains and pleasures 
he set a value immense, on the pains and pleasures of other men no value at all; he 
was impatient, irascible, headstrong' (Mill 1817: 225). 
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Practising a quite trade then in the context of such upheavals looked increasingly 
unlikely. 
If not exactly his father incarnate, so far as the Company was concerned Sirag-ud-
daullah did take on his father's mantle, in the sense that he would practice his 
relations with them, on similar terms. It was inevitable then that existing antagonisms 
between the Company and Alivardi's Subah would coalesce with ease into newer, 
perhaps more urgent ones. Only a matter of days after Sirag-ud-daullah's succession a 
character called Krishnadas, son of Raj Ballav, 'the revenue administrator of Dacca 
and a confidant of one of Sirag's rivals for the throne' is alleged to have embezzled a 
treasure of 5.3 million, and taken refuge in Calcutta (Rai 2002: 8). Sirag-ud-daullah 
despatched a messenger to the Council with a demand for the return of Krishnadas. 
Governor William Drake refused. As Rai puts it, Drake' ... ordered the Nawab's 
messenger be immediately expelled from Calcutta ... This expulsion was subsequently 
interpreted as only the most outrageous confirmation of the Company's general lack 
of respect for the new Nawab' (Rai 2002: 8). 
What little respect Sirag-ud-daullah had for the company,34 was about to evaporate. 35 
The young Nawab decided to put up with their pretensions no longer. Perhaps for all 
the reasons he carefully set out in his letter to his negotiator, Kwala Wazid, but 
particularly the Company's audacity in fortifying their positions at Fort William, 
without his permission, Sirag-ud-daullah mobilised some 40,000 troops to lay siege to 
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Fort William. When Drake 'refused to come to terms with the Nawab,' he took the 
Fort by force (Rai 2002: 8). 
As Macaulay narrates events, the traders at Bengal were 'terrified and bewildered' by 
the turn of events. Macaulay describes how the Governor, who he suggests, ' ... had 
heard ... of Sirag-ud-daullah's cruelty ... frightened out of his wits, jumped into a boat, 
and took refuge in the nearest ship ... ' (Macaulay 1891: vol. III: 36). Others in the fort 
he maintains were similarly inclined. So, he continues, 'the military commandant 
thought he could not do better than follow so good an example.' The result of all this 
he tells us was that the 'fort was taken after a feeble resistance; and ... great numbers 
ofthe English fell into the hands ofthe conquerors' (Macaulay 1891: vol. III: 36). 
Once the battle was over, Macaulay depicts a nascent scene of oriental despotism. 
Hence: 
'the Nabob seated himself with regal pomp in the principal hall of the factory, and 
ordered Mr. Howell, the first in rank among the prisoners, to be brought before him. 
His highness talked about the insolence of the English, and grumbled at the smallness 
of the treasure which he found; but promised to spare their lives, and retired to rest' 
(Macaulay 1891: vol. III: 36). 
After the Nawab's assurance that no harm would come to them, Rai recounts the story 
as told by Mr Howell, a man who Macaulay describes as ' ... the first in rank among 
the prisoners, to be brought before ... ' Sirag-ud-daullah.36 Mr Howell 
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'reported that on the night of June 20, 1756, after the surrender of Calcutta, some 
Company soldiers, content with the Nawab's assurance that no harm would come to 
any of them, celebrated by drinking the officers' "spirituous liquors", and in their 
intoxication attacked and killed a Bengali Officer. As punishment the Nawab ordered 
that the English be imprisoned, after which he retired for the night; when asked 
where in the Fort criminals were usually incarcerated, some Company servants 
pointed to what was known as the Black Hole, an airless dungeon look-up measuring 
fourteen by eighteen feet' (Rai 2002: 9). 
This is what people at the time, and others following, call the horror of the 'Black 
Hole of Calcutta.' 37 Clive, who was in Madras at the time, could not have hoped for a 
better opportunity to reek the foulest vengeance. 
Within 48 hours of the news about Calcutta reaching Madras, Clive determined to 
recapture Calcutta. How crucial this enterprise was to Clive in his make up as a 
military saviour of the Company's enterprise and his own, is often not emphasised 
enough. Just how close the two are in pursuit of glory and money is captured superbly 
by Mill. He speaks about the 'deliberations for recovering Calcutta', that took place in 
Madras, and says, 
'It was resolved, after some debate, that the re-establishment of the Company's 
affairs in Bengal should be pursued at the expense of every other enterprise. A 
dispute, however, of two months ensued, to determine in what manner prizes should 
be divided; who should command; and what should be the degree of power entrusted 
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with the commander. The parties, of whom the pretensions were severally to be 
weighed, were Mr. Pigott, who ... was void of military experience; Colonel Aldercron, 
who ... was unacquainted with the irregular warfare of the natives; Colonel Lawrence 
to ... whose asthmatical complaints the close and sultry climate of Bengal were 
injurious; and Clive, to whom none of these exceptions applied. It was ... determined, 
that Clive should be sent. It was also determined, that he should be sent with powers 
independent of the Presidency of Calcutta ... ' (James Mill 1817 Vol. II: 230). 
As it transpired, and as Rai, by reference to Hill, puts it, 
'the Capture of Fort William in the year 1756 is one of the most prominent incidents 
in the history of the British in Bengal, not merely as one of the great clashes of arms 
between the British and the Natives of the country, nor because of the sufferings of 
those who took part in the defence or underwent the hardships of the long stay at 
Fulta, but for this reason, that the behaviour of the Nawab, Sirag-ud-daullah, forced 
the Honourable East India Company to reconsider the whole question of its relations 
with the native Government of Bengal. Up to the outbreak of the war the servants of 
the Company had been satisfied to pose as foreign traders, practically unarmed, and 
not presuming in Bengal - whatever they had done in Southern India - to take any 
active share in the political arrangements of the country. Sirag-ud-daullah by his 
violent action convinced the Company that its merchants must be no longer looked 
upon as mere foreigners but as Lords of the country in which they resided for the 
purpose of trade. It took nearly ten years to realise this fact and perhaps still longer 
to acknowledge it but the recapture of Calcutta is the starting point of the new idea' 
(emphasis mine. Hill in Rai 2002: 5).38 
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This would be a new chapter in the history of the Company. Indeed as putative Lords 
of the country, the Company and its servants would no longer wish to be just 
merchants. Order for the long term was yet to be established, but at this stage the 
Company could and would no longer ignore potentials for native disruption of their 
trade. So, they would grasp this moment as marking the beginnings of their new idea 
- a new British imperialism in the above senses and move towards the 'establishment 
of sovereign rights' with the sword (SAHP 2001). Clive was their man. In the ensuing 
battle, as Macaulay would tell the House of Commons in 1833, the Company would 
unite' .. .in itself two characters, the character of trade and the character of Sovereign' 
(Macaulay 1898: 545). 
Of course in his descriptions of the changing character of the Company at this time, 
Macaulay insists that the Company was not a mere trader one day and sovereign the 
next. He reminds us that 'it is a mistake to suppose that the Company was a merely 
commercial body till the middle of the last century' (Macaulay 1898: 547). According 
to him 
'Commerce was its chief object; but in order to enable it to pursue that object, it had 
been, like the other Companies which were its rivals, like the Dutch India Company, 
like the French India Company, invested from a very early period with political 
functions. More than a hundred and twenty years ago, the Company was in miniature 
precisely what it now is. It was entrusted with the very highest prerogatives of 
sovereignty. It had its forts, and its white captains, and its black Sepoys; it had its 
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civil and criminal tribunals; it was authorised to proclaim martial law; it sent 
ambassadors to the native governments, and concluded treaties with them; it was 
Zemindar of several districts, and within those districts, like other Zemindars of the 
first class, it exercised the powers of a sovereign, even to the infliction of capital 
punishment on the Hindoos within its jurisdiction. It is incorrect, therefore, to say that 
the Company was at first a mere trader, and has since become a sovereign' 
(Macaulay 1898: 547). 
Perhaps it is truer to say then, as he further reflects, that 
'it is impossible to name anyone day, or anyone-year, as the day or year when the 
Company became a great potentate. It has been the fashion indeed to fix on the year 
1765, the year in which the Moghul issued a commission authorising the Company to 
administer the revenue of Bengal, Behar and Orissa, as the precise date the accession 
of this singular body to sovereignty. I am utterly at a loss to understand why this 
epoch should be selected. Long before that the Company had the reality of political 
power' (Macaulay 1898: 548). 
Macaulay's refrain about the already mUltiple characters of the Company is in a 
sense, a refrain about the impurity of all characterisations. Perhaps the only certainty 
in our story of the Company, its trade and how it governs its activities, is that it would 
often change its modus operandi. Macaulay once more provides us with a neat 
summary. Hence, 'the transformation of the Company from a trading body, which 
possessed some sovereign prerogatives for the purposes of trade, into a sovereign 
body, the trade of which was auxiliary to its sovereignty, was affected by degrees and 
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under disguise' (Macaulay 1898: 549). It is at such a conjuncture that Clive, described 
by Pitt as a 'heaven-born general', set out on his adventure (Morgan 1999: 452). If the 
Company wished to continue with its trade both in Bengal and elsewhere, the native 
challenge had to be met, and met with force. If Siraj-ud-Daullah would not co-operate 
in the Company's enterprise, a more compliant Nawab would have to be found. 
Precise accounts of the ensuing battles and manoeuvres in Bengal differ. It is not my 
intention to go through them here, save to note that by hook or by crook the Company 
triumphed and Clive's engagements would usher in our complicated new idea. In this 
way we see how the so-called new idea would exceed commerce and bring into 
serious consideration, trade as a problem to manage and govern. Mason puts it with a 
suitable brevity - 'Siraj-ud-Daullah was ... put down; Mir Jaffer was put up' (Mason 
1985: 36). Trade would now, it is hoped, be secure. Mason elaborates further: 
'Clive had pursued his way with his usual dogged pertinacity; he had let nothing turn 
him aside, he had not shrunk from intrigue and deception. He had rid Bengal of the 
French and for the English had won security to trade. Those had been his two main 
objectives, but he had also won much more ... These were the first steps towards an 
empire; now everything was ready for one of the worst chapters in English history. 
The English on the spot had deliberately, and with the aid of force, both overt and 
diplomatic, of bribery and of intrigue, set out to attain two ... objectives, to drive out 
the French and to make their trade secure. They had been led further than they meant 
to go; they had wanted power but had not realised that it must bring responsibility. As 
for the Directors in England, they had been presented with an empire at which they 
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looked with the incredulous elation, shot with sharp twinges of doubt, of a village 
grocer who had inherited a chain of department stores and is not quite sure whether 
they will pay him a profit beyond his dreams or drag him down to ruin' (Mason 1985: 
37). 
In times to come, chroniclers of these new moments in the Company's adventures on 
the sub-continent would sweeten the imperatives and bitter dosage of trade with a 
variety of humanitarianism. Hence, they would echo Macaulay in surprisingly 
missionary tones when he says: 
'It is scarcely possible to calculate the benefits which we might derive from the 
diffusion of European civilisation among the vast population of the East. It would be, 
on the most selfish view of the case, far better for us that the people of India were 
well governed and independent of us, than ill governed and subject to us; that they 
were ruled by their kings, but wearing our broad cloth, and working with our cutlery, 
than that they were performing their salaams to English collectors and English 
magistrates, but were too ignorant to value, or too poor to buy, English manufactures. 
To trade with civilised men is infinitely more profitable than to govern savages' 
(Macaulay 1833 in Sharpe 1993: 7).39 
But for now they would probably be more at ease with James Morris' future 
sentiments. He envisages a different version of this relationship. Writing about the 
effects ofthe so-called Mutiny in 1858,40 he says 
'The mutiny had demonstrated ... that not all the coloured peoples were capable of 
spiritual redemption . . . but the British could always concentrate on material 
regeneration - the enforcement of law and order, the distribution of scientific 
progress and lubrication oftrade' (in Straws on 1989: 33).41 
The Anglo-India war of 1857-58 and the changes incumbent on that are still to come. 
The army would playa crucial role in defeating the insurgents. For the moment it 
would, Straws on notes, ' ... help with all three' of the above objectives (Strawson 
1989: 33). What is particularly important for our purposes is that arms and the 
practice of arms in India would now change. They would change, as Guha puts it, 
into a more systematic imperial career. What are now at stake are matters of 
professional competence - matters of law and order. If Clive had not quite done with 
his mercenary mercantile adventures, he certainly appreciates the prospect of a 
regulated empire. The Marquess of Wellesley is one of those who would carry that 
forward. 
A Growing Militocracy - From Violence to Order42 
Less than a hard fought battle Plassey may have been but in terms of the ultimate aim 
of arms and forces in the field, Clive's armies triumphed. Clive now considered 
himself master of all Bengal. He set about the administration with gustO.43 Many, 
according to Macaulay, prostrated themselves at his feet. Meer Jaffer showered him 
with gifts. Perhaps the lucre exceeded even Clive greatest expectations.44 Macaulay 
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comments, 'there was no limit to his acquisitions but his own moderation' (Macaulay 
1891: 54).45 Doubtless the greatest gift of all that Meer Jaffer bestowed on Clive was 
the estate, comprising the land the East India Company held and paid rent to the 
Nawab for. Clive would now hold it free of all rents for life. Whatever the monetary 
benefits flowing into the war chest held by Clive,46 - and plunder would not cease just 
yet - he would still take immense pride in being regarded as a military man. 
As Warren Hastings put it after the conquest, 'the resources of this country (Bengal) 
in the hands of a military people ... are capable of raising them to the dominion of all 
India' (in Mason 1974: 18). Almost a hundred years later Major Edward Caulfied 
Archer would evaluate these processes, with a characteristic 'military bluntness' 
(Suleri 1992: 83). Though less hagiographic, critical even, he nevertheless captures an 
essential insight about the importance of arms. 47 He says 
'It is not to be denied that the power of the British has been obtained more by force 
than by other fairer means ... Those of former Governors-General, whose exactions 
and grasping seizures have acquired to the perpetuators such damming shame, have 
been accounted the greatest of Indian statesmen. Among these names are those of 
Lord Clive and Mr Hastings' (Archer 1833: 155).48 
Of course there would be more opportunities for graspmg seIzure, shameful or 
otherwise. Yet there is a growing realisation that the use of violence and the sword to 
gamer, even guarantee trade, for a time would have to give way to a less haphazard, 
more certain means in its conduct. What is at stake here is a burgeoning Imperial 
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career In arms - a Militocracy, a Military rule. A change In career path Guha 
expresses better than most. 
Hence, in the face of increasing ambivalence in their relations with the Mughuls, the 
Company did indeed as we see resort to the use of violence and the sword. It did 
manage to establish a sort of sovereignty along certain bits of India's coastline. Guha 
uses the words of Philip Francis to emphasise this fact: 'there was no power in India, 
but the power of the sword, and that was the British sword, and no other' (in Guha 
1997: 25). 
Yet, Guha continues, 
'The justification of Britain's occupation of India by the right of conquest was 
subjected before long to a dialectical shift as colonialism outgrew its predatory, 
mercantilist beginnings to graduate to a more systematic imperial career. What was 
acquired haphazardly by conquest developed, in the course of this transition, into a 
carefully "regulated empire." Corresponding to that change, the exclusive reliance on 
the sword, too, gave way to an orderly control in which force (without losing its 
primacy ... ) had to learn to live with institutions and ideologies designed to generate 
consent. In other words the idiom of conquest was replaced by the idiom of order' 
(Guha 1997: 25). 
Clive is himself clear about the importance and success of arms in the hunt for further 
colonial riches and expansion. We see just how importantly he views an imperial 
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career in arms to such an expansion especially in the form of a standing force in his 
letter to William Pitt (Pitt the Elder). Written two years after Plassey, Clive put 
before the Prime Minister exact amounts of the extensive revenues of the country. 
Surrounded by such a fortune Clive brings to the Prime Minister's attention his own 
hand in acquiring such riches; urges him not to neglect the exploitation of such Indian 
riches; and implores him to work constantly to their care and enhancement. Hence, 
'The great revolution that has been effected here by the success of the English arms, 
and the vast advantages gained to the Company by a treaty concluded in consequence 
thereof, have I observe, in some measure, engaged the public attention; but much 
more may yet in time be done, if the Company will exert themselves in the manner 
the importance of their present possessions and future prospects deserves. I have 
represented to them in the strongest terms the expediency of sending out and keeping 
up constantly such a force as will enable them to embrace the first opportunity of 
further aggrandizing themselves; and dare I pronounce, from a thorough knowledge 
of this country's government, and the genius of the people, acquired by two years' 
application and experience, that such an opportunity will soon offer ... It is well 
worthy of consideration, that [our] project may be brought about without draining the 
mother country ... A small force from home will be sufficient, as we always make 
sure of any number we please of black troops, who, being much better paid and 
treated by us than the country's powers, will very readily enter into our service' (in 
Keith 1922: 13-18) (in Malcolm II 1836: 119).49 
There were difficult times ahead. The Company may have proclaimed itself master in 
Bengal, but mastery of the vaster region of all India was not a forgone conclusion. 
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Before claiming dominion over all India, 'the ... Company's army had to meet three 
considerable military powers and were to suffer many set backs' (Mason 1974: 18). 
They would also meet with many other kinds of insurgent, no less trying for that, 
along the way. 50 British mastery secured a foundation that always rested on a 
precipice; it 'hung by a thread' (Mason 1974: 83). 
Whatever the conflicts between London and men on the spot in the growmg 
dominions in India - the directors in London were often the last to know about action 
taken in their name - security became the paramount concern for the men in India. 
The reins around India's neck would have to be tight. Some, as we see below, became 
exasperated at the Company court's lack of understanding of the conditions 
bedevilling commanders on the ground. 
(a) A Welleslian school? 
According to Peers, the Marquess of Wellesley 51 is one of the first to give serious 
consideration, post Clive, to the formation and pursuit of an imperial career in arms; 
an imperial career in arms in India. 52 Not for the first time, nor would it be the last, he 
gave vent to the frustrations many a Company official on the ground felt with the 
court in London, when he echoed the sentiments of the Marquess of Hastings: 
'It is difficult to make this court understand that their territorial possessions here are 
not precisely like an estate in Yorkshire, or that they are not to expect blind 
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compliance with their orders in the one case as they might in the other' (Hastings 
1858 in Peers 1995: 44).53 
Dealing with such complexities would become daily preoccupations of men like 
Wellesley who wanted both to keep that already acquired and sustain the aggressive 
acquisition of more. So much so, Peers argues, that the Company's concern with 
shareholder value became a secondary consideration: 
'The East India Trading Company's annual dividend, or the state of its China trade, 
were matters of secondary importance to officials more concerned with squaring the 
territorial revenues of India with governmental expenditure, or dealing with what 
they thought were endemic challenges to their authority. Home charges, domestic 
machinations and the broad issues of imperial defence and corporate stability were all 
secondary to the principle imperatives of security and stability. Policy in India was 
conceived in the first instance with reference to the army and financial resources 
necessary to sustain it. Hence, officials in India would assert that the "British system 
in India has always been to keep the troops in a constant state of preparation for war" 
-4 
, (see Peers 1995: 44).) 
Peers terms this burgeoning style of rule, a 'militocracy.' It had' .. .its genesis in the 
grouping of officials around Wellesley during his tenure as Governor-General' (Peers 
1995: 45). By collecting together remarks from its advocates and practitioners, Peers 
elaborates its reasoning thus: 
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'Perhaps the most complete articulation of this school of thought can be extracted 
from John Malcolm's Political History of British India, There it was stated quite 
bluntly that, "the only safe view that Britain can take of her empire is to consider it, 
as it really is, always in a state of danger." The widespread acceptance of Malcolm's 
line of thought can be seen in a journal article from 1845 when it was said, "No 
man, .. better understands the habits and feelings of our subjects in that part of the 
world than Sir John Malcolm." Malcolm's conclusion that, "Our government of that 
country is essentially military," was one that many officials in India would have 
agreed with. Thomas Munro remarked that, "in this country we always are, and 
always ought to be prepared for war." These sentiments were further echoed by 
Charles Metcalfe who proclaimed that "the main object of all the Acts of our 
Government [is] to have the most efficient army that we can possibly maintain" , (in 
Peers 1995: 45). 
Previous Governor-Generals had on the whole remained mesmerised by control from 
London. Wellesley is different. By the time of his Governorship, the Company had a 
man whose explicit aim would be expansion. Thus he wrote, 'I can declare my 
conscientious conviction, that no greater blessing can be conferred on the native 
inhabitants of India than the extension of the British authority, influence and power' 
(in Mason 1985: 84). F or Wellesley British supremacy through arms was not 
merely a matter of observation but instinctual command. 
According to Mason, Wellesley would 'grasp nettles without hesitation' (Mason 
1974: 135). There were many battles both historic and burgeoning to resolve often all 
at once. I don't go into detail here save only to mention those Wellesely either 
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inaugurated or brought to a conclusion by the 'device of.. . subsidiary treaty' or 
subsidiary alliance (Spear 1965: 103).55 
Spear describes its essential features thus: 
'Wellesley ... took ... advantage of.. . acute divisions and jealousies of the remaining 
Indian states. For this purpose he employed the device of the subsidiary treaty. He 
would guarantee the independence of a threatened state in return for control of its 
external relations. The method was to station a force of the Company's troops in the 
capital, available to deal with any attack. These were under the control of a British 
Resident and were paid for by the state itself. Thus, should the state fall out with the 
Company, it would find the Company's hand already at its heart. The financial 
arrangement made internal interference possible at any time on the ground of non-
payment of the subsidy for the force. In the then circumstances the whole 
arrangement meant for any state freedom from Indian conquest at the price of 
subjection to the British' (Spear 1965: 103). 
(b) A Wellesleyan future 
I'm not writing a biography of Wellesley. However, the claims for his character and 
policies are relevant as significant markers in defining our nascent traditions in arms. 
As legends of a soldier hero go they imbibe part of the package in the details that go 
to make up an ideal soldier at this time - an adventurer yes, but also a man who, 
realising the immensity of the tasks that lay ahead of him, sought to convey order. 
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Order would be the preoccupation of many soldiers to come, not least of General 
Dyer. 
Wellesley's staff would eulogise him as the 'glorious little man'; sometimes he is 
known as Wellesley Bhadhur. In a metaphoric translation, bold as brass; a man of 
considerable energy; a man with a 'staggering attention to detail'; and more valuable 
than anything else perhaps, a man of 'resolute common sense.' (Mason 1974: 154-
155). Paraphrasing Mason once more, it is frightening how, although the imperial 
project had yet to become as 'brassy, vulgar and self-assertive as it was at the time of 
the Diamond Jubilee,' Wellesley exemplifies a sense in which ' ... the certainty that 
right was on our side was even stronger' (Mason 1974: 166). 
The views of men like Wellesley and the officials around him are neatly summarised 
in another place. This time by Stocqueler in his The Old Field Officer' (1853). All 
our wars Stocqueler suggests are 
'almost always for the purpose of extending social improvement and good 
government ... and the blessings of tranquillity and security of life and property .. and 
these .. more than compensate for the rudeness by which amelioration is usually 
effected' (in Mason 1974: 16617).56 
However large a claim this may be it did signal just how demanding the new career in 
arms in pursuit of tranquillity would be. Trevor Hearl captures it perfectly when he 
says, 
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'the new responsibilities of imperial power (resulting from the Wellesley brothers' 
extension of Company territory in India), exposed old weaknesses, created new 
demands and expanded career opportunities in the armed forces and overseas 
administration. Significantly, these developments required a new type of soldier and 
administrator; not eighteenth century gentlemen, but nineteenth century 
professionals' (Hearl 1976: 254). 
It would simply not be enough anymore for men who bore arms in these senses to be 
fitted for this role in the absence of good schooling and good practise in that role. To 
be fitted as a soldier, meant more than being able to conduct a 'hard gallop, a gallant 
fight, and ... [drink] a full jug' (Barnett 1967: 16). Borrowing from Barnet, character 
would no longer suffice to the neglect of intellect in defining the ethics of men who 
fought to defend, and when the occasion demanded, expand empire (Barnett 1967: 
17). The use of violence in forging and gaining markets is now well and truly to be 
transformed into fighting in the name of law and order. 
Formalising Military Instruction and Training 
Wellesley himself did not formulate any course of instruction in military education. 
He did however direct his attention to 'improving the personnel of the civil service' 
by proposing the 'establishment of a college at Fort William at Calcutta ... where ... the 
education of the young civil servants sent out from England should be completed' 
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(Stephen & Lee 1917: 1129). The company did not approve his scheme. They thought 
it 'too vast and too expensive' (Stephen & Lee 1917: 1129).57 His proposals do 
exemplify nevertheless just how urgent the provision of training for men under arms 
was and just how contiguous the role and characters of administrator and soldiers are 
at this time. 58 
There were at this time still two routes, ultimately to a commission, in the armed 
services; 'the direct route straight from home or school into the services at 
sixteen ... or. .. the scholastic route from school.. . via a cadet college and its qualifying 
examinations ... ' (Hearl 1976: 251). The former, 
, ... used by over 80 percent of officers, required the help of patronage for the navy, 
the marines and the East India Company, and additionally until 1871, the price of 
purchase for infantry and cavalry in the Army, costing ... between £450 and £570, 
according to regiment and pro rata for promotion' (Hear11976: 251). 
According to Hearl, 'by 1812, a tenfold expansion of official provision in military and 
associated education had ... already ... been achieved' (Hearl 1976: 254). Numerous 
establishments sprang up, catering for the different arms of service and were taking 
on candidates. Hence 
'The Royal Naval Academy (1729) at Portsmouth was transformed into the Royal 
Naval College (1808) and the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich Warren (1720) 
was rebuilt on the Common (1808), together increasing a ... cadet strength of 80 or 90 
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to almost 300. A new Royal Military College for 400 candidates was opened at Great 
Marlow (1802) and moved to Sandhurst (1812), while the East India Company 
opened its colleges at Haileybury, Hertford (1812), and Addiscombe, Croydon 
(1809), for over 200 civil and military students' (Hearl 1976: 254). 
(a) Early battles for a professional heart 
Professionalisation in military character and education is now well under way. Hearl 
distinguishes this mini-revolution as being marked out by a trivalent of 
'colleges, curriculum ... and ... examinations: these three scholastic factors thereafter 
combined to produce a force, based on military needs, powerful enough to generate, 
"an educational revolution in this country during the 1820s and 1830s," 59 and to 
establish ... "the military ancestry of the Meritocracy" , 60 (Hearl 1976: 255). 
As early as 1855 Lord Panrnure and the Council of Military Education inaugurated a 
series of changes to military education. But it was really only a start. Henry Barnard 
summarises what the changes would mean: 
(i) Success in competitive examination would now govern admission to the 
various military schools; 
(ii) The Council of Military Education would take charge of the 'order and 
method of studies and all examinations for promotion' (Barnard 1872: 529); 
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(iii) The weight of study and the order in which it is to be delivered would be 
minutely organised with each Professor expected to keep to the requisite 
courses by 'the supervision of a Master of Studies' (Barnard 1872: 529); 
(iv) A Staff School to be developed and complete the system (Barnard 1872: 529). 
Of course the system of purchase would now have to be tackled head on. Brian Bond 
reminds us that 
, ... a really professional system of advancement was incompatible with the existence 
of the purchase system which of course effected the majority of first commissions 
offered for the infantry and cavalry, and of promotions up to the rank of Lieutenant-
Colonel' (Bond 1972: 18). 
Commissions already cost hundreds of pounds, but according to Bond by the time of 
the Crimean war, 'a captaincy might cost £2,400 and a lieutenant-colonelcy £7,000-
in 'smart' regiments it would be much more' (Bond 1972: 18). 
After prolonged, often heated debate, in 1871 Edward Cardwe1l61 repeated the 
necessity for reform in the following terms: 
'If there is one lesson which we have learned from the history of the ... Franco-
German War, ... it is this - that the secret of Prussian success has been more owing to 
the professional education of the officers than to any other cause to which it can be 
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ascribed. Neither gallantry nor heroism will avail without professional training' 
(Cardell in Bond 1972: 19). 
Though reform was introduced, the antagonism between reformers and conservatives 
would endure for a good while yet. 62 Alongside these developments grew up an army 
of another type; an army of tutors, and crammers who would ready candidates for the 
entrance examinations many would now need to pass as several colleges instituted 
entrance examinations. 
These were indeed seminal moments in the burgeoning professional character of 
imperial army careers. Perhaps an even greater impetus in the rush to army reform 
would be 'the legacy of the Anglo-Indian War 1857-58' (Wolpert 2000: 239). 
(b) A new order 
Officially at least in 1858 Company rule came to an end. The Crown would now 
assume direct responsibility for the Indian Empire. Of course in some senses nothing 
had or would change. As Mason highlights by reference to the words of Lord 
Grenville, generally nothing did indeed change. As early as 1813 Grenville 'had said 
in parliament ... "the British Crown is de facto sovereign in India" , adding, 'each of 
the great Government ofIndia Acts, in 1813, 1833 and 1853 had asserted a little more 
clearly the sovereignty of Parliament' (in Mason 1985: 173). So, according to Mason, 
as far as the army was concerned 'all that happened in 1858 was the final extinction 
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of a corporation through whom sovereignty had once been exercised, but over whom 
parliamentary control had progressively been strengthened' (Mason 1985: 173). 
Yet, the one institution the war did have a profound effect on was the army. The 
fallout was tremendous even given Mason's argument about continuity (Mason 
1974). Hence as Wolpert succinctly puts it 'The Company's presidency armies were 
reorganised as a martially co-ordinated royal machine designed to prevent any 
recurrence of rebellion' (Wolpert 2000: 241).63 
The dissolution of John Company in 1858 would herald the end of its civil service 
training college at Haileybury and 3 years later the closure of its military training 
college at Addiscombe. Unlike the former where (as we saw in chapter 3) universities 
were able to take up the slack, military training particularly for the army resolved to 
the Royal Military Academy, junior and senior departments. 
Militarv Traditions, New Models and Brigadier-General R E H Dyer 
(a) Antecedents 
Reginald Edward Harry Dyer (R E H Dyer) hailed from a family with a tradition of 
military service in India. His and his family's connections with India were long and 
deep. His biographer, Ian Colvin, tells us that the Honourable East India Company 
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employed Dyer's grandfather, John Dyer, as a ships pilot. John Dyer fought 'with 
success ... Dyak pirates who then infested the seas, islands and estuaries of Burma and 
the Malay Archipelago' (Colvin 1929: 2). Edward, Dyer's father, born on 7 July 1831 
in Calcutta, also sought employment in the military as an engineer. Eventually, 
persuaded by his brother, he settled down to a trade in beer by setting up a brewery. 
He began working in what he probably thought a quiet trade in the Hill station of 
Kasauli satisfying the growing thirst of the 'many Englishmen, servants and soldiers 
of John Company' (Colvin 1929: 3). 
It was whilst he and his wife were in the hills that they got their first taste of the 
turbulence associated with the so-called Mutiny about to break out around them. 
Colvin elaborates - they sheltered 'some of the English women who escaped, 
trembling and aghast, from the smoke and carnage of the plains below to the safety of 
the hills' (Colvin 1824: 3). Such an experience would live on in the memory not only 
of the Dyers, but many a so-called Britisher and define their changed relations with 
India and Indians.64 The Brig.-Gen. to be Dyer would carry the burden of the memory 
of the so-called mutiny. 
(b) An army cadet 
Like many of his contemporaries, Dyer was sent to Ireland for schooling. He attended 
Midleton College in Cork. After flirting briefly with the possibilities of a medical 
career, he opted for the prospects of a military career. After finishing with Midleton 
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he set sail for London where he would cram for entry to Sandhurst. His tutor, Ashton, 
had high hopes for him. But struck down with illness Dyer had to delay a year. He 
finally entered Sandhurst as a Gentleman Cadet on 3rd September 1884. when aged 19 
yrs and 9 months (Colvin 1929: 11). He left in August 1885 with 'proficiency in 
military law and tactics' to take up a commission on 29 August in the Royal West 
Surrey Regiment (Colvin 1929: 11). 
According to Mockler-Ferryman, the tone of the college at this time had changed 
entirely. Whereas it had been a 
' ... mere boys' school open to anyone passing a low standard qualifying 
examination, with just sufficient military veneer to make the cadet a little different 
from an ordinary public school boy ... now ... the small boy was abolished, and the age 
of admission (by competitive examination) was fixed at between sixteen and 
eighteen' (Mockler-Ferryman 1900: 35). 
Once there the education was determinedly military and determinedly practical. 
Mockler-Feryman once again gives us a window on the 'status of the cadets.' He 
adds, 'where possible military men took the place of civilian instructors' (Mockeler-
Ferrryman: 1900: 36). 
Orgill informs us that the' ... subjects in which Dyer was examined were Military 
Administration; Military Law; Tactics; Fortification; Military Topography and 
Reconnaissance; Drill; Gymnastics; Riding' (Orgill 2002). Dyer's mark at the end 
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was 1980, which Orgill thinks put him 'about half way in the order of merit.' Perhaps 
most intriguing of all is Orgill's comment that 'Dyer's conduct as a probationer was 
described as 'good,' but in his final term was described as indifferent, which was an 
unusually pej orati ve comment.' 65 
(c) 'At staff college batch,66 
The senior section of what was once known collectively as Sandhurst now stood on 
its own as Camberley. A place for the elite in the armed forces, Dyer took his staff 
college entrance examinations while in Meerut on 7th August 1895. He learned of his 
success in November and set out for England in December 1895, entering Camberley 
in January 1896. 
The tide of professionalism did not elude the Staff College. Bond suggests that by the 
1890s it put behind it ' ... much of its reputation for pedantry ... ' Consequently ' .. .it 
was attracting some outstanding students; and, above all, the magic letters p.s.c. were 
worth having since they opened up opportunities not only of coveted appointments, 
but also of accelerated promotion' (Bond 1972: 153).67 It now had at its disposal the 
services of two officers, Henry J. T. Hildyard and George F. R. Anderson. They left 
Bond argues, ' ... a lasting impression on the educational history of the army' (Bond 
1972: 153). 
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Dyer came to an institution then much changed; but still in the serious business of 
turning out men who would in the near future' ... command ... armies, corps and 
divisions in the First World War' (Bond 1972: 162). His contemporaries read like a 
list of what Bond terms a 'galaxy of future stars' (Bond 1972: 162). In a letter to the 
Times, a writer extols the class of 1896, teachers and students both, as quite simply 
the best. Signed under the pseudonym 'Archimedes,' 68 he speaks without reserve in 
the honour he pays. Much of the success of the General Staff of his day is due he 
thinks to their instruction - the instruction of Hildyard and Anderson. 69 
(d) A Regime of practise 
Yet, our signatory, Archimedes, is not so complimentary as to embellish Staff College 
practice without contradiction. Brig.-Gen. Edmonds' reminiscences, according to 
Bond, are 'for the most part unflattering description(s) of the Staff College in the 
1890s' (Bond 1972: 159). For instance he is not enamoured by the fact that in 1896 of 
the thirty-two students in each year, only twenty-four entered by competition. Eight 
entered by nomination (Edmonds 1896). For our unflattering critic the whole of his 
first year was wasted - purely formal. 
Leaving aside the details of the curriculum, the second year saw Hildyard and 
Henderson's ethics really came to the fore. Even our unflattering critic would approve 
the turnaround. According to Bond, Hildyard loathed cramming: ' ... we do not want 
any cramming here ... we want officers to absorb not to cram' (in Bond 1972: 154). 
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The next logical step for Hildyard would be to try and abolish all written 
examinations. Though it didn't happen as quickly as he would like, he did manage 
eventually to put an end to the final examination. Now under the new regime the 
manufacture of officers and future commanders in the field shifted from preparing the 
candidates for paper examinations to encouraging them to solve 'problems of 
strategy, tactics and organisation both in their quarters and in the field' (Bond 1972: 
154). Hence, Henderson summarises his ethic of training thus: 
'This method of training, accompanied as it was by a salutary friction with other 
brains ... was undoubtedly a great advance ... It was more exclusively practical than 
the method pursued at any Staff College in Europe; and it was the best substitute for 
the complete experience on which Wellington laid stress, and also the best 
supplement to the partial experience ... of one or more minor campaigns' (Henderson 
1910 in Bond 1972: 154).70 
This then was the formal Staff College training Brig.-Gen. Dyer underwent - hard 
work and application. Though Dyer, his biographer supposes, 'left but a slight 
impression on this brilliant assembly,' he also draws our attention to Hildyard's 
closing remarks in his report of Dyer: 'This officer has shown great force of 
character, and I shall expect to hear of him again' (in Colvin 1929: 34). Colvin adds, 
'he took in a great deal more than his comrades and teachers supposed' (Colvin 1929: 
34). The assumption that an officer on the ground knows best very much defined 
Dyer's creed. 
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Dyer graduated from the college on 21 December 1897 and sailed for India where 
until spring 1900 he was Lieutenant in the 29th Punjab infantry. 
1 
In Practice 
'He did his duty, as he saw it' (Kipling in Swinson 1964: 209). 
The Staff College was not to be Dyer's last encounter with military education. From 
1901 to 1908 as Captain Dyer he took charge of a Garrison School in Chakrata as an 
instructor. He returned to work in his regiment soon after his stint at Chakrata until 
February 1916. Opportunities to put into practice all his skills and experience gained 
at the heart of the centres of British military tradition would shortly appear. General 
Kirkpatick, Chief of Staff at Delhi sent for Dyer, now a colonel, instructing him to 
'take charge of the military operations in South-East Persia' (the Sarhad) (Colvin 
1929: 67). It was for the successful conclusion of this campaign that he was made a 
Companion of Bath (CB), and during it that his request to be made a General was 
granted (Colvin1929: 48/67). 
(a) A call to the Sarhad 
Traditionally, men like Dyer built their reputations on what Sir Isaiah Berlin 
characterise as 'the supreme value of action'. They would aim to be 'the dominant 
character' in all their engagements with whomever they did battle (in Strawson 1989: 
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72). Operations in the Sarhad would be one of the better known occasions when Dyer 
would cement his claim to being part of such a tradition. His campaigns in the Sarhad, 
to bring order to the ill-defined border areas with Persia are another episode in that 
job; another one of Victoria's little wars in all their complexity.71 
I do not discuss the campaigns in any detail here. There is an official history of the 
campaigns published by HMSO (Bayliss 1987), as there is Dyer's own account, 
which is akin to an adventure story (Dyer 1921). I do however highlight some 
instances of Dyer's encounters with what he would regard as recalcitrant natives as 
cases exemplifying the traditions of his style as a tough soldier and ruler; bringing the 
chaos all around him to order. 
The sub-title of Dyer's account of the campaign gives us a clue as to what is at stake. 
He calls his account, 'The Raiders of the Sarhad: Being the account of a campaign of 
arms and bluff against the brigands of the Persian - Baluchi border during the Great 
War' (1921). 72 These weren't just conventional wars, but also games of bluff and 
impression. We get a sense of the games he plays and the impression he seeks to 
foster in the Raiders when he recounts for us a moment involving his motor car. His 
companion explains the car to one of the Raiders: 'do you see that queer thing there?' 
he asks. 'And do you see that the front part of it is filled with hundreds of little holes? 
The General only has to press a button and a hail of bullets will come out of those 
holes, and you, and all your men will be killed' (Dyer 1921: 116). The chortle of 
laughter from his driver and assistant nearly has them falling over. Yet the point is 
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well made. The bluff must be held onto as long as possible, remembering all the while 
Dyer says, ' ... to show no sign of fear or doubt of them. That impresses them more 
than any thing else' (emphasis mine. Dyer 1921: 116). 
An amusing moment perhaps, but from the outset Dyer makes clear his role is to 
bring the 'nomad tribes of the Sarhad ... back into line with their old policy of 
friendship with Britain' by fostering in them an impression of his and British 
invincibility (Dyer 1921: 18). His duty is to teach them a lesson that seeking 
friendships elsewhere, in this context with sundry Germans, by allowing such 
Germans free passage thorough their lands is not in the end to their benefit. Of course 
bringing them into line would mean bringing them to a very British order and 
understanding of their relations with British power. Such a colonial understanding 
and order smacks of the paternalism we saw in chapter 3 practised by O'Dwyer, the 
administrator. So he, Dyer, would, he says, show these troublesome tribesmen that 
their activities were causing the British Raj harm, and that they' ... must ... fall into line 
with their old policy of friendship with Britain' (Dyer 1921: 18). 
The force of these lessons would be driven home! Of one thing he is quite sure: 
' ... no race, white or coloured, ever held in respect any man or government showing 
weakness or indecision, and ... it was little use in making friends with these tribesmen 
without first inspiring them with a wholesome respect for British arms' (Dyer 1921: 
216). 
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He adds confidently, 
' ... once the lesson ... is ... driven home ... only then ... should ... an endeavour be made 
to become friendly with them ... win them back to our side and ... appoint them as 
doorkeepers of the Baluchistan frontier. .. but door keepers with their rifles pointed at 
our enemies instead of at us' (Dyer 1921: 28). 
So he would comport himself in precisely the manner of a latter day Lord, goading 
the raiders both collectively and individually to try him, with a view to these ends. 
We see a clear version of such practice in his dealings with the entire Raider chiefs 
when he calls for their attendance at various Durbars; Durbars he calls to listen to 
their explanations/excuses for not behaving themselves and then insisting they change 
their ways. 
Thus, we see a particularly evocative moment in his style of dealing with the raider 
chiefs when caught in a trap of his own making he tells us about. He makes his way to 
Karismabad to convey his demands to one of the raider chiefs, Jiand. A meeting is 
convened at which he storms about the burning of animal feed, demanding to know 
who did it - 'how dare you burn my busha? What reason had you for doing it, and 
who told you to do it?' he storms. The reply is swift - 'the country is ours and 
everything in it. We will burn the busha, or burn anything we like' (Dyer 1921: 158). 
Surrounded he tells us by men who are armed with rifles, he angrily tells his 
interlocutor to sit down and orders one of his men to arrest the interlocutor. At that 
moment he relates how Jinand's men rose at once and brought their rifles to bear on 
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him and his party. Instantly he roars "how dare you, you dogs? Sit down this instant!" 
Reaching out to Jiand he 'forced him down to his side.' Disarming all competitors, he 
finished off addressing them with disdain: 'if there is the slightest sign of treachery I 
will shoot you down like the dogs you are' (Dyer 1921: 159). 
Other raiders he meets are treated with similar disdain. Suffice to say that his mode of 
relating to Indians is, as I note, not so extraordinary as to be, to borrow a phrase from 
another place, 'beyond the pale.' 73 The official account of his campaigns 
congratulates him on a success that stems in their view precisely on the ' ... way in 
which he outwitted the Sarhaddi chiefs' (Bayliss 1987: 167). 
(b) Called to restore order in Amritsar 
Following on from this logic, one would say that Dyer's actions in Amritsar 1919 
stem precisely from his way of conducting himself in relation to his charges - as a 
soldier. Arguably his statements/explanations for his actions in Amritsar, in all their 
versions are merely those of a soldier who understands his duty through the lens of 
his job as a defender of empire. Their monstrous character is not as something other 
to that job. Perhaps there is nothing more interesting than their normality - ideal 
statements of his practice! 
I want to end by highlighting some of his words as displaying his character and the 
assumptions of his role in relation to those over whom he exercised authority. 
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Perhaps the most candid statement about his actions and their imperatives is found in 
his report to the General Staff in August 1919 about his actions on that day. As we 
saw in chapter 1, he did not remonstrate with the crowd after arriving at the Bagh, 
after all he had not come' ... to further parley with the mob ... they were there to defy 
the arm of the law' (in Sayer 1991: 144). Borrowing from Sayer, in what follows he 
states' ... exactly why he acted as he did' on that fateful day (Sayer 1991: 144). Hence 
'The responsibility was very great. If I fired I must fire with good effect, a small 
amount of firing would be a criminal act of folly. I had the choice of carrying out a 
very distasteful and horrible duty or of neglecting to do my duty, of suppressing 
disorder or of becoming responsible for all future bloodshed ... What faced me was 
what on the morrow would be the Danda Fauj (Rebel Army). I fired and continued to 
fire until the crowd dispersed and I consider this the least amount of firing which 
would produce the necessary moral and widespread effect it was my duty to produce, 
if I was to justify my action. If more troops had been at hand the casualties would 
have been greater in proportion. It was no longer a question of merely dispersing the 
crowd but one of producing a sufficient moral effect, from a military point of view, 
not only on those who were present but more specifically throughout the Punjab. 
There could be no question of undue severity' (in Draper 154-6). 
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Conclusions 
In this chapter I have attempted to show at some length how important the tradition of 
arms is to Britain's imperial projects and mission in India. If anything, such an 
enterprise goes a long way to recognising how Britain's adventures in the sub-
continent were far from being merely accidental. It was more in the nature of a 
modem plan with its attendant schemes. Thus, far from being a fortuitous enterprise, 
armed order deserves the epithet tradition, and those who were at the forefront of that 
exercise, were drilled in its delivery. The events in Amritsar provide an exemplar par 
excellence for us to see the imperatives of order swing into action. Dyer was quite 
literally the man whose make up ensured he took no prisoners. Colonel Hildyard, as 
we saw, summed up Dyer's make up in a single sentence. It is worth repeating. 
Commenting in his final report on Dyer at the Staff College Hildyard said 'this officer 
has shown great force of character, and I shall expect to hear of him again' (in Colvin 
1929: 34). 
Of course traditions of arms have varied over the time of Britain's connections with 
the sub-continent. My aim has been to distil a distinctive set of practices that define 
the manner in which soldiers, specifically Reginald Dyer, saw themselves and their 
roles in India, given that project's initial imperatives and the impetus towards an 
Imperial profession in arms. We see how profoundly Dyer's versions of his duty and 
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conduct in relation to Indians are informed by histories of imperial adventure in the 
shape of the East India Trading Company. That adventure turns into a recondite 
professional career in arms the major preoccupation of which was order. Its major 
focus turned along the assumptions of sovereignty always a significant problem for 
our erstwhile rulers. 
In the next chapter I take the problems of order into a consideration of the role and 
make up of the Secretary of State for India at the time. He presents us with a much 
more complex figure who battles with the whole rationale for a foreign power being 
in India. He is in this sense different from the two characters we have encountered 
thus far. His solutions to the question of who should take the mantle of governor, are 
exemplary, if somewhat quixotic. Perhaps that is because he is slightly removed from 
the day to day reality of the conduct of empire. He is freer to take a longer view. 
Doing so gave him the time and freedom to ponder the requisite roles of Indians and 
their imperial masters. His ideal ruler gives a much greater scope and regard for the 
other. His version of the man who is made to rule was not so much 'after me no more 
fathers' as 'what can we do together?' 
This characterisation, however is perhaps rather too critical of his attempt to renew 
the character of ruler. In the figures of O'Dwyer and Dyer we encountered men who 
were certain of themselves and their roles in India. Montagu is certain of neither. The 
massacres at Amritsar urgently propelled him into finding a solution to the character 
of rule and ruler. One thing he is certain about is co-operation. His version of the 
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make up of ruler was not easy for either side to come to terms with. He wanted co-
operation to be the bedrock of empire. Hence his task as he sees it is to renew the 
relations of ruler and ruled. He envisages the formation of a co-operative domination. 
That is no easy task. Not easy for the rulers who were so used to getting their own 
way, not easy for the ruled who found it hard to trust their ruler's manoeuvres. But 
that did not scare him. If the words he expended on the task are anything to go by he 
is sure of his contribution to this historic question. In my re-composition of Amritsar 
in the terms I set out, I tum now to a consideration of the figure of a 'government 
man' - Edwin Montagu and his hard task. 
1. The reference to Leviathan reads, Michael Oakeshott (ed.), Leviathan, Oxford 1952: 109. The 
fuller, perhaps more useful quote in this context, continues ' ... and of no strength to secure a man at all. 
Therefore notwithstanding the laws of nature, (which every one hath then kept, when he has the will to 
keep them, when he can do it safely,) ifthere be no Power erected, or not great enough for our security; 
every man will, and may lawfully rely on his own strength and art, for caution against all other men' 
See Richard Flack (ed.) (1991: 117-118). Being the keepers of such an order is how many colonists 
fashioned their duty to India to be. 
1. Many men under arms were depicted as 'scum of the Earth'; men who enlisted for drink, or who 
were eager to 'avoid gaol or escape from the cloying opportunities of women folk' (Strawson 1989: 
12). 
3. Edmund Burke, Speech on the Army Estimates, 1790. From Michael Howard ed. 1957: 11-12. 
4. Mistrust and fear in this relation is not just one way. So, the distaste with which army officers, in 
their turn, viewed interference in their affairs by politicians is comically summarised by Sir William 
Butler. In a description ofthe War Office, he says: 
. A corporal and a file of men could not move from Glasgow to Edinburgh except with the sanction and 
under the sign-manual of the headquarters in London ... The thing that soon became clear to me, 
holding even a subordinate position in that great congeries of confusion then known as the War Office, 
was the hopelessness of any attempt to simplifY or improve matters in any way. A vast wheel was 
going round, and all men, big and little, were pinned to it, each one bound to eat a certain set ration of 
paper every day of his life' (Butler 1911: 186-7 in Hammer 1970: 9). 
5. The passage is from William Windham, quo CM. Clode, The Military Forces a/the Crown 1869, 
vol. 11, p.36. 
6. The reference to 1688/9 is to the co-called Glorious Revolution. William III and Mary 11 acceded to 
the English throne. The Declaration of Rights and Bill of Rights redefined the relation between ruling 
monarchs and their subjects. As well as barring any future Catholic succession to the throne, the 
settlement abolished the royal power to suspend and dispense with laws. The Crown could no longer 
levy taxation nor raise or maintain a standing army without getting prior parliamentary approval (detail 
from encyclopedia.com). 
7. Howard adds, the liberals declared that 'professional armies, were not only politically dangerous; as 
military weapons they were unnecessary ... The Whigs had for generations belittled the standing army 
262 
and declared that the strength as well as the liberties of the nation lay in the militia, the constitutional 
force ... ' (Howard 1957: 15). 
8. Strawson gives us a more detailed exploration of origins that includes many more instances of 
similar disputes. See esp. chapt. 1 (Strawson 1989). 
9. For a more detailed exposition see W SHammer 1970. 
10. Robert Arthur Talbot Gascoyne-Cecil Salisbury, was the third Marquis of Salisbury. His entry in 
World History Reads' Leading conservative states man and three times Prime Minister of England 
between 1886 and 1902 ... he was directly descended from Elizabeth I minister, William Cecil. .. His 
foreign policy was described in 1896 as one of 'splendid isolation,' a peaceful imperialism based on 
the strength of the British Empire rather than alliances in Europe' (Guy Uden 1989: 815). 
II. Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, (1864-1922), was Chief of Imperial General Staff 1918-1922. 
12. Dongola is in the Sudan. The battle for it against the Dervishes is reported in The Tablet Sept. 26 
1896 Vol. 88 No. 2942. 
13. Lansdowne was Secretary for War, 1895-1900; and Foreign Secretary, 1900-1905. See Lord 
Newton, Lord Lansdowne: a biography, London 1929. 
14. Salisbury was even clearer about the question of civil/military authority in his remarks in a debate 
in the House of Lords in March 1901. He said, 'in speech after speech from military men, men who 
know the language and spirit ofthe war office, it is easy to detect a desire that military problems shall 
only be solved by military men; but any attempt to take the opinion of the expert above the opinion of 
the politician must, in view of all the circumstances of our constitution, inevitably fail' (in Hammer 
1970: 185). 
15. Earl Haig famously echoes this sentiment. He says, 'It is a good thing to see the inside the War 
Office for a short time since it prevents one from having any respect for an official letter, but it is a bad 
thing to remain there' (Earl Haig in Hammer 1970: 1). 
16. For recent work looking at the East India Co. see Anthony Wild, The East India Company: Trade 
and Conquest from 1600, Harper Collins, London 1999; Philip Lawson, The East India Company, 
Longman, London 1993. 
17. In its thirty-nine articles, the charter enshrined a right to trade. Such a right, Keay tells us, attempts 
to unsettle prior claims made by Spain and Portugal. Thus, 'Madrid's claim to the treasures of the 
Americas and Lisbon's to the trade of the Indies, for each of which Papal authority was .. .invoked, 
were seen as "insolencyes." , Apparently God had shifted his allegiance. Now, Keay adds, 
, ... according to the text of Queen Elizabeth's standard letter of introduction to eastern princes, 
God ... in his infinite and unsearchable wisdom ... had so ordained matters that no nation was self-
sufficient and that "out of the abundance of fruit which some region[ s] enjoyeth, the necessitie or 
wante of others should be supplied ... Thus "severall and far remote countries" should ... "traffique" with 
one another and "by their interchange of commodities" should become friends' (in Keay 1991: 9-10). 
For the full text ofthe charter see India Office collections at the British library - Ref. No. IORNEG 
10872. 
18. At this stage in their adventures both the English and French were regarded as mere suppliants, 'to 
the powerful princes who were nominally Viceroys or Governors on behalf of the Mughal Emperor in 
Delhi' (Mason 1974: 17). 
19. John Company is an early term used to describe the East Indian Trading Company. See Carey 
1907. 
20. In the pages of SAHP, they tell us that in '1616, Sir Thomas Roe, an envoy of the East India 
Company had declared to the Mughals that war and trade were incompatible' (see From Trade to 
Colonisation, http://members.tripod.com/~INDIA RESOURCEieastindia.html). Yet, as my use of his 
words from Mason earlier tell us, Roe also made what Mason calls, 'some far-sighted remarks, arguing 
that "our only dependence is upon the same ground that we began and by which we subsist, fear" , 
(Mason 1985: 8). 
21. The SAHP list how numerous factors combined to ensure the Company's flying start in trade; it 
did after all have a monopoly status in England; its ships were amongst the largest among other trading 
companies; and they bought their goods at source, eliminating agents fees. Even in relatively lean 
times, and borrowing from Veronica Murphy's 'Europeans and the Textile Trade,' the SAHP remind 
us that they supplemented their income from the slave trade - 'The Atlantic slave trade was .. a vital 
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contributor to the financial strength of the East Indian Trading Companies' (From Trade to 
Colonisation, SAHP 2001). 
22. Keay tells us how one historian put the Company's and Aurangzeb's relationship - 'to Aurangzeb 
the Company was still a mere flea on the back of his imperial elephant' (Keay 1991: 146). 
23. The terms Aurangzeb demanded from the Company were often exacting. Any trading activity not 
approved of, or conducted in such a way that it would fall outside ofthe parameters defined by him, 
would incur hefty fines. Keay recounts an instance of piracy, when two of Auragzeb's ships were 
sacked. They were laden with treasure and pilgrims. Auragzeb subsequently' ... demanded both 
compensation and a written agreement making the Europeans in future responsible for all acts of 
piracy' (Keay 1991; 188). The Company official involved in these negotiations, one Samuel Annesley, 
Chief Factor, wanted time to clear the terms with London. Yet, they were Keay tells us, presented with 
a stark choice: expUlsion or execution. Trade of course was at a standstill while the matter was 
resolved. In the end Annesley ' ... was forced to capitulate and immediately afterwards ... dismissed from 
the Company's service' (Keay 1991: 188). 
24. The military resources for such an endeavour came from a variety of sources. In fact at this stage it 
is hard to talk of an Indian Army. Mason tells us how from the very earliest times the Company would 
employ locals to watch over their factories. They did not constitute an army, but rather were more akin 
to ' ... bands of swashbucklers, ... hired ... through some acknowledged leader of their own' (Mason 
1974: 20). The first soldiers, that is 'men recruited direct, trained and sworn in, with known obligations 
and fixed pay, organised in companies with officers and non-commissioned officers,' generally came 
from the localities in which the Company had those factories (Mason 1974: 20-21). So, there were at 
least three separate armies, corresponding roughly to the areas at which the Company had been allowed 
to establish trading stations, the first such body being in Madras. 
25. There are many instances throughout the history of Britain's imperial adventures that smell of this 
closeness. On the opium wars for instance see Arthur Waley, The Opium Wars Through Chinese Eyes, 
Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1958; P W Fay, The Opium War 1840-1842, University of North 
Carolina Press, Carolina, 1975; and see http://www.wsu.edu/~dee/CHING/OPIUM.HTM; On arms see 
also Goodenhough and Dalton's, Army Bookfor the British Empire 1893; Holden Furber, Rival 
Empires of Trade in the Orient 1600-1800, University of Minnesota Press, 1976. 
26. My emphasis. SAHP add some observations about French imperial designs. In their view, the 
French Dupleix advocated protection of their trade by similar means. The other imperial powers they 
point to as going along with these sentiments are the Netherlands. According to them, as early as 1614, 
'the Dutch Jan Pieterzoon Coen, had written to his directors: "Trade in India must be conducted and 
maintained under the protection and favour of your weapons, and the weapons must be supplied from 
the profits enjoyed by the trade, so that trade cannot be maintained without war or war without trade" , 
(From Trade to Colonisation, SAHP 2001). 
27. Described by an unknown author as a 'tempestuous ... overbearing autocrat.. .. used to getting what 
he wanted by bribery, intrigue and sheer force of character. .. a man who did nothing by halves ... ' 
(Mason 1985: 17). We learn from his entry in the on line 1911 edition ofthe Encyclopaedia Britannica 
that he is one ofthe first to advocate a change in the Company's practice from unarmed to armed 
traffic, in explicit renunciation of the practice of quiet trade associated with Sir Tomas Roe. See 
http://98.1911encycJopedia.orfiCICH/Child SIR JOSIAH.htm 
28. See Meadows Taylor 1904: 392. 
29. In 1685 Child explicitly spelled out the consequences of a new doctrine. This would be the 
doctrine of sovereignty (Mason 1985: 19). According to Keay, after' James II had issued the Company 
with a new charter which ... inured it to any ... challenge from within and empowered it to meet any 
assault from without,' Child, ' ... began to sound like a bullish imperialist.' Tired of 'Moghal exactions' 
and other challenges to the Company's trading monopolies, he advised Surat's factors, 
~If any natives fall upon you ... we would have you take the first and best opportunity you can to right 
us and yourselves without expecting further orders from England, for we are now in such a posture in 
India that we need not sneak or put up [with] palpable injury from any nation whatsoever' (in Keay 
1991: 177). 
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30 In his unpublished paper, Rai characterises 1756: the Black Hole of Calcutta, as an event caught in 
a complex web of discourses, superbly. According to him, 
'although the story circulates within the vague fantasies of our collective post-colonial imaginary, at 
the time perhaps nothing in the history of European expansion excited so much horror and righteous 
indignation among British citizens than the events associated with the Black Hole ofCa1cutta ... ' With 
123 Europeans dying, ' ... it served something of a primal scene for a burgeoning colonial imaginary. 
That event was, furthem1ore, part of what is no doubt the most significant reversal of fortunes in the 
history of the British Colonisation of South Asia' (Rai 2002: pp4-5). 
31. Rai borrows a sentiment from Hill. Hill says 'up to the outbreak of the war the servants ofthe 
Company had been satisfied to pose as foreign traders, practically unarmed, and not presuming in 
Bengal-what ever they had done in southern India-to take any active share in the political arrangements 
of the country' (Hill 1902: 1, in Rai unpublished 2002: 4). The term quiet trade (see ante) is borrowed 
from Sir Thomas Roe. He was nothing if not a pragmatist. To repeat and expand, he said -' ... ifyou 
will profit, seek it at sea and in a quiet trade; for without controversy it is an error to effect garrisons 
and land wars in India' (Roe 1620 in Keay 1991: 141). 
32. Like the haze under which Sirag-ud-daullah youth is discussed there are different versions about 
the transfer of power to him. Keay says' ... after the usual bloodbath Siraj succeeded to the Nawabship 
in April 1756' (Keay 1991: 300); Mason, with whom Mill would agree, says he took his 'seat on the 
throne with no need to fight an exhausting civil war' (Mason 1985: 32); (Mill 1817 vol. II: 224). 
33. Rai tells us how in all the histories he has consulted the Nawab's age varies. A flavour of such 
variety can be gleamed even from my limited sources. So Keay merely describes him as a 'young and 
beautiful reprobate'; Mason describes him as an 'unfortunate young man'; Macaulay describes him as 
a 'youth under twenty years of age.' H H Dodwell, Rai tells us, describes him as being '23 at the time 
of his accession' (Keay 1991: 300; Macaulay 1891: 35; Rai 2002: 8 n. 14). 
34. That didn't amount to very much, as Mason tells us. Sirag 'saw no reason why these aliens should 
live on any different terms from the rest of his subjects ... they were merchants and money lenders, no 
more, and ought to be subject to a capital levy whenever it suited their sovereign' (Mason 1985: 32). 
35. Rai usefully alerts us to a neat summary of Sirag's complaints about the company set out in a letter 
to his Armenian negotiator. In it Siraj says, 
'I have three substantial motives for extirpating the English out of my country: one that they have built 
strong fortifications and dug a large ditch in the King's dominions contrary to the established laws of 
the country; the second is that they have abused the privileges of their dastaks by granting them to such 
as were in no ways entitled to them, from which practice the king has suffered greatly in the revenue of 
his customs; the third motive is that they give protection to such of the king's subjects as have by their 
behaviour in the employs they were entrusted with made themselves liable to be called to an account' 
(in Rai 2002: 8). 
36. Rai calls him John Z. Howell. In Macaulay he is merely Mr. Howell. 1 assume this is the same man 
(Rai 2002: 8; Macaulay 1891 Vol. III: 36). 
37. Macaulay describes the scene with suitable dramatic verve, perhaps even license and awesome 
disbelief (see ante). Perhaps it is the scenes as recounted in these senses that would drive Clive to 
Calcutta. Thus, 
'Nothing in the history or fiction ... approaches the horrors which were recounted by the few survivors 
of that night. They cried for mercy. They strove to burst the door. Howell who, even in that extremity 
retained some presence of mind, offered large bribes to the gaolers. But the answer was that nothing 
could be done without the Nawab's orders, that the Nawab was asleep, and that he would be angry if 
anybody woke him ... The prisoners went mad with despair. They trampled each other down, fought for 
the places at the window, fought for the pittance of water with which the cruel mercy ofthe murderers 
mocked their agonies, raved, prayed, blasphemed, implored the guards to fire among them. The 
gaolers ... shouted with laughter at the frantic struggles of their victims. At length the tumult died 
away ... Day broke. The Nawab had slept off his debauch, and permitted the door to be opened ... It was 
some time before the soldiers could make a lane for the survivors, by piling up on each side the heaps 
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of corpses on which the burning climate had already begun to do its loath some work. When at length a 
passage was made, twenty three ghastly figures, such as their own mothers would not have known, 
staggered one by one out ofthe charnel-house. A pit was instantly dug. The dead bodies, a hundred and 
twenty three in number, were flung into it promiscuously, and covered up' (Macaulay 1891: 38). 
I pass over issues about the veracity ofthese events as narrated by Howell in particular. Rai does a 
brilliant job in alerting us to the complexities in the various narratives ofthe Black Hole incident. He 
reminds us of J H Little's two articles published in 1915-16. There he calls' the Black Hole incident a 
"gigantic hoax," citing inconsistencies in contemporary records, contradictions in Howell's different 
accounts, as well as the absence of the story in his official dispatches and in important contemporary 
histories written in Persian' (Rai 2002: 19). 
38. The sentiment is from Charles Hill, Last of the Europeans and Others in the English Factories in 
Bengal at the time of the Siege of Calcutta in the year 1756; with an appendix containing lists of 
European sufferers, Calcutta 1902, pl. 
39. Of course, as Sharpe elaborates, this 'human-making project ... is inseparable from the profit 
making enterprise of creating new markets for English manufactures.' She adds, 'the appeal that 
modern colonialism had for Europeans was that they could benefit both monetarily in producing a need 
for western goods and spiritually in generating a desire for good government, wealth and knowledge' 
(Sharpe 1993: 7-8). She includes comments by Brison Davis who describes the process to come thus: 
'For the first time in history, the more enlightened nations were beginning to understand that morality, 
self-interest, and human progress were mutually interdependent and were to be achieved by the same 
means' (in Sharpe 1993: 8); (Davies 1980). 
40. There are many that refer to these events in a different way. Without even a mention or use of the 
term mutiny, Wolpert for instance prefers' Anglo-Indian War of 1857-1858 (see Wolpert 2000: 230, 
238,241) 
41. Strawson doesn't give us a full source for this reference, save a brief bibliographical note that 
reads, 'Morris, James/Jan, Pax Britannica Trilogy, Faber' (Strawson 1989: 285). 
42. I borrow the term Militocracy from Douglas Peers 1995. 
43. Clive spent a number of different periods in Bengal (See Mason 1985: 37; Mill 1821 Chapt12; and 
Macaulay 1891 Chapt I). 
44. Mill suggests that the moneys and treasures of Sirag-ud-daullah were insufficient to satisfy the 
demand made by the English (Mill 1821: 241). 
45. Macaulay further notes that the 'treasury of Bengal was thrown open to him ... He walked between 
heaps of gold and silver, crowned with rubies and diamonds, and was at liberty to help himself 
(Macaulay 1891: 54/55). 
46. He would be the subject of censure for receiving the many gifts from Meer Jaffer by Parliament at 
a later date. See Macaulay 1891, pp 1-98. 
47. Amongst the many hagiographic descriptions applied to Clive and his deeds Mason's work 
includes the following: 'Brilliant in sudden danger & adversity, profuse, moody, recklessly generous, 
unable to endure himself or subsist in idleness . .' (Mason 1985: 26). 
48 In Sara Suleri 1992: 83. 
49. My emphasis. 
50. Mason lists the military engagements as the wars against Hydar Ali and his son Tippo Sahib; the 
wars against the Marathas; the Pindarry wars; and the two hard fought wars against the Sikhs. See post. 
Of course the impediments to colonial consolidation were not just external ones ofthis type. Other 
external impediments consisted in the different spiritual traditions, Sufism especially; tribal resistances 
catalogued by Ranajit Guha in his classic work, Elementwy Aspects of Peasant insurgency in Colonial 
India 1983; and resistance by the indigenous economic and political classes. We must not neglect 
internal impediments either, stemming from conflicts within and between the different factions within 
the Company's structures, particularly fiscal conservatives (Mason 1985: chapt. 7). 
51. The Duke of Wellington's elder brother, he Lived from 1769-1842. He succeeded Cornwallis as 
Governor-General of Bengal, 1797-1805. See Sir Leslie Stephen and Sir Sidney Lee (eds.) 1917173. 
52. In their entry in the Dictionary of National Biography above, Stephen and Lee suggest that 'the 
most brilliant part of Wellesley's career was unquestionably his government of India' (1917173: 1134). 
They regard him as ' ... one ofthe three men who consolidated the empire of which Clive laid the 
foundation,' the others they mention are Hastings and Dalhousie (Stephen and Lee 1919173: 1134). 
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53 The full citation from Peers reads, ' Francis Rawdon Hastings, Marquess of Hastngs, The Private 
Journal ofthe Marquess of Hastings, 2nd ed. London: Saunders and Otley, 1858, II, 113-114. 
54. He is quoting Walter Hamilton, A Geographical, Statistical and Historical Description of 
Hindostan and the Acijacent Countries, London, John Murray, 1820, I, xxxix). 
55. One of the more difficult to resolve were the Mysore wars, 1767-1799, where after victory he 
handed nominal control of Mysore over to a boy of seven; the Marahthan wars, 1775-1817; Others 
include his actions against the Nizam of Hyderabad, where he forced the Nizam to disband his forces. 
The Nizam, fearing the rising powers around him, had to yield to an alliance with the British; he also 
forced the annexation of the whole of the Carnatic; the Nawab ofOudh was compelled to cede 
administration, civil and military, to the Company (see generally Mason 1974). 
56. This quote Mason tells us is from J H Stocqueler, The Old Field Officer, or The Military 
Adventures of Major Worthington, Edinburgh 1853. In 1899 Henry Labouchere would lampoon these 
versions ofthe imperial project. Militocracy for Labouchere is intimately associated with the 'power of 
automatic weapons.' As we see in Chap. 3, Kipling gave us the White Man's Burden', a reading of his 
imperial project as self-sacrifice on behalf of 'new-caught, sullen peoples I Half devils and half child.' 
Labouchere gives us the 'Brown Man's Burden,' a rather different reading of that project. Titled 'An 
address to the United States by a Jingo Stripling' mockingly he concludes 
, 'Copyright' - All rights (of white men) reserved. No red, black, yellow or brown man's rights need to 
be regarded, as they haven't got any ... ' (Truth Feb. 9 1899: 331) 
See also 'The Brown Man's Burden,' reprinted in 
http://www.boondocksnet.com/ailkipiing/iabouche.htmiin Jim Zwick, ed., Anti-Imperialism in the 
United States, 1898-1935. http://www.boondocksnet.com/ai/ (June 23, 2002). 
57. However, their objections didn't stop it becoming a reality, some years later with the opening of 
the East India College in 1806 at Hertford, which then moved to Haileybury in 1809. 
58. Mason reminds us how before the so-called mutiny' ... there was not much feeling between 
Haileybury ... (the company's training college for civil servants) ... and Addiscombe ... (the company's 
training college for a small number of engineer and gunner cadets) ... since ... there was too much to 
do ... ' (Mason 1985: 148). Both the military in its guises as a mercenary army and the bureaucracy that 
developed around it to administer its newly won possessions, are implicated in pursuit of what Kipling 
later came to describe as the 'Great Game.' There are many so-called servants of empire at these early 
stages whose carers fit this model. The careers for instance of the Lawrence brothers as both Company 
soldiers' and administrators are exemplary in this regard, but not unusual. 
Mason neatly summarises the co-correspondence as it were of military and administrative 
competencies. The rapid expansion of the empire from about 1800 meant the army often being called 
to aid the so-called civil administration. Hence as 
' ... more and more districts came under direct British rule ... there was nothing like enough 
convenantated civilians - that is members of the Honourable East India Trading Company's Civil 
Service, the parent of the Indian Civil Service ... There was besides a feeling that in the first years after 
annexation, there might be work for which the soldier was better suited. There were also states where a 
British representative was needed, not only the great ambassadorial posts with the principal states, but 
lesser ones' (Mason 1974: 177). 
More than merely being auxiliaries, fulfilling an added value administrative role, military men became 
crucial in the work ofthe Company. In a rather romantic mode Mason lists some of those men who are 
crucial instances in this sense. He adds, 
' ... Meadows Taylor, for example, after very few years of military service went to such a post for the 
best part of his time. Sir Thomas Munro ... eventually Governor of Madras, left his regiment for civil 
employ before he was thirty; Sir John Malcolm ... was another who spent his whole life in civil posts, 
ending as Governor of Bombay; the list could go on for pages. In addition there were what we should 
now regard as legitimate staff appointments - quartermasters and adjutants to generals commanding 
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brigades and divisions. Men for all these posts were 'on the staff and stayed in their regimental lists' 
(Mason 1974: 177). 
59. The quote is from Brian Simon, Studies in the HistOlY of Education 1780-1870, London 1960, 118-
119. 
60. From W H G Armytage, 'Battle for the Best', in Paul Nash (ed.) History & Education, New York 
1970,287. 
61 Viscount Edward Cardwell 1813-1886. 
62. Trevor Hearl (1976) is good on this, as is Brian Bond (1972). 
63. Perhaps the significance of change is signalled specifically by a growing distrust in the so-called 
Sepoy. Hence, Wolpert says: 
'The ratio ofIndian to British troops was reduced to between two and three to one, total manpower in 
1863 being 140,000 Indian to 65,000 British soldiers. The British were moreover given exclusive 
control over artillery and other "scientific branches" of the service, so that in the event of any threat of 
mutiny, they could immediately use such weapons to overpower it. .. ' (Wolpert 2000: 241). 
64. Colvin adds: 'It is certain that report of "clanging fights and flaming towns, and sinking ships, and 
praying hands," came up to the Himalayan stations like the hot blast ... The massacre at Cawnpore, the 
defence of the residency at Lucknow, the siege of Delhi, the deeds of Nicholson, Hodson, and other 
heroes of that ferocious struggle, must have furnished nursery tales for the Dyer children' (Colvin 
1924: 4). 
65. This and the above commentary are the result of personal enquiry ofthe senior librarian at the 
Central Library, Royal Military Academy, and Sandhurst early 2002. 
0('. This is from the title of a note/letter to the Times titled 'Camberley 1896: A Staff College Batch' 
signed 'Archimedes' (II January 1921). 
67. p.s.c. literally, 'passed staff college'; or simply graduate of the staff college, Camberley. 
68. The Pseudonym Bond tells us was Brig.-Gen. Sir James Edmonds' nickname (see Bond 1972: 
159). 
69. The roll of honour includes many well-known, decorated soldiers. They are too numerous to list 
here. Perhaps we can gain a flavour of those included in what Colvin calls a 'year of extraordinary 
brilliance,' ifI mention just a couple. Included among their number are Earl Haig; Viscount Allenby; 
and Brigadier-General Findlay. Dyer however much some following the Jallianwala Bagh shootings 
depict him as being beyond the pale, was very much of the military establishment. See n. 66 above. 
70 It comes from Col. G. F. R. Henderson 1910: 403-3. 
71. Strawson reminds us that being a soldier, 
'during the latter part of Queen Victoria's reign, or any part of it for that matter, was to be more or less 
continually on active service ... she herself.. made it plain that if the British were to maintain their 
position as a first rate power, it would be necessary to be prepared for attacks and wars, somewhere or 
other all the time ... ' (Strawson 1989: xi). 
72 My italics. 
73 I borrow this phrase from Kipling's poem of the same name. 
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CHAPTER 5 - THE GOVERNMENT COMPLEX 
! 
Introduction 
In Chapter 4 my story of the composition of Amritsar in terms of the make-up of 
ruling subjects centred on the figure of a military man - Brigadier-General Reginald 
Dyer. As we saw in one sense his practice as such an officer exemplifies another 
version of our administrative man - Sir Michael O'Dwyer; in another his practice 
signifies a specific ruling tradition I characterise as 'armed order.' In this chapter I 
turn to a specific consideration of the figure of a man, an Anglo-Jewish man, in 
government - Edwin Samuel Montagu, Secretary of State for India, (1917-1922). My 
major resources for the readings I propose are S D Waley's biography, and Naomi 
Levine's tale oflove (Waley 1964; Levine 1991). 
I consider how the spirit Montagu cultivates, complicates the ideal practices of 
colonial authority represented by the O'Dwyers and Dyers. I read his journeys to 
India and his contribution to the MontaguiChelmsford reform process as substantial 
engagements with these problems. He struggles to define a different, perhaps new, 
make-up of governor whose style of colonial rule and domination in India at the time 
lays a much greater stress on co-operation, thus founding a claim for British prestige 
on official competence, not competent fist-force.! 
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Though Montagu is a figure who is very much in the imperial establishment at the 
time, he is also a figure - and his J ewishness perhaps being crucial in this - marginal 
to it. I argue that such a position makes him both an ardent critic of the ingenious 
autocracies implied in an ethics that stood its ground on forceful and dutiful (fatherly) 
impulses; and one who engages in the production of a sympathetic tryst, however 
limited, with so-called native demands for self-government. 2 So, in looking at 
Montagu I engage in a double movement. I catalogue his personnel battles to be both 
in and of the imperial centre, and his battles for another sty Ie of rule in India. In 
Montagu we see a figure that begins a journey to step out of, and not be imprisoned 
by, accepted forms and manners. Thus in Montagu's words and actions we see a 
profound attempt to move imperial administration and rule away from muscular duty 
as played out by the figures of 0 'Dwyer and Dyer. 
Orthodox Judaism - Stories from the Margins 
(a) An established circle 
Born in 1879, Edwin Samuel Montagu came of a long established Jewish family that 
could plot its movement to England in the middle of the eighteenth century from 
North Germany. They settled in Liverpool and Waley tells us, the Samuel family as 
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they chose at that time to be known, 'gave many leaders to Liverpool Jewry' (Waley 
1964: 3). The family adopted the name Montagu in 1842. This change was formalised 
'when Sir Samuel Montagu became a baronet in 1894 ... ' (Waley 1964: 3).3 
All the above and his 'numerous philanthropic activities made Samuel Montagu one 
of the leading figures in Anglo-Jewry' (Waley 1964: 4). Yet, Waley argues, amongst 
all he had going for him, there is a surprising flaw in his character. Thus, 'though a 
Liberal in politics he was intensely bigoted in his conservatism as a rigidly orthodox 
Jew' (Waley 1964: 4). This attachment, and its consequent battles, was to mark 
Edwin, his son, for the rest of his life (Waley 1964). 
(b) Sustained ambivalence 
To give us a flavour of what is at stake in the way that Edwin Montagu casts himself, 
we can glimpse elements of the complexities in the character Montagu plays by 
reference to Sir L E Jones. Jones gives us a vivid description of a young Montagu, 
when an undergraduate at Trinity College Cambridge. In Jones' book, An Edwardian 
youth, he says of the young Montagu: 
'A deep ... impression was made on me by another guest in these rooms - an 
undergraduate who struck me as unbelievably mature, almost world-weary. His long, 
ugly bony face was pockmarked like a photograph of the moon, but his eyes held 
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me: sombre, patient, unhappy eyes of extraordinary intelligence. He held the talk: he 
was sophisticated and mocking, and more amusing I thought, than anyone I had met' 
(emphasis mine. In Waley 1964: 7). 4 
Montagu's propensity for independent thought and action is a reputation he cultivated 
throughout his life. We see an early and continuous echo of that in his battles with his 
father against what Waley calls a 'rigid ceremonialism' of Jewish laws. 5 According to 
Waley, Montagu's father objected to his son turning as he saw it, away from Judaism, 
to a kind of agnosticism. He saw his son's battles with him as a rejection of many of 
the strict practices associated with Orthodox Judaism. He reasoned, if Edwin 
continued in his manner, he would through those actions, humiliate him and the faith 
he proclaimed. In an attempt to reassure his father, Montagu wrote to him that he 
acted as he did from a profound sense of duty (Waley 1964: 7): 
'Religion concerns only the individual and can be no man else's concern. By race I 
am an Englishman and my interests are mainly in England, but I will never forget that 
I am a Jew and the son of a Jew and I will always be a good 'Jew' according to my 
lights, my definition of a good Jew differs from yours. It is an awful thing to lose a 
father's love, as I fear I'm doing now and how I shall live without it I cannot think. 
But I must not and will not consider the temporal advantages ..... However much it 
grieves me or my relations I must try and be true and honest. .... It grieves me terribly 
to write like this to a father who does so much for me, but I can't help it. Try to 
forgive me.l must do my duty' (emphasis mine. In Waley 1964: 8).6 
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Of course such a letter did not reassure his farther. The personnel rancour between 
father and son over religion, rumbled on for many years; the pain associated with 
such discord for even longer (Waley 1964: 8). 
During his father's life Montagu ensured as far as possible that he met his father's 
wishes regarding religious ceremonies. In 1901 for instance, he went, when at home, 
to the 'Synagogue on the days of the main festivals, New Year and the day of 
Atonement in the autumn and Passover in the spring' (Waley 1964: 8). Even after his 
father's death on 12 January 1911, at the age of seventy-nine, Montagu continued to 
be made unhappy at having to break his schedules, as he saw it to appease his father's 
memory. According to Waley, ' ... every autumn and every spring when Montagu was 
able to snatch a few days' holiday in the country ... he would be made unhappy by 
reluctantly breaking his holiday or by facing a major row if he did not do so' (Waley 
1964: 8). 
These early battles with his father and his memory over his relation to his Jewishness 
were by no means benign.7 His father at one time, according to Waley, even believed 
that, 'Edwin, not having a Jewish name or Jewish appearance ... tries ... to conceal his 
Jewish race' (Waley 1964: 7). The result of doing so his father thought, would be to 
ensure that Edwin's friends 'would despise him' (Waley 1964: 7). At times he 
regretted 'allowing his son to study science and go to Cambridge' (Waley 1964: 7. He 
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feared humiliation if Edwin ceased to practice Orthodox Judaism (Waley 1964: 7). He 
pondered like a tired patriarch, how he could ever bring him into line? Perhaps he 
never would. Maybe worse, certainly in his terms, was yet to come. Even after his 
death his hand reached out beyond the grave. He left Edwin a substantial inheritance 
of over a £ 1 million. Yet it was only a life interest. The income from such an interest 
was be only payable so long as his son 'should profess the Jewish religion' (Waley 
1964: 47). His will declared that' ... no child of his should at any time or under any 
circumstances abandon the Jewish religion or intermarry with a person not of the 
Jewish religion' (Waley 1964: 47). A wish Edwin negotiated with a heavy heart, and 
ultimately failed to fulfiL 8 
Journeys into Indian Government 
Montagu's flirtations with India and things Indian were to be more than just that. 
Some dismissed them as mere Oriental fascinations. Montagu was often spoken 
about, as an Oriental so why shouldn't he be so fascinated. 9 Keynes captures their 
complex character in his observations, which he wrote as an obituary. They give us a 
glimpse of how such complex entanglements impact on the figure that Montagu is 
and aspires to be in government. Hence: 
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'[Montagu] was one of those who suffer violent fluctuations of mood, quickly 
passing from reckless courage and self-assertion to abject panic and dejection -
always dramatising life and his part in it, and seeing himself and his own instincts 
either in the most favourite or in the most unfavourable light, but seldom with a calm 
and steady view. Thus it was easy for the spiteful to convict him from his own mouth, 
and to belittle his name by remembering him only when his face was turned towards 
the earth. At one moment he could be emperor of the East, riding upon a elephant, 
clothed in rhetoric and glory, but at the next a beggar in the dust of the road, crying 
for alms, but murmuring under his breath cynical and outrageous with which pricked 
into dustier dust the rhetoric and the glory. 
That he was an Oriental equipped, nevertheless, with the intellectual technique and 
atmosphere of the West, drew him naturally to the problems of India, and allowed an 
instinctive, mutual sympathy between him and its peoples. But he was interested in 
all political problems and not least in the personal side of politics, and was most 
intensely a politician. Almost everything else bored him ... ' (in Waley 1964: 15). 
Waley summarises his recondite character beyond the merely whimsical when he says 
'It has often been said that it was Montagu's Jewish descent which made him, as an 
Oriental, fascinated by India. It would surely be better to say that it was his 
imagination which enabled him to realise the vast magnitude of India, his liberalism 
that made him the life-enemy of race-snobbery and police-state rule and his 
intellectual capacity and administrative ability which made India's problems so 
fascinating to him' (Waley 1964: 39). 
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That Montagu is trying to work out a distinctive style of colonial domination there is 
no doubt. An early trace of his open-ended commitment in the above senses, indeed a 
trace of a very specific kind, is found in a letter to his mother. In it he distinguishes 
the driving force behind his work from those behind that of Lily Montagu: 
'You say Lily was looking forward to seeing me. Poor girl, I believe she of all those 
at home believes there are possibilities about me and spares a corner from the 
marvellous work she is engaged in for me, but her life and my life are destined to 
always to be apart, for she works for sectarian purposes - 1 abominate them. She 
strengthens the barriers; 1 want to abolish them. So I cannot take an interest in her 
club (emphasis mine. In Waley 1964: 11). 
An exchange such as this, with these associations and the duties that came with them, 
as Montagu saw it, would stick with him for ill or good throughout his time at the 
heart of Government. 10 His goal so far as India is concerned, as he characterised it, is 
an Anglo-India. In this sense and in marked contrast to the administrative and military 
figures of O'Dwyer and Dyer respectively Montagu's first principle is 
accommodation. 
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(a) The first rung - PPS 
Montagu could not have hoped for a better start to his parliamentary career. In early 
1906 he was ' ... appointed Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer (Asquith) ... ' (Waley 1964: 20). He acted as Asquith's eyes and ears. Thus, 
from 1906-1910 he worked as a conduit to the leader. He warned 'of the dangers to 
the Liberal cause and .... criticised him when he felt bound to do so' (Waley 1964: 20). 
Waley characterises this as a brilliant start to Montagu's career. Perhaps one of the 
more notable elements Montagu displays for our purposes is an appreciation of one of 
the arts of government - pragmatism. Government for him is as much about the right 
arrangements, as about standing on the precipice of principle.]] In his next step on the 
ministerial ladder he would get more opportunities to fine-tune these techniques. 
(b) Under Secretary of State with his mentor 
'A new force in English Politics' 12 
His time with Asquith ended in 1910 with the call of the election. The Liberals won 
the election and returned to power. Asquith was grateful to Montagu for all his hard 
work and set out to reward his endeavours; he appointed Montagu Parliamentary 
Under Secretary of State for India in February 1910 (Levine 1991: 123); a post he 
held for four years (1910-1914). This came at a most opportune time. He spent almost 
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a year under Lord Morley the Secretary of State for India at the time. He could not 
hope for a more suitable pairing. A liberal, his appointment to the post, Levine 
argues, ' ... put an end to the habit of regarding India as a "dumping ground for 
mediocrities" and announced that India was important enough to have as its Secretary 
at Whitehall one of the leaders of Liberal England' (Levine 1991: 128).13 
Morely had already tried but failed to carry forward a reform scheme in 1908-1909, 
known as the Morely-Minto reforms. Nevertheless for Montagu it marks the 
beginnings of a growing ' ... realisation that what has been called the "brightest Jewel 
in the British Crown" is no mere ornament but an Imperial charge involving great and 
growing responsibilities' (in Levine 1991: 128).14 
As a Liberal, Morely seemed Montagu's ideal mentor. Wolpert recounts for us an 
exchange between Morely and Minto, the authors of earlier ill-fated reforms, that 
signals Morely's distaste for repressive acts carried out in the name of the Raj; a 
distaste Montagu, in his turn, would in the course of his associations with India seek 
to foster. Hence, Wolpert notes the conversation: 
'One young English "corporal" in a "fit of excitement shot the first native he met," 
Morely noted, expressing his concern over such matters to Minto and inquiring, 
"What happened to the corporal? .. Was he put on trial? Was he hanged? If we are 
not strong enough to prevent murder, then our pharisaic glorification of the stern 
justice of the British Raj us windy nonsense" , (in Wolpert 1999: 282). 
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These were the foundations on which Montagu hoped to build. 
If the number of words uttered, and schemes proposed, is a measure of tenacity, 
Montagu spent his time as Under Secretary of State in single-minded pursuit of his 
reform agenda for Indian government. Even after Morely's departure, Montagu found 
comfort in his dealings with Morely's successor, the Marquis of Crewe. Montagu 
thought the Marquis was an 'essentially conservative' man. He found out just how 
conservative in Crewe's reaction to one of his speeches. In the meantime he found 
him 'patient ... and ... courteous' (in Waley 1964: 38). 
In Montagu's first Indian Budget speech he set out the Indian scene. 'Normally a very 
humdrum affair,' given Montagu says, on days when the 'House was always empty,' 
he set out his mode of operation in relation to it (Waley 1964: 40). The government of 
India was immensely difficult and yet it presented unique opportunities to Britain. 
Thus: 
' .. .In India are associated under a single rule varieties of races far wider than can be 
found in the whole of Europe, as many different religions as Europe contains sects of 
Christianity. Stages of civilisation range from the Hindu or Mohammedan Judge on 
the bench of the High Court to the naked savage in the forest. Grafted on to this 
diverse population, numbering nearly 300 million, is a European element, 
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numerically insignificant, less than 200,000 in all, a population in no sense resident in 
the country, but of an importance in the spheres of education, commerce and 
administration wholly disproportionate to its numbers. The problem before us is to 
yoke a Government, as complex and irresponsible to the people it governs as the 
Government of India, to a democratic system in England which every year shows 
itself more determined to do its share in the Government of this great dependency' (in 
Waley 1964: 40). 
Not for the first time nor the last, Montagu's enthusiasm and advocacy for sharing the 
burden of rule with those over whom such rule is exercised, is evident here. His hopes 
for India and Indians, and his appreciation of what they, at least the so-called 
educated ones, long for, or at least should be satisfied with at this time, are even 
clearer when he confronts the growing problem of Indian unrest. Unrest at this 
moment, according to him was inevitable. He is astonished by the reactions of a 
'progressive people like the English ... (to) ... unrest.' He adds, 'we welcome it in 
Persia, commend it enthusiastically in Turkey, patronise it in China and 
Japan ... (but) ... are impatient of it in Egypt and India!' (in Waley 1964: 41). His 
colleagues he thinks should look at themselves when assessing unrest. Perhaps even 
feel a modicum of pride when its practitioners look over the ramparts. Hence he 
argues, 
' ... whatever. .. our object in touching the ancient civilisation of the Indian Empire, 
whatever. .. the reason for British occupation, it must be obvious that Eastern 
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civilisation could not be brought into contact with Western without disturbing its 
serenity, without bringing new ideas into play, without infusing new ingredients, 
without, In a word, causing unrest. .. When we undertook the Government of the 
country, when further, we deliberately embarked on a policy of educating the peoples 
on Western lines, we caused the unrest because we wished to colour Indian ideals 
with western aspirations ... ' (in Waley 1964: 41). 
The rambles of a novice these are not. Expanding on his consideration of so-called 
political unrest, later, in the same speech, he adds: 
'In so far as this political unrest is confined to pressing the Government to popularise 
the Government of the country, so far as the conditions in India will permit, I do not 
believe that anyone in this House will quarrel with it. You cannot give to the Indians 
Western education either in Europe or in India and then turn round and refuse to 
those who you have educated the right, the scope, or the opportunity to act and think 
as you have taught them to do. If you do, it seems to me that you must cause another 
kind of unrest, more dangerous than any other, amongst those bitterly dissatisfied and 
disappointed with the results of their education ... For this reason it seems to me ... that 
the condition of India at the moment is one which handled well, contains the promise 
of a complete justification of British rule, handled ill, it is bound to lead to 
chaos ... (emphasis mine. Montagu in Waley 1964: 42). 
For him any action whose result is chaos is not a proper way in which to conduct an 
empire, this empire, the British Empire. This is the spirit in which he commented, 
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during his first tour to India, on the police investigation of a bomb-throwing incident 
in Delhi. He says: 
'The police in this country are a real danger ... They were doing their best to stir up all 
the old trouble at a time when the policy of conciliation is likely to do so well, and 
there is evidence that they are being supported by that arch retrograde, 
Craddock ... He and all the police are "they all want to cut our throats" believers. 
Even if they do, what is the use of stirring them up by refusing to treat them fairly, 
and shadowing them with heavy-footed constables?' (in Waley 1964: 319). 
So another piece in Montagu's preoccupation with working out his distinctive style of 
colonial domination is placed. He has no time for Independence. Co-operation is the 
key. As he was to say on another occasion, 'an Indian India,' or an India for Indians 
does not and will not exist, but an Anglo-India does. The goal of an Anglo-Indian 
India is where he heads (in Waley 1964: 293). 
It is not long before he returns once again to his pet theme, this time in his Second 
Indian Budget speech on 26 July 1911. They are perhaps his clearest expressions yet 
among all the words he expends during his time as Under Secretary of State, of his 
proposed style of rule. After a long consideration of the political case for India he 
admonishes those who travelled no further in their dealings with India than a period 
called the 'High Noon of Empire.' 15 So, 
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'There are those who, filled with an ante-diluvian imperialism, cannot see beyond 
domination and subjection, beyond governor and governed, who hate the word 
'progress' and will accuse me of encouraging unrest. I bow in anticipation. I believe 
there is nothing dangerous in what I have said. I have pointed a long path, a path 
perhaps of centuries, for Englishmen and Indians to travel together. I ask the minority 
in India to bring along it in the widest sense, by organisation and by precept, all those 
who would be good citizens of their country ... When at intervals this well-ordered 
thought shows us that they have made social and political advance to another stage, 
and demand from us, in the name of responsibility we have accepted, that they should 
be allowed still further to share responsibility with us, I hope we shall be ready to 
answer with knowledge and with prudence. In this labour all parties and all 
interested ... may rest assured of the sympathy and assistance of government' (in 
Waley 1964: 49). 
The words he expends on this, his favourite topic, many though they already are, 
would now proliferate. Yet, it would not be long before someone would object to 
them and object to such a free expression of them. Waley relates one such instance. 
On February 28 1912 he delivered a speech to the Cambridge Liberal Club, of which 
he was president. In his comments he paid homage to the work of Lord Curzon in 
India, but asks rhetorically, 'how has he spent his time since?' He answers, 
' ... admiring what he has done, not looking and saymg, "We have done this," but 
saying, "This is my work." It is not "Hands off India" which he preaches: it is "leave 
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Curzonian India as Lord Curzon left it" ... These are not the grave and weighty 
criticisms of a statesman; they are the impetuous, angry fault findings of a man 
thinking primarily of himself" , (in Waley 1964: 51). 
The personnel rancour his words aroused lasted for years. According to Waley, it was 
a battle he would lose ten years later (Waley 1964: 51). 
Yet more trouble followed later in the year. This time his words elicited more than 
mere personal pique. The liberty he took in the above speech by quoting from a 
despatch of 25 August 1911, was interpreted by various Indian nationalists to be ' ... a 
declaration in favour of Home Rule for India ... ' (in Waley 1964: 51). The relevant 
passage reads: 
'The only possible solution ... Cto constitutional reform) ... would appear to be 
gradually to give the Provinces a larger measure of self-government until at last India 
would consist of a number of administrations, autonomous in all provincial affairs, 
with the Government of India above them all, and possessing power to interfere in 
cases of misgovernment, but ordinarily restricting its functions to matters of imperial 
concern' (in Waley 1964: 51).16 
Waley tells us how, in the House of Lords, Montagu's emphasis on these words, and 
Indian nationalist reactions to them, caused alarm in the ranks of some old 
imperialists - Lords Lansdowne and Curzon in particular. Waley continues, 
Montagu's boss, the Marquess of Crewe, had to assure the Lords that Home Rule or 
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anything akin to it was never promised (Waley 1964: 51). Montagu did however 
intend something very different to the present state of affairs. Speaking about the 
despatch very directly, he forthrightly declares that the statement, 'shows the goal, the 
aim towards which we propose to work - not immediately, not in a hurry, but 
gradually ... We cannot drift on forever without stating a policy ... ' (in Waley 1964: 
51). This for him was an opportunity. The moderates, amongst the Indians, he adds, 
' ... look to us to say what lines our future policy is to take. We have never answered 
that and we have put off answering them far too long. At last and not too soon, a 
viceroy has had the courage to state the trend of British policy in India and the lines 
on which we propose to advance' (in Waley 1964: 51/2). 
The controversy rumbled on into the House of Commons. Waley recounts how on 22 
April 1912, Conservative MP Andrew Bonar Law revived the argument. He 
recapitulated the differences in understandings of the Despatch. Montagu persisted, 
replying that as far as he was concerned there was no difference. Thus 
, ... when others were advocating their own ideals, it was not out of place to show the 
people of India that there was a direction in which the British occupation was 
tending, "some definite aim and object," and that they were in India not merely to 
administrate, but to develop India to a plan ... ' (Waley 1964: 52). 
The argument wound its way back to the House of Lords on 24 June 1912. This time 
Lord Curzon brought up the topic. He refers once again' ... to the Nationalists' 
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interpretation of the Despatch which Crewe had denied and Montagu had twice 
confirmed ... ' Waley continues, ' ... Crewe repeated his denial and stated emphatically 
that he saw no future for India on the lines of colonial self-government' (Waley 
1964: 52). 
Montagu felt the rush to clarify his sentiments as a snub. He wrote to Crewe 
expressing his profound disappointment. He says, 'I am more than unhappy ... 1 have 
always hoped that even if I did let you down you would be certain in public to come 
to my assistance. That is an incentive to do his best which any member of the 
Government however subordinate must feel.' In another letter four days later he adds, 
'I hate to be acclaimed ... a friend of the extremists or to be told I've been overruled' 
(in Waley 1964: 52/3). 
Crewe brought an end to the debate. In fact he brought an end to any debate, when he 
too denied any difference in view between himself, Montagu or the Government of 
India. It's just that his policy was the policy of them all. According to him all parties 
apparently were convinced of 
' ... the supremacy of British rule in India, because maintenance of British rule was 
the best method of securing the happiness of the people of India ... Was it conceivable 
that at any time the Indian Empire could succeed on the lines, say, of Australia or 
New Zealand?' (in Waley 1964: 53). 
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This early spat didn't deter Montagu from pursuing his particular goals. He would 
continue to espouse his views and distil his brand of rule. After his third budget 
speech in which he drew attention to the changing character of the Indian population, 
he sought and obtained Lord Crewe's permission to visit India for six months from 
October 1912 to March 1913. Crewe assented and Montagu would hasten there with 
unbounded enthusiasm. 
(i) Montagu's first visit to India - October 1912-March 1913 
'The infection of this country has become so acute I doubt I shall ever get over it' 
(Montagu 1912).17 
I will not describe his travels during this visit in detail, but pick out a few instances in 
his encounters that exemplify his creed. Whether he envisaged he would get a more 
favourable reception, for his tenet of co-operation in the governing of India when in 
India, is unclear. Of course he hoped those in the front line battling the new 
complexities in the problems of governing India would welcome and be interested in 
his input. As he hoped would those governed. He did not spend time agonising over 
such questions, but rather continued headlong with articulating his creed in the most 
forthright terms. We know this because Montagu kept a full diary of all his travels. 
They are not the recounting of a tourist. To be sure he did his fair share of 
sightseeing. Waley constructs him as an ' ... indefatigable sightseer ... ' who would 
constantly ask questions. By the end he managed to accumulate a wide store of 
information (Waley 1964: 291). 
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Yet, his writings are also 'vivid character studies ... and assessments ... of all the men 
he met,' and their conduct in the affairs of Indian government (Waley 1967: 291). 
Such assessments formed crucial material in his calls for new co-operative styles of 
rule. Generally he notes how members of the Indian Civil Service, though 
, ... devotedly interested in their files ... ' had 'surprisingly little interest in the people 
ofIndia' (Waley 1964: 292). Not only he says, did they have little interest of this sort, 
but also perhaps even more frightful he thinks, were appalled at the ' ... prospect of 
changed relations to the natives' that any widening of recruitment to the service 
would involve (Waley 1964: 292). He in his tum is aghast at their state of being in 
relation to such a prospect. They are he feels quite conventional in this regard. None 
of them, he thinks can break down conventions in recruitment. Any movement, to 
borrow a phrase, 'beyond the pale,' in recruitment would they believe inevitably 
entail a lowering of the prestige in which the Civil Service is regarded. 18 He 
concludes his rather terse views of the Indian Civil Service with a neat summary of 
their vast opportunities but limited imaginations: 
'Up to the present I do not see anything very alarming with regard to the rift between 
the r.C.S and the people; but what I do think I see is, that the r.C.S. men ignore the 
existence of people and pursue a machine-made path. Is it not true to say, that with 
every new educated man you produce, the cry that good government is no substitute 
for self-government - corruption notwithstanding - gains force? The question 
remains - what does 'self mean? We ought to make it our business to see that it 
means India and English together' (in Waley 1964: 292). 19 
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Montagu thought these fears misguided. As we see above, an India for Indians is not 
where Montagu wants to lead them. As Waley summarises it, though in this instance 
Montagu is ' ... most anxious that more Indians should be recruited to the Indian Civil 
Service he regarded "India for the Indians" as an almost infinitely distant ideal' 
(Waley 1964: 292). 
(ii) Bombay 
While he went about his journeys he would encounter many he would be critical of 
and occasionally others he would regard as fellow travellers. Perhaps in a general 
sense the members of the Indian Civil Service he meets are peculiarly sensitive about 
any proposed changes in Indian government. However, according to Waley, the 
impression he gets from administrators he meets when in Bombay is different. 
Perhaps in this instance they are more to his liking. As Waley puts it, his impression 
of Bombay 'was one of belief in British rule and pride in our administrators' (Waley 
1964: 296). The administrators in Bombay Montagu feels are 
' ... doggedly doing their jobs, interested in their departments more than in speculation 
of government problems, doing their daily work without hypotheses, working on no 
principle; but so official, so keen, not on the country, on their work' (in Waley 1964: 
296). 
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This arrangement suits Montagu, and he hints neatly perhaps at the driving force 
behind such efficiencies - an ideal separation between administration (the job) and 
politics (government). 
(iii) Simla 
By the time Montagu gets to Simla he is convinced that Bombay isn't an isolated 
instance of good government in the above sense, even in spite of its imperfections. He 
is impressed he says 'with the patriotism and devotion to efficiency of the Indian 
civilian and soldier' (in Waley 1964: 301). Yet, whilst here he is struck by an episode 
of race snobbery.2o On this he chose not to enlarge. 
Montagu did not hold back though when, Waley tells us, he bemoaned the growth in 
luxury among the governing class. All this Montagu adds, ' ... when the very 
pOOL .. are beginning to think ... '(in Waley 1964: 301). He's afraid that circumstances 
such as these will not change 'until someone who does not worship conventionality is 
Viceroy with a good Secretary of State' (in Waley 1964: 301). One who did not feel 
constrained by convention. 
Of course changes in such opulent lifestyles, as this will not come quickly; especially 
he thinks, as any Viceroyalty that embarks on a project to rein in such lifestyles is 
sure to encounter hostility. Nevertheless he is convinced that 'it should be done' 
290 
(Waley 1964: 301). He sets out an extraordinary personal manifesto. He volunteers, 'I 
think I could do it,' and adds, 'if I felt weak I would give the money I saved to 
charity ... ' Action like this he reasons, 'would help to stop the growth of luxury which 
Indian agitation is ... watching. People should lead simple working lives at Simla. It 
should be like a Cabinet Minister's weekend, not like Oyster Bay' (Waley 1964: 301). 
(iv) Peshawar 
Even when he gets to the bete noire of British rule, Peshawar, the Punjab border town 
in the new British manufacture called the North West Frontier Province, he finds an 
interesting version of co-operation. Ross-Keppel,21 the Chief Commissioner reveals a 
piquant style of management. Killing it seems, is that vigorous form of co-operation. 
Thus, 'despite raids and the necessity of shooting one another, English and Afridis are 
on most excellent terms ... ' (Waley 1964: 301). Of course these inhabitants of the 
frontier were immensely useful to the British Raj. Montagu refers to them thus: 
' ... nothing in the history of the world is probably so remarkable as keeping a country 
in order by the brothers and relations of the raiders themselves ... defending posts 
without the assistance or the immediate supervision of any British officer' (in Waley 
1964: 301). Though he encounters similar antipathies from the civil service in 
Pershawar to the ones he encounters at the very beginning of his journeys, the 
vicarious management of the frontier, Ross-Keppel style, is, he feels, a tangible result 
of his style of co-operation. 
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(v) The Canal Colonies 
His comments about the Dante administration in these colonies capture once again his 
desire for an ethic of co-operation in Indian government. He is impatient of men in 
Dante's administration who he thinks ' ... are not really interested in men as 
individuals; they want progress reducible to statistics; the men are pawns.' These 
observations are, according to Waley, like so many others, ' ... very charitable 
comments illustrating Montagu's imaginative sympathy with Indians as human 
beings' (in Waley 1964: 308). 
(vi) Lahore 
Impatience gets the better of him in Lahore when he is invited to a garden party at 
Government House. He sneers about these so-called 'Bridge Parties' where everyone 
makes a great pretence of getting to know each other. In reality he says the 'smart 
English ladies were gossiping together, while a few of them, with nearly all the 
English men, were playing tennis or badminton, ignoring all the Indians.' It does 
nothing for cordiality for they must he argues, 'increase bitterness ... among highly 
educated Indians ... and lack of respect, through misunderstanding' (in Waley 1964: 
310). 
(vii) Aligarh 
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A little while after his encounter with what he thinks are the detritus of administration 
in Lahore, and the 'indescribably horrible', panoply of a bridge party exemplifies this 
he visits Aligarh (Waley 1964: 310). Here he feels he is on firmer ground in the 
company of Lord Metson and Sir William Marris.22 Thoroughly impressed by their 
relation to their job of administration he gives them a glowing reference: 
'Here are men convinced of the changing conditions, looking forward to the part that 
they will have to pay, without fear, without pessimism. The very complication of an 
administration in partnership as compared with the administration of governor over 
governed does not frighten them, but leads them to new enthusiasm' (in Waley 1964: 
313). 
How he wished for a few more Metsons and a lot fewer Craddocks.23 
(c) A conclusion or opportunity 
Montagu thought his trip a mixed fortune of frustration and success. On leaving he 
remarks: 
'India is absorbingly interesting and difficult. Would that I had more opportunity to 
help! One feels that one is shrieking like Cassandra ... No one seems to disagree with, 
or to take, my advice; what with no parliamentary opportunity, the censure-like 
action of Asquith and Crewe in regard to the Commission, and the difficulties about a 
private secretary etc. I go home without zest and rather depressed. India ought to 
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have a great official purifying and it does so want energy. Almost a revolution of 
ideal and method is needed to avert a revolution of its people. One cannot feel 
optimistic after being there and discussing almost every problem with nearly 
everybody of importance' (in Waley 1964: 333).24 
Ending, if not exactly on a high, he certainly trod a path few others even dared 
contemplate. After setting out the foundations of his duty, as he saw it, and working 
towards forming a distinctive ethics, he would, in his role as Secretary of State for 
India, his most challenging yet, move onto devising the next phase of Indian reforms 
in the traditions of his mentor. He would however have to wait. It was not until July 
1917 that he was appointed Secretary of State for India. In between times he filled the 
roles of Financial Secretary to the Treasury and Chancellor of the Duchy of 
Lancaster. 
'We cannot devote more than a century to the tilling of the soil and then refuse to 
75 plant the seed' (Montagu 1918). -
We would be mistaken for thinking his promotion to Secretary of State fortuitous. A 
less casual description should recognise his sustained campaign for being in such a 
role. His intense interest in India didn't at first propel him into playing the part he 
craved in Indian affairs. Waley tells us about his frustrations with such slow progress. 
He thought himself stuck at the India Office. He wrote to Venetia, his wife, forlorn at 
his future prospects. He agonised, ' ... as ... the years go on ... they ... make things grow 
worse and more dismal. . .I remain, and I fear forever, a celibate, boycotted, unused, 
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USS of S for India' (in Waley 1964: 60). In short he longed' ... for the power to do 
something for India, and not merely make speeches' (Waley 1964: 60). 
He was not modest in his ambitions. Before becoming Secretary of Sate, he would 
attempt to supplant Lord Hardinge as Viceroy of India. In December 1915 he wrote to 
the Prime Minister in forthright tones. He said, 'I feel I should not be doing my duty 
to myself or as I conceive it to India, if I did not once again put forward with 
insistence, but for the last time, my own claims ... ' to succeed Lord Hardinge as 
Viceroy oflndia (in Waley 1964: 83). He did not expect the Prime Minister to resent 
his claims, when he adds, 
'I have carefully considered all the other possible names and, if I say that I know of 
no one who seems to me likely to do for India what I want done, I hope you will take 
it as an expression of opinion given in the frank and unpretending spirit in which you 
have always allowed me to address you .. .Indian problems attract me with an 
intensity which I can find for no other problems. I have no other ambition save to go 
to India and I have had no other since I entered public life' (in Waley 1964: 83). 
He is not beyond pleading. He implores: 
, .. .I have in asking you for favours in the past always been able to consider the 
interests of your Government and the personnel affection and esteem for yourself 
which grow with length of association. But in this instance I am only considering 
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myself and after a continuous consideration of my motives I find them respectable' 
(in Waley 1964: 83). 
Not for the first time or the last, he refers it to what he feels are his special claims on 
such a role. Of course he admits his insistence in one sense is purely selfish. Yet he 
also declares that he does so on behalf of the British government. His personal claims, 
his manifesto for Indian government, should be one and the same. He believes there is 
no one else quite as ideally fitted to the role. This is why in the penultimate paragraph 
of his letter to the Prime Minister he includes an object lesson in how a Viceroy 
should conduct himself in India. He writes a job description that relates his ideal 
candidate - that is no other than himself. Hence, 
'1 want to see a Viceroy who will try to be an energetic administrator rather than a 
mock royalty surrounded by out of date and rather tawdry pomp - one who goes to 
India attracted by India rather than the dignity of the office, one who will improve the 
system of representative government, consider without prejudice the demands born of 
India's share in the war, devises a better system of taxation, heals the schisms 
between Islam and Hinduism, simplifY the land system, organise the independent 
States and decentralise the Government ... ' (in Waley 1964: 84). 
Finally, like a soothsayer in the Bazaars of India, Montagu charms the Prime Minister 
with the wiles of his claims to competence. He adds, 
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'These are the problems, which of all others in the world I want to tackle. I know of 
no others to which I could apply myself with the same faith of some result. I believe I 
could do something while setting myself the task of avoiding friction either with 
many interests out there or the Home Government. If I could have my chance out 
there, I am quite prepared to abandon all hope of ever being asked to do anything 
else' (in Waley 1964: 84). 
As Waley tells us, Montagu is ultimately unsuccessful in his petition to Asquith. Yet 
in a larger sense all is not lost. It wouldn't be too long before his persistence paid off. 
It paid off in a dramatic way. 
In July 1917 Montagu got the call he was waiting for. Lloyd George appointed him 
Secretary of State for India. If he thought it would all be plain sailing from now on he 
was mistaken. According to Waley, Lord Derby commented, 'the appointment of 
Montagu, a Jew, to the India Office has made ... an uneasy feeling both in India and 
here ... ' Derby couples his unease with a pointed compliment when he says, 'I 
personally have a very high opinion of his capability and ... expect he will do well' (in 
Wa1ey 1964: 30). 
Quite fortuitously perhaps Montagu made a speech in the House of Commons a few 
days before his promotion, in his role as Vice-Chairman and acting Chief of the 
Reconstruction Committee.26 In it he touched on what he terms failures of the 
Government of India. Ostensibly his criticisms relate to their failure to supply 
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Nixon's army in their attack on Baghdad with the requisite munitions. In the course of 
his comments he describes the Government of India as 'too wooden, too iron, too 
inelastic, too anti-diluvian to be of any use for the modem purposes we have in view' 
(in Waley 1964: 127). He generalises his criticisms, to include 'the whole system of 
the India Office ... '. It is he feels' ... designed to prevent control by the House of 
Commons for fear there might be too advanced a Secretary of State' (in Waley 1964: 
127). 
One would be hard pushed to find a more damming indictment of the conduct of 
Indian Government! The logic of Montagu's comments is clear to Waley. For him it 
is nothing less than a demand for the wholesale reorganisation of the 'executive 
System of India'. It amounts to a demand for ' .. .less control by Westminster and 
Whitehall...'. He asks that ' ... more responsibility ... be ... given ... to the people of 
India' over their own affairs (Waley 1964: 127). He sees his goal as being to ensure 
that the' ... self governing Dominions and Provinces of India ... are ... organised and 
co-ordinated with the great Principalities - not as one great Home Rule country, 
but .. .in ... a series of self-governing Principalities, federated by one Central 
Government ... ' (in Waley 1964: 128). 
In his gracious written acceptance of the Prime Minister's offer of the Secretaryship 
of State, he presumes and replies on that basis. If he is to accept the Government's 
offer he reasons, it must accept his. That is to say it does so with the full knowledge 
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of his policy for Indian government. Now he reasons he could set about the job with a 
real glimmer of hope. 
(d) Secretary of State - A grand office 
Levine imagines for us the thoughts that ran through Montagu's mind when he 
stepped into his plush new offices 'as the New Secretary of State for India ... ' (Levine 
1991: 450). She describes a kingly scene: 
'It was a regal office, furnished magnificently with thick Oriental rugs, an elegant 
hand-carved desk and chair, and oak panelled walls decorated with Indian miniatures 
and with the oil portraits of former Secretaries of State. These looked down upon 
him, stem and stately, staring, perhaps incredulously, upon this rather unattractive 
Jew, the first of his religion to hold this office. Here was Edwin Montagu, the great-
grandson of a man born in a small village in the Jewish ghetto of Poland, grandson of 
a watchmaker from Liverpool, son of an Orthodox Jewish banker to whom the Jewish 
Sabbath was more sacred than the Magna Carta, following in the footsteps of the Earl 
of Derby, Lord Salisbury, Lord Randolph Churchill and the Duke of Argyll, to 
mention only four of the great British aristocrats who held this post' (Levine 1991: 
450). 
Montagu, one feels, is not unduly troubled by the grandeur of the scene that greets 
him. His concerns so far as India is concerned were to bring to fruition his ideals 
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about its government. He must he thinks to do his duty. A duty he defines very 
differently from the O'Dwyers and Dyers. Lord Chelmsford, with whom he was 
closely associated, was the Viceroy at the time. 
(i) The Declaration of 20th August 1917 
A month after his appointment, Montagu issued a proclamation outlining his and his 
government's intention towards Indian government. According to Levine, ' ... the fact 
that this was achieved at all and .... done in thirty-four days is a singular tribute to 
Montagu's obsessive determination ... ' (Levine 1991: 154). Paraphrasing Levine, he 
tried to cajole, write memoranda, lobby, persuade, pursue every stratagem and tactic 
of which Machiavelli would have been proud, to win over and get the agreement of 
his colleagues to the issue of his declaration. Levine declares, ' ... he made 
Chamberlain his ally and advisor and, in spite of his personal dislike of Curzon did all 
he could to win him over. .. '(Levine 1991: 454). Later he warned his colleagues, 
' ... action is necessary at once ... if you do not act soon, you will be lead irresistibly 
along the lines of repression, coercion, imprisonment - compared with which I am 
certain that the recent history of Ireland will be placid and peaceful. .. ' (Levine 1991: 
454). 
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In the end all finally agreed to steer India toward a verSIOn of self-government. 
Hence, the 'bipartisan Unionist coalition cabinet' (Fein 1977: 74) of which he was a 
member announced: 
' ... the policy of his Majesty's Government, with which the Government of India are 
in complete accord, is that of the increasing association of Indians in every branch of 
the administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a 
view to the progressive realisation of responsible government in India as an integral 
part of the British Empire' (in Fein 1977: 74). 
The only significant amendment to the final text carne from Curzon. He preferred the 
phrase 'responsible government' to Montagu's original words 'self-government' 
(Levine 1991: 456). 
The British government were now ready, as ready as they would ever be. This would 
be a difficult road to traverse. Indian nationalists thought it a very limited reform. 
Nevertheless the announcement aroused little in the way of opposition. Waley uses 
words from Morland and Chatterjee in their short History of India to summarise the 
reaction: 
'This announcement while it excited some surprise, aroused little opposition In 
England. It is probably correct to say that up to 1914 very few Englishmen had given 
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serious thought to the future of India. Ordinary people know it as a distant 
dependency, plagued by a few irresponsible politicians and agitators but progressing 
under British rule, and they were content to leave the matter there. The events of the 
war brought the dependency nearer to their minds and their minds and their hearts 
and feelings were stirred by various picturesque incidents of the time which operated 
to make it appear natural and reasonable that the dependency should develop into a 
dominion' (in Waley 1964: 136). 
Montagu is aware of the difficulties that lie ahead. He worked hard to bring such a 
policy to fruition. The day after the proclamation of his policy, he wrote to 
Chelmsford about the potential high cost of his proposals. Reforms, he suggests 
' ... cost money and we have ... nearly reached the limit of the taxable capacity ... of 
Indians' (Montagu 1917 in Waley 1964: 137). Yet there were other equally pressing 
matters that disturbed him. These related to fundamental issues of administration. 
He wrote once more to Chelmsford outlining his uncertainties. It is worth quoting in 
full: 
' ... The more I think of the subject, the more I realise the extraordinary difficulties of 
the position ... We have promised ... the development of self-governing institutions 
and a progressive realisation of responsible government in India. How far can we go 
in this direction safely ... ? If this is our object, the nearer we approach it, the greater 
our success ... But that is all that is simple. If the situation were such that we could say 
to India: "Bless you. The time has now come when we withdraw our machinery of 
executive government and substitute for it an indigenous one completely responsible 
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to the Indian people, and we are determined not to interfere with its wishes": we 
could ... draw up a beautiful constitution. Embodying all the best features of all the 
constitutions of the world. It would look beautiful on paper and we could then fold 
our arms and watch the Millennium. But. .. we are discussing a problem of the 
administration of an important part of the world, and are not considering an abstract 
mater for debate .. .Is there any country in the world that has attempted a half-way 
house in this, or a quarter-way house? An autocratic and independent executive is 
common. Self-governing institutions are now ... accepted as the only proper form of 
government. How can you unite the two? Can you have a form of government 
administered by an alien agency partly responsible to the people ofthe country itself? 
You have got a democracy at home, ignorant of Indian conditions, a Central 
Government in India naturally jealous of the efficiency of the Government of which 
it is the custodian, local governments growing in importance with the civilisation of 
the countries over which they preside, and an Indian opinion produced by a long 
series of statesmen from Macaulay to Morley which his now ... impossible to ignore. 
How can we reconcile all these things at a time when no complete solution is possible 
and everything must be another step on the slope which we started a hundred years 
ago?' (Montagu 1917 in Waley 1964: 137-138). 
Such conundrums in the conduct of this imperial government could mean only one 
thing. Montagu set out for India again. Once there he attempted to reconcile all the 
competing parties and elaborate a plan that would meet with the approval of as many 
as possible. Amongst all those who accompanied him on his trip, the most significant 
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name is that of Lord Chelmsford. He would be a co-designate to the eventual scheme 
that emerged. 
(ii) A second Trip to India - Nov. 1917 - May 1918 
That Montagu was convinced of the importance of this tour there is little doubt. In his 
diary he says,' ... my visit to India means that we are going to do something big ... I 
cannot go home and produce a little thing or nothing, it must be epoch making, or it is 
a failure; it must be the keystone of the future history ofIndia' (Montagu 1930: 8). 
As well as being convinced of the importance of his trip he has some very definite 
ideas about how he should conduct himself in relation to Indians. This would be a 
constant source of frustration in his dealings with his accomplice, Lord Chelmsford. 
Not long after he arrived he expresses his fear that Chelmsford would make things too 
formal for his liking. He paints him as ' ... cold, aloof, reserved' (Montagu 1930: 16). 
Montagu's designs are not exactly the warmest of descriptions. Yet his remarks got 
even chillier. He sees Chelmsford as ' ... strongly prejudiced in his views ... '. Perhaps 
he damns with faint praise when he says' .. .I don't see that any of them are his ... 
They seem to me to be ... collected from his surroundings ... ' (Montagu 1930: 16). 
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Montagu certainly didn't adhere to any protocols. He did not hesitate in characterising 
Chelmsford as being wholly unsuited to the role of Viceroy. He makes these feelings 
plain when he says, 
' ... the fact of the matter is - and it is borne in on me every moment of the day ... but it 
is no use because nobody will believe me - the sort of man we seek to make a 
Viceroy is wholly wrong, He comes from the wrong class. It is not right to blame 
Lord Chelmsford; it is only right to remember that that is not the sort of stuff of 
which to make Viceroys ... ' (Montagu 1930: 16). 
In an echo ofremarks he makes to describe administrators in the LC.S on his first trip 
to India - he continues in this critical vein. Thus in his view, 
'They ... (Viceroys) ... approach their problem from the wrong side; they do the work 
they are called upon to do; they wade through files; they think of their regulations; 
and then as to the social side - precedence, precedence, precedence. Everything is 
divided into Government and those who are not Government, official and those who 
are not official, Government and the opposition. Informal discussion, informal 
conversation they do not know. Political instincts they have none. The wooing of 
constituents is beneath their idea; the coaxing of the press is not their metier. Nothing 
is required of them but to get through their files, and carry on their social work 
according to the rule. Everything is prescribed; everything is printed ... This may be 
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all right for a Court; it is ... wrong when the Court is not Royal and is also the Prime 
Minister of the place' (Montagu 1930: 16). 
Montagu dispensed with protocol when discussing the character of Chelmsford. 
Montagu's comments about Chelmsford are not isolated instances of how he deals 
with the cast of characters on the Indian scene. Dispensing with form is a marked 
feature of how he comports himself generally. So for instance he deployed similarly 
informal methods in his discussions with Indians. In fact he maintains that their 
discussions with him should proceed on as familiar a basis as possible. Moreover 
acting in concert he is determined both he and Chelmsford should take their time in 
those discussions. He did not want to contemplate failure. He is quite clear when he 
says, 'rather than fail, I would stay a year in India and resign rather than hurry things' 
(Montagu 1910: 7). He would he insists, take as long as it requires to ' ... get at the 
bottom of matters .. .I cannot confine myself to ten minutes or a quarter of an hour' 
(Montagu 1930: 8). 
Montagu got his way. They received many a deputation and he did not confine 
himself to brief chit-chat with his interlopers. He reasoned that this method of 
proceeding is sure to pay dividends. He even feels he has a special relation with 
Indians, because of his lewishness. Perhaps he recognises the recondite character of 
his lewishness. This is how he puts it: 
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'I have only been here two days; and all the Indian Chiefs have called on me and 
talked to me as a friend, and I have got far more out of them than the Viceroy got in 
ten days of Conference. They asked for interviews; interviews were granted to them 
of ten minutes each because it was not considered that anything but formal interviews 
were necessary. They have all come back unofficially, and we have an hour and a 
half or three-quarters of an hour together at odd times, and they talk to me, as they 
never dare talk to anybody else. Perhaps there is some truth in the allegation that I 
am an Oriental. Certainly that social relationship which English people seem to find 
so difficult come quite easy to me; and we shall go from bad to worse, until we are 
hounded out of India, unless something is done to correct this sort of thing' (Montagu 
1930: 17).27 
(iii) Dyarchy 
The scheme Montagu and Chelmsford proposed is called Dyarchy. Originally 
conceived by Sir William Duke it did not satisfy anyone (Levine 1991: 464). 
Montagu feared as much. For some it went too far too soon. For others not far 
enough. Yet Montagu wrote in his diary: 
'The main principle ... [of the report]... is that instead of founding the Indian 
Government on the confidence of the people of England, we are gradually to found it 
on the confidence of the people of India. We are, beginning in the Provinces, 
maintaining the Government of India as now, but subjected, I am glad to think, to 
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more criticism, and future progress will depend on the creation of an electorate. I do 
not see how any reasonable man can find fault with the principles ... ' (Montagu 1930: 
362). 
The sentiments that William Duke first used to describe what he had in mind are the 
reasons why nationalists did not. He insisted on 
' ... introducing true responsible government In a limited and manageable field of 
administration, which could be contracted or extended in accordance with the 
practical results attained, without imperilling the structure of the government itself. 
The method by which this gradual and safe advance to responsible government could 
be made in India ... is ... "dyarchy" , (Duke 1915 in Levine 1991: 464). 
Montagu and Chelmsford's plan did not deviate profoundly from Duke's. According 
to Wolpert, the technique of dyarchy was devised to ensure that 
'several provincial departments of government were "transferred" to ministers 
elected by elected legislative council representatives, while other departments were 
"reserved" to officialdom. The reserved subjects were the most well-funded, 
powerful branches of government, finance and law and order' (Wolpert 2000: 297). 
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With such devices in mind the plan's limitations are obvious. Yet Wolpert argues 
' ... dyarchy was a substantial step toward independence. No such transfer of executive 
authority would as yet be introduced at the center, but the Imperial Legislative 
Council would be "enlarged and made more representative" , (Wolpert 2000: 297). 
There are others of course who agree in general with Wolpert's assessment. 
According to Datta, Coupland described it as a ' ... permanent contribution to the 
science of politics and the history of British Imperialism' (Coupland 1944 in Datta 
1964: 27). 
Contrasting views to this kind of optimism are generally twofold. Thus for instance, 
Annie Besant was highly critical. For her the plan' ... is unworthy for England to offer 
and unworthy of India to accept' (in Datta 1964: 27). The Indian National Congress 
convened a special meeting to discuss the report. They called it 'disappointing and 
unsatisfactory' (in Levine 1991: 471). Nonetheless, the Congress accepted its broad 
thrust. They saw it as an attempt to put into practice the principles set out in the 
declaration of 20th August (Levine 1991: 471). In the meantime they continued 'to 
urge modifications and improvement ... to make it a substantial first step towards 
responsible government in India ... both in the Central and Provincial governments' 
(in Levine 1991: 471). 
However Montagu's hopes for his proposals were somewhat dashed in a different 
way by the appointment and deliberations of the Rowlatt Committee. It recommended 
the extension of the Defence of India Act, a hated wartime measure.28 
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Montagu's nemesis Sir Michael O'Dwyer was also critical, but for different reasons. 
He called Dyarchy 'a spider's web spun out of the brain of a doctrinaire pedant' 
(O'Dwyer 1925: 369). He also wrote what Montagu describes as a ' ... violent note 
damming our scheme all the way up the hill and down the dale ... ' (Montagu in Waley 
1964: 149). His spats with 0 'Dwyer did not end with this. They broke out again on a 
more intense scale the following year. 
Curzon, a colleague in government, is another critic who took exception, to Montagu 
constantly pushing him (Levine 1991: 469). He warned Montagu that' ... haste and 
confidence are liable in Indian undertakings to rude disappointment' (in Levine 1991: 
464)?9 
Montagu did see his scheme enacted. Yet, as Levine points out, ' ... they did 
not ... prevent future conflict and bloodshed, nor ... lessen the unrest and violence that 
convulsed India in the decades ahead ... ' (Levine 1991: 467). Nevertheless Zimmern 
thinks the report 'a watershed in British-Indian relations'. He's in no doubt that the 
report prefaced 'developments of great moment' (Zimmern 1926: 13-14). In fact the 
same historian views it Levine suggests' ... as the beginning of the end of. .. ' 
' ... the Second British Empire and the beginning of the Third British Empire, the 
transformation of the Empire into a Commonwealth of Nations ... a landmark in 
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British Imperial History ... it marks the definite repudiation of the idea that there can, 
under the British flag, be one form of constitutional evolution for the West and 
another for the East, or one for the White race and another for the non-white' (Levine 
1991: 467; Zimmern 1926: 13-14). 
A lot of the commentary, historical or otherwise, judges Montagu's attempt at reform 
of British Government a failure. My task is not to join in such evaluations. Whatever 
view we may take on his attempts at reform, both on a personal and governmental 
level, they mark a sustained endeavour to change both its face and ethics in the 
idealistic terms Zimmern proposes, and the practical ones I do. They mark a moment 
in the make-up of a ruler in India who sought out sympathy as his duty. A tougher test 
of his ideas and putative practice was still to come. It is to that I now tum. 
4 
Dampening the Fire - The Hunter Committee Enquiry and Report 
1919 turned out to be ' ... both the best and worst times for ... Montagu' (Levine 1991: 
492). It began with Montagu gushing with enthusiasm about the reform process he set 
in trail. Hence, ' ... the Government of India Bill was passed into law with little 
opposition ... '; and the' ... enactment of...such ... a liberal measure by a Conservative 
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Government ... ' Waley suggests, ' ... was largely due to ... Montagu's ... pertinacity and 
patience' (Waley 1964: 191). Yet 1919 was also a ' ... year of tragic riots in the 
Punjab', culminating in 'the ... massacre by General Dyer at Amritsar' (Waley 1964: 
191). The massacres heralded another series of encounters with Sir Michael 
O'Dwyer; more opportunities for Montagu to condemn rule by order; and see him 
urge all concerned in Indian government to couple duty with co-operation. 
(a) It's All About Contrasting Styles? 
The antipathy Montagu and O'Dwyer shared is legendary. Neither gave the other any 
quarter. As I outline in chapter 4, O'Dwyer is renowned for a style of rule he made all 
his own; his rule would be akin to a tough but benevolent king. Montagu's preferred 
style of colonial domination couldn't be more antithetical. He styles it on what he 
terms co-operation. The aftermath of the massacres saw them j oust for their particular 
versions of domination. 
The imperial order exemplified by the versions of rule Dyer, O'Dwyer and others of 
their proclivities display were still well entrenched. Time and again, Montagu, by his 
words and actions expressed his utter contempt for such styles. For him such styles of 
rule did not work well, particularly at this time. In a long letter to Chelmsford he 
derided O'Dwyer's style thus: 
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'There is nothing so easy at any particular moment as to govern through the police. It 
is far simpler than any other method. It requires less thought, less circumlocution. 
Take every man on his police record, use intercepted correspondence and exceptional 
powers and you sow the whirlwind for your successor to reap and you bring down the 
Government in God's own time as certainly as it was brought down in Russia. That is 
why I have always thought O'Dwyer's success in the Punjab so cheap a success' (in 
Waley 1964: 201).30 
The massacres at the lallianwala are for him the exemplar par-excellence of the 
failure of O'Dwyer's style of rule. If this event was not to mark the end of the Raj, 
Montagu reasons, he would have to get a grip of matters before they spiralled out of 
all control. 
(b) Hunter 
Montagu steadfastly held to his views about the character of his proposals for reform. 
He did fear nevertheless that the events at Amritsar signalled an end to all talk and 
practice of progressive reform in Indian government. Yet in spite of all the distress 
wrought by Amritsar he pressed on. He resolved to see reform carried through to 
fruition. He wants to show' ... as soon and as emphatically as I can, that we do not 
want to find in these distressing occurrences a cause for any retreat from the pledges 
we have given or the proposals we have made ... ' (in Waley 1964: 207). Determined 
to discredit O'Dwyer, he writes to Sir George Lloyd: 
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'I cannot help thinking that what the asses call strong government is very largely 
responsible for what has occurred. Sitting on the barometer, stifling discussion, 
interfering with the free movement of people, eases the situation at the moment, but 
brings its reward ... ' (in Waley 1964: 207). 
The Arnritsar massacres provided Montagu with an ideal opportunity to shake up his 
critics. They would now have to engage critically with the hitherto prized methods of 
strong government. In a speech to the House of Commons he declares, ' ... you cannot 
have disturbances of this magnitude without an enquiry into the causes of and the 
measure taken to cope with ... ' them. 31 In May 1919 he took the opportunity to write 
to Chelmsford repeating his conviction that they must hold 
' ... an enquiry into the causes of and the treatment of the riots that have occurred in 
India ... The more I read of these occurrences, the more I am struck by the fact that 
there is every reason to believe that they are the inevitable consequences of that 
easiest form of government... firm strong government' (in Waley 1964: 207). 
(i) Composition 
After Montagu decided to hold a committee of enquiry, he worked to ensure that its 
make-up was suitable. Of course some regarded his concern about who should sit on 
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it suspiciously. Sir William Marris is one of that number. In fact he doubts the value 
of any committee Montagu appoints. Marris set out his doubts thus: 
'It would be most dangerous to have a committee consisting of persons appointed by 
Montagu. We cannot hope to get really first class men from Great Britain and should 
probably be forced to take second grade politicians of little independence of character 
in sitting in judgement on the Government in India' (in Datta 1975: 5). 
Yet, such suspicions didn't deter Montagu. He persisted with his concern about its 
make-up. He obtained a membership for it consistent with his ideal model for Indian 
Government. He wanted to change its face and practice to a more co-operative 
venture. So he ensured that the Government of India roamed far and wide when 
making their final selection of members for the Committee. According to Datta, he 
went as far as to impose' ... guidelines for the Government of India ... in regard to the 
composition of the committee' (Datta 1975: 5). He even wrote to the Viceroy on the 
i h August 1919, insisting that ' .. .Indians who command the confidence of the 
moderates ... are essential' as members of any proposed committee (Datta 1976: 5). In 
a later telegram he warned of the dangers in being seen to be fearful of Indian 
opinion. Hence, ' ... nothing does the Government of India more harm than the 
allegation that we fear Indian opinion and make safe appointments that command no 
confidence among those they are supposed to represent' (in Datta 1975: 5). 
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In the end the Government of India did appoint a mix of members. Lord Hunter a 
little known quantity in India, would be chairman.32 The other members of the 
committee read like a modem day list of the great and good. There we find past and 
present day lawyers, civil servants and military officials.33 They were joined by three 
Indian lawyers - The Honourable Pandit Jagat Narayan; Sir Chiminlal Setalvad; and 
Sardar Sahibzada - who by their skilful interrogations about the codes of conduct of 
government and its administration in India, broke the administration's, and 
specifically General Dyer's, composure.34 
In October 1919 the Committee commenced its work. Its terms of reference charged 
it to 'inquire into the causes of and measures taken to cope with the recent 
disturbances in Bombay, Delhi and Punjab. d5 
In taking such a keen interest in the composition of the committee Montagu had 
bigger prey squarely in view. The findings and conclusions of the Committee would, 
he hoped, sound the death knell of the manners of a school of government he so 
despised. 
(ii) A New Ethics? 
After my discussion of Montagu' s views on government it would be easy to clad him 
in heroic garb. That is not my aim. Certainly in comparison to O'Dwyer and Dyer he 
316 
saw both himself and his job rather differently. As we see he makes that abundantly 
clear on numerous occasions. His ideal ruler and the form of rule he should practice 
are what he calls co-operation. He wants what he calls an Anglo-India. He sees his 
duty as being to extend rule, but somewhat differently. If that is not as vulgar as 
O'Dwyer characterising himself as a father figure and Indians as his charges; or Dyer 
who thinks himself a soldier hero similarly characterising Indians as children who 
need looking after, and when being naughty require chastising; it is still domination, 
however collaboratively, however co-operatively. 
In spite of the formal change in the style to a man whose make-up prizes empathy as 
much as chastisement, many Indians as we see did not want to join Montagu. They 
did not want in effect be complicit in their own domination. High imperialism it may 
not be, but imperialism it is. Nevertheless Montagu's putative modus-operandi can be 
characterised as a different conception of the make-up of the person of colonial 
governor. Perhaps Datta summarises Montagu's journey, both in his singular 
endeavours in insisting on an enquiry, and generally in relation to India, better than 
most when he alerts us to its political ethics. Hence he argues, 
'In forcing the ... enquiry Montagu was moved by considerations of practical politics 
He was most intensely a politician, who worked for immediate returns. In the 
formation of policy for the management of affairs of state he would probably ask, not 
"what are the principle involved in it", but "what are the chances of its success." He 
knew what was brewing in the political cauldron in India. He recognised that public 
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opinion in India had felt outraged at the role of British officials in the disturbances. 
On grounds of political exigency, he considered it necessary to assuage the injured 
feelings of. . .Indian leaders over the ... disturbances, for they held the Government 
responsible. For the implementation of constitutional reforms, on which depended his 
reputation among his colleagues in England and his political strength he was anxious 
to rally nationalist public opinion around him in India. The Indian problem had been 
pending for long, due to the tasteless handling of it by the Government of India, and 
Montagu was determined to settle it .. .In order to enlist.. .Indian support in favour of 
his proposals he tried to appease ... nationalist opinion by conceding an enquiry' 
(Datta 1975: 3). 
Datta's comments are a necessary corrective to those who would place Montagu on a 
pedestal. As I say above, Montagu's oeuvre and deeds are all too easily categorised in 
heroic terms as attempts to deliver India from tyranny. I do not join in such praise. 
Montagu was a consummate politician, and a practical one at that. What we need to 
add to Datta's corrective is an appreciation of Montagu's manoeuvres and their 
profoundly ethical content beyond the merely self-indulgent - the making of a 
different colonial governor. 
Sympathetic engagement with Indians - and educated Indians at that - Montagu 
argued, is a much more convenient way of conducting affairs in India. You do not 
shoot your charges. You do not even thunder, as Sir Michael O'Dwyer is once 
reported as saying, 'remember Gandhi talks of soul-force, but there is another force 
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greater than [his] soul-force .. .its called ... fist force,' as he pounded the table (in 
Jayakar 1958: 364). Montagu's mind fixes firmly on what Foucault terms the 
'economy' of governing. Never fist-force, let alone soul-force, the word economy in 
this co-joining 'comes ... to designate a level of reality, a field of intervention ... ' 
whose primary object is 'the right disposition of things ... arranged so as to lead to a 
convenient end.' At this Montagu would attempt to excel: 
' ... the definition of government in no way refers to territory. One governs things. But 
what does this mean? I do not think that is a matter of opposing things to men, but 
rather of showing that what government has to do is not territory but rather a sort of 
complex composed of men and things. The things with which in this sense 
government is to be concerned with are in fact men, but men in their relations, their 
links their imbrication with those other things which are wealth, resources, means of 
subsistence, the territory with its specific qualities, climate, irrigation, fertility, etc; 
men in their relation to that other kind of things, customs, habits, ways of acting and 
thinking, etc; lastly, men in their relation to that other kinds of things, accidents and 
misfortunes such as famine, epidemics, death, etc ... (Foucault 1991: 93). 
(iii) Outcome 
The Hunter Committee submitted their final report on 8 March 1920. It is more 
accurate to say however that they submitted their reports ' ... for the committee split, 
on racial lines ... ' (Sayer 1991: 147). 
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The majority condemned Dyer's actions, though rather meekly. Dyer's justification 
for his actions on the ground of their moral effect on the populace, they construe as 
being 'a mistaken conception of his duty'. Individual acts by O'Dwyer or Dyer 
though injudicious did not in the majority's view amount to systemic failures. 36 The 
Punjab government escaped censure. 
The minority censured Dyer with more force. Sayer comments, Dyer's order to fire, 
in an interesting choice of words, is ' ... condemned as an act of "frightfulness" '. 
They compared his actions' ... to German atrocities in France and Belgium.' They 
were simply' "inhuman and un-British" , (Sayer 1991: 148). The regimes of martial 
law they thought unnecessary. Its enforcement they thought nothing less than 
opprobrious. 
Montagu got more or less what he wanted from the reports. 37 In case there was any 
doubt, he writes to Chelmsford saying so. Thus his focus once again is to discredit 
O'Dwyer the governor: 
'I do not regard the Report of the Hunter Committee, on first reading as having 
exonerated O'Dwyer. On the contrary they are inclined to say in guarded language 
what I would say about the rule for which he was responsible .. .I was not at the India 
Office during most of O'Dwyer's regime. Whether the ring-fence policy, which he to 
some extent advocated, was necessary or not, I do not choose to say ... But let all 
people beware that when they contemplate executive action, deportation, suppression 
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of the press, prohibition of public meetings, prohibition of free movement, they are 
bound sooner or later, to reap the reward. It is an expedient which perhaps tides them 
over for the moment. I am convinced that it does not tide them over in the long 
run ... Do not let us shut our eyes to the fact that there must be a harvest. The greatest 
administrator and the greatest Governor is the man who keeps his Province quiet and 
orderly without recourse, or with the minimum of recourse to those powers with 
which he has been entrusted' (Montagu in Waley 1964: 229). 
The military part of the cabal, Dyer, did not suffer dismissal. Instead he would be 
required to resign his commission. According to Fein, the Government of India 
managed to restrain Montagu from issuing his initial press release. Originally it would 
read, 'His Majesty's Government repudiates emphatically the doctrine of 
frightfulness upon which Dyer based his action.' The eventual release read: 
'The principle which has consistently governed the policy of his Majesty's 
Government in directing the Methods to be employed when military action in support 
of the civil authority is required may be broadly stated as using the minimum of force 
necessary ... Brig.-Gen. Dyer's action was in complete violation of this principle' (in 
Fein 1977: 106). 
(iv) In the House of Commons 
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Having got this far with the enquiry and taking things to a conclusion, Montagu had 
still to battle with protests from his contemporaries. 
The anti-Semitic character of much of the criticism directed at Montagu reared its 
head perhaps even more viciously at this time. 38 An attenuated instance occurs on the 
occasion of the House of Commons debates. In an extraordinary move Montagu's 
opponents in the Commons proposed a debate. The debate, which was 'technically on 
the motion to reduce the salary of the Secretary of State for India by £1 00', lasted 
nearly seven hours (Waley 1964: 231). If the nominees of such a debate intended by 
this means to express their disapproval of the way Montagu had conducted himself in 
relation to the cashiering of General Dyer, they failed. Formally at least, the 
government triumphed by 230 votes to 129. 
In the debate Montagu opens for the government. He is unbending in his convictions 
about how India should be governed. In fact he declares he would do no more than 
restate his and the government's views. Debate being ruled out, he asserts, rather 
rhetorically perhaps, how he is not in the Commons to discuss the 1919 disturbances 
but rather to restate his and the government's views. Hence, 
'I am in the position of having stated my views and the views of His Majesty's 
Government, of which 1 am the spokesman ... The dispatch ... was drawn up by a 
Cabinet Committee and approved by the whole cabinet. 1 have no desire to withdraw 
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from or add to that dispatch. Every single body, civil and military, which has been 
charged with the discussion of this lamentable affair has ... come to the same 
conclusion. The question before the Committee ... is whether they will endorse the 
position of His Majesty's Government, of the Hunter Committee, of the Commander-
in-Chief in India, of the Government of India, and of the Army Council, or whether 
they will desire to censure them.' 39 
He continues in this mode. One of the defining moments for him comes when he 
candidly states the issues the House of Commons have to contend with. There is he 
argues only one question. Hence he asks, 
'if an officer justifies his conduct, no matter how gallant his record is - and 
everybody knows how gallant General Dyer's is - by saying that there was no 
question of undue severity, that if his means had been greater, the casualties would 
have been greater, and that the motive was teach a moral lesson to the whole of the 
Punjab, I say without hesitation, and I would ask the Committee to contradict me if I 
am wrong, because the whole matter turns on this, that it is the doctrine of 
terrorism. ,40 
Terrorism is not his style of government. Having posed the question, he pointedly 
asks of the Commons, 
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, ... are you going to keep your hold on India by terrorism, racial humiliation and 
subordination, and frightfulness, or are you going to rest it upon the good will of the 
people of your Indian Empire?,41 
This theory, his theory of partnership would, he assured his audience, ensure both 
British honour and Indian honour. Are you, he pleads, on 
'India's side in ensuring that order is enforced with the canons of modern British 
democracy ... ? We hold British lives sacred, but we hold Indian lives sacred, too. We 
want to safeguard British honour by protecting and safeguarding Indian honour, too. 
Our institutions shall be gradually perfected whilst protection is afforded to you and 
ourselves by revolution and anarchy in order that they may commend themselves to 
,42 you ... 
Of course, in spite of the government winning the vote, many were not convinced of 
the call for partnership. Sir Edward Carson for instance is not at all sure the issue 
before the Commons is, or should be, 'the governance of India' (Sayer 1991: 154). 
His sole concern is with the treatment meted out to General Dyer (Sayer 1991: 154). 
He gives members, Montagu specifically, a reprimand. They should be ashamed he 
thinks of their appalling treatment of General Dyer. Hence: 
'You talk of the great principles of liberty which you have laid down. General Dyer 
has a right to be brought within those principles of liberty. He has no right to be 
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broken on the ipse dixit of any Commission or Committee, however great, unless he 
has been fairly tried - and he has not been tried ... ' 43 
He concludes, to 'loud and prolonged cheers', by adding, 'to break a man under the 
circumstances of this case is un-English.' 44 
Perhaps Carson meant these comments more as a snub to Montagu rather than 
anything else. Only a very un-English Secretary of State would on his reasoning by-
pass all the protocols of understanding between men of a certain class! 
Sir W. lohnson-Hicks is just as biting in his comments about what he thinks is 
Montagu's mendacity. He is convinced' ... a more disastrous speech ... has never been 
made on the Arnritsar affair.' He adds, 
'My Right Hon. Friend the Secretary of State has for some time past entirely lost the 
confidence of the Indian Civil Service throughout India ... The speech which he has 
made this afternoon will have utterly destroyed any little shred of confidence which 
was left to him, not merely in the minds of the Indian Civil Servants, but in the minds 
of the British army in India ... The speech of the Secretary of State ... was merely one 
long vituperation of General Dyer and his actions in India, and one long appeal to 
. 1 ., 45 
racla passIon. 
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Of course there was more to come. Brigadier Surtees passed on a warning. He says, 
'1 will ask hon. members to consider carefully the effect of this debate, not only in 
India, but among the civilised and uncivilised peoples among whom we rule. There 
are vast areas in Africa and the Pacific, where the sole British representative is the 
one white man. It is up to him to keep the native race more or less in order, to look 
after administration, to see to justice, and, so far as possible, to stamp out violence 
and vice. In the most favourable circumstances this official is allowed a small-armed 
native guard, but in the case of any serious upheaval, he and his police would be 
scattered like chaff, but for one thing ... British prestige. Once you destroy that.. .then 
the Empire will collapse like a house of cards, and with it all that trade which feeds, 
clothes, and gives employment to our people ... ,46 
Rupert Gwynne is another who doesn't hold back in his criticisms of Montagu's 
conduct in relation to Arnritsar. He accuses him of 'deliberately misleading' the house 
about the precise date of the outbreak in Amritsar. If that isn't enough he charges him 
with having an unhealthy interest in India and all things Indian, particularly in those 
who Gwynne brands agitators. In one such instance Gwynne accuses him of naked 
favouritism. The House according to Gwynne would be shocked to learn' ... that first-
class priority tickets on ... steamers were given to ... representatives of the agitators in 
India to let them come ... here and give evidence, while officers and women and 
children anxious to get home could not obtain berths ... ' .47 
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Thomas Jewell Bennett, a liberal like Montagu, commented on the debate in a letter 
to The Times. He thought the whole proceeding 'charged with personal antipathy 
towards Montagu - not free from the racial prejudice which worked mischief in 
France during the anti-Dreyfus controversy' (Bennett 1920 in Fein 1977: 135).48 
Hurtful though these attacks and racial slurs are, Montagu stuck by his guns. The 
debates did however leave him a gloomy and sick man. It didn't help that Chelmsford 
would write to him to protest about his charges of 'frightfulness' (Waley 1964: 233). 
Montagu's response was robust. In fact he regrets little. If he had any regrets at all it 
was about what he did not say. Frankly, he remarks, 
' ... the "word frightfulness" ... was absolutely necessary ... to show when we are told 
that O'Dwyer saved India from Mutiny, that it was the principle on which he 
acted ... that was condemned. To do that it was no use mincing words in the debate .. .I 
do not regret in the least having called a spade a spade' (in Waley 1964: 234). 
(v) Doubts 
Quite close to collapse at this stage, Montagu believed and expected that his 
colleague, Chelmsford, should stand with him in carrying through to the ends what 
they had started (Waley 1964: 235). There are moments now however when he 
expresses a deep pessimism about the process of reform in India. He even allows 
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himself the luxury of disbelief. He manages to convince himself that pursuing the 
policy of self-government at this time is a mistake. Hence in a letter to Lord 
Willing don he admits as much. It had lead he thinks to a heightened racial 
consciousness. Who he wondered could or would hold the ring in these times when 
his hopes and policies for India would merely intensify them further. In a sense he 
merely repeats and finds that some of the antipathy he detected on his earlier journeys 
to India is very much a reality of British rule. Hence, he writes 
'I personally do not believe that the Dyer incident was the cause of the great racial 
exacerbation which is now in existence and which has got to be lived through and 
down before we can get into a more hopeful atmosphere ... This racial consciousness 
is inevitable. As soon as the Indians were told that we agreed with them and they 
were to become partners with us, it instilled into their minds an increased feeling of 
existing subordination and a realisation of everything by which this subordination 
was expressed. Similarly, when the Europeans were told that, after driving the 
Indians for so many years, that regime was to be over and they might find themselves 
forced to Cupertino with the Indians, or even forced to allow Indians to rule India, 
their race consciousness sprang up afresh. I am convinced in my own mind that that 
has been the fatal mistake of our policy in India. We ought to have let Indians run 
their own show from the beginning, with all its inefficiency and imperfections. 
Development would have been much slower, but the inevitable transition would have 
been less difficult ... The temper of democratic countries such as our is increasingly 
against remaining in a country where we are not wanted, and we have either got to 
make our peace with the Indians, or as the educated class grow, we shall find a 
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strenuous desire in this country to get rid of India and all its bother. .. ' (Montagu 
1920 in Waley 1964: 235). 49 
Conclusions 
(a) Resignation 
Exhausted and depressed after so much effort in pursuit of governmental reform, it 
was not long before Montagu decided enough was enough. Yet like much else in the 
sweep of his revisionist zeal, he would be brought down as much by the deeds of 
others, as of his own accord. I am not writing a biography, but it is as well to note the 
part played by his arch detractor, Lord Curzon, in his eventual fall. 
Montagu's downfall came about because of the circulation by him of a telegram 
relating to the problems of the Turkish Empire. His interests in the settlement of the 
affairs of a defeated Turkey arose because of the large Muslim population in India. 
Yet he would be deemed impetuous in his hurry to publish the Government ofIndia's 
manifesto 'about the terms of peace with Turkey' (Waley 1964: 273). Curzon did not 
hesitate to take advantage of such an opportunity. He set the ground of fault out like a 
ruthless tiger hungry for his game. Sanctimonious to the last, he writes about the 
above in barely disguised contempt: 
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'In common with my colleagues I received on ... March 4th a copy of the telegram 
from the Government of India in which they sought permission to publish their 
manifesto ... Knowing that there was to be a Cabinet Meeting at the beginning of the 
next week and not deeming it possible that Mr Montagu could conceive of 
publication without reference to his colleagues, I regarded it as certain that the 
question would be brought up at the meeting on Monday [March 6]' (in Waley 1964: 
273). 
To his chagrin he finds that Montagu chose to allow circulation of the memo without 
reference to the Cabinet. He wrote to Montagu expressing his disgust at his impetuous 
conduct. Had he, Curzon, when Viceroy of India, ' ... ventured to make public 
pronouncement in India, about the foreign policy of the Government in Europe,' he 
would he thinks, have been recalled (in Waley 1964: 274). Moreover, he found the 
presumption that because the Government of India ruled over many Muslims it could 
concern itself with and influence matters on 'Smyrna or Thrace ... Egypt, the Soudan, 
Palestine ... or any other part of the Moslem world ... ' ridiculous (in Waley 1964: 
273). The upshot was that Montagu had to resign. 
Resignation did not dampen Montagu's enthusiasm for India. Even after his departure 
as Secretary of State in 1922 he did not want to lose the ties he had built up in the 
recent past. Lord Reading discouraged him from visiting India. He warned: 
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'You can never come as a private gentleman ... You will find that you will be 
Secretary of State still to most people in India. I mean they still think of you in that 
capacity. I doubt whether you quite realise the hold you have on the Indian public. I 
shall say no more and merely put this view to you' (Reading in Waley 1964: 281). 
(b) Legacy 
Of course it could be said that ultimately Montagu left his task incomplete and a 
broken man. Yet as I say above, I am not concerned with judging his contributions to 
Indian government in that way. I am content merely to mark him as someone whose 
ideals and practice of being a ruler and ruling over Indian others constituted a 
distinctive style of governor. He, of course, would term it co-operative domination, 
with an emphasis on the former rather than the latter. If what is at stake in our 
exploration of styles of rule at this time is individual claims to competence, then 
Montagu did not think his style of person and rule needed a big stick to support such 
claims. The events in Amritsar lead him to an urgent re-evaluation, spoken and 
written, of Britain's place in India. He is exemplary in this regard. 
One part of what is crucial in Montagu's style of ruler is the vernacular of 'being 
Montagu' that he brings to the task. It is worth repeating that what we think marginal 
is often at the centre in an epochal way. So in this instance, Montagu's marginality as 
a Jewish member of the colonial government teaches us to regard an-other history as 
our history, a British history. His conception of the make-up of a colonial governor is 
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one who engages in what I call a sympathetic tryst, however limited, with so-called 
native demands for self-government. We have seen him struggle with conceptions of 
the make-up of the person of the colonial governor, in a way that ensures both a 
continued domination, and lays a much greater stress than either O'Dwyer or Dyer on 
co-operation. His lewishness is central to this as he strives to attain a different modus 
operandi for government. Yet, borrowing from Rai the fact that his sympathetic tryst 
did not enable him to be a man who could move beyond a ' ... non-propriative 
identification with others ... ' entirely merely marks him as being a man of his time 
(Rai 2002: 161). Paraphrasing Rai, doing one's duty and listening, being sympathetic 
and ensuring a continued domination, 'was in fact a stem and savage oppression' (Rai 
2002: 160). 
In chapter 6 I set out my conclusions from my particular perspective on Amritsar. 
What emerges from my consideration of Amritsar in this way is how profoundly 
empire was a job of work. The characters I have examined took the matter of 
government seriously. It was for them a problem not a given. A problem that grew to 
be taken seriously the more remote the Indian Empire became from the days of the 
East India Trading Co. Trade required treaties and needed arms to be sure. But it also 
needed careers. The careers of imperial servants of empire grew in that era which was 
the high noon of empire. All its servants, and these servants particularly, wanted to 
make their mark in its history. Consequently they spent a considerable amount of time 
thinking about and practising government as governmentality. 
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1. Commenting on the administration's conduct in relation to the setting and enforcement of martial 
law, in the Punjab, in particular the notorious crawling order, Montagu wrote to Sir George Lloyd, 
' ... what the asses call strong government is very largely responsible for what has occurred. Sitting on 
the barometer, stifling discussion, interfering with free movement of people, eases the situation at the 
moment, but brings its own reward ... The more I read of the riots that have occurred in India ... the 
more I'm struck by the fact that there is every reason to believe that they are the inevitable 
consequences of that easiest of all forms of government, firm strong government ... ' (In Waley 1964: 
pp207/8). 
". On a brilliant re-reading of colonial sympathy see Rai 2002. 
3. In 1847 Samuel Montagu moved to London with is brother. They started a business dealing in 
foreign exchange and banking. Success came quickly. 1862 he married into what Waley describes as 
'one of the rich and exclusive Jewish families; his wife, Ellen Cohen, was a grand niece of Sir Moses 
Montefiore' (Waley 1964: 4). He sat as a Liberal MP for 15 years (1885-1900) and in 1907 barely 
seven years after claiming a baronetcy he became a Peer. 
4. Emphasis mine. 
5. My engagement with these elements of his life are not merely intended as flowery embroidery of 
detail to a writing of his life; Rather I mean to highlight the complexities in (his) life stories that are 
occluded by conventional accounts of Amritsar 1919. For instance these complexities rather stand in 
the way of accounts that see events in 1919 solely as a 'confrontation between ruler and ruled' (Datta 
1969: vii). Edwin Montagu is a figure more than simply on one side and not the other. We see that in 
his profound engagements with styles of colonial authority. See N. 4 
6. Emphasis mine. 
7. I've sought to focus on the practice of his Jewishness as a point of contention between him and his 
father, because I see that as an important element/experience in defining how he negotiates his duty to 
India. We should also note however the relevance of another experiential element in defining his style 
in relation to India and his friends there. This concerns his relation to the law as a profession garbed in 
unchanging tradition. He said, of his time at Messrs Coward Hawksley Chance, 'No work has ever 
bored me more ... ' The law he adds, 
'is a profession which I would never recommend to, or willingly see adopted by, anybody I was fond 
of. It is a bloodsucking, all-domineering profession, which takes a man who practices it, twists him and 
distorts him, and demands from him youth, energy, vigour, long years of disappointment and 
despondency, waiting for a practice and bitter regret when a practice arrives; work from morning to 
night, without excitement, without reward, not allowed to choose the subjects which engross you, with 
a hidebound etiquette and a cynicism which is not surpassed by the medical profession itself' (Waley 
1964: 12). 
In his dealings with all things Indian, in whatever guise, he would try his utmost to exceed, as he would 
regard it, all 'hidebound etiquette' 
8. He married Venetia Stanley who Annan tells us' ... came from a well-known aristocratic family, the 
Stanley'S of Alderley' (Noel Annan 1991; see also see Levine 1991). 
9. The Times would report on his speech to the Commons in terms that didn't simply draw attention to 
his ethnicity, but comments on its supposed consequences. Thus, 'Mr Montagu, patriotic and sincere 
English Liberal as he is, is also a Jew, and in excitement has the mental idiom of the East' (in Sayer 
1991: 157). 
10. Just as interesting, in this sense, and consistent with his declared creed, though not specifically 
relevant to the Indian scene, is Montagu's well-documented opposition to the so-called Balfour 
Declaration 1917. The government of the time proposed that' Palestine should be reconstituted as the 
national home of the Jewish people.' He objected to such a wording proposing instead the amendment 
that there should be the 'establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people.' Montagu 
insisted on including a caveat in the declaration. Thus, ' ... it being clearly understood that nothing shall 
be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in 
Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country' (see Naomi B. Levine 
1991: 446; and http://digilander.libero.it!APecci/friends/documentilbalfour.htm). 
11. Waley relates one such instance. It relates to how Montagu negotiates a burgeoning controversy 
between the Church of England and Nonconformists. The former were adamantly opposed to 
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secularism in education, whilst the latter would oppose denominational teaching. It's not so much the 
dispute or even outcomes of this dispute that interest me in itself, as much as the methods Montagu 
employs to dissipate the dispute. The pragmatic arts he deploys are not to decide a winner in the 
dispute but to satisfy all comers. So in his advice, he suggests a conference and stresses: 
' ... the enormous importance of obtaining, if we can, a solution which is not opposed by the official 
part of the Church of England, and which at the same time satisfies the Nonconformists; for we do not 
want the bitter hostility of the Church of England at the next General Election, if it can be avoided' 
(Waley 1964: 22). 
12 Daily Mail 27 July 1910 in Levine 1991: 128. 
13 The excerpt is from the Cambridge Ne"ws, Nov. 14 1910. 
14 I do no more than to allude to these reforms here; they are known merely as the Morley-Minto 
Reforms of 1908-1909. After the initial euphoria that greeted the proposed scheme of reforms 
eventually embodied in the Indian Councils Act 1909 the proposed scheme was found out - many 
saw through them. It contained only a limited proposal for election of members of the Central 
Legislative Council, hedged about in ways that ensured only a limited number of propertied Indians 
would be eligible to vote. In fact Morely would later sum up his proposals first objective as follows: 
·There are three classes of people whom we have to consider in dealing with a scheme of this kind. 
There are the extremists who nurse fanatic dreams that some day they will drive us out of India .... The 
second group nourish no hopes of this sort, but hope for autonomy or self-government of the colonial 
species and pattern. And then the third section ofthis classification ask for no more than to be admitted 
to co-operation in our administration. I believe the effect of the Reforms has been, is being, and will be 
to draw the second class, who hope for colonial autonomy, into the third class, who will be content 
with being admitted to a fair and full co-operation.' (from 
http://www.maoism.org/misc/indialrupe/fsb/chap2.htm). 
Radical it may not have been, and many objected even to its limited schemes, but it did nevertheless 
introduce an elective principle into colonial/Indian government. 
15 ( h I borrow this phrase from Strawson 1989: cap. 2). 
16 Waley cites this as being from Cd. 5979, page 7. 
17 Nov 12 1912 in Levine 1991: 180. 
18 The phrase is from Kipling's poem of the same name. See Kipling 1993 (1888). 
19 Emphasis mine. 
20 Waley quotes Montagu's observation of Lord Nicholson, ' ... he urged me never to talk to my 
servants, as this was harmful to prestige.' Waley also tells us, Montagu would' ... suspendjudgement,' 
he says, 'on the equally striking superficial aloofness and apparent lack of interest in the Indian citizens 
ofthe country' (in Waley 1964: 301). 
21. Waley's footnote description reads 'Sir George Ross-Keppel (1866-1921). G.C.I.E., Chief 
Commissioner, NorthWest Frontier Provinces' (Waley 1964: 341, n.6). 
22. As set out in Waley's footnote and for completeness, Marris and Metson's antecedents are as 
follows: 
'Lord Metson (1865-1943), Secretary to the Finance Department of the Government ofIndia, 1906-12; 
Lieutenant Governor of the United Provinces. 1912-18; Imperial War Cabinet, 1917; Finance Member 
of the Viceroy's Council, 1919'. 
'Sir William Marris (1872-1945), Joint Secretary of the Home Department of the Government ofIndia, 
1917-22; Governor of the United Provinces, 1922-27; Member of the Secretary of State's Council' 
(Waley 1964: 313 n. 9 & 10). 
23 See ante, chapter 3 n. 35. 
24 Emphasis mine. 
25 From Levine 1991: 450. 
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26. A committee delegated by Asquith to consider the 'problems that will arise on the conclusion of 
peace, and to co-ordinate work which has already been done ... in this direction,' that the end of the first 
World War was bound to raise (Levine 1991: 399). 
27. Of course this trip can easily be seen as little more than an emollient exercise. Datta for instance 
suggests, Montagu's ' ... mission in India was to arrest the rising tide of extremism in politics and to 
stop the defection of moderate opinion ... Montagu's visit was determined ... by "enlightened self-
interest" (Datta 1969: 27). In support of his claim Datta refers to two extracts from Montagu's diary. 
Hence Montagu says, 
'I have kept India quiet for six months at a critical period of the war; I have set the politicians thinking 
of nothing else but my mission.' Later he adds, 'we have kept India quiet for six critical months. When 
I came out moderates were rushing to join the Home Rule League; on leaving, the succession of 
moderates from the Home Rule League is making marked headway ... (Montagu 1930: 288; 363 in 
Datta 1964: 27). 
28. The new Acts, named after the man who proposed them, are known as the Rowlatt Acts. 
Mohammed Ali Jinnah knew them as the 'Black Acts.' Passed in March 1919, Jinnah wrote, 'The 
fundamental principles of justice have been uprooted and the constitutional rights of the people have 
been violated at a time when there is no real danger to the state, by an overfretful and incompetent 
bureaucracy which is neither responsible to the people nor in touch with public opinion' (inWolpert 
2000: 298). 
29. Many more would join in a chorus of condemnation. Waley tells us how his attendance at a 
conference of Lieutenant Governors, did nothing to bolster his confidence. After hearing them he 
admits to being more depressed than ever. They seemed not to be speaking the same language as him. 
He imagined if they were right, then his policy would be wrong. That he would not contemplate. They 
had their own schemes for Indian government, which he felt 'dated from a day before Parliamentary 
institutions dawned in India.' Yet, he held steadfastly to his desires. In language reminiscent of the so-
called agitators calls for freedom, and in dismissive fashion, he continues 
'I heard them say, to my amazement, that it was a most disquieting sign that agitation was spreading to 
the villages. What was the unfortunate politician in India to do? He was told that he could not have 
self-government because there was no electorate, because only the educated wanted it, because the 
villagers had no political instincts; and then when he went into the village to try and make an 
electorate, to try and create a political desire, he was told he was agitating .... that agitation must be put 
a stop to ... We should try and educate the villagers; we should put our case; but to sit quiet while an 
agitator was agitating and then intern him showed that we had no answer ... Disaffection was an 
excellent thing if it meant you were teaching a man that he must hope for better things. Our whole 
policy ... is ... to make India a political country, and it was impossible to associate that with 
repression ... ' (in Waley 1964: 150). 
30. Letter to Chelmsford March 8 1919. 
31. Parliamentary debates House of Commons, Hansard 19th May to 6th June 1919. Vol. xvi p. 338. 
Intriguingly he also believes an enquiry' ... would not only help remove the causes of unrest 
but ... dispose ... of some of the libellous charges which have been made against British troops and those 
upon whom the unpleasant duties in connection with those riots have fallen' (ibid.). 
32. Hunter was, Draper tells us, a former Solicitor General for Scotland (Draper 1981: 151). Fein tells 
us how Montagu picked him personally (cf. Fein 1977: 105). 
33. For a list of all that agreed to serve on the Committee see the so-called Hunter Committee Report, 
HMSO, London 1920 Cmd 681 :iii. 
34. I don't discuss their often-forensic assassination of General Dyer in any detail here. For detail see 
Swinson 1964; Sayer 1991; Datta 1975/2000 
35. The resolution by the Government ofIndia appointing the committee was passed, with the 
approval of the Secretary of State, the 14th October 1919. 
36. Sayer offers us a useful summary of those acts. Hence, Dyer is censured for not giving the 
'assembly a chance to disperse ... ' and' ... for continuing to fire after it had ... started to do so'; They 
condemned his crawling order - an order requiring all Indians who wished to pass a tract of land to do 
so on their hands and knees - as "injudicious" since it did not distinguish between the innocent and the 
guilty, which they felt an "act of humiliation" that could only cause "bitterness and racial ill-feeling". 
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Other irregularities in the conduct and enforcement of the martial law regime are also condemned (A 
good source for all these acts is found in the Indian National Congress report) (see Sayer 1991 147-
148). 
37. I say more or less because Sayer alerts us to the peculiarly exonerating language used in the 
Viceroy's executive council when they discussed the reports. So for instance, in spite of the council 
adopting the majorities' conclusions, they thought Dyer 'acted honestly'. By his actions he 'checked 
the spread of the disturbances'. Though they felt, 'General Dyer acted beyond the necessity of the 
case ... beyond what any reasonable man could have thought ... necessary ... and not act with as much 
humanity as the case permitted ... ' they nevertheless added, ' ... it is with pain that we arrive at this 
conclusion, for we are not forgetful of General Dyer's distinguished record as a 
soldier. .. [especially] ... his gallant relief of the garrison at Thai during the ... Afghan war' (in Sayer 
1991: 148-149; Correspondence between the Government of India and the Secretary of State for Indian 
the Report of Lord Hunter's Committee, 1920 Cmd. 705: 21). 
38. Naomi Levine (1991) alerts us to what she sees as a particularly vicious streak of upper classes 
anti-Semitism in Britain at this time. However Annan, her reviewer, argues that 'Britain was the only 
major European country in which fascism gained negligible support.' Commenting specifically on 
Montagu Annan says, 'nor is it tenable that Montagu failed to get the high office he deserved just 
because he was a Jew.' Many Jews in England, according to her 'rose to the top in politics, in the 
judiciary, in ... medical colleges, and in the universities earlier than they did in East Coast America.' 
Perhaps in Montagu's case Annan suggests, he was just 'too volatile in temperament, too given to 
euphoria then to dejection, too apt to appeal to his colleagues for support' (Annan 1991: 5). Whatever 
the final verdict on the effect of such anti-Semitism generally and on Montagu particularly, it is an 
element that complicates our story in the ways I enumerate. 
39 See Hansard, 5th ser. (Commons), cxxxi, cos. 1705-820, 1706. 
40 Ibid 1707. 
41 Ibid 1708 
42 Ibid 17008-1709. 
43 Ibid 1712. 
44 Ibid 1719. 
45 Ibid 1755. 
46 Ibid 1775. 
47 Ibid 1796; 1797. 
4i' The Times 12 July 1920, 
49 Letter to Lord Willingdon 9 September 1920. 
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CHAPTER 6 - CONCLUSIONS 
! 
In Service to India: The ethics of rule and conduct of British 
Administrators and Army Officers in late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries India 
Introduction 
'By what men have done, we learn what men can do. A great career, though 
balked of its end, is still a landmark of human energy. He who approaches the 
highest point of the supreme quality of Duty is entitled to rank with the most 
distinguished of his race ... and to count as ... the best and bravest men and 
women in ... the career of well-doing' (Smiles 1880: 11). 
'Out of this fiery and uncouth material, it is only soldiers' discipline which can 
bring the full force of power. Men who, under other circumstances, would 
have shrunk into lethargy or dissipation are redeemed into noble life by a 
service which at once summons and directs their energies' (Ruskin in Smiles 
1880: 158). 
£ 
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'If I were to be asked what is the great want of English society .. .I should 
say ... the want is the want of sympathy' (Talfourd in Smiles 1880: 219). 
In thrall to Duty 
The aim of my thesis has been the re-construction of the Amritsar Massacres and 
Disturbances of 1919. I reassembled them as a case that tells us about the histories of 
manly moral duty and the active questioning of such notions of duty by others deemed 
beyond the pale. I argued that the question of character is crucial to our understanding 
of duty as a mode of power. 
I discern that manly moral duty was quite simply good policy. It was often practised 
in such a way as to consolidate white men as good characters. But practised also in 
such a way as to carry out their imperial duties in the service of others (Rai 2002). 
Hence my histories enable readers to grasp the formations of white men as rulers in 
these senses at particular times. To do this I made use of Foucault's notion of 
government as governmentality. But as I say in chapter 2, the focus of my 
characterological studies is different if similar to Foucault's emphasis. So I 
complimented his approach by using Collini's focus on exemplary characters 
(Burchell et al1991) (Collini 1991). 
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The implications of this mode of analysis are quite clear. I find that the events I focus 
on were not accidental. On the contrary they defined the norms of British 
administrative and army practice. Maybe they were not part of a bigger plan. But they 
were nevertheless part of what two of my characters, O'Dwyer and Dyer, thought a fit 
and proper man should do in these circumstances. In this sense I find that it amounted 
to a form of moral uplift. Part of a tradition, or traditions of imperial duty. I find that 
taking care of events were simply a question of good government in a Foucaultian 
sense. That is to say government of both self and other. Thus, when presented with 
such a state of affairs, and in order to establish order and prolong British imperial 
power they so acted. 
We see how their instruction in the conduct of rule in the elite centres of imperial 
schooling - Balliol College Oxford and the Staff College at Camberley - ensured that 
they would so act. Montagu, the third character I focused on, had been to Trinity 
College Cambridge, however this did not detract from the ultimate aims of such 
actions but only the means to be utilised. 
What we find in situ at these moments I argued is a developed and developing arenas 
of expertise in that endeavour. At one moment we find that that manifested itself in 
notions of fatherly care as an administrator. Sir Michael O'Dwyer was adamant in this 
regard. We saw a flavour of these thoughts in chapter three. On the very first page of 
his autobiography he forthrightly declares his life's work and sole concern. It is to 
, ... emphasise the responsibility of the people and Parliament of Great Britain for the 
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welfare and advancement of the Indian peoples, and to show where that responsibility 
is being lost sight of or inadequately discharged' (O'Dwyer 1925: ix). 
In his early posting as a member of the IeS in Gujranwala we find him take the 
mantle for instance of Settlement officer. Taking on such a role his sole concern is to 
arrive at what he thinks is a fair and final assessment of rights in the land so that all 
can be fairly dealt with. He thinks that only he can do this because his concern is with 
their 'placid and pathetic contentment' (O'Dwyer 1925: 56). 
At another moment it manifested itself in a display of professional force by Reginald 
Dyer, an army officer charged with defending India from sundry Russians, Germans 
and insurgents closer to home. Dyer stated that the force he used on that day 'was no 
more ... than was required by the occasion' (Dyer 1920: 5). He too wanted to be their 
father. If he had to hurt them they knew he was only doing it for their own good. He 
merely carried out his duty. I find that the carrying out of that duty in this sense is 
thoroughly imbued in immense horror and megalomania. The massacred and bleeding 
other marked the normalised objects with which he could identify. I borrow once 
more from Rai, but such duty is carried on only so as to habituate 'the self to propriety' 
(Rai 2002: 165). In Dyer's own words, ' ... the assembly of the crowd that afternoon 
was for all practical purposes a declaration of war by leaders whose hope and belief 
was that I should fail to take up the challenge' (Dyer 1920: 19). Failure is not 
something he contemplated. He was not going to do that. The implication being that 
he secured his dignity with all the force at his command and ensured that by his action 
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he secured order for all. The implication is that Dyer was very definitely a part of the 
'dominant conception of imperial purpose, throughout this period' (Sayer 1991: 162). 
He did not represent someone outside of those ethics. In his military training 
throughout he represented the normalisation of what many commentators saw as 
someone who by his actions was 'beyond the pale.' As we saw in a letter sent to The 
Times and signed by 'Archimedes', his batch of Staff College attendees was a roll call 
of 'extraordinary brilliance' (Colvin 1929: 33). In this sense he was very definitely a 
man of the military establishment. 
At yet another moment in the struggle to define a new modus of operandi between the 
relation of Indians and their rulers. Montagu wanted them both to work together. 
Ruling India he thought of as a joint enterprise. That was his sense of duty. The 
character that emerges from this staging of duty was one who fantasised about the 
other joining him in government. He imagined keeping in contact with those others 
once he relinquished his job as Secretary of State for India. In such fantasies one 
glimpses how he reaches out for a dutiful being who recognises another place beyond 
the proprietary of his self. Yet, as we have seen, ultimately this observance of the 
other beyond the self does not' ... spill beyond policy' (Rai 2002 167). 
Through my exploration, in sources as diverse as parliamentary debates, news reports, 
contemporary commentaries, moral exegesis and writing about imperial conduct and 
character, we have seen how the imperatives of imperial duty defined the proper 
contours of imperialism. I 
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The Jouneys to Professionalism 
After the end of the East India Trading Company we saw how its mantle of instruction 
in the conduct of empire was passed on to the home that is the British imperial 
government. I have argued that such government wanted to reach a position in which 
they were guaranteed near certainty in its conduct. Government now became a 
problem. 
There were two areas of concern for the imperial government. Administration as 
practised by the ICS and the conduct of military affairs in the Indian army. 
I have shown that the implication of this, as far as administration is concerned, is that 
India was to be ruled from the top 'by a picked aristocracy whose ideal was a light but 
benevolent administration' (Mason 1985: 207). Or more precisely, to use Osborne's 
term, it was to be a new clerisy. Their concern was with how they could make 
themselves competent to rule. This was to be the new zeigeist. It was quite simply to 
be a new mode of governing. The certainty craved for was to be found in the practise 
of duty. As I have already argued it is through the practise of duty that the colonial 
self gathered himself up in sovereignty. That, as we see, was the expertise that they 
garnered at Balliol College. 
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Habituating themselves in this practise of duty, as we see, is not a chance endeavour. 
On the contrary, I have shown that whole systems are put in place to train candidates 
in its manly pursuit. Whether that was in the fields of administrative practice. Whether 
it was in the fields of military discipline. Whether in the more intellectual areas of 
meaning, speeches and policy, it was akin to drilling candidates into careers of well 
doing. That is to say in the careers of turning oneself into a professional who looked 
after his charges. And doing that well. Doing ones duty in this sense is constitutive of 
the glory of manly character (Smiles 1880: 11). The implication is that a whole new 
professional form of life and type of character developed to satisfy the needs of the 
colonial state. Each of the men that are the subject of my study worked to ensure and 
support the longevity of empire. 
Thus, what this amounts to, I show, are 'new careers in domination' or new 
professions of rule (Rai 2002: 162). Put another way, I proposed that my colonial 
subjects found new and other ways in which to consolidate their dignity. Quite simply, 
the pedagogy of duty defined the proper limits of white masculine selves. I find that 
its practitioners might blush. But more than likely they would fill with pride. 
I borrow a concluding sentiment from Rai. He speaks about a different but related 
tradition. That is to say he alerts us to a history of sentiment. He urges us to rethink 
elements of the colonial enterprise 'in the name of sympathy' (Rai 2002 161). He 
detects from within sympathies performances, an astonishing desire to fulfil an Anglo-
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Indians role. I detect a similar ethic within duties performance. This is the profundity 
of duty. Hence, 
' ... within this tradition, from inside a discourse that seems to abject relentlessly the 
racial other, we ... come across scenes where a ... European man ... sympathises with 
those who seem to be beyond the pale of humanity - savages and barbarians, or even 
Indians' (Rai 2002: 161). 
This is a difficult lesson to learn. My aim here is not to proselytise. I wish merely to 
demonstrate that doing good and looking out for ones charges was the foundation on 
which many believed the empire stood. We see how Montagu sought a place beyond 
self and other. Perhaps the protesters who were ashamed of Dyer's actions, discussed 
in chapter one, got closer still to pushing duty in the direction of a radical justice. That 
is to say they wished to use the pedagogy of duty and the practice of duty as a demand 
on the imperial power. A demand for justice in rule. Borrowing and paraphrasing an 
observation from Rai about sympathy, 'if.. . duty ... was a form of European power, 
then it did not go unchallenged; the question of justice in ... [India]... was posed 
through practices that were both negotiations with and ex-centric to European forms 
of sympathy' (Rai 2002: xx). The asking of questions about the imperial power would 
now proliferate. From the now memorable reply Gandhi gave to the question of 
Western civilisation, 'I think it would be a good idea'.2 To his re-appropriation of duty, 
'non-cooperation with evil is a sacred duty,.3 He set out his radical soul force. 
Horniman too gives it a good disruption in his demands for another 'duty to India'. But 
they and he remained within the bounds of accepted policy. 
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Doing ones duty after 1858, I argue, is turned into a ' ... more systematic imperial 
career(s)' (Guha 1997: 25). In this sense carrying out one duty to oneself and the other 
belonged in the realm of a 'carefully regulated empire' (Guha 1997: 25). If that meant 
that hundreds of people would die then so be it. For as far as most members of the 
bureaucracy were concerned they were stirred by duty as a mode of power. 
The implication was as follows: the days in which the empire was an amateur pursuit 
were no longer. It is not possible to mark the exact date on which such a change came 
into effect. Suffice to say that the events of 1858 gave an added urgency to the pursuit 
of new professions of rule. I have argued that what was new in this style of rule was 
the formation of a whole bureaucracy devoted to turning out men who elaborated a 
sense of duty as a professional mode of power. 
I believe that the massacres at Amritsar are a useful case against which to examine the 
working out of these notions of duty. The empire was for many, if nothing else, a job 
of work. On occasion it was a monstrous job of work. To this extent the men charged 
with carrying it out were sensitive both to conducting themselves in a manner beyond 
reproach and acting in the service of others. But they did not believe that carrying it 
out was some kind of malady to the Great British Raj. As I noted in chapter three, 
there was no sense in which they thought that what they did was a wicked 
imperialism. In fact some ' ... didn't think imperialists were necessarily wicked' (in 
Allen ed. 1975: 217). Modem day readers might take fright at Anglo-Indians actions 
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being described in terms of monstrosity. But that is not the point. In this sense these 
imperialists followed good practice, ideal practice. There were few critics of General 
Dyer's actions that day. I have argued that he merely carried out his duty both to 
himself and others. Many would have thought him remiss had he not so acted. They're 
calling demanded nothing less. Horrifying it may have been but very British of the 
time nevertheless. I argue that what are at stake are whole professions of rule, whole 
professions of monstrosity. 
The implications of this thesis are quite simple. If the term monstrosity is used to 
describe Dyer's actions, and Sir Michael O'Dwyer's support of them, and to a lesser 
extent Edwin Montagu's, then we need to regard this as demonstrating only the norms 
of British practice. The monstrous in government and the Indian army is the very 
epitome of British Imperial practice at this time. Those norms ensured - first and 
foremost - in all circumstances, the fulfilment of imperial purpose, i.e. the longevity of 
empire. The traditions entailed in such a project did not just mean repetition in 
government. My practitioners' character guided them on how they carried out the arts 
of government. That often meant ensuring that the servants of empire did their duty 
and their duty to empire. To themselves and to others. I find that they served 'this 
world, where much is to be done and little to be known .... ' (Johnson in Lawrence 
1928: 32). I establish that the only thing not up for negotiation was the empire. 
Government in this sense required men to be made as heroes. It is little wonder that 
the training and fitness of these men reminded one of a description from 
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Ecclesiasticus: 'He shall serve amongst great men and appear before Princess; he will 
travel through strange countries' (Ecclesiasticus in Lawrence 1928: 55). 
In conducting this research I have sometimes ventured into the terrain of military as 
well as administrative authority. But the question of better governing in India 
concerns itself as much with that terrain, as the strictly civil. Indeed civil in this sense 
is somewhat of a misnomer. Lest we forget, one of my most important findings is that 
India, conquered by the sword, was to be held on to by the sword. I therefore 
undertook to chart the growth in professional conduct of the men who ruled 
respectively as an officer of the army, a member of the Indian Civil Service and a man 
in government. 
We have discussed an ethics of engagement by servants of empire with the problems 
of colonial government in India.4 Being concerned with carrying out their duty to 
those deemed their charges, to the best of the abilities, many a British official made 
themselves and India their life's work. The individuals I am concerned with, who were 
entrusted with those tasks, are ideal examples of such men. 
Borrowing from Rai once again we can see that a complex process of identification 
between those who rule and those others over whom rule is to be practised (Rai 2002). 
Thus each of the characters I investigated is concerned with doing their duty in India 
in their turns as an administrator; as a military officer; and as a member of the colonial 
government. In this respect they carried out their duty in a manner beyond the merely 
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self-devoted. His was an empathetic calling conducted with due reserve and often 
little reward. It is, in other words, performed in such a way as to make the official 
fitted for modesty's crown. Thus 
"'00 you wish to be to be great?" asks St. Augustine. "Then begin by being little. Do 
you desire to construct a vast and lofty fabric? Think first about the foundations of 
humility. The higher your structure is to be, the deeper must be its foundations. 
Modest humility is beauty's crown' (Augustine in Smiles 1880: 16). 
After a lifetime of devotion to their duty practised in such away, Smiles suggests, 
quoting the words of St. Francis of Assisi, that on his last day he who has lived up to 
expectations can satisfy himself with the knowledge that: 
'Even such is Time, which takes in trust 
Our youth, our joys, and all we have, 
And pays us nought but Age and Dust, 
When in the dark and silent grave, 
When we have wandered our ways, 
Shuts up the story of our days; 
And from which grave and earth and dust, 
The Lord shall raise me up, I trust' (Assisi in Smiles 1880: 340) 
What I have found, more than anything else, is that the imperialists' concern above all 
else was to drill the empire's servants into practising duty as a job (Rai 2002). It was 
sometimes a hard job, sometimes incredibly easy job. But the colonial self- image was 
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never sullied by it. Massacre or no massacre the imperialist was in India to carry out a 
job of work. Whatever its versions, military or civil, it was quite simply the norm of 
British civilisation. 
I have not explored here the question of what I term 'lesser breeds without the law, 
dangerous breeds within the law.' That is to say the role and make up of Asian lawyers 
in disrupting Dyer's composure in the grilling they gave him during the Hunter 
Committee's questionings of him. Such lawyers are indeed modernity's shadows. In 
particular I want to look at the life and works of Chiminlal Setalvad. But that is for 
another place at another time. 
1 lowe this model of thinking about what I've written to Amit Rai (Rai 2002). 
I get this from a collection of his quotes found at http://www.st11earLcom/gandhi.html 
3 Ibid. 
4 T E Lawrence had an interesting comment on the affinity with the other that comes over many an 
Imperial mandarin. He said 
'We export two chief kinds of Englishmen. [The great majority] assert their aloofness. They impress the 
peoples among whom they live by giving them an example of the foreigner apart. lA few] feel deeply 
the int1uence of the native people, and try to adjust themselves to its spirit' (Lawrence in Dewey 1993: 
1 ). 
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THE STORY OF MY BIBLIOGRAPHY 
There is ostensibly a vast literature on the Amritsar disturbances and Massacres of 
1919. So in this sense I was somewhat spoilt for choice in terms of signposts. But, 
as I learned most writings about the events of 1919 offer a similar formal 
structure. That is to say whatever they're precise conclusions, they all engage in 
finding out what really happened on that April day in 1919. 
391 
As my intention was somewhat different, that is to say, to explore the ethical 
competencies claimed by white governors; a military officer; a man of 
government; and an administrator, I had to follow a divers route. My interests are 
in the empire as a job of work. Ironically, the clues that led me on my way in 
ploughing my furrows were found in their structures and bibliographies. My 
starting place into this intensely cultivated terrain was Derek Sayer's article, 
'British Reactions to the Amritsar Massacres: 1919-1920 (1991). Perhaps because 
his work is article length and not a whole book I found my way through the 
terrain by a close attention to his scrupulous footnotes. 
His article was then my first encounter with the vast field of literature that forms 
part of the historiography of the events. Yet his article did more than just 
introduce me to these writings. Because it took its subject to be the British 
reaction to the massacres it roamed further than the body of work that makes what 
I call the form. So for instance unpacking British reactions to the massacre led 
him to the Houses of Parliament, both the Houses of Lords and Commons. The 
reactions he is charting led him also to the press coverage of the time. This in tum 
led him to account for, in brief, the make-up of the ruling characters involved. 
These brief references to, and accounts of the characters involved, led me in tum 
to explore and chart their life histories. Each of the characters that are the subject 
of my reconstruction of the Massacre and disturbances claimed a different, if 
related series of competencies. My task therefore would be to unpack their life 
392 
histories and the traditions of which they are a part. This is how I hooked onto a 
field defined by notions of duty and its sympathetic practices. 
I took these varied practices as marking a significant set of ethical imperatives in 
the make-up of my governing characters. The Problems of rule and the adequate 
character and characterizations of those who exercised such rule were now to 
become issues of professional conduct. Ranajit Guha's, Dominance without 
Hegemony: History and Power in Colonial India (1997) is one of the texts that 
provided me with the conceptual and theoretical resources I needed to explore this 
further. He alerted me to the writings of Samuel Smiles. Smiles work exemplified 
a working out of a set of such practices. At its heart was the imperious idea that 
' ... the most important results in daily life are to be obtained, not through the 
exercise of extraordinary powers, such as genius and intellect, but through the 
energetic use of simple means and ordinary qualities, with which nearly all 
human individuals have been more or less endowed' (Smiles 1859: 8). 
Biographies and autobiographies of my characters seemed to be the next places to 
continue with my journey; to reconstruct Amritsar and the disturbances in terms 
of a set of ruling ethics. O'Dwyer has written an autobiography about his time in 
India; Dyer has been the subject of a biography; and Montagu the subject both of 
a story about a love triangle and a conventional biography (O'Dwyer 1925; Colvin 
1929; Levine 1991; Waley 1964). 
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I considered other works penned by my subjects. In the case of Dyer, I examined 
his account of his campaigns in the Sarhad (Dyer 1920). In the case of Montagu, a 
diary he kept, but published posthumously by his wife (Montagu 1926). In the 
case of O'Dwyer his contributions to debates about India's future; his criticism of 
the Hunter enquiry process; and a collection of his war speeches (O'Dwyer 1919; 
1920; 1927). 
Though enlightening, all this work offered me many more clues and references to 
follow up. I complemented these texts with biographies, autobiographies and 
accounts by others and about others, of their times on the job, so to speak, in India 
as Indian officials. The three volumes by J W Kaye, The Lives of Indian Officers 
(1880) are immensely helpful in this regard. 
The autobiographies and biographies I looked at are not particularly centred on 
the characters to the neglect of all else. I nevertheless felt I needed to broaden out 
my stories to take in a fuller sense of the different traditions. Invaluable to me in 
this respect is the edited collection of the thoughts of Anglo-Indians put together 
by Charles Allen called, Plain Tales From The Raj: Images of British India in the 
Twentieth Century (1975). Hilton Brown's, The Sahibs, The Life and Ways of the 
British in India as Recorded by Themselves (1948), provides a substantial pre-
history of Anglo-Indian lives to the times Allen focuses on. I complemented 
Brown's earlier focuses by looking specifically at East India Trading Company 
histories, and the maneuvers attributed to Clive of India (Macaulay 1877; Carey 
1906; Bence-Jones 1974; Keay 1993; Lawson 1993; Wild 1999). In general these 
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compendia provide a useful synopsis of the lives of Anglo-Indians who were in 
service, or not, at these times. 
I then moved on to divide my labour between the different traditions my subjects 
carried forward. In both cases of ruling army and administrative traditions in 
India, I started with the influential works of Philip Mason, who also wrote as 
Philip Woodruff (Woodruff 1954; Mason 1974). The work of Thomas Osborne 
provides an invaluable aid to understanding the construction of imperial expertise 
in governing others (Osborne 1994). The work of military historians such as Brian 
Bond and Douglas Peers was immensely helpful (Bond 1994; Peers 1995). Bond 
in particular charts the growth in military academies and schools that catered 
specifically for the new breed of soldier manager. Broadening my antenna still 
further to capture the drama of the empire as a job, I turned to fictional 
representations of what Kipling calls the 'White Man's Burden' (Kipling 1899). 
Kipling often mentioned the army in his writings. His War Stories and Poems is 
particularly evocative of the job as presented to Sahibs (Kipling 1990). 
Of course I utilized the resources of a number of libraries in my search for 
material in my reconstruction of Amritsar. The Army Museum in Chelsea is a 
case in point. I spent many an hour there going through their immense catalogues 
of writings about the British army and its relations to empire. That is where I 
came across Goodenhough and Dalton's Army Book for the British Empire (1893) 
and Fortescue's histories of the army; especially, as he saw it, their gallant deeds 
in many theatres of operation (Fortescue 1914; 1927). I obtained a copy of the 
official history of Dyer's campaigns in the Sarhad by Frederick James Moberly 
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titled, Operations in Persia 1919 (1987), from the Imperial War Museum. I also 
made use of the libraries at Sandhurst and what used to be known as the Staff 
College at Camberley. 
Apart from my use of the Museum at Chelsea, and the training colleges, I used the 
general collections about India at the India Office in the British Library. Further 
afield in my search for materials, I travelled to India twice and worked at the 
universities in the Punjab; the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library; the National 
Archives in New Delhi; and the Khalsa College Library in Amritsar. Fortunately, 
I was able to find a copy of the War Speeches of Michael O'Dwyer (1919) at the 
Khalsa College after I drew so many blanks back in London. Ironically, after my 
return to London, and trying for what I thought would be one last unsuccessful 
time, I managed to find microfilm copies of these speeches at the India Office 
library. I uncovered other source material in India. For instance, in the Nehru 
Memorial Museum and Library I came across an important article by N. Gerald 
Barrier called, How to Rule India: Two Documents On The I C. S. and The 
Politics of Administration (1971). 
Outside of these spaces, and just as useful in my reconstruction of Amritsar, are 
the collections of materials put together by retailers of naval, military and 
imperial histories both here and in India. Francis Edwards and Woolcott Books 
are among two of those I used most frequently. But perhaps even more useful was 
an organization called Low Price Publications that operates from India. It 
specializes in the re-publication of long forgotten tracts on such varied topics as 
India's rulers; ethnologies and histories of its peoples, especially the Sikhs; and 
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the perennial source of imperial fears, the North West Frontier (Cunningham 
1882; Barstow 1928; Cunningham 1849; Douie 1916). I also found the resources 
of the Indian Military Historical Society very useful. 
I'm sure my searches have, as always, revealed many more leads than contained in 
my final collection of materials. All searches of this nature must of course be 
selective. The journey in itself is an adventure. Before I even begin to put finger 
to keyboard, I imagined I'd written a book of exploration. Itching to get back to an 
exploration of terrain uncovered and yet not used will mark my next adventure. 
